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Telling these functions to autodetect the numeric base has lead to
trouble in the past.
Fixes bug 22469. Bugfix on 0.2.2.various.
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Before we've set our options, we can neither call get_options() nor
networkstatus_get_latest_consensus().
Fixes bug 22252; bugfix on 4d9d2553baa6856b1d85ec26baa1ac3d2c24832a
in 0.2.9.3-alpha.
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That way, when we are parsing the options and LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is set
to 0, we don't assert trying to get the options list with get_options().
Fixes #21062
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Fixes #18145.
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This commit adds or improves the module-level documenation for:
buffers.c circuitstats.c command.c connection_edge.c control.c
cpuworker.c crypto_curve25519.c crypto_curve25519.h
crypto_ed25519.c crypto_format.c dircollate.c dirserv.c dns.c
dns_structs.h fp_pair.c geoip.c hibernate.c keypin.c ntmain.c
onion.c onion_fast.c onion_ntor.c onion_tap.c periodic.c
protover.c protover.h reasons.c rephist.c replaycache.c
routerlist.c routerparse.c routerset.c statefile.c status.c
tor_main.c workqueue.c
In particular, I've tried to explain (for each documented module)
what each module does, what's in it, what the big idea is, why it
belongs in Tor, and who calls it. In a few cases, I've added TODO
notes about refactoring opportunities.
I've also renamed an argument, and fixed a few DOCDOC comments.
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* Check consistency between the two single onion torrc options
* Use the more relevant option each time we check for single onion mode
* Clarify log messages
* Clarify comments
* Otherwise, no behaviour change
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Previously, we checked LearnCircuitBuildTimeout directly.
Fixes bug #20073 in commit 5b0b51ca3 on tor 0.2.4.12-alpha.
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Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
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These appeared on some of the Jenkins platforms. Apparently some
GCCs care when you shadow globals, and some don't.
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Because in 95 years, we or our successors will surely care about
enforcing the BSD license terms on this code. Right?
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In circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout() in circuitstats.c, avoid dividing
by zero in the pareto calculations.
If either the alpha or p parameters are 0, we would divide by zero, yielding
an infinite result; which would be clamped to INT32_MAX anyway. So rather
than dividing by zero, we just skip the offending calculation(s), and
use INT32_MAX for the result.
Division by zero traps under clang -fsanitize=undefined-trap -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error.
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Also, apply it.
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Coverity thinks that when we do "double x = int1/int2;", we probably
meant "double x = ((double)int1) / int2;". In these cases, we
didn't.
[Coverity CID 1232089 and 1232090]
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When we successfully create a usable circuit after it previously
timed out for a certain amount of time, we should make sure that
our public IP address hasn't changed and update our descriptor.
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something recently made it get called once per second, which will clutter
up your debug log file.
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There were only two functions outside of circuitstats that actually
wanted to know what was inside this. Making the structure itself
hidden should help isolation and prevent us from spaghettifying the
thing more.
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(These have proved invaluable for other global accessors.)
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Change the global circ_times to a static variable and use
accessor functions throughout the code, instead of
accessing it directly.
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We previously used FILENAME_PRIVATE identifiers mostly for
identifiers exposed only to the unit tests... but also for
identifiers exposed to the benchmarker, and sometimes for
identifiers exposed to a similar module, and occasionally for no
really good reason at all.
Now, we use FILENAME_PRIVATE identifiers for identifiers shared by
Tor and the unit tests. They should be defined static when we
aren't building the unit test, and globally visible otherwise. (The
STATIC macro will keep us honest here.)
For identifiers used only by the unit tests and never by Tor at all,
on the other hand, we wrap them in #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS.
This is not the motivating use case for the split test/non-test
build system; it's just a test example to see how it works, and to
take a chance to clean up the code a little.
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It could just be due to small clock jumps, after all.
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Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
src/or/config.c
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It had nothing to do with circuit build times.
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Also, add a hack Roger suggested where we're more patient if no circuits are
opened yet.
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