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In some cases we had checked for it, but in others we had not. One
of these cases could have been used to remotely cause
denial-of-service against directory authorities while they attempted
to vote.
Fixes TROVE-2018-001.
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since all it does is produce false positives
this commit should get merged into 0.2.9 and 0.3.0 *and* 0.3.1, even
though the code in the previous commit is already present in 0.3.1. sorry
for the mess.
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This commit takes a piece of commit af8cadf3a9 and a piece of commit
46fe353f25, with the goal of making channel_is_client() be based on what
sort of connection handshake the other side used, rather than seeing
whether the other side ever sent a create_fast cell to us.
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Fixes #25236
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Never allow the function to set a bucket value above the allowed circuit
burst.
Closes #25202
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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We had this safeguard around dos_init() but not when the consensus changes
which can modify consensus parameters and possibly enable the DoS mitigation
even if tor wasn't a public relay.
Fixes #25223
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Explicitly inform the operator of the rejected relay to set a valid email
address in the ContactInfo field and contact bad-relays@ mailing list.
Fixes #25170
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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We don't expect this to come up very much, but we may as well make
sure that the value isn't predictable (as we do for the other
addresses) in case the issue ever comes up.
Spotted by teor.
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Part of #25193
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This is to avoid positively identifying Exit relays if tor client connection
comes from them that is reentering the network.
One thing to note is that this is done only in the DoS subsystem but we'll
still add it to the geoip cache as a "client" seen. This is done that way so
to avoid as much as possible changing the current behavior of the geoip client
cache since this is being backported.
Closes #25193
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This also adds one that tests the integration with the nodelist.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This set is rebuilt whenever a consensus arrives. In between
consensuses, it is add-only.
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This is a convenience function, so callers don't need to wrap
the IPv4 address.
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We're going to need this to make our anti-DoS code (see 24902) more
robust.
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The HT_FOREACH() is insanely heavy on the CPU and this is part of the fast
path so make it return the nice memory size counter we added in
4d812e29b9b1ec88.
Fixes #25148
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Becasue the circuit creation burst and rate can change at runtime it is
possible that between two refill of a bucket, we end up setting the bucket
value to less than there currently is.
Fixes #25128
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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These functions protect againts over and underflow. They BUG() in case we
overflow the counter.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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If the cache is using 20% of our maximum allowed memory, clean 10% of it. Same
behavior as the HS descriptor cache.
Closes #25122
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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The accurate address of a connection is real_addr, not the addr member.
channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method() now returns real_addr instead.
Fixes #24952; bugfix on 707c1e2 in 0.2.4.11-alpha.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
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Closes #25094.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Debug log the elapsed time in cc_stats_refill_bucket
Part of #25094.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This round is left over from the tenths of a second code.
Part of #25094.
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Because this touches too many commits at once, it is made into one single
commit.
Remove the use of "tenths" for the circuit rate to simplify things. We can
only refill the buckets at best once every second because of the use of
approx_time() and our token system is set to be 1 token = 1 circuit so make
the rate a flat integer of circuit per second.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Imagine this scenario. We had 10 connections over the 24h lifetime of a geoip
cache entry. The lifetime of the entry has been reached so it is about to get
freed but 2 connections remain for it. After the free, a third connection
comes in thus making us create a new geoip entry for that address matching the
2 previous ones that are still alive. If they end up being closed, we'll have
a concurrent count desynch from what the reality is.
To mitigate this probably very rare scenario in practice, when we free a geoip
entry and it has a concurrent count above 0, we'll go over all connections
matching the address and clear out the tracked flag. So once they are closed,
we don't try to decrement the count.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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This option refuses any ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell arriving from a client
connection. Its default value is "auto" for which we can turn it on or off
with a consensus parameter. Default value is 0.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Defend against an address that has reached the concurrent connection count
threshold.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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If the client address was detected as malicious, apply a defense which is at
this commit to return a DESTROY cell.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Add a function that notifies the DoS subsystem that a new CREATE cell has
arrived. The statistics are updated accordingly and the IP address can also be
marked as malicious if it is above threshold.
At this commit, no defense is applied, just detection with a circuit creation
token bucket system.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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Implement a basic connection tracking that counts the number of concurrent
connections when they open and close.
This commit also adds the circuit creation mitigation data structure that will
be needed at later commit to keep track of the circuit rate.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
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