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When receiving an introduction NACK, the client either decides to close or
re-extend the circuit to another intro point.
In order to do this, the service descriptor needs to exists but it is possible
that it gets removed from the cache between the establishement of the
introduction circuit and the reception of the (N)ACK.
For that reason, the BUG(desc == NULL) is removed because it is a possible
normal use case. Tor recovers gracefully already.
Fixes #34087
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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It now uses the 'goto err' pattern, instead of the fatal_unreached()
pattern. The latter pattern is usually used when there is a loop, but there is
no loop in this function so it can be simplified easily.
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The warning was:
11:23:10 ../tor/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c: In function 'log_cant_upload_desc':
11:23:10 ../tor/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c:3118:3: error: comparison of unsigned expression < 0 is always false [-Werror=type-limits]
See #34254 for more info.
I guess this means that gcc assigned an unsigned type to the
`log_desc_upload_reason_t` enum and it warned if we compared it against 0...
For now I think it's simpler to remove that check instead of turning the enum
to a signed type, or trying to hack it some other way.
From what it seems, enum is up to the compiler on whether it's signed/unsigned:
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/159034/are-c-enums-signed-or-unsigned
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There's nothing wrong with the comment, but the script I'm about to
apply wouldn't like it.
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Do not try to stuff "HS_DESC_DECODE_GENERIC_ERROR" (-1) into a
socks5_reply_status_t (enum). It doesn't actually make sense, and
isn't one of our documented extensions.
(This can only happen on a nonfatal assertion that we haven't seen,
so it probably isn't happening in practice.)
Fixes another case of bug 34077; bugfix on 0.4.3.1-alpha.
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And also disallow all-zeroes keys from the filesystem; add a test for it too.
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The client auth protocol allows attacker-controlled x25519 private keys being
passed around, which allows an attacker to potentially trigger the all-zeroes
assert for client_auth_sk in hs_descriptor.c:decrypt_descriptor_cookie().
We fixed that by making sure that an all-zeroes client auth key will not be
used.
There are no guidelines for validating x25519 private keys, and the assert was
there as a sanity check for code flow issues (we don't want to enter that
function with an unitialized key if client auth is being used). To avoid such
crashes in the future, we also changed the assert to a BUG-and-err.
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asn: Accidentally left this commit out when merging #32542, so cherry-picking
it now.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Fixes #33779
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This is to allow a visual feedback in the logs for operators setting up Onion
Balance so they can confirm they properly configured the instances.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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It's more natural there since it's runtime state.
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The ob_subcreds array was not copied after SIGHUP, and that left the
post-SIGHUP service with a NULL ob_subcreds pointer (until the next descriptor
gets build where we regenerate ob_subcreds in hs_ob_refresh_keys()).
Fixes bug #33762; not in any released tor version.
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Make it LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN and also add the expiration timestamp in there to
ease debugging in the future.
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Add a nonfatal assertion about a branch that should be unreachable.
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This simplifies our parsing code by about 150 lines, and makes the
functions more straightforward.
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This patch doesn't actually use the results of the parsed object to
create the service configuration: subsequent patches will do
that. This patch just introduces the necessary configuration tables
and starts using them to validate the configuration.
As of this writing, this patch breaks tests. I'll likely fix that
in a rebase later on: the current error messages for failures to
parse options are a regression, so I've opened #33640 for that.
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Add an inline helper function that indicates if the cached object contains a
decrypted descriptor or not.
The descriptor object is NULL if tor is unable to decrypt it (lacking client
authorization) and some actions need to be done only when we have a decrypted
object.
This improves code semantic.
Fixes #33458
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Given that ed25519 public key validity checks are usually not needed
and (so far) they are only necessary for onion addesses in the Tor
protocol, we decided to fix this specific bug instance without
modifying the rest of the codebase (see below for other fix
approaches).
In our minimal fix we check that the pubkey in
hs_service_add_ephemeral() is valid and error out otherwise.
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When a service can not upload its descriptor(s), we have no logs on why. This
adds logging for each possible reason for each descriptors.
That logging is emitted every second so it is rate limited for each reason and
per descriptor.
Closes #33400
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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- Fix a bug and add unittest.
- Add changes file.
- Add man page entry.
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- Loose the asserts on num_pkeys.
- Straighten some dangling &.
- Fix some unpredictable memcpys.
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