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Fixes #40364
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This is related to ticket #40360 which found this problem when a Bridge entry
with a transport name (let say obfs4) is set without a fingerprint:
Bridge obfs4 <IP>:<PORT> cert=<...> iat-mode=0
(Notice, no fingerprint between PORT and "cert=")
Problem: commit 09c6d0324626ffa349c7eed66d9ede92ecd71583 added a check in
get_sampled_guard_for_bridge() that would return NULL if the selected bridge
did not have a valid transport name (that is the Bridge transport name that
corresponds to a ClientTransportPlugin).
Unfortuantely, this function is also used when selecting our eligible guards
which is done *before* the transport list is populated and so the added check
for the bridge<->transport name is querying an empty list of transports
resulting in always returning NULL.
For completion, the logic is: Pick eligible guards (use bridge(s) if need be)
then for those, initiate a connection to the pluggable transport proxy and
then populate the transport list once we've connected.
Back to get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(). As said earlier, it is used when
selecting our eligible guards in a way that prevents us from selecting
duplicates. In other words, if that function returns non-NULL, the selection
continues considering the bridge was sampled before. But if it returns NULL,
the relay is added to the eligible list.
This bug made it that our eligible guard list was populated with the *same*
bridge 3 times like so (remember no fingerprint):
[info] entry_guards_update_primary(): Primary entry guards have changed. New primary guard list is:
[info] entry_guards_update_primary(): 1/3: [bridge] ($0000000000000000000000000000000000000000)
[info] entry_guards_update_primary(): 2/3: [bridge] ($0000000000000000000000000000000000000000)
[info] entry_guards_update_primary(): 3/3: [bridge] ($0000000000000000000000000000000000000000)
When tor starts, it will find the bridge fingerprint by connecting to it and
will then update the primary guard list by calling
entry_guard_learned_bridge_identity() which then goes and update only 1 single
entry resulting in this list:
[debug] sampled_guards_update_consensus_presence(): Sampled guard [bridge] ($<FINGERPRINT>) is still listed.
[debug] sampled_guards_update_consensus_presence(): Sampled guard [bridge] ($0000000000000000000000000000000000000000) is still listed.
[debug] sampled_guards_update_consensus_presence(): Sampled guard [bridge] ($0000000000000000000000000000000000000000) is still listed.
And here lies the problem, now tor is stuck attempting to wait for a valid
descriptor for at least 2 guards where the second one is a bunch of zeroes and
thus tor will never fully bootstraps:
[info] I learned some more directory information, but not enough to build a
circuit: We're missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards
(total microdescriptors: 6671/6703). That's ok. We will try to fetch missing
descriptors soon.
Now, why passing the fingerprint then works? This is because the list of
guards contains 3 times the same bridge but they all have a fingerprint and so
the descriptor can be found and tor can bootstraps.
The solution here is to entirely remove the transport name check in
get_sampled_guard_for_bridge() since the transport_list is empty at that
point. That way, the eligible guard list only gets 1 entry, the bridge, and
can then go on to bootstrap properly.
It is OK to do so since when launching a bridge descriptor fetch, we validate
that the bridge transport name is OK and thus avoid connecting to a bridge
without a ClientTransportPlugin. If we wanted to keep the check in place, we
would need to populate the transport_list much earlier and this would require
a much bigger refactoring.
Fixes #40360
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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We use it in router.c, where chunks are joined with "", not with
NL... so leaving off the terminating NL will lead to an unparseable
extrainfo.
Found by toralf. Bug not in any released Tor.
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```
src/feature/stats/rephist.c: In function ‘overload_happened_recently’:
src/feature/stats/rephist.c:215:21: error: comparison between signed and unsigned integer expressions [-Werror=sign-compare]
if (overload_time > approx_time() - 3600 * n_hours) {
```
from https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40341#note_2729364
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- OOM metric
- onionskin overload metric
- DNS timeout metric
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- Implement overload statistics structure.
- Implement function that keeps track of overload statistics.
- Implement function that writes overload statistics to descriptor.
- Unittest for the whole logic.
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We were looking for the first instance of "directory-signature "
when instead the correct behavior is to look for the first instance
of "directory-signature " at the start of a line.
Unfortunately, this can be exploited as to crash authorities while
they're voting.
Fixes #40316; bugfix on 0.2.2.4-alpha. This is TROVE-2021-002,
also tracked as CVE-2021-28090.
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We're going to disable this feature in all versions for now.
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Closes #40314
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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When reloading a service, we can re-register a service and thus end up again
in the metrics store initialization code path which is fine. No need to BUG()
anymore.
Fixes #40334
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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See comments about why this needs a new flag and we can't just use
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER.
Fixes #40285; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
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The directory_fetches_from_authorities() is used to know if a client or relay
should fetch data from an authority early in the boot process.
We had a condition in that function that made a relay trigger that fetch if it
didn't know its address (so we can learn it). However, when this is called,
the address discovery has not been done yet so it would always return true for
a relay.
Furthermore, it would always trigger a log notice that the IPv4 couldn't be
found which was inevitable because the address discovery process has not been
done yet (done when building our first descriptor).
It is also important to point out that starting in 0.4.5.1-alpha, asking an
authority for an address is done during address discovery time using a one-hop
circuit thus independent from the relay deciding to fetch or not documents
from an authority.
Small fix also is to reverse the "IPv(4|6)Only" flag in the notice so that if
we can't find IPv6 it would output to use IPv4Only.
Fixes #40300
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This is a new detection type which is that a relay can now control the rate of
client connections from a single address.
The mechanism is pretty simple, if the rate/burst is reached, the address is
marked for a period of time and any connection from that address is denied.
Closes #40253
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Fixes #40301
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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When trying to find our address to publish, we would log notice if we couldn't
find it from the cache but then we would look at the suggested cache (which
contains the address from the authorities) in which we might actually have the
address.
Thus that log notice was misplaced. Move it down after the suggested address
cache lookup.
Closes #40300
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Relay will always publish 0 as DirPort value in their descriptor from now on
except authorities.
Related to #40282
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Regular relays are about to get their DirPort removed so that reachability
test is not useful anymore
Authorities will still use the DirPort but because network reentry towards
their DirPort is now denied network wide, this test is not useful anymore and
so it should simply be considered reachable at all time.
Part of #40282
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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With v2 support for HSFETCH gone, we only support v3 addresses. We don't
support v2 descriptor IDs anymore and hence we can remove that code.
The code removed would ensure that if a v2 descriptor ID was provided, the user
also had to provide HSDirs explicitly.
In the v3 case, the code should work even if no HSDirs are provided, and Tor
would find the HSDirs itself.
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