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Fixes #25236
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Because this touches too many commits at once, it is made into one single
commit.
Remove the use of "tenths" for the circuit rate to simplify things. We can
only refill the buckets at best once every second because of the use of
approx_time() and our token system is set to be 1 token = 1 circuit so make
the rate a flat integer of circuit per second.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This makes clients on the public tor network prefer to bootstrap off fallback
directory mirrors.
This is a follow-up to 24679, which removed weights from the default fallbacks.
Implements ticket 24681.
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Closes 20487.
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Feature 18753 -- all this to allow spaces.
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The client addr is essentially meaningless in this context (yes, it is
possible to explicitly `bind()` AF_LOCAL client side sockets to a path,
but no one does it, and there are better ways to grant that sort of
feature if people want it like using `SO_PASSCRED`).
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And make consequential line-length adjustments.
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Parse the value to UseEntryNodes_option, then set UseEntryNodes before
validating options.
This way, Authorities, Tor2web, and Single Onion Services don't write
spurious "UseEntryNodes 0" lines to their configs. Document the fact that
these tor configurations ignore UseEntryNodes in the manual page.
Also reorder options validation so we modify UseEntryNodes first, then
check its value against EntryNodes.
And silence a warning about disabled UseEntryNodes for hidden services
when we're actually in non-anonymous single onion service mode.
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Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
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... when the directory authorities don't set min_paths_for_circs_pct.
Fixes bug 20117; bugfix on 02c320916e02 in tor-0.2.4.10-alpha.
Reported by Jesse V.
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OnionTrafficOnly is equivalent to NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic,
and NoIPv6Traffic.
Add unit tests for parsing and checking option validity.
Add documentation for each flag to the man page.
Add changes file for all of #18693.
Parsing only: the flags do not change client behaviour (yet!)
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Rely on onion_populate_cpath to check that we're only using
TAP for the rare hidden service cases.
Check and log if handshakes only support TAP when they should support
ntor.
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Also, stop implying that Roger still does all the source releases.
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Closes 19743.
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In particular, teach it that deprecated options must exist.
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(All this IOCP stuff was bufferevent-only.)
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asciidoc adds a timestamp at the end of a generated HTML file.
This timestamp is based on the date of the file but it can change
depending on the TZ environment variable.
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Trivial Conflicts:
src/or/or.h
src/or/routerparse.c
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This commit adds the commit(s) line in the vote as well as the SR values. It
also has the mechanism to add the majority SRVs in the consensus.
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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From 0.2.7.2-alpha onwards, Exits would reject all the IP addresses
they knew about in their exit policy. But this may have disclosed
addresses that were otherwise unlisted.
Now, only advertised addresses are rejected by default by
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate. All known addresses are only rejected when
ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces is explicitly set to 1.
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option name and semantics
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