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I had forgotten to include the fuzz_static_testcases.sh script in
EXTRA_DIST.
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Bug 21242 occurred because we asserted that extend_info_from_node()
had succeeded...even though we already had the code to handle such a
failure. We fixed that in 93b39c51629ed0ded2bf807cb6.
But there were four other cases in our code where we called
extend_info_from_node() and either tor_assert()ed that it returned
non-NULL, or [in one case] silently assumed that it returned
non-NULL. That's not such a great idea. This patch makes those
cases check for a bug of this kind instead.
Fixes bug 21372; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha when
extend_info_from_node() was introduced.
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Once a second, we go over all services and consider the validity of the intro
points. Now, also try to remove expiring nodes that have no more circuit
associated to them. This is possible if we moved an intro point object
previously to that list and the circuit actually timed out or was closed by
the introduction point itself.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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In rend_service_intro_has_opened(), this is subject to a possible underflow
because of how the if() casts the results. In the case where the expiring
nodes list length is bigger than the number of IP circuits, we end up in the
following situation where the result will be cast to an unsigned int. For
instance, "5 - 6" is actually a BIG number.
Ultimately leading to closing IP circuits in a non stop loop.
Partially fixes #21302.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Previously the dirserv_orconn_tls_done() function would skip routers
when they advertised an ed25519 key but didn't present it during the
link handshake. But that covers all versions between 0.2.7.2-alpha
and 0.2.9.x inclusive!
Fixes bug 21107; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Because we don't allow client functionalities in non anonymous mode,
recommending Tor2web is a bad idea.
If a user wants to use Tor2web as a client (losing all anonymity), it should
run a second tor, not use it with a single onion service tor.
Fixes #21294.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This patch adds checks for expected log messages for failure cases of
different ill-formed ESTABLISH_INTRO cell's.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21266
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In rend_consider_services_intro_points(), we had a possible interger underflow
which could lead to creating a very large number of intro points. We had a
safe guard against that *except* if the expiring_nodes list was not empty
which is realistic thing.
This commit removes the check on the expiring nodes length being zero. It's
not because we have an empty list of expiring nodes that we don't want to open
new IPs. Prior to this check, we remove invalid IP nodes from the main list of
a service so it should be the only thing to look at when deciding if we need
to create new IP(s) or not.
Partially fixes #21302.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Determining if OpenSSL structures are opaque now uses an autoconf check
instead of comparing the version number. Some definitions have been
moved to their own check as assumptions which were true for OpenSSL
with opaque structures did not hold for LibreSSL. Closes ticket 21359.
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It is renamed to --enable-fragile-hardening.
TROVE-2017-001 was triggerable only through the expensive hardening which is
making the tor daemon abort when the issue is detected. Thus, it makes tor
more at risk of remote crashes but safer against RCE or heartbleed bug
category.
Fixes #21290.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This issue was triggered by 17027 in 0.2.8.1-alpha, which rejects a relay's
own IPv6 address.
Bugfix on commit 004f3f4e53 in 0.2.4.7-alpha.
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This disregards anything smaller than an IPv6 /64, and rejects ports that
are rejected on an IPv6 /16 or larger.
Adjust existing unit tests, and add more to cover exceptional cases.
No IPv4 behaviour changes.
Fixes bug 21357
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This interim fix results in too many IPv6 rejections.
No behaviour change for IPv4 counts, except for overflow fixes that
would require 4 billion redundant 0.0.0.0/0 policy entries to trigger.
Part of 21357
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No behaviour change, apart from non-fatal assertions
Part of 21357
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These tests currently fail due to bug 21357
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Stop modifying the value of our torrc option HiddenServiceStatistics just
because we're not a bridge or relay. This bug was causing Tor Browser users to
write "HiddenServiceStatistics 0" in their torrc files as if they had chosen
to change the config.
Fixes #21150
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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It's okay for guard_state to be null: we might have a fallback
circuit, or we might not be using guards.
Fixes bug 211228; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha
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Since we can call this function more than once before we update all
the confirmed_idx fields, we can't rely on all the relays having an
accurate confirmed_idx.
Fixes bug 21129; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha
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But do clear is_v2_dir.
Fixes bug 21108 -- bugfix on d95e7c7d67134b9b964d49cf8c2bdbf805a in
0.2.0.13-alpha.
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