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Fixes bug 13701.
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Authorities are no longer voting on Named, so specifying nodes by
nickname isn't a clever thing to do. (Not that it ever was!) So
remove the documentation that suggests that you should do it.
Additionally, add proper cross-references to our __node__ lists, and
explain about the optional $ before identity digests.
Also, the oxford comma: endorsed by Steven Pinker, my spouse, and my
11th grade English teacher.
Closes 13381.
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Closes 13678. Doesn't actually matter for older tors.
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Conflicts:
src/or/buffers.c
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Fixes bug 13214; reported by 'special'.
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Now, if a router ever changes its microdescriptor, but the new
microdescriptor SHA256 hash has the same 160-bit prefix as the old
one, we treat it as a new microdescriptor when deciding whether to
copy status information.
(This function also is used to compare SHA1 digests of router
descriptors, but don't worry: the descriptor_digest field either holds
a SHA256 hash, or a SHA1 hash padded with 0 bytes.)
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Needed for #13399.
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Silence clang warnings under --enable-expensive-hardening, including:
+ implicit truncation of 64 bit values to 32 bit;
+ const char assignment to self;
+ tautological compare; and
+ additional parentheses around equality tests. (gcc uses these to
silence assignment, so clang warns when they're present in an
equality test. But we need to use extra parentheses in macros to
isolate them from other code).
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(Also resort and rewrap)
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flag.
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I concatenated the remaining changes/* files, removed them, made the
headings more uniform, then told format_changelog.py to sort,
collate, and wrap them.
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(This means that changes/* is now "everything that changed since
0.2.5.10".)
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By now, support in the network is widespread and it's time to require
more modern crypto on all Tor instances, whether they're clients or
servers. By doing this early in 0.2.6, we can be sure that at some point
all clients will have reasonable support.
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When Tor first generates identity keypair, emit a log message that
thanks for their participation and points to new Tor relay lifecycle
document.
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Conflicts:
src/tools/tor-resolve.c
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See also http://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=141357408522028&w=2
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Ensure we securely wipe keys from memory after
crypto_digest_get_digest and init_curve25519_keypair_from_file
have finished using them.
Fixes bug 13477.
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Add unit tests for tor_timegm signed overflow,
tor_timegm and parse_rfc1123_time validity checks,
and correct_tm year clamping.
Unit tests (visible) fixes in bug 13476.
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Clamp year values returned by system localtime(_r) and
gmtime(_r) to year 1. This ensures tor can read any
values it might write out.
Fixes bug 13476.
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Check all date/time values passed to tor_timegm
and parse_rfc1123_time for validity, taking leap
years into account.
Improves HTTP header validation.
Avoid unlikely signed integer overflow in tor_timegm
on systems with 32-bit time_t.
Fixes bug 13476.
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Set the correct day of year value in correct_tm() when the
system's localtime(_r) or gmtime(_r) functions fail to set struct tm.
Fixes bug 13476.
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Closes 8093.
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The POODLE attack doesn't affect Tor, but there's no reason to tempt
fate: SSLv3 isn't going to get any better.
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One pain point in evolving the Tor design and implementing has been
adding code that makes clients reject directory documents that they
previously would have accepted, if those descriptors actually exist.
When this happened, the clients would get the document, reject it,
and then decide to try downloading it again, ad infinitum. This
problem becomes particularly obnoxious with authorities, since if
some authorities accept a descriptor that others don't, the ones
that don't accept it would go crazy trying to re-fetch it over and
over. (See for example ticket #9286.)
This patch tries to solve this problem by tracking, if a descriptor
isn't parseable, what its digest was, and whether it is invalid
because of some flaw that applies to the portion containing the
digest. (This excludes RSA signature problems: RSA signatures
aren't included in the digest. This means that a directory
authority can still put another directory authority into a loop by
mentioning a descriptor, and then serving that descriptor with an
invalid RSA signatures. But that would also make the misbehaving
directory authority get DoSed by the server it's attacking, so it's
not much of an issue.)
We already have a mechanism to mark something undownloadable with
downloadstatus_mark_impossible(); we use that here for
microdescriptors, extrainfos, and router descriptors.
Unit tests to follow in another patch.
Closes ticket #11243.
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Fix an instance of integer overflow in format_time_interval() when
taking the absolute value of the supplied signed interval value.
Fixes bug 13393.
Create unit tests for format_time_interval().
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The versions which this function would keep from getting the guard
flag are already blocked by the minimum version check.
Closes 13152.
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