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-rw-r--r--src/common/address.c113
-rw-r--r--src/common/address.h4
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto.c32
-rw-r--r--src/common/crypto.h4
-rw-r--r--src/common/include.am6
-rw-r--r--src/or/router.c17
-rw-r--r--src/or/router.h2
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.c62
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.h2
-rw-r--r--src/test/test.c130
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_addr.c103
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_crypto.c44
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_util.c38
-rw-r--r--src/win32/orconfig.h2
14 files changed, 252 insertions, 307 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/address.c b/src/common/address.c
index 6fc9fb3c47..69e7f68103 100644
--- a/src/common/address.c
+++ b/src/common/address.c
@@ -1565,32 +1565,6 @@ addr_mask_get_bits(uint32_t mask)
return -1;
}
-/** Compare two addresses <b>a1</b> and <b>a2</b> for equality under a
- * netmask of <b>mbits</b> bits. Return -1, 0, or 1.
- *
- * XXXX_IP6 Temporary function to allow masks as bitcounts everywhere. This
- * will be replaced with an IPv6-aware version as soon as 32-bit addresses are
- * no longer passed around.
- */
-int
-addr_mask_cmp_bits(uint32_t a1, uint32_t a2, maskbits_t bits)
-{
- if (bits > 32)
- bits = 32;
- else if (bits == 0)
- return 0;
-
- a1 >>= (32-bits);
- a2 >>= (32-bits);
-
- if (a1 < a2)
- return -1;
- else if (a1 > a2)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Parse a string <b>s</b> in the format of (*|port(-maxport)?)?, setting the
* various *out pointers as appropriate. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
@@ -1643,93 +1617,6 @@ parse_port_range(const char *port, uint16_t *port_min_out,
return 0;
}
-/** Parse a string <b>s</b> in the format of
- * (IP(/mask|/mask-bits)?|*)(:(*|port(-maxport))?)?, setting the various
- * *out pointers as appropriate. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-int
-parse_addr_and_port_range(const char *s, uint32_t *addr_out,
- maskbits_t *maskbits_out, uint16_t *port_min_out,
- uint16_t *port_max_out)
-{
- char *address;
- char *mask, *port, *endptr;
- struct in_addr in;
- int bits;
-
- tor_assert(s);
- tor_assert(addr_out);
- tor_assert(maskbits_out);
- tor_assert(port_min_out);
- tor_assert(port_max_out);
-
- address = tor_strdup(s);
- /* Break 'address' into separate strings.
- */
- mask = strchr(address,'/');
- port = strchr(mask?mask:address,':');
- if (mask)
- *mask++ = '\0';
- if (port)
- *port++ = '\0';
- /* Now "address" is the IP|'*' part...
- * "mask" is the Mask|Maskbits part...
- * and "port" is the *|port|min-max part.
- */
-
- if (strcmp(address,"*")==0) {
- *addr_out = 0;
- } else if (tor_inet_aton(address, &in) != 0) {
- *addr_out = ntohl(in.s_addr);
- } else {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Malformed IP %s in address pattern; rejecting.",
- escaped(address));
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!mask) {
- if (strcmp(address,"*")==0)
- *maskbits_out = 0;
- else
- *maskbits_out = 32;
- } else {
- endptr = NULL;
- bits = (int) strtol(mask, &endptr, 10);
- if (!*endptr) {
- /* strtol handled the whole mask. */
- if (bits < 0 || bits > 32) {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
- "Bad number of mask bits on address range; rejecting.");
- goto err;
- }
- *maskbits_out = bits;
- } else if (tor_inet_aton(mask, &in) != 0) {
- bits = addr_mask_get_bits(ntohl(in.s_addr));
- if (bits < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
- "Mask %s on address range isn't a prefix; dropping",
- escaped(mask));
- goto err;
- }
- *maskbits_out = bits;
- } else {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
- "Malformed mask %s on address range; rejecting.",
- escaped(mask));
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (parse_port_range(port, port_min_out, port_max_out)<0)
- goto err;
-
- tor_free(address);
- return 0;
- err:
- tor_free(address);
- return -1;
-}
-
/** Given an IPv4 in_addr struct *<b>in</b> (in network order, as usual),
* write it as a string into the <b>buf_len</b>-byte buffer in
* <b>buf</b>.
diff --git a/src/common/address.h b/src/common/address.h
index 9cbc32ce9b..77e5855346 100644
--- a/src/common/address.h
+++ b/src/common/address.h
@@ -219,11 +219,7 @@ int addr_port_lookup(int severity, const char *addrport, char **address,
uint32_t *addr, uint16_t *port_out);
int parse_port_range(const char *port, uint16_t *port_min_out,
uint16_t *port_max_out);
-int parse_addr_and_port_range(const char *s, uint32_t *addr_out,
- maskbits_t *maskbits_out, uint16_t *port_min_out,
- uint16_t *port_max_out);
int addr_mask_get_bits(uint32_t mask);
-int addr_mask_cmp_bits(uint32_t a1, uint32_t a2, maskbits_t bits);
/** Length of a buffer to allocate to hold the results of tor_inet_ntoa.*/
#define INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN 16
int tor_inet_ntoa(const struct in_addr *in, char *buf, size_t buf_len);
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 22d57c7c8a..2f9f3ad7d7 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -1294,23 +1294,6 @@ crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out, int add_space)
return 0;
}
-/** Return true iff <b>s</b> is in the correct format for a fingerprint.
- */
-int
-crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(const char *s)
-{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < FINGERPRINT_LEN; ++i) {
- if ((i%5) == 4) {
- if (!TOR_ISSPACE(s[i])) return 0;
- } else {
- if (!TOR_ISXDIGIT(s[i])) return 0;
- }
- }
- if (s[FINGERPRINT_LEN]) return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
/* symmetric crypto */
/** Return a pointer to the key set for the cipher in <b>env</b>.
@@ -1631,21 +1614,6 @@ crypto_digest_assign(crypto_digest_t *into,
memcpy(into,from,sizeof(crypto_digest_t));
}
-/** Compute the HMAC-SHA-1 of the <b>msg_len</b> bytes in <b>msg</b>, using
- * the <b>key</b> of length <b>key_len</b>. Store the DIGEST_LEN-byte result
- * in <b>hmac_out</b>.
- */
-void
-crypto_hmac_sha1(char *hmac_out,
- const char *key, size_t key_len,
- const char *msg, size_t msg_len)
-{
- tor_assert(key_len < INT_MAX);
- tor_assert(msg_len < INT_MAX);
- HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, (int)key_len, (unsigned char*)msg, (int)msg_len,
- (unsigned char*)hmac_out, NULL);
-}
-
/** Compute the HMAC-SHA-256 of the <b>msg_len</b> bytes in <b>msg</b>, using
* the <b>key</b> of length <b>key_len</b>. Store the DIGEST256_LEN-byte
* result in <b>hmac_out</b>.
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h
index 12fcfae27e..ee356c64bd 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto.h
@@ -183,7 +183,6 @@ crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_asn1_decode(const char *str, size_t len);
int crypto_pk_get_digest(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *digest_out);
int crypto_pk_get_all_digests(crypto_pk_t *pk, digests_t *digests_out);
int crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out,int add_space);
-int crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(const char *s);
/* symmetric crypto */
const char *crypto_cipher_get_key(crypto_cipher_t *env);
@@ -218,9 +217,6 @@ void crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest,
crypto_digest_t *crypto_digest_dup(const crypto_digest_t *digest);
void crypto_digest_assign(crypto_digest_t *into,
const crypto_digest_t *from);
-void crypto_hmac_sha1(char *hmac_out,
- const char *key, size_t key_len,
- const char *msg, size_t msg_len);
void crypto_hmac_sha256(char *hmac_out,
const char *key, size_t key_len,
const char *msg, size_t msg_len);
diff --git a/src/common/include.am b/src/common/include.am
index b796ebfae8..68275cbcf7 100644
--- a/src/common/include.am
+++ b/src/common/include.am
@@ -14,9 +14,13 @@ else
libor_extra_source=
endif
+src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_CFLAGS=
+
if BUILD_CURVE25519_DONNA
src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_SOURCES=\
src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c
+src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_CFLAGS+=\
+ @F_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER@
noinst_LIBRARIES+=src/common/libcurve25519_donna.a
LIBDONNA=src/common/libcurve25519_donna.a
else
@@ -30,8 +34,6 @@ LIBDONNA=
endif
endif
-src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_CFLAGS =
-
if CURVE25519_ENABLED
libcrypto_extra_source=src/common/crypto_curve25519.c
endif
diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c
index 422fe5db2e..c8c9ce1a4f 100644
--- a/src/or/router.c
+++ b/src/or/router.c
@@ -2983,23 +2983,6 @@ router_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, const routerinfo_t *router)
strlcpy(buf+1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
}
-/** Set <b>buf</b> (which must have MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1 bytes) to the
- * verbose representation of the identity of <b>router</b>. The format is:
- * A dollar sign.
- * The upper-case hexadecimal encoding of the SHA1 hash of router's identity.
- * A "=" if the router is named; a "~" if it is not.
- * The router's nickname.
- **/
-void
-routerstatus_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, const routerstatus_t *router)
-{
- buf[0] = '$';
- base16_encode(buf+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->identity_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN);
- buf[1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN] = router->is_named ? '=' : '~';
- strlcpy(buf+1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
-}
-
/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
* warn again if we see the same errors. */
void
diff --git a/src/or/router.h b/src/or/router.h
index fd2076af01..96749b53c0 100644
--- a/src/or/router.h
+++ b/src/or/router.h
@@ -132,8 +132,6 @@ const char *routerstatus_describe(const routerstatus_t *ri);
const char *extend_info_describe(const extend_info_t *ei);
void router_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, const routerinfo_t *router);
-void routerstatus_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf,
- const routerstatus_t *router);
void router_reset_warnings(void);
void router_reset_reachability(void);
void router_free_all(void);
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 2f08167f18..f98ba64954 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ static const routerstatus_t *router_pick_dirserver_generic(
smartlist_t *sourcelist,
dirinfo_type_t type, int flags);
static void mark_all_dirservers_up(smartlist_t *server_list);
-static int router_nickname_matches(const routerinfo_t *router,
- const char *nickname);
static void dir_server_free(dir_server_t *ds);
static int signed_desc_digest_is_recognized(signed_descriptor_t *desc);
static const char *signed_descriptor_get_body_impl(
@@ -1462,30 +1460,6 @@ routerlist_add_node_and_family(smartlist_t *sl, const routerinfo_t *router)
nodelist_add_node_and_family(sl, node);
}
-/** Return 1 iff any member of the (possibly NULL) comma-separated list
- * <b>list</b> is an acceptable nickname or hexdigest for <b>router</b>. Else
- * return 0.
- */
-int
-router_nickname_is_in_list(const routerinfo_t *router, const char *list)
-{
- smartlist_t *nickname_list;
- int v = 0;
-
- if (!list)
- return 0; /* definitely not */
- tor_assert(router);
-
- nickname_list = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_split_string(nickname_list, list, ",",
- SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_STRIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nickname_list, const char *, cp,
- if (router_nickname_matches(router, cp)) {v=1;break;});
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nickname_list, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(nickname_list);
- return v;
-}
-
/** Add every suitable node from our nodelist to <b>sl</b>, so that
* we can pick a node for a circuit.
*/
@@ -2299,31 +2273,6 @@ router_is_named(const routerinfo_t *router)
tor_memeq(digest, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
}
-/** Return true iff the digest of <b>router</b>'s identity key,
- * encoded in hexadecimal, matches <b>hexdigest</b> (which is
- * optionally prefixed with a single dollar sign). Return false if
- * <b>hexdigest</b> is malformed, or it doesn't match. */
-static INLINE int
-router_hex_digest_matches(const routerinfo_t *router, const char *hexdigest)
-{
- return hex_digest_nickname_matches(hexdigest,
- router->cache_info.identity_digest,
- router->nickname,
- router_is_named(router));
-}
-
-/** Return true if <b>router</b>'s nickname matches <b>nickname</b>
- * (case-insensitive), or if <b>router's</b> identity key digest
- * matches a hexadecimal value stored in <b>nickname</b>. Return
- * false otherwise. */
-static int
-router_nickname_matches(const routerinfo_t *router, const char *nickname)
-{
- if (nickname[0]!='$' && !strcasecmp(router->nickname, nickname))
- return 1;
- return router_hex_digest_matches(router, nickname);
-}
-
/** Return true iff <b>digest</b> is the digest of the identity key of a
* trusted directory matching at least one bit of <b>type</b>. If <b>type</b>
* is zero, any authority is okay. */
@@ -4052,17 +4001,6 @@ clear_dir_servers(void)
router_dir_info_changed();
}
-/** Return 1 if any trusted dir server supports v1 directories,
- * else return 0. */
-int
-any_trusted_dir_is_v1_authority(void)
-{
- if (trusted_dir_servers)
- return get_n_authorities(V1_DIRINFO) > 0;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/** For every current directory connection whose purpose is <b>purpose</b>,
* and where the resource being downloaded begins with <b>prefix</b>, split
* rest of the resource into base16 fingerprints (or base64 fingerprints if
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h
index 1849fff31c..28b2f58935 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.h
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.h
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ int router_get_my_share_of_directory_requests(double *v2_share_out,
double *v3_share_out);
void router_reset_status_download_failures(void);
int routers_have_same_or_addrs(const routerinfo_t *r1, const routerinfo_t *r2);
-int router_nickname_is_in_list(const routerinfo_t *router, const char *list);
const routerinfo_t *routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void);
uint32_t router_get_advertised_bandwidth(const routerinfo_t *router);
uint32_t router_get_advertised_bandwidth_capped(const routerinfo_t *router);
@@ -146,7 +145,6 @@ void dir_server_add(dir_server_t *ent);
void authority_cert_free(authority_cert_t *cert);
void clear_dir_servers(void);
-int any_trusted_dir_is_v1_authority(void);
void update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads(time_t now, int is_vote,
networkstatus_t *consensus);
void update_router_descriptor_downloads(time_t now);
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index 6c64d35990..41ab421a9d 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -821,43 +821,130 @@ test_onion_handshake(void)
crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL;
char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
char c_keys[40];
-
/* server-side */
char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN];
char s_keys[40];
-
+ int i;
/* shared */
- crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL;
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL;
pk = pk_generate(0);
+ pk2 = pk_generate(1);
/* client handshake 1. */
memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf));
- /* server handshake */
- memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
- memset(s_keys, 0, 40);
- test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
- s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+ for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i) {
+ crypto_pk_t *k1, *k2;
+ if (i==1) {
+ /* server handshake: only one key known. */
+ k1 = pk; k2 = NULL;
+ } else if (i==2) {
+ /* server handshake: try the right key first. */
+ k1 = pk; k2 = pk2;
+ } else {
+ /* server handshake: try the right key second. */
+ k1 = pk2; k2 = pk;
+ }
- /* client handshake 2 */
- memset(c_keys, 0, 40);
- test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+ memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
+ memset(s_keys, 0, 40);
+ test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, k1, k2,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
- if (memcmp(c_keys, s_keys, 40)) {
- puts("Aiiiie");
- exit(1);
+ /* client handshake 2 */
+ memset(c_keys, 0, 40);
+ test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+
+ test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40);
+ memset(s_buf, 0, 40);
+ test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40);
}
- test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40);
- memset(s_buf, 0, 40);
- test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40);
+ done:
+ crypto_dh_free(c_dh);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk2);
+}
+
+static void
+test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg)
+{
+ char junk_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+ char junk_buf2[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+ /* client-side */
+ crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL;
+ char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+ char c_keys[40];
+ /* server-side */
+ char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN];
+ char s_keys[40];
+ /* shared */
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL;
+
+ (void)arg;
+
+ pk = pk_generate(0);
+ pk2 = pk_generate(1);
+
+ /* Server: Case 1: the encrypted data is degenerate. */
+ memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf));
+ crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
+ junk_buf, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1);
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* Server: Case 2: the encrypted data is not long enough. */
+ memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf));
+ memset(junk_buf2, 0, sizeof(junk_buf2));
+ crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, sizeof(junk_buf2),
+ junk_buf, 48, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* client handshake 1: do it straight. */
+ memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
+ test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf));
+
+ /* Server: Case 3: we just don't have the right key. */
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk2, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* Server: Case 4: The RSA-encrypted portion is corrupt. */
+ c_buf[64] ^= 33;
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+ c_buf[64] ^= 33;
+
+ /* (Let the server procede) */
+ tt_int_op(0, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
+ s_buf, s_keys, 40));
+
+ /* Client: Case 1: The server sent back junk. */
+ s_buf[64] ^= 33;
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+ s_buf[64] ^= 33;
+
+ /* Let the client finish; make sure it can. */
+ tt_int_op(0, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
+ test_memeq(s_keys, c_keys, 40);
+
+ /* Client: Case 2: The server sent back a degenerate DH. */
+ memset(s_buf, 0, sizeof(s_buf));
+ tt_int_op(-1, ==,
+ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40));
done:
- if (c_dh)
- crypto_dh_free(c_dh);
- if (pk)
- crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ crypto_dh_free(c_dh);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk2);
}
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
@@ -1991,6 +2078,7 @@ static struct testcase_t test_array[] = {
ENT(buffers),
{ "buffer_copy", test_buffer_copy, 0, NULL, NULL },
ENT(onion_handshake),
+ { "bad_onion_handshake", test_bad_onion_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL },
#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED
{ "ntor_handshake", test_ntor_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL },
#endif
diff --git a/src/test/test_addr.c b/src/test/test_addr.c
index 890dfe4366..f182bca195 100644
--- a/src/test/test_addr.c
+++ b/src/test/test_addr.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ test_addr_basic(void)
test_eq(u32, 0x7f000001u);
test_eq(u16, 0);
tor_free(cp);
+
+ test_assert(addr_port_lookup(LOG_WARN, "localhost:3", &cp, &u32, NULL));
+ tor_free(cp);
+
test_eq(0, addr_mask_get_bits(0x0u));
test_eq(32, addr_mask_get_bits(0xFFFFFFFFu));
test_eq(16, addr_mask_get_bits(0xFFFF0000u));
@@ -217,11 +221,12 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void)
/* ==== Converting to and from sockaddr_t. */
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa_storage;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
- sin->sin_port = 9090;
+ sin->sin_port = htons(9090);
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7f7f0102); /*127.127.1.2*/
- tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin, NULL);
+ tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin, &port1);
test_eq(tor_addr_family(&t1), AF_INET);
test_eq(tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&t1), 0x7f7f0102);
+ tt_int_op(port1, ==, 9090);
memset(&sa_storage, 0, sizeof(sa_storage));
test_eq(sizeof(struct sockaddr_in),
@@ -235,8 +240,9 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void)
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = htons(7070);
sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr[0] = 128;
- tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin6, NULL);
+ tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin6, &port1);
test_eq(tor_addr_family(&t1), AF_INET6);
+ tt_int_op(port1, ==, 7070);
p1 = tor_addr_to_str(buf, &t1, sizeof(buf), 0);
test_streq(p1, "8000::");
@@ -464,6 +470,9 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void)
test_eq(0, i);
i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "Foobar.baz", AF_UNSPEC, 1);
test_eq(0, i);
+ i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "9999999999999999999999999999.in-addr.arpa",
+ AF_UNSPEC, 1);
+ test_eq(-1, i);
i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "1.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa",
AF_UNSPEC, 1);
test_eq(1, i);
@@ -843,6 +852,91 @@ test_virtaddrmap(void *data)
;
}
+static void
+test_addr_localname(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("localhost"));
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LOCALHOST"));
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LocalHost"));
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("local"));
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LOCAL"));
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("here.now.local"));
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("here.now.LOCAL"));
+
+
+ tt_assert(!tor_addr_hostname_is_local(" localhost"));
+ tt_assert(!tor_addr_hostname_is_local("www.torproject.org"));
+ done:
+ ;
+}
+
+static void
+test_addr_dup_ip(void *arg)
+{
+ char *v = NULL;
+ (void)arg;
+#define CHECK(ip, s) do { \
+ v = tor_dup_ip(ip); \
+ tt_str_op(v,==,(s)); \
+ tor_free(v); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ CHECK(0xffffffff, "255.255.255.255");
+ CHECK(0x00000000, "0.0.0.0");
+ CHECK(0x7f000001, "127.0.0.1");
+ CHECK(0x01020304, "1.2.3.4");
+
+#undef CHECK
+ done:
+ tor_free(v);
+}
+
+static void
+test_addr_sockaddr_to_str(void *arg)
+{
+ char *v = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
+ struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+ struct sockaddr_un sun;
+#endif
+#define CHECK(sa, s) do { \
+ v = tor_sockaddr_to_str((const struct sockaddr*) &(sa)); \
+ tt_str_op(v,==,(s)); \
+ tor_free(v); \
+ } while (0)
+ (void)arg;
+
+ memset(&ss,0,sizeof(ss));
+ ss.ss_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ CHECK(ss, "unspec");
+
+ memset(&sin,0,sizeof(sin));
+ sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7f808001);
+ sin.sin_port = htons(1234);
+ CHECK(sin, "127.128.128.1:1234");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+ memset(&sun,0,sizeof(sun));
+ sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strlcpy(sun.sun_path, "/here/is/a/path", sizeof(sun.sun_path));
+ CHECK(sun, "unix:/here/is/a/path");
+#endif
+
+ memset(&sin6,0,sizeof(sin6));
+ sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ memcpy(sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr, "\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x1a\x2b\x3c\x4d\x5e\x00\x01", 16);
+ sin6.sin6_port = htons(1234);
+ CHECK(sin6, "[2000::1a:2b3c:4d5e:1]:1234");
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(v);
+}
+
#define ADDR_LEGACY(name) \
{ #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_addr_ ## name }
@@ -851,6 +945,9 @@ struct testcase_t addr_tests[] = {
ADDR_LEGACY(ip6_helpers),
ADDR_LEGACY(parse),
{ "virtaddr", test_virtaddrmap, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "localname", test_addr_localname, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "dup_ip", test_addr_dup_ip, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "sockaddr_to_str", test_addr_sockaddr_to_str, 0, NULL, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index afb338a69c..645fc9f8a6 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -269,34 +269,6 @@ test_crypto_sha(void)
"96177A9CB410FF61F20015AD");
tt_int_op(i, ==, 0);
- /* Test HMAC-SHA-1 with test cases from RFC2202. */
-
- /* Case 1. */
- memset(key, 0x0b, 20);
- crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, key, 20, "Hi There", 8);
- test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20),
- "B617318655057264E28BC0B6FB378C8EF146BE00");
- /* Case 2. */
- crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, "Jefe", 4, "what do ya want for nothing?", 28);
- test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20),
- "EFFCDF6AE5EB2FA2D27416D5F184DF9C259A7C79");
-
- /* Case 4. */
- base16_decode(key, 25,
- "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819", 50);
- memset(data, 0xcd, 50);
- crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, key, 25, data, 50);
- test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20),
- "4C9007F4026250C6BC8414F9BF50C86C2D7235DA");
-
- /* Case 5. */
- memset(key, 0xaa, 80);
- crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, key, 80,
- "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First",
- 54);
- test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20),
- "AA4AE5E15272D00E95705637CE8A3B55ED402112");
-
/* Test HMAC-SHA256 with test cases from wikipedia and RFC 4231 */
/* Case empty (wikipedia) */
@@ -636,22 +608,6 @@ test_crypto_formats(void)
tor_free(data2);
}
- /* Check fingerprint */
- {
- test_assert(crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(
- "ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000 ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000"));
- test_assert(!crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(
- "ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000 ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 000"));
- test_assert(!crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(
- "ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000 ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 00000"));
- test_assert(!crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(
- "ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000 ABCD1234 ABCD 5678 0000"));
- test_assert(!crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(
- "ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000 ABCD1234 ABCD 5678 00000"));
- test_assert(!crypto_pk_check_fingerprint_syntax(
- "ACD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000 ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 00000"));
- }
-
done:
tor_free(data1);
tor_free(data2);
diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c
index c2cb4448e6..8c1fd4f591 100644
--- a/src/test/test_util.c
+++ b/src/test/test_util.c
@@ -3284,6 +3284,42 @@ test_util_mathlog(void *arg)
;
}
+static void
+test_util_round_to_next_multiple_of(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+
+ test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(0,1) == 0);
+ test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(0,7) == 0);
+
+ test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,1) == 99);
+ test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,7) == 105);
+ test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,9) == 99);
+
+ done:
+ ;
+}
+
+static void
+test_util_strclear(void *arg)
+{
+ static const char *vals[] = { "", "a", "abcdef", "abcdefgh", NULL };
+ int i;
+ char *v = NULL;
+ (void)arg;
+
+ for (i = 0; vals[i]; ++i) {
+ size_t n;
+ v = tor_strdup(vals[i]);
+ n = strlen(v);
+ tor_strclear(v);
+ tt_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(v, n+1));
+ tor_free(v);
+ }
+ done:
+ tor_free(v);
+}
+
#define UTIL_LEGACY(name) \
{ #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_util_ ## name }
@@ -3313,6 +3349,8 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = {
UTIL_LEGACY(path_is_relative),
UTIL_LEGACY(strtok),
UTIL_LEGACY(di_ops),
+ UTIL_TEST(round_to_next_multiple_of, 0),
+ UTIL_TEST(strclear, 0),
UTIL_TEST(find_str_at_start_of_line, 0),
UTIL_TEST(string_is_C_identifier, 0),
UTIL_TEST(asprintf, 0),
diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h
index f5d5cf4460..43f68c3b08 100644
--- a/src/win32/orconfig.h
+++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
#define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT
/* Version number of package */
-#define VERSION "0.2.4.10-alpha-dev"
+#define VERSION "0.2.5.0-alpha-dev"
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