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This commit was made mechanically by this perl script:
\#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p
next if /^#define FREE_AND_NULL/;
s/\bFREE_AND_NULL\((\w+),/FREE_AND_NULL\(${1}_t, ${1}_free_,/;
s/\bFREE_AND_NULL_UNMATCHED\(/FREE_AND_NULL\(/;
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See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-April/012213.html .
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Test for both v2 and v3 ESTABLISH_INTRO handling.
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Part of #16794
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The base64 and base32 functions used to be in crypto.c;
crypto_format.h had no header; some general-purpose functions were in
crypto_curve25519.c.
This patch makes a {crypto,util}_format.[ch], and puts more functions
there. Small modules are beautiful!
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The runtime sanity checking is slightly different from the optimized
basepoint stuff in that it uses a given implementation's self tests if
available, and checks if signing/verification works with a test vector
from the IETF EdDSA draft.
The unit tests include a new testcase that will fuzz donna against ref0,
including the blinding and curve25519 key conversion routines. If this
is something that should be done at runtime (No?), the code can be
stolen from there.
Note: Integrating batch verification is not done yet.
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Now that we have ed25519 keys, we can sign descriptors with them
and check those signatures as documented in proposal 220.
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For prop220, we have a new ed25519 certificate type. This patch
implements the code to create, parse, and validate those, along with
code for routers to maintain their own sets of certificates and
keys. (Some parts of master identity key encryption are done, but
the implementation of that isn't finished)
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Because in 95 years, we or our successors will surely care about
enforcing the BSD license terms on this code. Right?
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By now, support in the network is widespread and it's time to require
more modern crypto on all Tor instances, whether they're clients or
servers. By doing this early in 0.2.6, we can be sure that at some point
all clients will have reasonable support.
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This implementation allows somebody to add a blinding factor to a
secret key, and a corresponding blinding factor to the public key.
Robert Ransom came up with this idea, I believe. Nick Hopper proved a
scheme like this secure. The bugs are my own.
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For proposal 228, we need to cross-certify our identity with our
curve25519 key, so that we can prove at descriptor-generation time
that we own that key. But how can we sign something with a key that
is only for doing Diffie-Hellman? By converting it to the
corresponding ed25519 point.
See the ALL-CAPS warning in the documentation. According to djb
(IIUC), it is safe to use these keys in the ways that ntor and prop228
are using them, but it might not be safe if we start providing crazy
oracle access.
(Unit tests included. What kind of a monster do you take me for?)
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This refactors the "== type:tag ==" code from crypto_curve25519.c
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This will be needed/helpful for the key blinding of prop224, I
believe.
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Taken from earlier ed25519 branch based on floodyberry's
ed25519-donna. Tweaked so that it applies to ref10 instead.
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