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-rw-r--r--src/common/container.c8
-rw-r--r--src/common/di_ops.c2
-rw-r--r--src/common/sandbox.c44
-rw-r--r--src/common/sandbox.h4
-rw-r--r--src/common/tortls.c12
-rw-r--r--src/common/util.c7
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitstats.c4
-rw-r--r--src/or/control.c8
-rw-r--r--src/or/dirserv.c9
-rw-r--r--src/or/dirvote.c17
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.c8
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.c2
-rw-r--r--src/test/test_entrynodes.c2
-rw-r--r--src/tools/tor-gencert.c12
14 files changed, 83 insertions, 56 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/container.c b/src/common/container.c
index 54f041bac7..7f02dec550 100644
--- a/src/common/container.c
+++ b/src/common/container.c
@@ -66,11 +66,17 @@ smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, int size)
#define MAX_CAPACITY (INT_MAX)
#else
#define MAX_CAPACITY (int)((SIZE_MAX / (sizeof(void*))))
+#define ASSERT_CAPACITY
#endif
if (size > sl->capacity) {
int higher = sl->capacity;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(size > MAX_CAPACITY/2)) {
+#ifdef ASSERT_CAPACITY
+ /* We don't include this assertion when MAX_CAPACITY == INT_MAX,
+ * since int size; (size <= INT_MAX) makes analysis tools think we're
+ * doing something stupid. */
tor_assert(size <= MAX_CAPACITY);
+#endif
higher = MAX_CAPACITY;
} else {
while (size > higher)
@@ -80,6 +86,8 @@ smartlist_ensure_capacity(smartlist_t *sl, int size)
sl->list = tor_reallocarray(sl->list, sizeof(void *),
((size_t)sl->capacity));
}
+#undef ASSERT_CAPACITY
+#undef MAX_CAPACITY
}
/** Append element to the end of the list. */
diff --git a/src/common/di_ops.c b/src/common/di_ops.c
index 14a1443400..a8bfd02532 100644
--- a/src/common/di_ops.c
+++ b/src/common/di_ops.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ tor_memeq(const void *a, const void *b, size_t sz)
* 1 & ((any_difference - 1) >> 8) == 0
*/
+ /*coverity[overflow]*/
return 1 & ((any_difference - 1) >> 8);
}
@@ -217,6 +218,7 @@ safe_mem_is_zero(const void *mem, size_t sz)
total |= *ptr++;
}
+ /*coverity[overflow]*/
return 1 & ((total - 1) >> 8);
}
diff --git a/src/common/sandbox.c b/src/common/sandbox.c
index 05b91be7be..e735feb018 100644
--- a/src/common/sandbox.c
+++ b/src/common/sandbox.c
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ static sandbox_cfg_t *filter_dynamic = NULL;
#undef SCMP_CMP
#define SCMP_CMP(a,b,c) ((struct scmp_arg_cmp){(a),(b),(c),0})
+#define SCMP_CMP_STR(a,b,c) \
+ ((struct scmp_arg_cmp){(a),(b),(intptr_t)(void*)(c),0})
#define SCMP_CMP4(a,b,c,d) ((struct scmp_arg_cmp){(a),(b),(c),(d)})
/* We use a wrapper here because these masked comparisons seem to be pretty
* verbose. Also, it's important to cast to scmp_datum_t before negating the
@@ -252,7 +254,7 @@ sb_execve(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
== SCMP_SYS(execve)) {
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(execve),
- SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
+ SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
if (rc != 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add execve syscall, received "
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
@@ -389,7 +391,7 @@ sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
== SCMP_SYS(open)) {
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open),
- SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
+ SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
if (rc != 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received "
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
@@ -444,8 +446,8 @@ sb_rename(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(rename)) {
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rename),
- SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
- SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value2));
+ SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
+ SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value2));
if (rc != 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add rename syscall, received "
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
@@ -475,7 +477,7 @@ sb_openat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
== SCMP_SYS(openat)) {
rc = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat),
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
- SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
+ SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_DIRECTORY|
O_CLOEXEC));
if (rc != 0) {
@@ -884,7 +886,7 @@ sb_stat64(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && (param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(open)
|| param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(stat64))) {
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(stat64),
- SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
+ SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
if (rc != 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received "
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
@@ -967,7 +969,7 @@ static int
prot_strings_helper(strmap_t *locations,
char **pr_mem_next_p,
size_t *pr_mem_left_p,
- intptr_t *value_p)
+ char **value_p)
{
char *param_val;
size_t param_size;
@@ -983,7 +985,7 @@ prot_strings_helper(strmap_t *locations,
if (location) {
// We already interned this string.
tor_free(param_val);
- *value_p = (intptr_t) location;
+ *value_p = location;
return 0;
} else if (*pr_mem_left_p >= param_size) {
// copy to protected
@@ -992,7 +994,7 @@ prot_strings_helper(strmap_t *locations,
// re-point el parameter to protected
tor_free(param_val);
- *value_p = (intptr_t) location;
+ *value_p = location;
strmap_set(locations, location, location); /* good real estate advice */
@@ -1082,7 +1084,7 @@ prot_strings(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base));
if (ret) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) munmap protected memory filter fail!");
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
/*
@@ -1101,7 +1103,7 @@ prot_strings(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE));
if (ret) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mprotect protected memory filter fail (LT)!");
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
ret = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
@@ -1111,7 +1113,7 @@ prot_strings(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE));
if (ret) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mprotect protected memory filter fail (GT)!");
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
out:
@@ -1126,7 +1128,7 @@ prot_strings(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg)
* point.
*/
static sandbox_cfg_t*
-new_element2(int syscall, intptr_t value, intptr_t value2)
+new_element2(int syscall, char *value, char *value2)
{
smp_param_t *param = NULL;
@@ -1142,9 +1144,9 @@ new_element2(int syscall, intptr_t value, intptr_t value2)
}
static sandbox_cfg_t*
-new_element(int syscall, intptr_t value)
+new_element(int syscall, char *value)
{
- return new_element2(syscall, value, 0);
+ return new_element2(syscall, value, NULL);
}
#ifdef __NR_stat64
@@ -1158,7 +1160,7 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
{
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
- elem = new_element(SCMP_stat, (intptr_t)(void*) file);
+ elem = new_element(SCMP_stat, file);
if (!elem) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
return -1;
@@ -1197,7 +1199,7 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
{
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
- elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(open), (intptr_t)(void *) file);
+ elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(open), file);
if (!elem) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
return -1;
@@ -1214,9 +1216,7 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_rename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file1, char *file2)
{
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
- elem = new_element2(SCMP_SYS(rename),
- (intptr_t)(void *) file1,
- (intptr_t)(void *) file2);
+ elem = new_element2(SCMP_SYS(rename), file1, file2);
if (!elem) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file)
{
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
- elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(openat), (intptr_t)(void *) file);
+ elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(openat), file);
if (!elem) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
return -1;
@@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com)
{
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
- elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(execve), (intptr_t)(void *) com);
+ elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(execve), com);
if (!elem) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!");
return -1;
diff --git a/src/common/sandbox.h b/src/common/sandbox.h
index 20d5d5080c..b4bb294750 100644
--- a/src/common/sandbox.h
+++ b/src/common/sandbox.h
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ typedef struct smp_param {
int syscall;
/** parameter value. */
- intptr_t value;
+ char *value;
/** parameter value, second argument. */
- intptr_t value2;
+ char *value2;
/** parameter flag (0 = not protected, 1 = protected). */
int prot;
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index 0f989684cf..5fe8d81c59 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -2611,16 +2611,20 @@ check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
int
tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
+#if defined(V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER) && defined(V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT)
+ return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
+#else
if (tls->isServer) {
-#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
+# ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
-#endif
+# endif
} else {
-#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
+# ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
-#endif
+# endif
}
return 1;
+#endif
}
/** Return true iff <b>name</b> is a DN of a kind that could only
diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c
index 4029512978..16ff8e3a80 100644
--- a/src/common/util.c
+++ b/src/common/util.c
@@ -4052,8 +4052,11 @@ tor_spawn_background(const char *const filename, const char **argv,
status = process_handle->status = PROCESS_STATUS_RUNNING;
/* Set stdout/stderr pipes to be non-blocking */
- fcntl(process_handle->stdout_pipe, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
- fcntl(process_handle->stderr_pipe, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (fcntl(process_handle->stdout_pipe, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0 ||
+ fcntl(process_handle->stderr_pipe, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Failed to set stderror/stdout pipes nonblocking "
+ "in parent process: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
/* Open the buffered IO streams */
process_handle->stdout_handle = fdopen(process_handle->stdout_pipe, "r");
process_handle->stderr_handle = fdopen(process_handle->stderr_pipe, "r");
diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.c b/src/or/circuitstats.c
index 5cdd534507..88a1f9b46c 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitstats.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitstats.c
@@ -1371,10 +1371,11 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
}
cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx = 0;
+#define MAX_TIMEOUT ((int32_t) (INT32_MAX/2))
/* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout
* to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */
if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) {
- if (cbt->timeout_ms > INT32_MAX/2 || cbt->close_ms > INT32_MAX/2) {
+ if (cbt->timeout_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT || cbt->close_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. "
"(timeout = %fmsec, close = %fmsec)",
cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms);
@@ -1386,6 +1387,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms
= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
}
+#undef MAX_TIMEOUT
cbt_control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET);
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index a920ac835e..b3a9dd693e 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
{
int used_quoted_string = 0;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
- const char *errstr = NULL;
+ const char *errstr = "Unknown error";
char *password;
size_t password_len;
const char *cp;
@@ -1160,9 +1160,10 @@ handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
}
if (bad) {
if (!also_cookie) {
- log_warn(LD_CONTROL,
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Couldn't decode HashedControlPassword: invalid base16");
errstr="Couldn't decode HashedControlPassword value in configuration.";
+ goto err;
}
bad_password = 1;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
@@ -1198,8 +1199,7 @@ handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
err:
tor_free(password);
- connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "515 Authentication failed: %s\r\n",
- errstr ? errstr : "Unknown reason.");
+ connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "515 Authentication failed: %s\r\n", errstr);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return 0;
ok:
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index f33437ff52..52258e875f 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -1959,13 +1959,12 @@ routerstatus_format_entry(const routerstatus_t *rs, const char *version,
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char identity64[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1];
char digest64[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1];
- smartlist_t *chunks = NULL;
+ smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
format_iso_time(published, rs->published_on);
digest_to_base64(identity64, rs->identity_digest);
digest_to_base64(digest64, rs->descriptor_digest);
- chunks = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
"r %s %s %s%s%s %s %d %d\n",
rs->nickname,
@@ -2090,10 +2089,8 @@ routerstatus_format_entry(const routerstatus_t *rs, const char *version,
result = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
err:
- if (chunks) {
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(chunks);
- }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 30f132115b..cf6b88eb31 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ STATIC char *
format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key,
networkstatus_t *v3_ns)
{
- smartlist_t *chunks;
+ smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
const char *client_versions = NULL, *server_versions = NULL;
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key,
server_versions_line = tor_strdup("");
}
- chunks = smartlist_new();
{
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char va[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
@@ -230,10 +229,9 @@ format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key,
done:
tor_free(client_versions_line);
tor_free(server_versions_line);
- if (chunks) {
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(chunks);
- }
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
return status;
}
@@ -2275,8 +2273,11 @@ networkstatus_add_detached_signatures(networkstatus_t *target,
if (!sig->good_signature && !sig->bad_signature) {
cert = authority_cert_get_by_digests(sig->identity_digest,
sig->signing_key_digest);
- if (cert)
- networkstatus_check_document_signature(target, sig, cert);
+ if (cert) {
+ /* Not checking the return value here, since we are going to look
+ * at the status of sig->good_signature in a moment. */
+ (void) networkstatus_check_document_signature(target, sig, cert);
+ }
}
/* If this signature is good, or we don't have any signature yet,
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 629e42cdf2..0633c35fbb 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -1446,10 +1446,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
memwipe(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
/* Free the parsed cell */
- if (parsed_req) {
- rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req);
- parsed_req = NULL;
- }
+ rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req);
/* Free rp if we must */
if (need_rp_free) extend_info_free(rp);
@@ -1539,7 +1536,6 @@ void
rend_service_free_intro(rend_intro_cell_t *request)
{
if (!request) {
- log_info(LD_BUG, "rend_service_free_intro() called with NULL request!");
return;
}
@@ -1648,7 +1644,7 @@ rend_service_begin_parse_intro(const uint8_t *request,
goto done;
err:
- if (rv) rend_service_free_intro(rv);
+ rend_service_free_intro(rv);
rv = NULL;
if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 12ed71d01e..14451c0cd8 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ scale_array_elements_to_u64(u64_dbl_t *entries, int n_entries,
double scale_factor;
int i;
/* big, but far away from overflowing an int64_t */
-#define SCALE_TO_U64_MAX (INT64_MAX / 4)
+#define SCALE_TO_U64_MAX ((int64_t) (INT64_MAX / 4))
for (i = 0; i < n_entries; ++i)
total += entries[i].dbl;
diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
index fbb7625f84..fab82c3446 100644
--- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple(void *arg)
done:
state_lines_free(entry_state_lines);
or_state_free(state);
+ tor_free(msg);
}
/** Similar to test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple() but aims to test
@@ -515,6 +516,7 @@ test_entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias(void *arg)
done:
or_state_free(state);
state_lines_free(entry_state_lines);
+ tor_free(msg);
}
/* Simple test of entry_guards_set_from_config() by specifying a
diff --git a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c
index e799df5cad..fae26ef956 100644
--- a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c
+++ b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c
@@ -134,18 +134,30 @@ parse_commandline(int argc, char **argv)
fprintf(stderr, "No argument to -i\n");
return 1;
}
+ if (identity_key_file) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate values for -i\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
identity_key_file = tor_strdup(argv[++i]);
} else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-s")) {
if (i+1>=argc) {
fprintf(stderr, "No argument to -s\n");
return 1;
}
+ if (signing_key_file) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate values for -s\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
signing_key_file = tor_strdup(argv[++i]);
} else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-c")) {
if (i+1>=argc) {
fprintf(stderr, "No argument to -c\n");
return 1;
}
+ if (certificate_file) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate values for -c\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
certificate_file = tor_strdup(argv[++i]);
} else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-m")) {
if (i+1>=argc) {
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