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On or-talk, Marco Bonetti reports that recent iPhone SDKs build
Tor fine without it.
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Vista is Windows 6.0, and 7 is Windows 6.1. Fixes bug 1097.
Also fix a coding style violation.
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The src and dest of a memcpy() call aren't supposed to overlap,
but we were sometimes calling tor_addr_copy() as a no-op.
Also, tor_addr_assign was a redundant copy of tor_addr_copy(); this patch
removes it.
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It isn't necessary to walk through all possible subnets when the policy
we're looking at doesn't touch that subnet.
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Also reword it slightly to reflect the fact that no packagers
ship the file.
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We implemented ratelimiting for warnings going into the logfile, but didn't
rate-limit controller events. Now both log warnings and controller events
are rate-limited.
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Tor has tor_lookup_hostname(), which prefers ipv4 addresses automatically.
Bug 1244 occured because gethostbyname() returned an ipv6 address, which
Tor cannot handle currently. Fixes bug 1244; bugfix on 0.0.2pre25.
Reported by Mike Mestnik.
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The problem was that we didn't allocate enough memory on 32-bit
platforms with 64-bit time_t. The memory leak occured every time
we fetched a hidden service descriptor we've fetched before.
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When calculating the is_exit flag for a routerinfo_t, we don't need
to call exit_policy_is_general_exit() if router_exit_policy_rejects_all()
tells us it definitely is an exit. This check is much cheaper than
running exit_policy_is_general_exit().
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Previously we were treating them as decent hostnames and sending them
to the exit, which is completely wrong.
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The original comment said what it did if there was at least one /8 that
allowed access to the port, but not what it did otherwise.
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exit_policy_is_general_exit() assumed that there are no redundancies
in the passed policy, in the sense that we actively combine entries
in the policy to really get rid of any redundancy. Since we cannot
do that without massively rewriting the policy lines the relay
operators set, fix exit_policy_is_general_exit().
Fixes bug 1238, discovered by Martin Kowalczyk.
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We don't have such an entry for 0.2.1.x, since bug 1237 never made it
into a released version of 0.2.1.x.
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For most linking setups, this doesn't matter. But for some setups, when
statically linking openssl, it does matter, since you need to link things
with dependencies before you link things they depend on.
Fix for bug 1237.
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In brief: you mustn't use the SSL3_FLAG solution with anything but 0.9.8l,
and you mustn't use the SSL_OP solution with anything before 0.9.8m, and
you get in _real_ trouble if you try to set the flag in 1.0.0beta, since
they use it for something different.
For the ugly version, see my long comment in tortls.c
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Conflicts:
src/common/tortls.c
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We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
[backported]
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Since it doesn't seem to hurt, we should use _both_ fixes whenever
we see OpenSSL 0.9.7L .. 0.9.8, or OpenSSL 0.9.8L..
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We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
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Apparently some autoconf versions need this, while others don't.
This means documentation will be installed into share/doc/tor/.
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This removes the Makefile.am from doc/design-paper and replaces it with
a static Makefile. We don't need to call it during the normal Tor build
process, as we don't need its targets normally. Keeping it around in
case we want to rebuild the pdf or ps files later.
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I propose a backward-compatible change to the Tor connection
establishment protocol to avoid the use of TLS
renegotiation.
Rather than doing a TLS renegotiation to exchange
certificates and authenticate the original handshake, this
proposal takes an approach similar to Steven Murdoch's
proposal 124, and uses Tor cells to authenticate the
parties' identities once the initial TLS handshake is
finished.
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rieo pointed out something isn't right here
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