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Fixes bug 22789; bugfix on 0.2.3.8-alpha.
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We still silently ignore
memwipe(NULL, ch, 0);
and
memwipe(ptr, ch, 0); /* for ptr != NULL */
But we now assert on:
memwipe(NULL, ch, 30);
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Check size argument to memwipe() for underflow.
Closes bug #18089. Reported by "gk", patch by "teor".
Bugfix on 0.2.3.25 and 0.2.4.6-alpha (#7352),
commit 49dd5ef3 on 7 Nov 2012.
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If OpenSSL fails to generate an RSA key, do not retain a dangling
pointer to the previous (uninitialized) key value. The impact here
should be limited to a difficult-to-trigger crash, if OpenSSL is
running an engine that makes key generation failures possible, or if
OpenSSL runs out of memory. Fixes bug 19152; bugfix on
0.2.1.10-alpha. Found by Yuan Jochen Kang, Suman Jana, and Baishakhi
Ray.
This is potentially scary stuff, so let me walk through my analysis.
I think this is a bug, and a backport candidate, but not remotely
triggerable in any useful way.
Observation 1a:
Looking over the OpenSSL code here, the only way we can really fail in
the non-engine case is if malloc() fails. But if malloc() is failing,
then tor_malloc() calls should be tor_asserting -- the only way that an
attacker could do an exploit here would be to figure out some way to
make malloc() fail when openssl does it, but work whenever Tor does it.
(Also ordinary malloc() doesn't fail on platforms like Linux that
overcommit.)
Observation 1b:
Although engines are _allowed_ to fail in extra ways, I can't find much
evidence online that they actually _do_ fail in practice. More evidence
would be nice, though.
Observation 2:
We don't call crypto_pk_generate*() all that often, and we don't do it
in response to external inputs. The only way to get it to happen
remotely would be by causing a hidden service to build new introduction
points.
Observation 3a:
So, let's assume that both of the above observations are wrong, and the
attacker can make us generate a crypto_pk_env_t with a dangling pointer
in its 'key' field, and not immediately crash.
This dangling pointer will point to what used to be an RSA structure,
with the fields all set to NULL. Actually using this RSA structure,
before the memory is reused for anything else, will cause a crash.
In nearly every function where we call crypto_pk_generate*(), we quickly
use the RSA key pointer -- either to sign something, or to encode the
key, or to free the key. The only exception is when we generate an
intro key in rend_consider_services_intro_points(). In that case, we
don't actually use the key until the intro circuit is opened -- at which
point we encode it, and use it to sign an introduction request.
So in order to exploit this bug to do anything besides crash Tor, the
attacker needs to make sure that by the time the introduction circuit
completes, either:
* the e, d, and n BNs look valid, and at least one of the other BNs is
still NULL.
OR
* all 8 of the BNs must look valid.
To look like a valid BN, *they* all need to have their 'top' index plus
their 'd' pointer indicate an addressable region in memory.
So actually getting useful data of of this, rather than a crash, is
going to be pretty damn hard. You'd have to force an introduction point
to be created (or wait for one to be created), and force that particular
crypto_pk_generate*() to fail, and then arrange for the memory that the
RSA points to to in turn point to 3...8 valid BNs, all by the time the
introduction circuit completes.
Naturally, the signature won't check as valid [*], so the intro point
will reject the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. So you need to _be_ the
introduction point, or you don't actually see this information.
[*] Okay, so if you could somehow make the 'rsa' pointer point to a
different valid RSA key, then you'd get a valid signature of an
ESTABLISH_INTRO cell using a key that was supposed to be used for
something else ... but nothing else looks like that, so you can't use
that signature elsewhere.
Observation 3b:
Your best bet as an attacker would be to make the dangling RSA pointer
actually contain a fake method, with a fake RSA_private_encrypt
function that actually pointed to code you wanted to execute. You'd
still need to transit 3 or 4 pointers deep though in order to make that
work.
Conclusion:
By 1, you probably can't trigger this without Tor crashing from OOM.
By 2, you probably can't trigger this reliably.
By 3, even if I'm wrong about 1 and 2, you have to jump through a pretty
big array of hoops in order to get any kind of data leak or code
execution.
So I'm calling it a bug, but not a security hole. Still worth
patching.
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Issues noted by cypherpunks on #18162
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This closes bug 18162; bugfix on a45b1315909c9, which fixed a related
issue long ago.
In addition to the #18162 issues, this fixes a signed integer overflow
in smarltist_add_all(), which is probably not so great either.
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Without this check, we potentially look up to 3 characters before
the start of a malloc'd segment, which could provoke a crash under
certain (weird afaik) circumstances.
Fixes 17404; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha.
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There is a bug in the overlap-checking in strlcat that can crash Tor
servers. Fixes bug 15205; this is an OSX bug, not a Tor bug.
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fixes bug 15088. patch from sanic.
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Backports some commits from tor master.
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This is a good idea in case the caller stupidly doesn't check the
return value from baseX_decode(), and as a workaround for the
current inconsistent API of base16_decode.
Prevents any fallout from bug 14013.
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The POODLE attack doesn't affect Tor, but there's no reason to tempt
fate: SSLv3 isn't going to get any better.
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Also, make sure we will compile correctly on systems where they
finally rip it out.
Fixes issue #13325. Caused by this openbsd commit:
​http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-cvs&m=140768179627976&w=2
Reported by Fredzupy.
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Fixes bug 13295; bugfix on 0.2.5.3-alpha.
The alternative here is to call crypto_global_init() from tor-resolve,
but let's avoid linking openssl into tor-resolve for as long as we
can.
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Fixes bug 13081; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha. Patch from "NewEraCracker."
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Most of these are in somewhat non-obvious code where it is probably
a good idea to initialize variables and add extra assertions anyway.
Closes 13036. Patches from "teor".
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This function is supposed to construct a list of all the ciphers in
the "v2 link protocol cipher list" that are supported by Tor's
openssl. It does this by invoking ssl23_get_cipher_by_char on each
two-byte ciphersuite ID to see which ones give a match. But when
ssl23_get_cipher_by_char cannot find a match for a two-byte SSL3/TLS
ciphersuite ID, it checks to see whether it has a match for a
three-byte SSL2 ciphersuite ID. This was causing a read off the end
of the 'cipherid' array.
This was probably harmless in practice, but we shouldn't be having
any uninitialized reads.
(Using ssl23_get_cipher_by_char in this way is a kludge, but then
again the entire existence of the v2 link protocol is kind of a
kludge. Once Tor 0.2.2 clients are all gone, we can drop this code
entirely.)
Found by starlight. Fix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Fixes bug 12227.
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Found because LibreSSL has OPENSSL_NO_COMP always-on, but this
conflicts with the way that _we_ turn off compression. Patch from
dhill, who attributes it to "OpenBSD". Fixes bug 12602; bugfix on
0.2.1.1-alpha, which introduced this turn-compression-off code.
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Conflicts:
src/common/include.am
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In the unit tests I want to loop with a delay, but I want less than
a 1 second delay. This, sadly, requires compatibility code.
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When we create a process yourself with CreateProcess, we get a
handle to the process in the PROCESS_INFO output structure. But
instead of using that handle, we were manually looking up a _new_
handle based on the process ID, which is a poor idea, since the
process ID might refer to a new process later on, but the handle
can't.
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This lets us avoid sending SIGTERM to something that has already
died, since we realize it has already died, and is a fix for the
unix version of #8746.
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Also, move 'procmon' into libor_event library, since it uses libevent.
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This function is supposed to construct a list of all the ciphers in
the "v2 link protocol cipher list" that are supported by Tor's
openssl. It does this by invoking ssl23_get_cipher_by_char on each
two-byte ciphersuite ID to see which ones give a match. But when
ssl23_get_cipher_by_char cannot find a match for a two-byte SSL3/TLS
ciphersuite ID, it checks to see whether it has a match for a
three-byte SSL2 ciphersuite ID. This was causing a read off the end
of the 'cipherid' array.
This was probably harmless in practice, but we shouldn't be having
any uninitialized reads.
(Using ssl23_get_cipher_by_char in this way is a kludge, but then
again the entire existence of the v2 link protocol is kind of a
kludge. Once Tor 0.2.2 clients are all gone, we can drop this code
entirely.)
Found by starlight. Fix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Fixes bug 12227.
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Fixes bug in b0c1c700114aa8d4dfc180d85870c5bbe15fcacb; bug
12229. Bugfix not in any released Tor. Patch from "alphawolf".
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fixes bug 12139; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha
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Fix for 12115; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha
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(This is how I found out I was trying to test with a kernel too old
for seccomp. I think.)
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This is a minimal set of changes for compilation; I need a more
recent kernel to test this stuff.
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The old cache had problems:
* It needed to be manually preloaded. (It didn't remember any
address you didn't tell it to remember)
* It was AF_INET only.
* It looked at its cache even if the sandbox wasn't turned on.
* It couldn't remember errors.
* It had some memory management problems. (You can't use memcpy
to copy an addrinfo safely; it has pointers in.)
This patch fixes those issues, and moves to a hash table.
Fixes bug 11970; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
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