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Now a NULL argument to either makes it fail, not crash.
Fies bug 9004; bugfix on 0.2.2.4-alpha.
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Improvement on 11108 fix; suggested by cypherpunks.
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This is a fix for 9393; it's not a bugfix on any Tor version per se,
but rather on whatever Tor version was current when we reorganized the
wiki.
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All circuits are predictive; it's the ports that are expiring here.
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Conflicts:
doc/tor.1.txt
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By default, after you've made a connection to port XYZ, we assume
you might still want to have an exit ready to connect to XYZ for one
hour. This patch lets you lower that interval.
Implements ticket 91
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Conflicts:
src/or/router.c
src/test/test_dir.c
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Also make it unsigned and document that it's for INTRODUCE cell versions.
Fixes 9099; bugfix on 0.2.1.5-alpha, which introduced the v3 protocol.
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Conflicts:
src/test/test.c
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Conflicts:
src/common/compat_libevent.h
src/or/relay.c
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Conflicts:
src/or/relay.c
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This should fixes some "hey, that function could have
__attribute__((noreturn))" warnings introduced by f96400d9.
Bug not in any released version of Tor.
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We have ignored any ports listed here since 80365b989 (0.0.7rc1),
but we didn't warn the user that we were ignoring them. This patch
adds a warning if you put explicit ports in any of the options
{Socks,Dir}Policy or AuthDir{Reject,Invalid,BadDir,BadExit}. It
also adjusts the manpage to say that ports are ignored.
Fixes ticket 11108.
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There was one "missing prototype" warning because the test function
wasn't static, and one "unused parameter" warning about the "data"
parameter.
Also, I added a couple of tests to make sure that the "make_null"
addresses really were the addresses we expected, by formatting them
as strings.
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Signed-off-by: Kevin Murray <spam@kdmurray.id.au>
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REND_CLIENTNAME_MAX_LEN is set to 16, not 19.
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Implements #10884.
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In a couple of places, to implement the OOM-circuit-killer defense
against sniper attacks, we have counters to remember the age of
cells or data chunks. These timers were based on wall clock time,
which can move backwards, thus giving roll-over results for our age
calculation. This commit creates a low-budget monotonic time, based
on ratcheting gettimeofday(), so that even in the event of a time
rollback, we don't do anything _really_ stupid.
A future version of Tor should update this function to do something
even less stupid here, like employ clock_gettime() or its kin.
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See 1d2179bc900f1646a5491b65294e78b175e70056 in master for details.
"""
Fall back to registered country if necessary.
When extracting geoip and geoip6 files from MaxMind's GeoLite2 Country
database, we only look at country->iso_code which is the two-character ISO
3166-1 country code of the country where MaxMind believes the end user is
located.
But if MaxMind thinks a range belongs to anonymous proxies, they don't put
anything there. Hence, we omit those ranges and resolve them all to '??'.
That's not what we want.
What we should do is first try country->iso_code, and if there's no such
key, try registered_country->iso_code which is the country in which the
ISP has registered the IP address.
In short: let's fill all A1 entries with what ARIN et. al think.
"""
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When extracting geoip and geoip6 files from MaxMind's GeoLite2 Country
database, we only look at country->iso_code which is the two-character ISO
3166-1 country code of the country where MaxMind believes the end user is
located.
But if MaxMind thinks a range belongs to anonymous proxies, they don't put
anything there. Hence, we omit those ranges and resolve them all to '??'.
That's not what we want.
What we should do is first try country->iso_code, and if there's no such
key, try registered_country->iso_code which is the country in which the
ISP has registered the IP address.
In short: let's fill all A1 entries with what ARIN et. al think.
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