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-rw-r--r--src/common/compress.c6
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto_ed25519.c50
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto_ed25519.h2
-rw-r--r--src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h5
-rw-r--r--src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c27
-rw-r--r--src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c37
-rw-r--r--src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h4
-rw-r--r--src/or/buffers.c12
-rw-r--r--src/or/channel.c47
-rw-r--r--src/or/channel.h1
-rw-r--r--src/or/channeltls.c2
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.c5
-rw-r--r--src/or/config.c17
-rw-r--r--src/or/control.c36
-rw-r--r--src/or/cpuworker.c2
-rw-r--r--src/or/directory.c2
-rw-r--r--src/or/dirserv.c16
-rw-r--r--src/or/dns.c12
-rw-r--r--src/or/main.c4
-rw-r--r--src/or/relay.c42
-rw-r--r--src/or/router.c31
-rw-r--r--src/or/router.h2
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.c4
-rw-r--r--src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py30
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_channel.c30
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_crypto.c65
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_scheduler.c4
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_socks.c26
-rw-r--r--src/win32/orconfig.h2
29 files changed, 392 insertions, 131 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/compress.c b/src/common/compress.c
index 7926faaa60..472268a439 100644
--- a/src/common/compress.c
+++ b/src/common/compress.c
@@ -574,6 +574,12 @@ tor_compress_process(tor_compress_state_t *state,
if (BUG((rv == TOR_COMPRESS_OK) &&
*in_len == in_len_orig &&
*out_len == out_len_orig)) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
+ "More info on the bug: method == %s, finish == %d, "
+ " *in_len == in_len_orig == %lu, "
+ "*out_len == out_len_orig == %lu",
+ compression_method_get_human_name(state->method), finish,
+ (unsigned long)in_len_orig, (unsigned long)out_len_orig);
return TOR_COMPRESS_ERROR;
}
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
index 188e18c710..1a6d19b97b 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "crypto_format.h"
#include "torlog.h"
#include "util.h"
+#include "util_format.h"
#include "ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h"
#include "ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h"
@@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ typedef struct {
int (*pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey)(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *,
int);
+
+ int (*ed25519_scalarmult_with_group_order)(unsigned char *,
+ const unsigned char *);
} ed25519_impl_t;
/** The Ref10 Ed25519 implementation. This one is pure C and lightly
@@ -77,6 +81,7 @@ static const ed25519_impl_t impl_ref10 = {
ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key,
ed25519_ref10_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey,
+ ed25519_ref10_scalarmult_with_group_order,
};
/** The Ref10 Ed25519 implementation. This one is heavily optimized, but still
@@ -97,6 +102,7 @@ static const ed25519_impl_t impl_donna = {
ed25519_donna_blind_public_key,
ed25519_donna_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey,
+ ed25519_donna_scalarmult_with_group_order,
};
/** Which Ed25519 implementation are we using? NULL if we haven't decided
@@ -754,3 +760,47 @@ ed25519_init(void)
pick_ed25519_impl();
}
+/* Return true if <b>point</b> is the identity element of the ed25519 group. */
+static int
+ed25519_point_is_identity_element(const uint8_t *point)
+{
+ /* The identity element in ed25159 is the point with coordinates (0,1). */
+ static const uint8_t ed25519_identity[32] = {
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+ tor_assert(sizeof(ed25519_identity) == ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ return tor_memeq(point, ed25519_identity, sizeof(ed25519_identity));
+}
+
+/** Validate <b>pubkey</b> to ensure that it has no torsion component.
+ * Return 0 if <b>pubkey</b> is valid, else return -1. */
+int
+ed25519_validate_pubkey(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
+{
+ uint8_t result[32] = {9};
+
+ /* First check that we were not given the identity element */
+ if (ed25519_point_is_identity_element(pubkey->pubkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "ed25519 pubkey is the identity");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* For any point on the curve, doing l*point should give the identity element
+ * (where l is the group order). Do the computation and check that the
+ * identity element is returned. */
+ if (get_ed_impl()->ed25519_scalarmult_with_group_order(result,
+ pubkey->pubkey) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "ed25519 group order scalarmult failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ed25519_point_is_identity_element(result)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "ed25519 validation failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h
index 77a3313adc..3a439207b3 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.h
@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ void ed25519_pubkey_copy(ed25519_public_key_t *dest,
void ed25519_set_impl_params(int use_donna);
void ed25519_init(void);
+int ed25519_validate_pubkey(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey);
+
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
void crypto_ed25519_testing_force_impl(const char *name);
void crypto_ed25519_testing_restore_impl(void);
diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h
index d225407b1c..7d7b8c0625 100644
--- a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h
+++ b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h
@@ -30,4 +30,9 @@ int ed25519_donna_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp,
int ed25519_donna_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey(unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *inp, int signbit);
+
+int
+ed25519_donna_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *pubkey);
+
#endif
diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c
index 9537ae66a1..bd11027efa 100644
--- a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c
+++ b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c
@@ -340,5 +340,32 @@ ed25519_donna_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey(unsigned char *out,
return 0;
}
+/* Do the scalar multiplication of <b>pubkey</b> with the group order
+ * <b>modm_m</b>. Place the result in <b>out</b> which must be at least 32
+ * bytes long. */
+int
+ed25519_donna_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *pubkey)
+{
+ static const bignum256modm ALIGN(16) zero = { 0 };
+ unsigned char pkcopy[32];
+ ge25519 ALIGN(16) Point, Result;
+
+ /* No "ge25519_unpack", negate the public key and unpack it back.
+ * See ed25519_donna_blind_public_key() */
+ memcpy(pkcopy, pubkey, 32);
+ pkcopy[31] ^= (1<<7);
+ if (!ge25519_unpack_negative_vartime(&Point, pkcopy)) {
+ return -1; /* error: bail out */
+ }
+
+ /* There is no regular scalarmult function so we have to do:
+ * Result = l*P + 0*B */
+ ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(&Result, &Point, modm_m, zero);
+ ge25519_pack(out, &Result);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#include "test-internals.c"
diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c
index ee3e8666fa..8503f90edd 100644
--- a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c
+++ b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/blinding.c
@@ -74,3 +74,40 @@ int ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out,
return 0;
}
+
+/* This is the group order encoded in a format that
+ * ge_double_scalarmult_vartime() understands. The group order m is:
+ * m = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 =
+ * 0x1000000000000000000000000000000014def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed
+ */
+static const uint8_t modm_m[32] = {0xed,0xd3,0xf5,0x5c,0x1a,0x63,0x12,0x58,
+ 0xd6,0x9c,0xf7,0xa2,0xde,0xf9,0xde,0x14,
+ 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
+ 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10};
+
+/* Do the scalar multiplication of <b>pubkey</b> with the group order
+ * <b>modm_m</b>. Place the result in <b>out</b> which must be at least 32
+ * bytes long. */
+int
+ed25519_ref10_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *pubkey)
+{
+ unsigned char pkcopy[32];
+ unsigned char zero[32] = {0};
+ ge_p3 Point;
+ ge_p2 Result;
+
+ /* All this is done to fit 'pubkey' in 'Point' so that it can be used by
+ * ed25519 ref code. Same thing as in blinding function */
+ memcpy(pkcopy, pubkey, 32);
+ pkcopy[31] ^= (1<<7);
+ if (ge_frombytes_negate_vartime(&Point, pkcopy) != 0) {
+ return -1; /* error: bail out */
+ }
+
+ /* There isn't a regular scalarmult -- we have to do r = l*P + 0*B */
+ ge_double_scalarmult_vartime(&Result, modm_m, &Point, zero);
+ ge_tobytes(out, &Result);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h
index af7e21a2ad..5965694977 100644
--- a/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h
+++ b/src/ext/ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h
@@ -27,4 +27,8 @@ int ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key(unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *inp,
const unsigned char *param);
+int
+ed25519_ref10_scalarmult_with_group_order(unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *pubkey);
+
#endif
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c
index 12a6c0239b..d0639b81eb 100644
--- a/src/or/buffers.c
+++ b/src/or/buffers.c
@@ -1684,15 +1684,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len));
*drain_out = 5+len+2;
- if (string_is_valid_ipv4_address(req->address) ||
- string_is_valid_ipv6_address(req->address)) {
- log_unsafe_socks_warning(5,req->address,req->port,safe_socks);
-
- if (safe_socks) {
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return -1;
- }
- } else if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
+ if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
@@ -1814,7 +1806,7 @@ parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success.");
strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf,
sizeof(req->address));
- if (!tor_strisprint(req->address) || strchr(req->address,'\"')) {
+ if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor "
"a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c
index df6d7d3423..9f8a03683f 100644
--- a/src/or/channel.c
+++ b/src/or/channel.c
@@ -2086,8 +2086,8 @@ channel_write_var_cell(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell)
* are appropriate to the state transition in question.
*/
-void
-channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state)
+static void
+channel_change_state_(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state)
{
channel_state_t from_state;
unsigned char was_active, is_active;
@@ -2206,18 +2206,8 @@ channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state)
estimated_total_queue_size += chan->bytes_in_queue;
}
- /* Tell circuits if we opened and stuff */
- if (to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN) {
- channel_do_open_actions(chan);
- chan->has_been_open = 1;
-
- /* Check for queued cells to process */
- if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->incoming_queue))
- channel_process_cells(chan);
- if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->outgoing_queue))
- channel_flush_cells(chan);
- } else if (to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED ||
- to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR) {
+ if (to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED ||
+ to_state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR) {
/* Assert that all queues are empty */
tor_assert(TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->incoming_queue));
tor_assert(TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->outgoing_queue));
@@ -2225,6 +2215,35 @@ channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state)
}
/**
+ * As channel_change_state_, but change the state to any state but open.
+ */
+void
+channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state)
+{
+ tor_assert(to_state != CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_(chan, to_state);
+}
+
+/**
+ * As channel_change_state, but change the state to open.
+ */
+void
+channel_change_state_open(channel_t *chan)
+{
+ channel_change_state_(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+
+ /* Tell circuits if we opened and stuff */
+ channel_do_open_actions(chan);
+ chan->has_been_open = 1;
+
+ /* Check for queued cells to process */
+ if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->incoming_queue))
+ channel_process_cells(chan);
+ if (! TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->outgoing_queue))
+ channel_flush_cells(chan);
+}
+
+/**
* Change channel listener state
*
* This internal and subclass use only function is used to change channel
diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h
index ea280f2fd2..2d0ec39924 100644
--- a/src/or/channel.h
+++ b/src/or/channel.h
@@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ void channel_listener_free(channel_listener_t *chan_l);
/* State/metadata setters */
void channel_change_state(channel_t *chan, channel_state_t to_state);
+void channel_change_state_open(channel_t *chan);
void channel_clear_identity_digest(channel_t *chan);
void channel_clear_remote_end(channel_t *chan);
void channel_mark_local(channel_t *chan);
diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c
index f44e4fc8ea..707dd5ba8e 100644
--- a/src/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/or/channeltls.c
@@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan,
* We can go to CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN from CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING or
* CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT on this.
*/
- channel_change_state(base_chan, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(base_chan);
/* We might have just become writeable; check and tell the scheduler */
if (connection_or_num_cells_writeable(conn) > 0) {
scheduler_channel_wants_writes(base_chan);
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 16cef0e56b..240c64b6d1 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1956,9 +1956,10 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
}
if (options->ExitNodes) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
- "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: "
+ "No exits in ExitNodes%s seem to be running: "
"can't choose an exit.",
- options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ? "non-excluded " : "");
+ options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ?
+ ", except possibly those excluded by your configuration, " : "");
}
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index 7d2ebbdd03..5b5bb9049b 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -673,6 +673,13 @@ static const config_deprecation_t option_deprecation_notes_[] = {
"easier to fingerprint, and may open you to esoteric attacks." },
/* End of options deprecated since 0.2.9.2-alpha. */
+ /* Deprecated since 0.3.2.0-alpha. */
+ { "HTTPProxy", "It only applies to direct unencrypted HTTP connections "
+ "to your directory server, which your Tor probably wasn't using." },
+ { "HTTPProxyAuthenticator", "HTTPProxy is deprecated in favor of HTTPSProxy "
+ "which should be used with HTTPSProxyAuthenticator." },
+ /* End of options deprecated since 0.3.2.0-alpha. */
+
{ NULL, NULL }
};
@@ -3154,7 +3161,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
"UseEntryGuards. Disabling.");
options->UseEntryGuards = 0;
}
- if (!options->DownloadExtraInfo && authdir_mode_any_main(options)) {
+ if (!options->DownloadExtraInfo && authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Authoritative directories always try to download "
"extra-info documents. Setting DownloadExtraInfo.");
options->DownloadExtraInfo = 1;
@@ -6251,8 +6258,9 @@ port_cfg_free(port_cfg_t *port)
/** Warn for every port in <b>ports</b> of type <b>listener_type</b> that is
* on a publicly routable address. */
static void
-warn_nonlocal_client_ports(const smartlist_t *ports, const char *portname,
- int listener_type)
+warn_nonlocal_client_ports(const smartlist_t *ports,
+ const char *portname,
+ const int listener_type)
{
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, const port_cfg_t *, port) {
if (port->type != listener_type)
@@ -6936,7 +6944,8 @@ parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
options->SocksPort_lines,
"Socks", CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER,
"127.0.0.1", 9050,
- CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL|CL_PORT_TAKES_HOSTNAMES|gw_flag) < 0) {
+ ((validate_only ? 0 : CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL)
+ | CL_PORT_TAKES_HOSTNAMES | gw_flag)) < 0) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Invalid SocksPort configuration");
goto err;
}
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index 9bcf1ee364..232f7b9c2c 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include "hibernate.h"
#include "hs_common.h"
#include "main.h"
+#include "microdesc.h"
#include "networkstatus.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "policies.h"
@@ -1892,6 +1893,12 @@ getinfo_helper_dir(control_connection_t *control_conn,
const char *body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&ri->cache_info);
if (body)
*answer = tor_strndup(body, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len);
+ } else if (! we_fetch_router_descriptors(get_options())) {
+ /* Descriptors won't be available, provide proper error */
+ *errmsg = "We fetch microdescriptors, not router "
+ "descriptors. You'll need to use md/id/* "
+ "instead of desc/id/*.";
+ return 0;
}
} else if (!strcmpstart(question, "desc/name/")) {
const routerinfo_t *ri = NULL;
@@ -1905,6 +1912,12 @@ getinfo_helper_dir(control_connection_t *control_conn,
const char *body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&ri->cache_info);
if (body)
*answer = tor_strndup(body, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len);
+ } else if (! we_fetch_router_descriptors(get_options())) {
+ /* Descriptors won't be available, provide proper error */
+ *errmsg = "We fetch microdescriptors, not router "
+ "descriptors. You'll need to use md/name/* "
+ "instead of desc/name/*.";
+ return 0;
}
} else if (!strcmp(question, "desc/all-recent")) {
routerlist_t *routerlist = router_get_routerlist();
@@ -2907,7 +2920,8 @@ getinfo_helper_sr(control_connection_t *control_conn,
* *<b>a</b>. If an internal error occurs, return -1 and optionally set
* *<b>error_out</b> to point to an error message to be delivered to the
* controller. On success, _or if the key is not recognized_, return 0. Do not
- * set <b>a</b> if the key is not recognized.
+ * set <b>a</b> if the key is not recognized but you may set <b>error_out</b>
+ * to improve the error message.
*/
typedef int (*getinfo_helper_t)(control_connection_t *,
const char *q, char **a,
@@ -3162,7 +3176,7 @@ handle_control_getinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
smartlist_t *questions = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *answers = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *unrecognized = smartlist_new();
- char *msg = NULL, *ans = NULL;
+ char *ans = NULL;
int i;
(void) len; /* body is NUL-terminated, so it's safe to ignore the length. */
@@ -3177,20 +3191,26 @@ handle_control_getinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
goto done;
}
if (!ans) {
- smartlist_add(unrecognized, (char*)q);
+ if (errmsg) /* use provided error message */
+ smartlist_add_strdup(unrecognized, errmsg);
+ else /* use default error message */
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(unrecognized, "Unrecognized key \"%s\"", q);
} else {
smartlist_add_strdup(answers, q);
smartlist_add(answers, ans);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(q);
+
if (smartlist_len(unrecognized)) {
+ /* control-spec section 2.3, mid-reply '-' or end of reply ' ' */
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(unrecognized)-1; ++i)
connection_printf_to_buf(conn,
- "552-Unrecognized key \"%s\"\r\n",
- (char*)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i));
+ "552-%s\r\n",
+ (char *)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i));
+
connection_printf_to_buf(conn,
- "552 Unrecognized key \"%s\"\r\n",
- (char*)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i));
+ "552 %s\r\n",
+ (char *)smartlist_get(unrecognized, i));
goto done;
}
@@ -3217,8 +3237,8 @@ handle_control_getinfo(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
smartlist_free(answers);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(questions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(questions);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(unrecognized, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(unrecognized);
- tor_free(msg);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/or/cpuworker.c b/src/or/cpuworker.c
index 1013fa555e..06d45f9960 100644
--- a/src/or/cpuworker.c
+++ b/src/or/cpuworker.c
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ queue_pending_tasks(void)
if (!circ)
return;
- if (assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(circ, onionskin))
+ if (assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(circ, onionskin) < 0)
log_info(LD_OR,"assign_to_cpuworker failed. Ignoring.");
}
}
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c
index 6ce739b4f6..c6963fe00e 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.c
+++ b/src/or/directory.c
@@ -4881,7 +4881,7 @@ directory_handle_command_post,(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers,
goto done;
}
- if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1) &&
+ if (authdir_mode(options) &&
!strcmp(url,"/tor/")) { /* server descriptor post */
const char *msg = "[None]";
uint8_t purpose = authdir_mode_bridge(options) ?
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index 4954471c6a..75a245e07a 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -704,10 +704,22 @@ dirserv_add_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, const char **msg, const char *source)
/* Do keypinning again ... this time, to add the pin if appropriate */
int keypin_status;
if (ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
+ ed25519_public_key_t *pkey = &ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key;
+ /* First let's validate this pubkey before pinning it */
+ if (ed25519_validate_pubkey(pkey) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Received bad key from %s (source %s)",
+ router_describe(ri), source);
+ control_event_or_authdir_new_descriptor("REJECTED",
+ ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ desclen, *msg);
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ return ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS;
+ }
+
+ /* Now pin it! */
keypin_status = keypin_check_and_add(
(const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
- ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key.pubkey,
- ! key_pinning);
+ pkey->pubkey, ! key_pinning);
} else {
keypin_status = keypin_check_lone_rsa(
(const uint8_t*)ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c
index 98b684c904..722c5925d8 100644
--- a/src/or/dns.c
+++ b/src/or/dns.c
@@ -182,6 +182,18 @@ evdns_log_cb(int warn, const char *msg)
} else if (!strcmp(msg, "All nameservers have failed")) {
control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN, "NAMESERVER_ALL_DOWN");
all_down = 1;
+ } else if (!strcmpstart(msg, "Address mismatch on received DNS")) {
+ static ratelim_t mismatch_limit = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
+ const char *src = strstr(msg, " Apparent source");
+ if (!src || get_options()->SafeLogging) {
+ src = "";
+ }
+ log_fn_ratelim(&mismatch_limit, severity, LD_EXIT,
+ "eventdns: Received a DNS packet from "
+ "an IP address to which we did not send a request. This "
+ "could be a DNS spoofing attempt, or some kind of "
+ "misconfiguration.%s", src);
+ return;
}
tor_log(severity, LD_EXIT, "eventdns: %s", msg);
}
diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c
index cb24fd18c8..5fa3869ff8 100644
--- a/src/or/main.c
+++ b/src/or/main.c
@@ -2355,7 +2355,7 @@ do_hup(void)
tor_free(msg);
}
}
- if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1)) {
+ if (authdir_mode(options)) {
/* reload the approved-routers file */
if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) {
/* warnings are logged from dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() directly */
@@ -3478,7 +3478,7 @@ sandbox_init_filter(void)
if (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir)
OPEN_DATADIR_SUFFIX("networkstatus-bridges", ".tmp");
- if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1))
+ if (authdir_mode(options))
OPEN_DATADIR("approved-routers");
if (options->ServerDNSResolvConfFile)
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c
index 0ff53ed5e9..18ccc65b80 100644
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@ -184,18 +184,12 @@ relay_digest_matches(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell)
/** Apply <b>cipher</b> to CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE bytes of <b>in</b>
* (in place).
*
- * If <b>encrypt_mode</b> is 1 then encrypt, else decrypt.
- *
- * Returns 0.
+ * Note that we use the same operation for encrypting and for decrypting.
*/
-static int
-relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in,
- int encrypt_mode)
+static void
+relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in)
{
- (void)encrypt_mode;
crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, (char*) in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
-
- return 0;
}
/**
@@ -449,8 +443,8 @@ relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction,
do { /* Remember: cpath is in forward order, that is, first hop first. */
tor_assert(thishop);
- if (relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->b_crypto, cell->payload, 0) < 0)
- return -1;
+ /* decrypt one layer */
+ relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->b_crypto, cell->payload);
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
if (rh.recognized == 0) {
@@ -467,19 +461,14 @@ relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction,
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Incoming cell at client not recognized. Closing.");
return -1;
- } else { /* we're in the middle. Just one crypt. */
- if (relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_crypto,
- cell->payload, 1) < 0)
- return -1;
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping recognized check, because we're not "
-// "the client.");
+ } else {
+ /* We're in the middle. Encrypt one layer. */
+ relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_crypto, cell->payload);
}
} else /* cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT */ {
- /* we're in the middle. Just one crypt. */
+ /* We're in the middle. Decrypt one layer. */
- if (relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_crypto,
- cell->payload, 0) < 0)
- return -1;
+ relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_crypto, cell->payload);
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
if (rh.recognized == 0) {
@@ -525,11 +514,8 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
/* moving from farthest to nearest hop */
do {
tor_assert(thishop);
- /* XXXX RD This is a bug, right? */
- log_debug(LD_OR,"crypting a layer of the relay cell.");
- if (relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->f_crypto, cell->payload, 1) < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
+ log_debug(LD_OR,"encrypting a layer of the relay cell.");
+ relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->f_crypto, cell->payload);
thishop = thishop->prev;
} while (thishop != TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath->prev);
@@ -546,8 +532,8 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
chan = or_circ->p_chan;
relay_set_digest(or_circ->p_digest, cell);
- if (relay_crypt_one_payload(or_circ->p_crypto, cell->payload, 1) < 0)
- return -1;
+ /* encrypt one layer */
+ relay_crypt_one_payload(or_circ->p_crypto, cell->payload);
}
++stats_n_relay_cells_relayed;
diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c
index 2187a76b48..100c4cc949 100644
--- a/src/or/router.c
+++ b/src/or/router.c
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ init_keys(void)
/* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
/* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
- if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)) {
+ if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
const char *m = NULL;
routerinfo_t *ri;
/* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
@@ -1596,32 +1596,19 @@ authdir_mode_v3(const or_options_t *options)
{
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V3AuthoritativeDir != 0;
}
-/** Return true iff we are a v3 directory authority. */
-int
-authdir_mode_any_main(const or_options_t *options)
-{
- return options->V3AuthoritativeDir;
-}
-/** Return true if we believe ourselves to be any kind of
- * authoritative directory beyond just a hidserv authority. */
-int
-authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(const or_options_t *options)
-{
- return options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ||
- authdir_mode_any_main(options);
-}
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that is
* authoritative about receiving and serving descriptors of type
- * <b>purpose</b> on its dirport. Use -1 for "any purpose". */
+ * <b>purpose</b> on its dirport.
+ */
int
authdir_mode_handles_descs(const or_options_t *options, int purpose)
{
- if (purpose < 0)
- return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options);
+ if (BUG(purpose < 0)) /* Deprecated. */
+ return authdir_mode(options);
else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)
- return authdir_mode_any_main(options);
+ return authdir_mode_v3(options);
else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
- return (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir);
+ return authdir_mode_bridge(options);
else
return 0;
}
@@ -1633,7 +1620,7 @@ authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(const or_options_t *options)
{
if (authdir_mode_bridge(options))
return 0;
- return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options);
+ return authdir_mode(options);
}
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that
* tests reachability of the descriptors it learns about.
@@ -1641,7 +1628,7 @@ authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(const or_options_t *options)
int
authdir_mode_tests_reachability(const or_options_t *options)
{
- return authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1);
+ return authdir_mode(options);
}
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a bridge authoritative
* directory server.
diff --git a/src/or/router.h b/src/or/router.h
index 9c5def5218..97f331713a 100644
--- a/src/or/router.h
+++ b/src/or/router.h
@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ int net_is_disabled(void);
int authdir_mode(const or_options_t *options);
int authdir_mode_v3(const or_options_t *options);
-int authdir_mode_any_main(const or_options_t *options);
-int authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(const or_options_t *options);
int authdir_mode_handles_descs(const or_options_t *options, int purpose);
int authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(const or_options_t *options);
int authdir_mode_tests_reachability(const or_options_t *options);
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 0e45f63f70..8adaaf6c05 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -5033,7 +5033,7 @@ launch_descriptor_downloads(int purpose,
}
}
- if (!authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options)) {
+ if (!authdir_mode(options)) {
/* If we wind up going to the authorities, we want to only open one
* connection to each authority at a time, so that we don't overload
* them. We do this by setting PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH
@@ -5164,7 +5164,7 @@ update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads(time_t now, int is_vote,
smartlist_add(downloadable, rs->descriptor_digest);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(rsp);
- if (!authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)
+ if (!authdir_mode_v3(options)
&& smartlist_len(no_longer_old)) {
routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
log_info(LD_DIR, "%d router descriptors listed in consensus are "
diff --git a/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py b/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py
index af5010415e..1898256540 100644
--- a/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py
+++ b/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ def signatureWithESK(m,h,pk):
def newSK():
return os.urandom(32)
+def random_scalar(entropy_f): # 0..L-1 inclusive
+ # reduce the bias to a safe level by generating 256 extra bits
+ oversized = int(binascii.hexlify(entropy_f(32+32)), 16)
+ return oversized % ell
+
# ------------------------------------------------------------
MSG = "This is extremely silly. But it is also incredibly serious business!"
@@ -126,6 +131,31 @@ class SelfTest(unittest.TestCase):
self._testSignatures(besk, bpk)
+ def testIdentity(self):
+ # Base point:
+ # B is the unique point (x, 4/5) \in E for which x is positive
+ By = 4 * inv(5)
+ Bx = xrecover(By)
+ B = [Bx % q,By % q]
+
+ # Get identity E by doing: E = l*B, where l is the group order
+ identity = scalarmult(B, ell)
+
+ # Get identity E by doing: E = l*A, where A is a random point
+ sk = newSK()
+ pk = decodepoint(publickey(sk))
+ identity2 = scalarmult(pk, ell)
+
+ # Check that identities match
+ assert(identity == identity2)
+ # Check that identity is the point (0,1)
+ assert(identity == [0L,1L])
+
+ # Check identity element: a*E = E, where a is a random scalar
+ scalar = random_scalar(os.urandom)
+ result = scalarmult(identity, scalar)
+ assert(result == identity == identity2)
+
# ------------------------------------------------------------
# From pprint.pprint([ binascii.b2a_hex(os.urandom(32)) for _ in xrange(8) ])
diff --git a/src/test/test_channel.c b/src/test/test_channel.c
index f5999b8e67..347aca7ecb 100644
--- a/src/test/test_channel.c
+++ b/src/test/test_channel.c
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ test_channel_incoming(void *arg)
tt_assert(ch->registered);
/* Open it */
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
/* Receive a fixed cell */
@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle(void *arg)
tt_int_op(old_count, ==, test_cells_written);
/* Move it to OPEN and flush */
- channel_change_state(ch1, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch1);
/* Queue should drain */
tt_int_op(old_count + 1, ==, test_cells_written);
@@ -925,13 +925,13 @@ test_channel_lifecycle(void *arg)
tt_int_op(test_releases_count, ==, init_releases_count);
/* Move ch2 to OPEN */
- channel_change_state(ch2, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch2);
tt_int_op(test_doesnt_want_writes_count, ==,
init_doesnt_want_writes_count + 1);
tt_int_op(test_releases_count, ==, init_releases_count);
/* Move ch1 back to OPEN */
- channel_change_state(ch1, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch1);
tt_int_op(test_doesnt_want_writes_count, ==,
init_doesnt_want_writes_count + 1);
tt_int_op(test_releases_count, ==, init_releases_count);
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg)
tt_assert(ch->registered);
/* Finish opening it */
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
/* Error exit from lower layer */
chan_test_error(ch);
@@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg)
tt_assert(ch->registered);
/* Finish opening it */
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
/* Go to maintenance state */
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg)
tt_assert(ch->registered);
/* Finish opening it */
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
/* Go to maintenance state */
@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ test_channel_lifecycle_2(void *arg)
tt_assert(ch->registered);
/* Finish opening it */
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
/* Go to maintenance state */
@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg)
* gets thrown away properly.
*/
test_chan_accept_cells = 1;
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count);
tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0);
@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg)
/* Let it drain and check that the bad entry is discarded */
test_chan_accept_cells = 1;
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count);
tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0);
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg)
/* Let it drain and check that the bad entry is discarded */
test_chan_accept_cells = 1;
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count);
tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0);
@@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ test_channel_queue_impossible(void *arg)
/* Let it drain and check that the bad entry is discarded */
test_chan_accept_cells = 1;
tor_capture_bugs_(1);
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count);
tt_int_op(chan_cell_queue_len(&(ch->outgoing_queue)), ==, 0);
@@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ test_channel_queue_incoming(void *arg)
tt_assert(ch->registered);
/* Open it */
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_int_op(ch->state, ==, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
/* Assert that the incoming queue is empty */
@@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ test_channel_queue_size(void *arg)
/* Go to open */
old_count = test_cells_written;
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
/*
* It should try to write, but we aren't accepting cells right now, so
@@ -1706,7 +1706,7 @@ test_channel_write(void *arg)
* gets drained from the queue.
*/
test_chan_accept_cells = 1;
- channel_change_state(ch, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch);
tt_assert(test_cells_written == old_count + 1);
/*
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index ec9d4e2709..924dd7d64c 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -2170,6 +2170,9 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_simple(void *arg)
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub1, &sec1));
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub2, &sec1));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub2), OP_EQ, 0);
+
tt_mem_op(pub1.pubkey, OP_EQ, pub2.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub2));
tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub1));
@@ -2832,6 +2835,67 @@ crypto_rand_check_failure_mode_predict(void)
#undef FAILURE_MODE_BUFFER_SIZE
+/** Test that our ed25519 validation function rejects evil public keys and
+ * accepts good ones. */
+static void
+test_crypto_ed25519_validation(void *arg)
+{
+ (void) arg;
+
+ int retval;
+ ed25519_public_key_t pub1;
+
+ /* See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-April/012230.html
+ for a list of points with torsion components in ed25519. */
+
+ { /* Point with torsion component (order 8l) */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "300ef2e64e588e1df55b48e4da0416ffb64cc85d5b00af6463d5cc6c2b1c185e";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* Point with torsion component (order 4l) */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "f43e3a046db8749164c6e69b193f1e942c7452e7d888736f40b98093d814d5e7";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* Point with torsion component (order 2l) */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "c9fff3af0471c28e33e98c2043e44f779d0427b1e37c521a6bddc011ed1869af";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* This point is not even on the curve */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "e19c65de75c68cf3b7643ea732ba9eb1a3d20d6d57ba223c2ece1df66feb5af0";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* This one is a good key */
+ const char goodkey[] =
+ "4ba2e44760dff4c559ef3c38768c1c14a8a54740c782c8d70803e9d6e3ad8794";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ goodkey, strlen(goodkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, 0);
+ }
+
+ done: ;
+}
+
static void
test_crypto_failure_modes(void *arg)
{
@@ -2918,6 +2982,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = {
ED25519_TEST(convert, 0),
ED25519_TEST(blinding, 0),
ED25519_TEST(testvectors, 0),
+ ED25519_TEST(validation, 0),
{ "ed25519_storage", test_crypto_ed25519_storage, 0, NULL, NULL },
{ "siphash", test_crypto_siphash, 0, NULL, NULL },
{ "failure_modes", test_crypto_failure_modes, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
diff --git a/src/test/test_scheduler.c b/src/test/test_scheduler.c
index 4c536b0905..a2e77a45d4 100644
--- a/src/test/test_scheduler.c
+++ b/src/test/test_scheduler.c
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ test_scheduler_loop(void *arg)
channel_register(ch1);
tt_assert(ch1->registered);
/* Finish opening it */
- channel_change_state(ch1, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch1);
/* It should start off in SCHED_CHAN_IDLE */
tt_int_op(ch1->scheduler_state, ==, SCHED_CHAN_IDLE);
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ test_scheduler_loop(void *arg)
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(channels_pending), ==, 0);
/* Now, finish opening ch2, and get both back to pending */
- channel_change_state(ch2, CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN);
+ channel_change_state_open(ch2);
scheduler_channel_wants_writes(ch1);
scheduler_channel_wants_writes(ch2);
scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells(ch1);
diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c
index bb1be11f2b..94b94640cc 100644
--- a/src/test/test_socks.c
+++ b/src/test/test_socks.c
@@ -229,25 +229,24 @@ test_socks_5_supported_commands(void *ptr)
tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf));
socks_request_clear(socks);
- /* SOCKS 5 Should reject RESOLVE [F0] request for IPv4 address
+ /* SOCKS 5 Should NOT reject RESOLVE [F0] request for IPv4 address
* string if SafeSocks is enabled. */
ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00");
ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF0\x00\x03\x07");
ADD_DATA(buf, "8.8.8.8");
- ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02");
+ ADD_DATA(buf, "\x11\x11");
tt_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf,socks,get_options()->TestSocks,1)
- == -1);
+ == 1);
- tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->socks_version);
- tt_int_op(10,OP_EQ,socks->replylen);
- tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->reply[0]);
- tt_int_op(SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED,OP_EQ,socks->reply[1]);
- tt_int_op(1,OP_EQ,socks->reply[3]);
+ tt_str_op("8.8.8.8", OP_EQ, socks->address);
+ tt_int_op(4369, OP_EQ, socks->port);
+
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf));
socks_request_clear(socks);
- /* SOCKS 5 should reject RESOLVE [F0] reject for IPv6 address
+ /* SOCKS 5 should NOT reject RESOLVE [F0] reject for IPv6 address
* string if SafeSocks is enabled. */
ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00");
@@ -257,11 +256,10 @@ test_socks_5_supported_commands(void *ptr)
tt_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf,socks,get_options()->TestSocks,1)
== -1);
- tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->socks_version);
- tt_int_op(10,OP_EQ,socks->replylen);
- tt_int_op(5,OP_EQ,socks->reply[0]);
- tt_int_op(SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED,OP_EQ,socks->reply[1]);
- tt_int_op(1,OP_EQ,socks->reply[3]);
+ tt_str_op("2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334", OP_EQ, socks->address);
+ tt_int_op(258, OP_EQ, socks->port);
+
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, buf_datalen(buf));
socks_request_clear(socks);
diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h
index 696f6fee8b..9b16c64752 100644
--- a/src/win32/orconfig.h
+++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
#define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT
/* Version number of package */
-#define VERSION "0.3.1.3-alpha-dev"
+#define VERSION "0.3.2.0-alpha-dev"
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