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Found by cypherpunks; fixes bug 2384.
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mistake again
Our public key functions assumed that they were always writing into a
large enough buffer. In one case, they weren't.
(Incorporates fixes from sebastian)
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The C standard says that INT32_MAX is supposed to be a signed
integer. On platforms that have it, we get the correct
platform-defined value. Our own replacement, however, was
unsigned. That's going to cause a bug somewhere eventually.
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I am not at all sure that it is possible to trigger a bug here,
but better safe than sorry.
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Spotted by doors, fixes bug 2326.
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Fixes bug 2324.
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On Windows, we never use pthreads, since it doesn't usually exist,
and when it does it tends to be a little weirdly-behaved. But some
mingw installations have a pthreads installed, so autoconf detects
pthread.h and tells us about it. This would make us include
pthread.h, which could make for trouble when the iffy pthread.h
tried to include config.h.
This patch changes compat.h so that we never include pthread.h on
Windows. Fixes bug 2313; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc.
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This will avoid some signed/unsigned assignment-related bugs.
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It's all too easy in C to convert an unsigned value to a signed one,
which will (on all modern computers) give you a huge signed value. If
you have a size_t value of size greater than SSIZE_T_MAX, that is way
likelier to be an underflow than it is to be an actual request for
more than 2gb of memory in one go. (There's nothing in Tor that
should be trying to allocate >2gb chunks.)
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This may fix bug 2204, and resolve the incompatibility with openssl
0.9.8p/1.0.0b.
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Doing so could make Libevent call Libevent from inside a Libevent
logging call, which is a recipe for reentrant confusion and
hard-to-debug crashes. This would especially hurt if Libevent
debug-level logging is enabled AND the user has a controller
watching for low-severity log messages.
Fix bug 2190; fix on 0.1.0.2-rc.
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Our code assumed that any version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8l could not
possibly require SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION. This is
so... except that many vendors have backported the flag from later
versions of openssl when they backported the RFC5476 renegotiation
feature.
The new behavior is particularly annoying to detect. Previously,
leaving SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION unset meant that
clients would fail to renegotiate. People noticed that one fast!
Now, OpenSSL's RFC5476 support means that clients will happily talk to
any servers there are, but servers won't accept renegotiation requests
from unpatched clients unless SSL_OP_ALLOW_etc is set. More fun:
servers send back a "no renegotiation for you!" error, which unpatched
clients respond to by stalling, and generally producing no useful
error message.
This might not be _the_ cause of bug 1346, but it is quite likely _a_
cause for bug 1346.
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We used to only zero the first ptrsize bytes of the cipher. Since
cipher is large enough, we didn't zero too many bytes. Discovered
and fixed by ekir. Fixes bug 1254.
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This time, set the SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION flag on every
version before OpenSSL 0.9.8l. I can confirm that the option value (0x0010)
wasn't reused until OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3.
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In brief: you mustn't use the SSL3_FLAG solution with anything but 0.9.8l,
and you mustn't use the SSL_OP solution with anything before 0.9.8m, and
you get in _real_ trouble if you try to set the flag in 1.0.0beta, since
they use it for something different.
For the ugly version, see my long comment in tortls.c
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We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
[backported]
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We were checking for msg==NULL, but not lib or proc. This case can
only occur if we have an error whose string we somehow haven't loaded,
but it's worth coding defensively here.
Spotted by rieo on IRC.
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It turns out that OpenSSL 0.9.8m is likely to take a completely
different approach for reenabling renegotiation than OpenSSL 0.9.8l
did, so we need to work with both. :p Fixes bug 1158.
(patch by coderman; commit message by nickm)
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To fix a major security problem related to incorrect use of
SSL/TLS renegotiation, OpenSSL has turned off renegotiation by
default. We are not affected by this security problem, however,
since we do renegotiation right. (Specifically, we never treat a
renegotiated credential as authenticating previous communication.)
Nevertheless, OpenSSL's new behavior requires us to explicitly
turn renegotiation back on in order to get our protocol working
again.
Amusingly, this is not so simple as "set the flag when you create
the SSL object" , since calling connect or accept seems to clear
the flags.
For belt-and-suspenders purposes, we clear the flag once the Tor
handshake is done. There's no way to exploit a second handshake
either, but we might as well not allow it.
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Partial backport of 381766ce4b1145460.
Partial backport of 56c6d78520a98fb64.
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(Given that we're pretty much assuming that int is 32 bits, and given that
hex values are always unsigned, taking out the "ul" from 0xff000000 should
be fine.)
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Big thanks to nickm and arma for helping me with this!
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Once we had called log_free_all(), anything that tried to log a
message (like a failed tor_assert()) would fail like this:
1. The logging call eventually invokes the _log() function.
2. _log() calls tor_mutex_lock(log_mutex).
3. tor_mutex_lock(m) calls tor_assert(m).
4. Since we freed the log_mutex, tor_assert() fails, and tries to
log its failure.
5. GOTO 1.
Now we allocate the mutex statically, and never destroy it on
shutdown.
Bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha, which introduced the log mutex.
This bug was found by Matt Edman.
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This patch adds a function to determine whether we're in the main
thread, and changes control_event_logmsg() to return immediately if
we're in a subthread. This is necessary because otherwise we will
call connection_write_to_buf, which modifies non-locked data
structures.
Bugfix on 0.2.0.x; fix for at least one of the things currently
called "bug 977".
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The trick is that we should assert that our next_mem pointer has not
run off the end of the array _before_ we realign the pointer, since
doing that could take us over the end... but only if we're on a system
where malloc() gives us ram in increments smaller than sizeof(void*).
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This matters because a cpuworker can close its socket when it
finishes. Cpuworker typically runs in another thread, so without a
lock here, we can have a race condition and get confused about how
many sockets are open. Possible fix for bug 939.
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unmapped ram, but you also must not copy it. From lark.
svn:r19095
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Bug was harmless for now, I think.
svn:r19094
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svn:r19074
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svn:r18818
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svn:r18761
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