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Now that we update our buckets on demand before reading or writing,
we no longer need to update them all every TokenBucketRefillInterval
msec.
When a connection runs out of bandwidth, we do need a way to
reenable it, however. We do this by scheduling a timer to reenable
all blocked connections for TokenBucketRefillInterval msec after a
connection becomes blocked.
(If we were using PerConnBWRate more, it might make sense to have a
per-connection timer, rather than a single timeout. But since
PerConnBWRate is currently (mostly) unused, I'm going to go for the
simpler approach here, since usually whenever one connection has
become blocked on bandwidth, most connections are blocked on
bandwidth.)
Implements ticket 25373.
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Previously this was done as part of the refill callback, but there's
no real reason to do it like that. Since we're trying to remove the
refill callback completely, we can do this work as part of
record_num_bytes_transferred_impl(), which already does quite a lot
of this.
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(This patch does not yet eliminate the global refill callback;
fortunately, bucket refilling is idempotent.)
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We used to do this 10x per second in connection_buckets_refill();
instead, we now do it when the bucket becomes empty. This change is
part of the work of making connection_buckets_refill() obsolete.
Closes ticket 25828; bugfix on 0.2.3.5-alpha.
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Also document its actual behavior
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There was nothing round_robinish about this function.
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Right now, this patch just introduces and exposes some new
functions. Later, these functions will get a little more complexity.
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Typecasts bind more tightly than division, so we need to do the
division first.
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We recently merged a circuit cell queue size safeguard. This commit adds the
number of killed circuits that have reached the limit to the DoS heartbeat. It
now looks like this:
[notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits killed with too many
cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0 connections closed. 0
single hop clients refused.
Second thing that this patch does. It makes tor always print the DoS
mitigation heartbeat line (for a relay) even though no DoS mitigation have
been enabled. The reason is because we now kill circuits that have too many
cells regardless on if it is enabled or not but also it will give the operator
a chance to learn what is enabled with the heartbeat instead of suddenly
appearing when it is enabled by let say the consensus.
Fixes #25824
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Unfortunately, the units passed to
monotime_coarse_stamp_units_to_approx_msec() was always 0 due to a type
conversion.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Closes ticket 25818.
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This commit introduces the consensus parameter "circ_max_cell_queue_size"
which controls the maximum number of cells a circuit queue should have.
The default value is currently 50000 cells which is above what should be
expected but keeps us a margin of error for padding cells.
Related to this is #9072. Back in 0.2.4.14-alpha, we've removed that limit due
to a Guard discovery attack. Ticket #25226 details why we are putting back the
limit due to the memory pressure issue on relays.
Fixes #25226
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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We removed this file, but didn't take it out of EXTRA_DIST -- thus
breaking "make dist".
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"ours" to avoid version bump.
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Both header and code file had some indentation issues after mass renaming.
No code behavior change.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Really, the uint32_t is only an optimization; any kind of unit
should work fine. Some users might want to use time_t or
monotime_coarse_t or something like that.
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(These functions were previously helper functions for
token_bucket_rw_t).
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(The tests caught this one.)
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Begin by creating a lowest-level triple of the types needed to
implement a token bucket: a configuration, a timestamp, and the raw
bucket itself.
Note that for low-level buckets, the units of the timestamp and the
bucket itself are unspecified: each user can use a different type.
(This patch breaks check-spaces; a later patch will fix it)
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Add to the Denial of Service section of the man page an explanation about the
three different mitigation Tor has.
Fixes #25248.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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