Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
Split "can extend over IPv6" and "has advertised IPv6 ORPort" into
separate functions. They currently have the same result, but this may
change in 33818 with ExtendAllowIPv6Addresses.
Part of 33817.
|
|
Rename the function, and give it a boolean return value.
No behaviour change.
Part of 33817.
|
|
Part of 33817.
|
|
Flatten the logic in circuit_choose_ip_ap_for_extend().
Part of 33817.
|
|
Refactor circuit_open_connection_for_extend(), splitting out the IP
address choice code into a new function.
Adds unit tests. No behaviour changes in tor.
Part of 33817.
|
|
Add IPv4-only and IPv6-only tests for
circuit_open_connection_for_extend().
Part of 33817.
|
|
When an EXTEND2 cell has an IPv4 and an IPv6 address, choose one of them
uniformly at random.
Part of 33817.
|
|
Re-use the newly created extend_info to launch the connection in
circuit_open_connection_for_extend().
No behaviour change.
Part of 33817.
|
|
Search for existing connections using the remote IPv4 and IPv6
addresses.
Part of 33817.
|
|
Part of 33817.
|
|
Allow extend cells with IPv6-only link specifiers.
Warn and fail if both IPv4 and IPv6 are invalid.
Also warn if the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses are unexpectedly internal,
but continue with the valid address.
Part of 33817.
|
|
Always log the address family in extend protocol warnings.
If SafeLogging is 0, also log the address and port.
Diagnostics for 33817.
|
|
No behaviour change.
Part of 33817.
|
|
tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(ap, 0) checks if the address or port are
zero, exactly like the previous code.
Preparation for 33817.
|
|
|
|
Part of 33817.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
And also disallow all-zeroes keys from the filesystem; add a test for it too.
|
|
The client auth protocol allows attacker-controlled x25519 private keys being
passed around, which allows an attacker to potentially trigger the all-zeroes
assert for client_auth_sk in hs_descriptor.c:decrypt_descriptor_cookie().
We fixed that by making sure that an all-zeroes client auth key will not be
used.
There are no guidelines for validating x25519 private keys, and the assert was
there as a sanity check for code flow issues (we don't want to enter that
function with an unitialized key if client auth is being used). To avoid such
crashes in the future, we also changed the assert to a BUG-and-err.
|
|
|
|
|
|
asn: Accidentally left this commit out when merging #32542, so cherry-picking
it now.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
But only take the changes from the relay module.
Part of 33633.
|
|
Make the "else" case explicit at the end of the function.
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
Consistent logs make testing easier.
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
Allow the circuitbuild_relay functions to be accessed by the unit tests.
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
Part of 33633.
|
|
circuit_extend() may be called when a client receives an extend cell,
even if the relay module is disabled.
Log a protocol warning when the relay module is disabled.
Part of 33633.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
Fixes #33779
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
|
|
This is to allow a visual feedback in the logs for operators setting up Onion
Balance so they can confirm they properly configured the instances.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
|
|
|
|
It's more natural there since it's runtime state.
|
|
The ob_subcreds array was not copied after SIGHUP, and that left the
post-SIGHUP service with a NULL ob_subcreds pointer (until the next descriptor
gets build where we regenerate ob_subcreds in hs_ob_refresh_keys()).
Fixes bug #33762; not in any released tor version.
|
|
|
|
Make it LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN and also add the expiration timestamp in there to
ease debugging in the future.
|