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-rw-r--r--src/test/test_entrynodes.c3208
1 files changed, 2605 insertions, 603 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
index b1c3accfab..3b54ffa2e9 100644
--- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
@@ -1,18 +1,25 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2014-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* Copyright (c) 2014-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#include "orconfig.h"
+#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
#define STATEFILE_PRIVATE
#define ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE
#define ROUTERLIST_PRIVATE
+#define DIRECTORY_PRIVATE
#include "or.h"
#include "test.h"
+#include "bridges.h"
+#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "config.h"
+#include "confparse.h"
+#include "directory.h"
#include "entrynodes.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
+#include "networkstatus.h"
#include "policies.h"
#include "routerlist.h"
#include "routerparse.h"
@@ -21,6 +28,7 @@
#include "util.h"
#include "test_helpers.h"
+#include "log_test_helpers.h"
/* TODO:
* choose_random_entry() test with state set.
@@ -39,37 +47,128 @@ get_or_state_replacement(void)
return dummy_state;
}
+static networkstatus_t *dummy_consensus = NULL;
+
+static smartlist_t *big_fake_net_nodes = NULL;
+
+static smartlist_t *
+bfn_mock_nodelist_get_list(void)
+{
+ return big_fake_net_nodes;
+}
+
+static networkstatus_t *
+bfn_mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time_t now)
+{
+ (void)now;
+ return dummy_consensus;
+}
+
+static const node_t *
+bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(const char *id)
+{
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n,
+ if (fast_memeq(n->identity, id, 20))
+ return n);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/* Unittest cleanup function: Cleanup the fake network. */
static int
-fake_network_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr)
+big_fake_network_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr)
{
(void) testcase;
(void) ptr;
- routerlist_free_all();
- nodelist_free_all();
- entry_guards_free_all();
+ if (big_fake_net_nodes) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, {
+ tor_free(n->rs);
+ tor_free(n->md);
+ tor_free(n);
+ });
+ smartlist_free(big_fake_net_nodes);
+ }
+
+ UNMOCK(nodelist_get_list);
+ UNMOCK(node_get_by_id);
+ UNMOCK(get_or_state);
+ UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
or_state_free(dummy_state);
+ dummy_state = NULL;
+ tor_free(dummy_consensus);
return 1; /* NOP */
}
/* Unittest setup function: Setup a fake network. */
static void *
-fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase)
+big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase)
{
- (void) testcase;
+ int i;
+
+ /* These are minimal node_t objects that only contain the aspects of node_t
+ * that we need for entrynodes.c. */
+ const int N_NODES = 271;
+
+ big_fake_net_nodes = smartlist_new();
+ for (i = 0; i < N_NODES; ++i) {
+ node_t *n = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(node_t));
+ n->md = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(microdesc_t));
+
+ crypto_rand(n->identity, sizeof(n->identity));
+ n->rs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerstatus_t));
+
+ memcpy(n->rs->identity_digest, n->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ n->is_running = n->is_valid = n->is_fast = n->is_stable = 1;
+
+ /* Note: all these guards have the same address, so you'll need to
+ * disable EnforceDistinctSubnets when a restriction is applied. */
+ n->rs->addr = 0x04020202;
+ n->rs->or_port = 1234;
+ n->rs->is_v2_dir = 1;
+ n->rs->has_bandwidth = 1;
+ n->rs->bandwidth_kb = 30;
+
+ /* Make a random nickname for each node */
+ {
+ char nickname_binary[8];
+ crypto_rand(nickname_binary, sizeof(nickname_binary));
+ base64_encode(n->rs->nickname, sizeof(n->rs->nickname),
+ nickname_binary, sizeof(nickname_binary), 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Call half of the nodes a possible guard. */
+ if (i % 2 == 0) {
+ n->is_possible_guard = 1;
+ n->rs->guardfraction_percentage = 100;
+ n->rs->has_guardfraction = 1;
+ }
+
+ smartlist_add(big_fake_net_nodes, n);
+ }
- /* Setup fake state */
dummy_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t));
+ dummy_consensus = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(networkstatus_t));
+ dummy_consensus->valid_after = approx_time() - 3600;
+ dummy_consensus->valid_until = approx_time() + 3600;
+
+ MOCK(nodelist_get_list, bfn_mock_nodelist_get_list);
+ MOCK(node_get_by_id, bfn_mock_node_get_by_id);
MOCK(get_or_state,
get_or_state_replacement);
-
- /* Setup fake routerlist. */
- helper_setup_fake_routerlist();
-
+ MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
+ bfn_mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
/* Return anything but NULL (it's interpreted as test fail) */
- return dummy_state;
+ return (void*)testcase;
+}
+
+static time_t
+mock_randomize_time_no_randomization(time_t a, time_t b)
+{
+ (void) b;
+ return a;
}
static or_options_t mocked_options;
@@ -80,796 +179,2699 @@ mock_get_options(void)
return &mocked_options;
}
-/** Test choose_random_entry() with none of our routers being guard nodes. */
+#define TEST_IPV4_ADDR "123.45.67.89"
+#define TEST_IPV6_ADDR "[1234:5678:90ab:cdef::]"
+
static void
-test_choose_random_entry_no_guards(void *arg)
+test_node_preferred_orport(void *arg)
{
- const node_t *chosen_entry = NULL;
-
- (void) arg;
+ (void)arg;
+ tor_addr_t ipv4_addr;
+ const uint16_t ipv4_port = 4444;
+ tor_addr_t ipv6_addr;
+ const uint16_t ipv6_port = 6666;
+ routerinfo_t node_ri;
+ node_t node;
+ tor_addr_port_t ap;
+ /* Setup options */
+ memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
+ /* We don't test ClientPreferIPv6ORPort here, because it's used in
+ * nodelist_set_consensus to setup node.ipv6_preferred, which we set
+ * directly. */
MOCK(get_options, mock_get_options);
- /* Check that we get a guard if it passes preferred
- * address settings */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
+ /* Setup IP addresses */
+ tor_addr_parse(&ipv4_addr, TEST_IPV4_ADDR);
+ tor_addr_parse(&ipv6_addr, TEST_IPV6_ADDR);
+
+ /* Setup node_ri */
+ memset(&node_ri, 0, sizeof(node_ri));
+ node_ri.addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&ipv4_addr);
+ node_ri.or_port = ipv4_port;
+ tor_addr_copy(&node_ri.ipv6_addr, &ipv6_addr);
+ node_ri.ipv6_orport = ipv6_port;
+
+ /* Setup node */
+ memset(&node, 0, sizeof(node));
+ node.ri = &node_ri;
+
+ /* Check the preferred address is IPv4 if we're only using IPv4, regardless
+ * of whether we prefer it or not */
mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = 0;
+ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 0;
+ node.ipv6_preferred = 0;
+ node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv4_addr));
+ tt_assert(ap.port == ipv4_port);
- /* Try to pick an entry even though none of our routers are guards. */
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
+ node.ipv6_preferred = 1;
+ node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv4_addr));
+ tt_assert(ap.port == ipv4_port);
- /* Unintuitively, we actually pick a random node as our entry,
- because router_choose_random_node() relaxes its constraints if it
- can't find a proper entry guard. */
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+ /* Check the preferred address is IPv4 if we're using IPv4 and IPv6, but
+ * don't prefer the IPv6 address */
+ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
+ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
+ node.ipv6_preferred = 0;
+ node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv4_addr));
+ tt_assert(ap.port == ipv4_port);
- /* And with the other IP version active */
+ /* Check the preferred address is IPv6 if we prefer it and
+ * ClientUseIPv6 is 1, regardless of ClientUseIPv4 */
+ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+ node.ipv6_preferred = 1;
+ node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv6_addr));
+ tt_assert(ap.port == ipv6_port);
- /* And with the preference on auto */
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = -1;
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0;
+ node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv6_addr));
+ tt_assert(ap.port == ipv6_port);
- /* Check that we don't get a guard if it doesn't pass mandatory address
- * settings */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
+ /* Check the preferred address is IPv6 if we don't prefer it, but
+ * ClientUseIPv4 is 0 */
mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = 0;
+ mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
+ node.ipv6_preferred = fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(&mocked_options);
+ node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
+ tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv6_addr));
+ tt_assert(ap.port == ipv6_port);
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
+ done:
+ UNMOCK(get_options);
+}
- /* If we don't allow IPv4 at all, we don't get a guard*/
- tt_assert(!chosen_entry);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_describe(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ entry_guard_t g;
+ memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+ strlcpy(g.nickname, "okefenokee", sizeof(g.nickname));
+ memcpy(g.identity, "theforestprimeval---", DIGEST_LEN);
- /* Check that we get a guard if it passes allowed but not preferred address
- * settings */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = 1;
+ tt_str_op(entry_guard_describe(&g), OP_EQ,
+ "okefenokee ($746865666F726573747072696D6576616C2D2D2D)");
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+ done:
+ ;
+}
- /* Check that we get a guard if it passes preferred address settings when
- * they're auto */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = -1;
+static void
+test_entry_guard_randomize_time(void *arg)
+{
+ const time_t now = 1479153573;
+ const int delay = 86400;
+ const int N = 1000;
+ (void)arg;
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+ time_t t;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
+ t = randomize_time(now, delay);
+ tt_int_op(t, OP_LE, now);
+ tt_int_op(t, OP_GE, now-delay);
+ }
- /* And with IPv6 active */
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
+ /* now try the corner cases */
+ for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
+ t = randomize_time(100, delay);
+ tt_int_op(t, OP_GE, 1);
+ tt_int_op(t, OP_LE, 100);
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+ t = randomize_time(0, delay);
+ tt_int_op(t, OP_EQ, 1);
+ }
done:
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- UNMOCK(get_options);
+ ;
}
-/** Test choose_random_entry() with only one of our routers being a
- guard node. */
static void
-test_choose_random_entry_one_possible_guard(void *arg)
+test_entry_guard_encode_for_state_minimal(void *arg)
{
- const node_t *chosen_entry = NULL;
- node_t *the_guard = NULL;
- smartlist_t *our_nodelist = NULL;
-
(void) arg;
+ entry_guard_t *eg = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
- MOCK(get_options, mock_get_options);
+ eg->selection_name = tor_strdup("wubwub");
+ memcpy(eg->identity, "plurpyflurpyslurpydo", DIGEST_LEN);
+ eg->sampled_on_date = 1479081600;
+ eg->confirmed_idx = -1;
- /* Set one of the nodes to be a guard. */
- our_nodelist = nodelist_get_list();
- the_guard = smartlist_get(our_nodelist, 4); /* chosen by fair dice roll */
- the_guard->is_possible_guard = 1;
+ char *s = NULL;
+ s = entry_guard_encode_for_state(eg);
- /* Check that we get the guard if it passes preferred
- * address settings */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = 0;
+ tt_str_op(s, OP_EQ,
+ "in=wubwub "
+ "rsa_id=706C75727079666C75727079736C75727079646F "
+ "sampled_on=2016-11-14T00:00:00 "
+ "listed=0");
- /* Pick an entry. Make sure we pick the node we marked as guard. */
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_ptr_op(chosen_entry, OP_EQ, the_guard);
+ done:
+ entry_guard_free(eg);
+ tor_free(s);
+}
- /* And with the other IP version active */
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_ptr_op(chosen_entry, OP_EQ, the_guard);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_encode_for_state_maximal(void *arg)
+{
+ (void) arg;
+ entry_guard_t *eg = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
+
+ strlcpy(eg->nickname, "Fred", sizeof(eg->nickname));
+ eg->selection_name = tor_strdup("default");
+ memcpy(eg->identity, "plurpyflurpyslurpydo", DIGEST_LEN);
+ eg->bridge_addr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_addr_port_t));
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&eg->bridge_addr->addr, 0x08080404);
+ eg->bridge_addr->port = 9999;
+ eg->sampled_on_date = 1479081600;
+ eg->sampled_by_version = tor_strdup("1.2.3");
+ eg->unlisted_since_date = 1479081645;
+ eg->currently_listed = 1;
+ eg->confirmed_on_date = 1479081690;
+ eg->confirmed_idx = 333;
+ eg->extra_state_fields = tor_strdup("and the green grass grew all around");
+
+ char *s = NULL;
+ s = entry_guard_encode_for_state(eg);
+
+ tt_str_op(s, OP_EQ,
+ "in=default "
+ "rsa_id=706C75727079666C75727079736C75727079646F "
+ "bridge_addr=8.8.4.4:9999 "
+ "nickname=Fred "
+ "sampled_on=2016-11-14T00:00:00 "
+ "sampled_by=1.2.3 "
+ "unlisted_since=2016-11-14T00:00:45 "
+ "listed=1 "
+ "confirmed_on=2016-11-14T00:01:30 "
+ "confirmed_idx=333 "
+ "and the green grass grew all around");
- /* And with the preference on auto */
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = -1;
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_ptr_op(chosen_entry, OP_EQ, the_guard);
+ done:
+ entry_guard_free(eg);
+ tor_free(s);
+}
- /* Check that we don't get a guard if it doesn't pass mandatory address
- * settings */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = 0;
+static void
+test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_minimal(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ char *mem_op_hex_tmp = NULL;
+ entry_guard_t *eg = NULL;
+ time_t t = approx_time();
+
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state(
+ "in=default_plus "
+ "rsa_id=596f75206d6179206e656564206120686f626279");
+ tt_assert(eg);
+
+ tt_str_op(eg->selection_name, OP_EQ, "default_plus");
+ test_mem_op_hex(eg->identity, OP_EQ,
+ "596f75206d6179206e656564206120686f626279");
+ tt_str_op(eg->nickname, OP_EQ, "$596F75206D6179206E656564206120686F626279");
+ tt_ptr_op(eg->bridge_addr, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->sampled_on_date, OP_GE, t);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->sampled_on_date, OP_LE, t+86400);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(eg->sampled_by_version, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(eg->currently_listed, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->confirmed_on_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(eg->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ tt_int_op(eg->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(eg->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
+ done:
+ entry_guard_free(eg);
+ tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp);
+}
+
+static void
+test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_maximal(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ char *mem_op_hex_tmp = NULL;
+ entry_guard_t *eg = NULL;
+
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state(
+ "in=fred "
+ "rsa_id=706C75727079666C75727079736C75727079646F "
+ "bridge_addr=[1::3]:9999 "
+ "nickname=Fred "
+ "sampled_on=2016-11-14T00:00:00 "
+ "sampled_by=1.2.3 "
+ "unlisted_since=2016-11-14T00:00:45 "
+ "listed=1 "
+ "confirmed_on=2016-11-14T00:01:30 "
+ "confirmed_idx=333 "
+ "and the green grass grew all around "
+ "rsa_id=all,around");
+ tt_assert(eg);
+
+ test_mem_op_hex(eg->identity, OP_EQ,
+ "706C75727079666C75727079736C75727079646F");
+ tt_str_op(fmt_addr(&eg->bridge_addr->addr), OP_EQ, "1::3");
+ tt_int_op(eg->bridge_addr->port, OP_EQ, 9999);
+ tt_str_op(eg->nickname, OP_EQ, "Fred");
+ tt_i64_op(eg->sampled_on_date, OP_EQ, 1479081600);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, 1479081645);
+ tt_str_op(eg->sampled_by_version, OP_EQ, "1.2.3");
+ tt_int_op(eg->currently_listed, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->confirmed_on_date, OP_EQ, 1479081690);
+ tt_int_op(eg->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 333);
+ tt_str_op(eg->extra_state_fields, OP_EQ,
+ "and the green grass grew all around rsa_id=all,around");
+
+ tt_int_op(eg->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(eg->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
- /* If we don't allow IPv4 at all, we don't get a guard*/
- tt_assert(!chosen_entry);
+ done:
+ entry_guard_free(eg);
+ tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp);
+}
- /* Check that we get a node if it passes allowed but not preferred
- * address settings */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = 1;
+static void
+test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_failure(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ entry_guard_t *eg = NULL;
+
+ /* no selection */
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state(
+ "rsa_id=596f75206d6179206e656564206120686f626270");
+ tt_ptr_op(eg, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+ /* no RSA ID. */
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state("in=default nickname=Fred");
+ tt_ptr_op(eg, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+ /* Bad RSA ID: bad character. */
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state(
+ "in=default "
+ "rsa_id=596f75206d6179206e656564206120686f62627q");
+ tt_ptr_op(eg, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+ /* Bad RSA ID: too long.*/
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state(
+ "in=default "
+ "rsa_id=596f75206d6179206e656564206120686f6262703");
+ tt_ptr_op(eg, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+ /* Bad RSA ID: too short.*/
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state(
+ "in=default "
+ "rsa_id=596f75206d6179206e65656420612");
+ tt_ptr_op(eg, OP_EQ, NULL);
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
+ done:
+ entry_guard_free(eg);
+}
- /* We disable the guard check and the preferred address check at the same
- * time, so we can't be sure we get the guard */
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_partial_failure(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ char *mem_op_hex_tmp = NULL;
+ entry_guard_t *eg = NULL;
+ time_t t = approx_time();
+
+ eg = entry_guard_parse_from_state(
+ "in=default "
+ "rsa_id=706C75727079666C75727079736C75727079646F "
+ "bridge_addr=1.2.3.3.4:5 "
+ "nickname=FredIsANodeWithAStrangeNicknameThatIsTooLong "
+ "sampled_on=2016-11-14T00:00:99 "
+ "sampled_by=1.2.3 stuff in the middle "
+ "unlisted_since=2016-xx-14T00:00:45 "
+ "listed=0 "
+ "confirmed_on=2016-11-14T00:01:30zz "
+ "confirmed_idx=idx "
+ "and the green grass grew all around "
+ "rsa_id=all,around");
+ tt_assert(eg);
+
+ test_mem_op_hex(eg->identity, OP_EQ,
+ "706C75727079666C75727079736C75727079646F");
+ tt_str_op(eg->nickname, OP_EQ, "FredIsANodeWithAStrangeNicknameThatIsTooL");
+ tt_ptr_op(eg->bridge_addr, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->sampled_on_date, OP_EQ, t);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_str_op(eg->sampled_by_version, OP_EQ, "1.2.3");
+ tt_int_op(eg->currently_listed, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_i64_op(eg->confirmed_on_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(eg->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+ tt_str_op(eg->extra_state_fields, OP_EQ,
+ "stuff in the middle and the green grass grew all around "
+ "rsa_id=all,around");
+
+ tt_int_op(eg->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(eg->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
- /* Check that we get a node if it is allowed but not preferred when settings
- * are auto */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientPreferIPv6ORPort = -1;
+ done:
+ entry_guard_free(eg);
+ tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp);
+}
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
+static int
+mock_entry_guard_is_listed(guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_t *guard)
+{
+ (void)gs;
+ (void)guard;
+ return 1;
+}
- /* We disable the guard check and the preferred address check at the same
- * time, so we can't be sure we get the guard */
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_full(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ /* Here's a state I made while testing. The identities and locations for
+ * the bridges are redacted. */
+ const char STATE[] =
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=214F44BD5B638E8C817D47FF7C97397790BF0345 "
+ "nickname=TotallyNinja sampled_on=2016-11-12T19:32:49 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1\n"
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=052900AB0EA3ED54BAB84AE8A99E74E8693CE2B2 "
+ "nickname=5OfNovember sampled_on=2016-11-20T04:32:05 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-22T08:13:28 confirmed_idx=0 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=4.000000 pb_circ_successes=2.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=2.000000\n"
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A "
+ "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-24T08:45:30 confirmed_idx=4 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=5.000000 pb_circ_successes=5.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=5.000000\n"
+ "Guard in=wobblesome rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A "
+ "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1\n"
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=E9025AD60D86875D5F11548D536CC6AF60F0EF5E "
+ "nickname=maibrunn sampled_on=2016-11-25T22:36:38 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n"
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=DCD30B90BA3A792DA75DC54A327EF353FB84C38E "
+ "nickname=Unnamed sampled_on=2016-11-25T14:34:00 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n"
+ "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=8FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF2E "
+ "bridge_addr=24.1.1.1:443 sampled_on=2016-11-25T06:44:14 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1 "
+ "confirmed_on=2016-11-29T10:36:06 confirmed_idx=0 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=8.000000 pb_circ_successes=8.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=13.000000\n"
+ "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=5800000000000000000000000000000000000000 "
+ "bridge_addr=37.218.246.143:28366 "
+ "sampled_on=2016-11-18T15:07:34 sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n";
+
+ config_line_t *lines = NULL;
+ or_state_t *state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t));
+ int r = config_get_lines(STATE, &lines, 0);
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ smartlist_t *text = smartlist_new();
+ char *joined = NULL;
- /* and with IPv6 active */
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
+ // So nodes aren't expired. This is Tue, 13 Dec 2016 09:37:14 GMT
+ update_approx_time(1481621834);
+
+ MOCK(entry_guard_is_listed, mock_entry_guard_is_listed);
+
+ dummy_state = state;
+ MOCK(get_or_state,
+ get_or_state_replacement);
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_assert(chosen_entry);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_assert(lines);
+
+ state->Guard = lines;
+
+ /* Try it first without setting the result. */
+ r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, &msg);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ guard_selection_t *gs_br =
+ get_guard_selection_by_name("bridges", GS_TYPE_BRIDGE, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs_br, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+ r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ gs_br = get_guard_selection_by_name("bridges", GS_TYPE_BRIDGE, 0);
+ guard_selection_t *gs_df =
+ get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ guard_selection_t *gs_wb =
+ get_guard_selection_by_name("wobblesome", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+
+ tt_assert(gs_br);
+ tt_assert(gs_df);
+ tt_assert(gs_wb);
+
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 5);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_br->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 2);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_wb->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ /* Try again; make sure it doesn't double-add the guards. */
+ r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ gs_br = get_guard_selection_by_name("bridges", GS_TYPE_BRIDGE, 0);
+ gs_df = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_assert(gs_br);
+ tt_assert(gs_df);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 5);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_br->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 2);
+
+ /* Re-encode; it should be the same... almost. */
+ {
+ /* (Make a guard nonpersistent first) */
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards, 0);
+ g->is_persistent = 0;
+ }
+ config_free_lines(lines);
+ lines = state->Guard = NULL; // to prevent double-free.
+ entry_guards_update_state(state);
+ tt_assert(state->Guard);
+ lines = state->Guard;
+
+ config_line_t *ln;
+ for (ln = lines; ln; ln = ln->next) {
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(text, "%s %s\n",ln->key, ln->value);
+ }
+ joined = smartlist_join_strings(text, "", 0, NULL);
+ tt_str_op(joined, OP_EQ,
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=052900AB0EA3ED54BAB84AE8A99E74E8693CE2B2 "
+ "nickname=5OfNovember sampled_on=2016-11-20T04:32:05 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-22T08:13:28 confirmed_idx=0 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=4.000000 pb_circ_successes=2.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=2.000000\n"
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A "
+ "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-24T08:45:30 confirmed_idx=1 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=5.000000 pb_circ_successes=5.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=5.000000\n"
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=E9025AD60D86875D5F11548D536CC6AF60F0EF5E "
+ "nickname=maibrunn sampled_on=2016-11-25T22:36:38 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n"
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=DCD30B90BA3A792DA75DC54A327EF353FB84C38E "
+ "nickname=Unnamed sampled_on=2016-11-25T14:34:00 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n"
+ "Guard in=wobblesome rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A "
+ "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1\n"
+ "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=8FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF2E "
+ "bridge_addr=24.1.1.1:443 sampled_on=2016-11-25T06:44:14 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1 "
+ "confirmed_on=2016-11-29T10:36:06 confirmed_idx=0 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=8.000000 pb_circ_successes=8.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=13.000000\n"
+ "Guard in=bridges rsa_id=5800000000000000000000000000000000000000 "
+ "bridge_addr=37.218.246.143:28366 "
+ "sampled_on=2016-11-18T15:07:34 sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev listed=1\n");
done:
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- UNMOCK(get_options);
+ config_free_lines(lines);
+ tor_free(state);
+ tor_free(msg);
+ UNMOCK(get_or_state);
+ UNMOCK(entry_guard_is_listed);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(text, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(text);
+ tor_free(joined);
}
-/** Helper to conduct tests for populate_live_entry_guards().
+static void
+test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_broken(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ /* Here's a variation on the previous state. Every line but the first is
+ * busted somehow. */
+ const char STATE[] =
+ /* Okay. */
+ "Guard in=default rsa_id=214F44BD5B638E8C817D47FF7C97397790BF0345 "
+ "nickname=TotallyNinja sampled_on=2016-11-12T19:32:49 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1\n"
+ /* No selection listed. */
+ "Guard rsa_id=052900AB0EA3ED54BAB84AE8A99E74E8693CE2B2 "
+ "nickname=5OfNovember sampled_on=2016-11-20T04:32:05 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-22T08:13:28 confirmed_idx=0 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=4.000000 pb_circ_successes=2.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=2.000000\n"
+ /* Selection is "legacy"!! */
+ "Guard in=legacy rsa_id=7B700C0C207EBD0002E00F499BE265519AC3C25A "
+ "nickname=dc6jgk11 sampled_on=2016-11-28T11:50:13 "
+ "sampled_by=0.3.0.0-alpha-dev "
+ "listed=1 confirmed_on=2016-11-24T08:45:30 confirmed_idx=4 "
+ "pb_circ_attempts=5.000000 pb_circ_successes=5.000000 "
+ "pb_successful_circuits_closed=5.000000\n";
+
+ config_line_t *lines = NULL;
+ or_state_t *state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t));
+ int r = config_get_lines(STATE, &lines, 0);
+ char *msg = NULL;
+
+ dummy_state = state;
+ MOCK(get_or_state,
+ get_or_state_replacement);
+
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_assert(lines);
- This test adds some entry guards to our list, and then tests
- populate_live_entry_guards() to mke sure it filters them correctly.
+ state->Guard = lines;
+
+ /* First, no-set case. we should get an error. */
+ r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, &msg);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_LT, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_NE, NULL);
+ /* And we shouldn't have made anything. */
+ guard_selection_t *gs_df =
+ get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs_df, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ tor_free(msg);
+
+ /* Now see about the set case (which shouldn't happen IRL) */
+ r = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_LT, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_NE, NULL);
+ gs_df = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs_df, OP_NE, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs_df->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ done:
+ config_free_lines(lines);
+ tor_free(state);
+ tor_free(msg);
+ UNMOCK(get_or_state);
+}
- <b>num_needed</b> is the number of guard nodes we support. It's
- configurable to make sure we function properly with 1 or 3 guard
- nodes configured.
-*/
static void
-populate_live_entry_guards_test_helper(int num_needed)
+test_entry_guard_get_guard_selection_by_name(void *arg)
{
- smartlist_t *our_nodelist = NULL;
- smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
- const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
- or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
- int retval;
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs1, *gs2, *gs3;
+
+ gs1 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs1, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ gs1 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs1, OP_NE, NULL);
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
+ tt_assert(gs2 == gs1);
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_assert(gs2 == gs1);
+
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs2, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs2, OP_NE, NULL);
+ tt_assert(gs2 != gs1);
+ gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_assert(gs3 == gs2);
+
+ gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs3, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs3, OP_NE, NULL);
+ tt_assert(gs3 != gs2);
+ tt_assert(gs3 != gs1);
+ tt_assert(gs3 == get_guard_selection_info());
+
+ done:
+ entry_guards_free_all();
+}
- /* Set NumEntryGuards to the provided number. */
- options->NumEntryGuards = num_needed;
- tt_int_op(num_needed, OP_EQ, decide_num_guards(options, 0));
-
- /* The global entry guards smartlist should be empty now. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
-
- /* Walk the nodelist and add all nodes as entry guards. */
- our_nodelist = nodelist_get_list();
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(our_nodelist), OP_EQ, HELPER_NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
-
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(our_nodelist, const node_t *, node) {
- const node_t *node_tmp;
- node_tmp = add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 1, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(node_tmp);
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
-
- /* Make sure the nodes were added as entry guards. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ,
- HELPER_NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
-
- /* Ensure that all the possible entry guards are enough to satisfy us. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_GE, num_needed);
-
- /* Walk the entry guard list for some sanity checking */
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_entry_guards, const entry_guard_t *, entry) {
- /* Since we called add_an_entry_guard() with 'for_discovery' being
- False, all guards should have made_contact enabled. */
- tt_int_op(entry->made_contact, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
-
- /* First, try to get some fast guards. This should fail. */
- retval = populate_live_entry_guards(live_entry_guards,
- all_entry_guards,
- NULL,
- NO_DIRINFO, /* Don't care about DIRINFO*/
- 0, 0,
- 1); /* We want fast guard! */
- tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(live_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
-
- /* Now try to get some stable guards. This should fail too. */
- retval = populate_live_entry_guards(live_entry_guards,
- all_entry_guards,
- NULL,
- NO_DIRINFO,
- 0,
- 1, /* We want stable guard! */
- 0);
- tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(live_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
-
- /* Now try to get any guard we can find. This should succeed. */
- retval = populate_live_entry_guards(live_entry_guards,
- all_entry_guards,
- NULL,
- NO_DIRINFO,
- 0, 0, 0); /* No restrictions! */
-
- /* Since we had more than enough guards in 'all_entry_guards', we
- should have added 'num_needed' of them to live_entry_guards.
- 'retval' should be 1 since we now have enough live entry guards
- to pick one. */
- tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1);
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(live_entry_guards), OP_EQ, num_needed);
-
- done:
- smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
-}
-
-/* Test populate_live_entry_guards() for 1 guard node. */
-static void
-test_populate_live_entry_guards_1guard(void *arg)
+static void
+test_entry_guard_choose_selection_initial(void *arg)
{
- (void) arg;
+ /* Tests for picking our initial guard selection (based on having had
+ * no previous selection */
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;
+ const char *name = choose_guard_selection(get_options(),
+ dummy_consensus, NULL, &type);
+ tt_str_op(name, OP_EQ, "default");
+ tt_int_op(type, OP_EQ, GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+
+ /* If we're using bridges, we get the bridge selection. */
+ get_options_mutable()->UseBridges = 1;
+ name = choose_guard_selection(get_options(),
+ dummy_consensus, NULL, &type);
+ tt_str_op(name, OP_EQ, "bridges");
+ tt_int_op(type, OP_EQ, GS_TYPE_BRIDGE);
+ get_options_mutable()->UseBridges = 0;
+
+ /* If we discard >99% of our guards, though, we should be in the restricted
+ * set. */
+ tt_assert(get_options_mutable()->EntryNodes == NULL);
+ get_options_mutable()->EntryNodes = routerset_new();
+ routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->EntryNodes, "1.0.0.0/8", "foo");
+ name = choose_guard_selection(get_options(),
+ dummy_consensus, NULL, &type);
+ tt_str_op(name, OP_EQ, "restricted");
+ tt_int_op(type, OP_EQ, GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED);
- populate_live_entry_guards_test_helper(1);
+ done:
+ ;
}
-/* Test populate_live_entry_guards() for 3 guard nodes. */
static void
-test_populate_live_entry_guards_3guards(void *arg)
+test_entry_guard_add_single_guard(void *arg)
{
- (void) arg;
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+
+ /* 1: Add a single guard to the sample. */
+ node_t *n1 = smartlist_get(big_fake_net_nodes, 0);
+ time_t now = approx_time();
+ tt_assert(n1->is_possible_guard == 1);
+ entry_guard_t *g1 = entry_guard_add_to_sample(gs, n1);
+ tt_assert(g1);
+
+ /* Make sure its fields look right. */
+ tt_mem_op(n1->identity, OP_EQ, g1->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tt_i64_op(g1->sampled_on_date, OP_GE, now - 12*86400);
+ tt_i64_op(g1->sampled_on_date, OP_LE, now);
+ tt_str_op(g1->sampled_by_version, OP_EQ, VERSION);
+ tt_uint_op(g1->currently_listed, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_i64_op(g1->confirmed_on_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g1->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+ tt_int_op(g1->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_uint_op(g1->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+ tt_i64_op(g1->failing_since, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_uint_op(g1->is_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_uint_op(g1->is_usable_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_uint_op(g1->is_primary, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(g1->extra_state_fields, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+ /* Make sure it got added. */
+ tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards));
+ tt_ptr_op(g1, OP_EQ, smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0));
+ tt_ptr_op(g1, OP_EQ, get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, (uint8_t*)n1->identity));
+ const uint8_t bad_id[20] = {0};
+ tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, bad_id));
- populate_live_entry_guards_test_helper(3);
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
}
-/** Append some EntryGuard lines to the Tor state at <b>state</b>.
-
- <b>entry_guard_lines</b> is a smartlist containing 2-tuple
- smartlists that carry the key and values of the statefile.
- As an example:
- entry_guard_lines =
- (("EntryGuard", "name 67E72FF33D7D41BF11C569646A0A7B4B188340DF DirCache"),
- ("EntryGuardDownSince", "2014-06-07 16:02:46 2014-06-07 16:02:46"))
-*/
static void
-state_insert_entry_guard_helper(or_state_t *state,
- smartlist_t *entry_guard_lines)
+test_entry_guard_node_filter(void *arg)
{
- config_line_t **next, *line;
-
- next = &state->EntryGuards;
- *next = NULL;
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ bridge_line_t *bl = NULL;
+
+ /* Initialize a bunch of node objects that are all guards. */
+#define NUM 7
+ node_t *n[NUM];
+ entry_guard_t *g[NUM];
+ int i;
+ for (i=0; i < NUM; ++i) {
+ n[i] = smartlist_get(big_fake_net_nodes, i*2); // even ones are guards.
+ g[i] = entry_guard_add_to_sample(gs, n[i]);
+
+ // everything starts out filtered-in
+ tt_uint_op(g[i]->is_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_uint_op(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 1);
+ }
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, NUM);
- /* Loop over all the state lines in the smartlist */
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guard_lines, const smartlist_t *,state_lines) {
- /* Get key and value for each line */
- const char *state_key = smartlist_get(state_lines, 0);
- const char *state_value = smartlist_get(state_lines, 1);
+ /* Make sure refiltering doesn't hurt */
+ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs);
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM; ++i) {
+ tt_uint_op(g[i]->is_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_uint_op(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 1);
+ }
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, NUM);
+
+ /* Now start doing things to make the guards get filtered out, 1 by 1. */
+
+ /* 0: Not listed. */
+ g[0]->currently_listed = 0;
+
+ /* 1: path bias says this guard is maybe eeeevil. */
+ g[1]->pb.path_bias_disabled = 1;
+
+ /* 2: Unreachable address. */
+ n[2]->rs->addr = 0;
+
+ /* 3: ExcludeNodes */
+ n[3]->rs->addr = 0x90902020;
+ routerset_free(get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes);
+ get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes = routerset_new();
+ routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes, "144.144.0.0/16", "");
+
+ /* 4: Bridge. */
+ get_options_mutable()->UseBridges = 1;
+ sweep_bridge_list();
+ bl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_line_t));
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&bl->addr, n[4]->rs->addr);
+ bl->port = n[4]->rs->or_port;
+ memcpy(bl->digest, n[4]->identity, 20);
+ bridge_add_from_config(bl);
+ bl = NULL; // prevent free.
+ get_options_mutable()->UseBridges = 0;
+
+ /* 5: Unreachable. This stays in the filter, but isn't in usable-filtered */
+ g[5]->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time(); // prevent retry.
+ g[5]->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO;
+
+ /* 6: no change. */
+
+ /* Now refilter and inspect. */
+ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs);
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM; ++i) {
+ tt_assert(g[i]->is_filtered_guard == (i == 5 || i == 6));
+ tt_assert(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard == (i == 6));
+ }
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ /* Now make sure we have no live consensus, and no nodes. Nothing should
+ * pass the filter any more. */
+ tor_free(dummy_consensus);
+ dummy_consensus = NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, node, {
+ memset(node->identity, 0xff, 20);
+ });
+ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs);
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM; ++i) {
+ tt_uint_op(g[i]->is_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_uint_op(g[i]->is_usable_filtered_guard, OP_EQ, 0);
+ }
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, 0);
- *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
- line->key = tor_strdup(state_key);
- tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s", state_value);
- next = &(line->next);
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(state_lines);
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ tor_free(bl);
+#undef NUM
}
-/** Free memory occupied by <b>entry_guard_lines</b>. */
static void
-state_lines_free(smartlist_t *entry_guard_lines)
+test_entry_guard_expand_sample(void *arg)
{
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guard_lines, smartlist_t *, state_lines) {
- char *state_key = smartlist_get(state_lines, 0);
- char *state_value = smartlist_get(state_lines, 1);
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ digestmap_t *node_by_id = digestmap_new();
+
+ entry_guard_t *guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ tt_assert(guard); // the last guard returned.
+
+ // Every sampled guard here should be filtered and reachable for now.
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ,
+ num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL));
+
+ /* Make sure we got the right number. */
+ tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ,
+ num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL));
+
+ // Make sure everything we got was from our fake node list, and everything
+ // was unique.
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, g) {
+ const node_t *n = bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity);
+ tt_assert(n);
+ tt_ptr_op(NULL, OP_EQ, digestmap_get(node_by_id, g->identity));
+ digestmap_set(node_by_id, g->identity, (void*) n);
+ int idx = smartlist_pos(big_fake_net_nodes, n);
+ // The even ones are the guards; make sure we got guards.
+ tt_int_op(idx & 1, OP_EQ, 0);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(g);
+
+ // Nothing became unusable/unfiltered, so a subsequent expand should
+ // make no changes.
+ guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ tt_ptr_op(guard, OP_EQ, NULL); // no guard was added.
+ tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ,
+ num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL));
+
+ // Make a few guards unreachable.
+ guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0);
+ guard->is_usable_filtered_guard = 0;
+ guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 1);
+ guard->is_usable_filtered_guard = 0;
+ guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 2);
+ guard->is_usable_filtered_guard = 0;
+ tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE - 3, OP_EQ,
+ num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL));
+
+ // This time, expanding the sample will add some more guards.
+ guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ tt_assert(guard); // no guard was added.
+ tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ,
+ num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL));
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ,
+ num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL)+3);
+
+ // Still idempotent.
+ guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ tt_ptr_op(guard, OP_EQ, NULL); // no guard was added.
+ tt_int_op(DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE, OP_EQ,
+ num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL));
+
+ // Now, do a nasty trick: tell the filter to exclude 31/32 of the guards.
+ // This will cause the sample size to get reeeeally huge, while the
+ // filtered sample size grows only slowly.
+ routerset_free(get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes);
+ get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes = routerset_new();
+ routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes, "144.144.0.0/16", "");
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, {
+ if (n_sl_idx % 64 != 0) {
+ n->rs->addr = 0x90903030;
+ }
+ });
+ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs);
+
+ // Surely (p ~ 1-2**-60), one of our guards has been excluded.
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_LT,
+ DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE);
+
+ // Try to regenerate the guards.
+ guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ tt_assert(guard); // no guard was added.
+
+ /* this time, it's possible that we didn't add enough sampled guards. */
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_LE,
+ DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE);
+ /* but we definitely didn't exceed the sample maximum. */
+ const int n_guards = 271 / 2;
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_LE,
+ (int)(n_guards * .3));
- tor_free(state_key);
- tor_free(state_value);
- smartlist_free(state_lines);
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(state_lines);
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ digestmap_free(node_by_id, NULL);
+}
- smartlist_free(entry_guard_lines);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_expand_sample_small_net(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+
+ /* Fun corner case: not enough guards to make up our whole sample size. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, {
+ if (n_sl_idx >= 15) {
+ tor_free(n->rs);
+ tor_free(n->md);
+ tor_free(n);
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(big_fake_net_nodes, n);
+ } else {
+ n->rs->addr = 0; // make the filter reject this.
+ }
+ });
+
+ entry_guard_t *guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ tt_assert(guard); // the last guard returned -- some guard was added.
+ // half the nodes are guards, so we have 8 guards left. The set
+ // is small, so we sampled everything.
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 8);
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, 0);
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
}
-/* Tests entry_guards_parse_state(). It creates a fake Tor state with
- a saved entry guard and makes sure that Tor can parse it and
- creates the right entry node out of it.
-*/
static void
-test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple(void *arg)
+test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_status(void *arg)
{
- or_state_t *state = or_state_new();
- const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
- smartlist_t *entry_state_lines = smartlist_new();
- char *msg = NULL;
- int retval;
+ /* Here we're going to have some nodes become un-guardy, and say we got a
+ * new consensus. This should cause those nodes to get detected as
+ * unreachable. */
- /* Details of our fake guard node */
- const char *nickname = "hagbard";
- const char *fpr = "B29D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298212";
- const char *tor_version = "0.2.5.3-alpha-dev";
- const char *added_at = get_yesterday_date_str();
- const char *unlisted_since = "2014-06-08 16:16:50";
+ (void)arg;
+ int i;
+ time_t start = approx_time();
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ networkstatus_t *ns_tmp = NULL;
+
+ /* Don't randomly backdate stuff; it will make correctness harder to check.*/
+ MOCK(randomize_time, mock_randomize_time_no_randomization);
+
+ /* First, sample some guards. */
+ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ int n_sampled_pre = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards);
+ int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL);
+ tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre);
+ tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_GT, 10);
+
+ /* At this point, it should be a no-op to do this: */
+ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs);
+
+ /* Now let's make some of our guards become unlisted. The easiest way to
+ * do that would be to take away their guard flag. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ node_t *n = (node_t*) bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity);
+ tt_assert(n);
+ n->is_possible_guard = 0;
+ }
- (void) arg;
+ update_approx_time(start + 30);
+ {
+ /* try this with no live networkstatus. Nothing should happen! */
+ ns_tmp = dummy_consensus;
+ dummy_consensus = NULL;
+ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs);
+ tt_i64_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre);
+ tt_i64_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre);
+ /* put the networkstatus back. */
+ dummy_consensus = ns_tmp;
+ ns_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Now those guards should become unlisted, and drop off the filter, but
+ * stay in the sample. */
+ update_approx_time(start + 60);
+ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs);
+
+ tt_i64_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre);
+ tt_i64_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre-5);
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ tt_assert(! g->currently_listed);
+ tt_i64_op(g->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, start+60);
+ }
+ for (i = 5; i < n_sampled_pre; ++i) {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ tt_assert(g->currently_listed);
+ tt_i64_op(g->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Now re-list one, and remove one completely. */
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0);
+ node_t *n = (node_t*) bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity);
+ tt_assert(n);
+ n->is_possible_guard = 1;
+ }
+ {
+ /* try removing the node, to make sure we don't crash on an absent node
+ */
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 5);
+ node_t *n = (node_t*) bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity);
+ tt_assert(n);
+ smartlist_remove(big_fake_net_nodes, n);
+ tor_free(n->rs);
+ tor_free(n->md);
+ tor_free(n);
+ }
+ update_approx_time(start + 300);
+ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs);
+
+ /* guards 1..5 are now unlisted; 0,6,7.. are listed. */
+ tt_i64_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre);
+ for (i = 1; i < 6; ++i) {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ tt_assert(! g->currently_listed);
+ if (i == 5)
+ tt_i64_op(g->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, start+300);
+ else
+ tt_i64_op(g->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, start+60);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < n_sampled_pre; i = (!i) ? 6 : i+1) { /* 0,6,7,8, ... */
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ tt_assert(g->currently_listed);
+ tt_i64_op(g->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ }
- /* The global entry guards smartlist should be empty now. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
+ done:
+ tor_free(ns_tmp); /* in case we couldn't put it back */
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ UNMOCK(randomize_time);
+}
- { /* Prepare the state entry */
+static void
+test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_repair(void *arg)
+{
+ /* Here we'll make sure that our code to repair the unlisted-since
+ * times is correct. */
- /* Prepare the smartlist to hold the key/value of each line */
- smartlist_t *state_line = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuard");
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%s %s %s", nickname, fpr, "DirCache");
- smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
+ (void)arg;
+ int i;
+ time_t start = approx_time();
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+
+ /* Don't randomly backdate stuff; it will make correctness harder to check.*/
+ MOCK(randomize_time, mock_randomize_time_no_randomization);
+
+ /* First, sample some guards. */
+ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ int n_sampled_pre = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards);
+ int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL);
+ tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre);
+ tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_GT, 10);
+
+ /* Now corrupt the list a bit. Call some unlisted-since-never, and some
+ * listed-and-unlisted-since-a-time. */
+ update_approx_time(start + 300);
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
+ /* these will get a date. */
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ node_t *n = (node_t*) bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity);
+ tt_assert(n);
+ n->is_possible_guard = 0;
+ g->currently_listed = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 3; i < 6; ++i) {
+ /* these will become listed. */
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ g->unlisted_since_date = start+100;
+ }
+ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
+ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs);
+ expect_log_msg_containing(
+ "was listed, but with unlisted_since_date set");
+ expect_log_msg_containing(
+ "was unlisted, but with unlisted_since_date unset");
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre);
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre-3);
+ for (i = 3; i < n_sampled_pre; ++i) {
+ /* these will become listed. */
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ if (i < 3) {
+ tt_assert(! g->currently_listed);
+ tt_i64_op(g->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, start+300);
+ } else {
+ tt_assert(g->currently_listed);
+ tt_i64_op(g->unlisted_since_date, OP_EQ, 0);
+ }
+ }
- state_line = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardAddedBy");
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%s %s %s", fpr, tor_version, added_at);
- smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ UNMOCK(randomize_time);
+}
- state_line = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%s", unlisted_since);
- smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_remove(void *arg)
+{
+ /* Now let's check the logic responsible for removing guards from the
+ * sample entirely. */
+
+ (void)arg;
+ //int i;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ smartlist_t *keep_ids = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_t *remove_ids = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* Don't randomly backdate stuff; it will make correctness harder to check.*/
+ MOCK(randomize_time, mock_randomize_time_no_randomization);
+
+ /* First, sample some guards. */
+ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ int n_sampled_pre = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards);
+ int n_filtered_pre = num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL);
+ tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_EQ, n_filtered_pre);
+ tt_i64_op(n_sampled_pre, OP_GT, 10);
+
+ const time_t one_day_ago = approx_time() - 1*24*60*60;
+ const time_t one_year_ago = approx_time() - 365*24*60*60;
+ const time_t two_years_ago = approx_time() - 2*365*24*60*60;
+ /* 0: unlisted for a day. (keep this) */
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0);
+ node_t *n = (node_t*) bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity);
+ tt_assert(n);
+ n->is_possible_guard = 0;
+ g->currently_listed = 0;
+ g->unlisted_since_date = one_day_ago;
+ smartlist_add(keep_ids, tor_memdup(g->identity, 20));
+ }
+ /* 1: unlisted for a year. (remove this) */
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 1);
+ node_t *n = (node_t*) bfn_mock_node_get_by_id(g->identity);
+ tt_assert(n);
+ n->is_possible_guard = 0;
+ g->currently_listed = 0;
+ g->unlisted_since_date = one_year_ago;
+ smartlist_add(remove_ids, tor_memdup(g->identity, 20));
+ }
+ /* 2: added a day ago, never confirmed. (keep this) */
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 2);
+ g->sampled_on_date = one_day_ago;
+ smartlist_add(keep_ids, tor_memdup(g->identity, 20));
+ }
+ /* 3: added a year ago, never confirmed. (remove this) */
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 3);
+ g->sampled_on_date = one_year_ago;
+ smartlist_add(remove_ids, tor_memdup(g->identity, 20));
+ }
+ /* 4: added two year ago, confirmed yesterday, primary. (keep this.) */
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 4);
+ g->sampled_on_date = one_year_ago;
+ g->confirmed_on_date = one_day_ago;
+ g->confirmed_idx = 0;
+ g->is_primary = 1;
+ smartlist_add(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, g);
+ smartlist_add(gs->primary_entry_guards, g);
+ smartlist_add(keep_ids, tor_memdup(g->identity, 20));
+ }
+ /* 5: added two years ago, confirmed a year ago, primary. (remove this) */
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 5);
+ g->sampled_on_date = two_years_ago;
+ g->confirmed_on_date = one_year_ago;
+ g->confirmed_idx = 1;
+ g->is_primary = 1;
+ smartlist_add(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, g);
+ smartlist_add(gs->primary_entry_guards, g);
+ smartlist_add(remove_ids, tor_memdup(g->identity, 20));
}
- /* Inject our lines in the state */
- state_insert_entry_guard_helper(state, entry_state_lines);
+ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(gs);
- /* Parse state */
- retval = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg);
- tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0);
+ /* Did we remove the right ones? */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(keep_ids, uint8_t *, id, {
+ tt_assert(get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, id) != NULL);
+ });
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(remove_ids, uint8_t *, id, {
+ tt_want(get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, id) == NULL);
+ });
- /* Test that the guard was registered.
- We need to re-get the entry guard list since its pointer was
- overwritten in entry_guards_parse_state(). */
- all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1);
+ /* Did we remove the right number? */
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_sampled_pre - 3);
- { /* Test the entry guard structure */
- char hex_digest[1024];
- char str_time[1024];
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ UNMOCK(randomize_time);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(keep_ids, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(remove_ids, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(keep_ids);
+ smartlist_free(remove_ids);
+}
- const entry_guard_t *e = smartlist_get(all_entry_guards, 0);
- tt_str_op(e->nickname, OP_EQ, nickname); /* Verify nickname */
+static void
+test_entry_guard_confirming_guards(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ /* Now let's check the logic responsible for manipulating the list
+ * of confirmed guards */
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ MOCK(randomize_time, mock_randomize_time_no_randomization);
+
+ /* Create the sample. */
+ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+
+ /* Confirm a few guards. */
+ time_t start = approx_time();
+ entry_guard_t *g1 = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0);
+ entry_guard_t *g2 = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 1);
+ entry_guard_t *g3 = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 8);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, g2);
+ update_approx_time(start + 10);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, g1);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, g3);
+
+ /* Were the correct dates and indices fed in? */
+ tt_int_op(g1->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g3->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 2);
+ tt_i64_op(g1->confirmed_on_date, OP_EQ, start+10);
+ tt_i64_op(g2->confirmed_on_date, OP_EQ, start);
+ tt_i64_op(g3->confirmed_on_date, OP_EQ, start+10);
+ tt_ptr_op(smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 0), OP_EQ, g2);
+ tt_ptr_op(smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 1), OP_EQ, g1);
+ tt_ptr_op(smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 2), OP_EQ, g3);
+
+ /* Now make sure we can regenerate the confirmed_entry_guards list. */
+ smartlist_clear(gs->confirmed_entry_guards);
+ g2->confirmed_idx = 0;
+ g1->confirmed_idx = 10;
+ g3->confirmed_idx = 100;
+ entry_guards_update_confirmed(gs);
+ tt_int_op(g1->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g3->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 2);
+ tt_ptr_op(smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 0), OP_EQ, g2);
+ tt_ptr_op(smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 1), OP_EQ, g1);
+ tt_ptr_op(smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 2), OP_EQ, g3);
+
+ /* Now make sure we can regenerate the confirmed_entry_guards list if
+ * the indices are messed up. */
+ g1->confirmed_idx = g2->confirmed_idx = g3->confirmed_idx = 999;
+ smartlist_clear(gs->confirmed_entry_guards);
+ entry_guards_update_confirmed(gs);
+ tt_int_op(g1->confirmed_idx, OP_GE, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_GE, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g3->confirmed_idx, OP_GE, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g1->confirmed_idx, OP_LE, 2);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_LE, 2);
+ tt_int_op(g3->confirmed_idx, OP_LE, 2);
+ g1 = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 0);
+ g2 = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 1);
+ g3 = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 2);
+ tt_int_op(g1->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(g3->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 2);
+ tt_assert(g1 != g2);
+ tt_assert(g1 != g3);
+ tt_assert(g2 != g3);
- base16_encode(hex_digest, sizeof(hex_digest),
- e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
- tt_str_op(hex_digest, OP_EQ, fpr); /* Verify fingerprint */
+ done:
+ UNMOCK(randomize_time);
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+}
- tt_assert(e->is_dir_cache); /* Verify dirness */
+static void
+test_entry_guard_sample_reachable_filtered(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ const int N = 10000;
+ bitarray_t *selected = NULL;
+ int i, j;
+
+ /* We've got a sampled list now; let's make one non-usable-filtered; some
+ * confirmed, some primary, some pending.
+ */
+ int n_guards = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards);
+ tt_int_op(n_guards, OP_GT, 10);
+ entry_guard_t *g;
+ g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0);
+ g->is_pending = 1;
+ g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 1);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, g);
+ g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 2);
+ g->is_primary = 1;
+ g = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 3);
+ g->pb.path_bias_disabled = 1;
+
+ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(gs);
+ gs->primary_guards_up_to_date = 1;
+ tt_int_op(num_reachable_filtered_guards(gs, NULL), OP_EQ, n_guards - 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_guards);
+
+ // +1 since the one we made disabled will make another one get added.
+ ++n_guards;
+
+ /* Try a bunch of selections. */
+ const struct {
+ int flag; int idx;
+ } tests[] = {
+ { 0, -1 },
+ { SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_CONFIRMED, 1 },
+ { SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY|SAMPLE_NO_UPDATE_PRIMARY, 2 },
+ { SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PENDING, 0 },
+ { -1, -1},
+ };
+
+ for (j = 0; tests[j].flag >= 0; ++j) {
+ selected = bitarray_init_zero(n_guards);
+ const int excluded_flags = tests[j].flag;
+ const int excluded_idx = tests[j].idx;
+ for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
+ g = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, NULL, excluded_flags);
+ tor_assert(g);
+ int pos = smartlist_pos(gs->sampled_entry_guards, g);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_guards);
+ tt_int_op(pos, OP_GE, 0);
+ tt_int_op(pos, OP_LT, n_guards);
+ bitarray_set(selected, pos);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < n_guards; ++i) {
+ const int should_be_set = (i != excluded_idx &&
+ i != 3); // filtered out.
+ tt_int_op(!!bitarray_is_set(selected, i), OP_EQ, should_be_set);
+ }
+ bitarray_free(selected);
+ selected = NULL;
+ }
- tt_str_op(e->chosen_by_version, OP_EQ, tor_version); /* Verify version */
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ bitarray_free(selected);
+}
- tt_assert(e->made_contact); /* All saved guards have been contacted */
+static void
+test_entry_guard_sample_reachable_filtered_empty(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ /* What if we try to sample from a set of 0? */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n,
+ n->is_possible_guard = 0);
- tt_assert(e->bad_since); /* Verify bad_since timestamp */
- format_iso_time(str_time, e->bad_since);
- tt_str_op(str_time, OP_EQ, unlisted_since);
+ entry_guard_t *g = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, NULL, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, NULL);
- /* The rest should be unset */
- tt_assert(!e->unreachable_since);
- tt_assert(!e->can_retry);
- tt_assert(!e->path_bias_noticed);
- tt_assert(!e->path_bias_warned);
- tt_assert(!e->path_bias_extreme);
- tt_assert(!e->path_bias_disabled);
- tt_assert(!e->path_bias_use_noticed);
- tt_assert(!e->path_bias_use_extreme);
- tt_assert(!e->last_attempted);
- }
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+}
+
+static void
+test_entry_guard_retry_unreachable(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+
+ entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
+ /* Let's say that we have two guards, and they're down.
+ */
+ time_t start = approx_time();
+ entry_guard_t *g1 = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 0);
+ entry_guard_t *g2 = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 1);
+ entry_guard_t *g3 = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, 2);
+ g1->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO;
+ g2->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO;
+ g1->is_primary = 1;
+ g1->failing_since = g2->failing_since = start;
+ g1->last_tried_to_connect = g2->last_tried_to_connect = start;
+
+ /* Wait 5 minutes. Nothing will get retried. */
+ update_approx_time(start + 5 * 60);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g1);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g2);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g3); // just to make sure this doesn't crash.
+ tt_int_op(g1->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_NO);
+ tt_int_op(g2->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_NO);
+ tt_int_op(g3->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+
+ /* After 30 min, the primary one gets retried */
+ update_approx_time(start + 35 * 60);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g1);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g2);
+ tt_int_op(g1->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+ tt_int_op(g2->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_NO);
+
+ g1->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO;
+ g1->last_tried_to_connect = start + 55*60;
+
+ /* After 1 hour, we'll retry the nonprimary one. */
+ update_approx_time(start + 61 * 60);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g1);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g2);
+ tt_int_op(g1->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_NO);
+ tt_int_op(g2->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+
+ g2->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO;
+ g2->last_tried_to_connect = start + 61*60;
+
+ /* And then the primary one again. */
+ update_approx_time(start + 66 * 60);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g1);
+ entry_guard_consider_retry(g2);
+ tt_int_op(g1->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+ tt_int_op(g2->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_NO);
done:
- state_lines_free(entry_state_lines);
- or_state_free(state);
- tor_free(msg);
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
}
-/** Similar to test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple() but aims to test
- the PathBias-related details of the entry guard. */
static void
-test_entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias(void *arg)
+test_entry_guard_manage_primary(void *arg)
{
- or_state_t *state = or_state_new();
- const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
- char *msg = NULL;
- int retval;
- smartlist_t *entry_state_lines = smartlist_new();
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ smartlist_t *prev_guards = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* If no guards are confirmed, we should pick a few reachable guards and
+ * call them all primary. But not confirmed.*/
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+ int n_primary = smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards);
+ tt_int_op(n_primary, OP_GE, 1);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, g, {
+ tt_assert(g->is_primary);
+ tt_assert(g->confirmed_idx == -1);
+ });
+
+ /* Calling it a second time should leave the guards unchanged. */
+ smartlist_add_all(prev_guards, gs->primary_entry_guards);
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_primary);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, g, {
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, smartlist_get(prev_guards, g_sl_idx));
+ });
+
+ /* If we have one confirmed guard, that guards becomes the first primary
+ * guard, and the other primary guards get kept. */
+
+ /* find a non-primary guard... */
+ entry_guard_t *confirmed = NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, g, {
+ if (! g->is_primary) {
+ confirmed = g;
+ break;
+ }
+ });
+ tt_assert(confirmed);
+ /* make it confirmed. */
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, confirmed);
+ /* update the list... */
+ smartlist_clear(prev_guards);
+ smartlist_add_all(prev_guards, gs->primary_entry_guards);
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+
+ /* and see what's primary now! */
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_primary);
+ tt_ptr_op(smartlist_get(gs->primary_entry_guards, 0), OP_EQ, confirmed);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, g, {
+ tt_assert(g->is_primary);
+ if (g_sl_idx == 0)
+ continue;
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, smartlist_get(prev_guards, g_sl_idx - 1));
+ });
+ {
+ entry_guard_t *prev_last_guard = smartlist_get(prev_guards, n_primary-1);
+ tt_assert(! prev_last_guard->is_primary);
+ }
- /* Path bias details of the fake guard */
- const double circ_attempts = 9;
- const double circ_successes = 8;
- const double successful_closed = 4;
- const double collapsed = 2;
- const double unusable = 0;
- const double timeouts = 1;
+ /* Calling it a fourth time should leave the guards unchanged. */
+ smartlist_clear(prev_guards);
+ smartlist_add_all(prev_guards, gs->primary_entry_guards);
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards), OP_EQ, n_primary);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, g, {
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, smartlist_get(prev_guards, g_sl_idx));
+ });
+
+ /* Do some dirinfo checks */
+ {
+ /* Check that we have all required dirinfo for the primaries (that's done
+ * in big_fake_network_setup()) */
+ char *dir_info_str =
+ guard_selection_get_err_str_if_dir_info_missing(gs, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!dir_info_str);
+
+ /* Now artificially remove the first primary's descriptor and re-check */
+ entry_guard_t *first_primary;
+ first_primary = smartlist_get(gs->primary_entry_guards, 0);
+ /* Change the first primary's identity digest so that the mocked functions
+ * can't find its descriptor */
+ memset(first_primary->identity, 9, sizeof(first_primary->identity));
+ dir_info_str =guard_selection_get_err_str_if_dir_info_missing(gs, 1, 2, 3);
+ tt_str_op(dir_info_str, OP_EQ,
+ "We're missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards "
+ "(total microdescriptors: 2/3).");
+ tor_free(dir_info_str);
+ }
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ smartlist_free(prev_guards);
+}
+
+static void
+test_entry_guard_guard_preferred(void *arg)
+{
(void) arg;
+ entry_guard_t *g1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
+ entry_guard_t *g2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
- /* The global entry guards smartlist should be empty now. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
+ g1->confirmed_idx = g2->confirmed_idx = -1;
+ g1->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time();
+ g2->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time();
- { /* Prepare the state entry */
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g1, g1));
- /* Prepare the smartlist to hold the key/value of each line */
- smartlist_t *state_line = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuard");
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line,
- "givethanks B29D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298212 NoDirCache");
- smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
+ /* Neither is pending; priorities equal. */
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g2, g1));
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g1, g2));
- state_line = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardAddedBy");
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line,
- "B29D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298212 0.2.5.3-alpha-dev "
- "%s", get_yesterday_date_str());
- smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
+ /* If one is pending, the pending one has higher priority */
+ g1->is_pending = 1;
+ tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g1, g2));
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g2, g1));
- state_line = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "2014-06-08 16:16:50");
- smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
+ /* If both are pending, and last_tried_to_connect is equal:
+ priorities equal */
+ g2->is_pending = 1;
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g2, g1));
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g1, g2));
- state_line = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "EntryGuardPathBias");
- smartlist_add_asprintf(state_line, "%f %f %f %f %f %f",
- circ_attempts, circ_successes, successful_closed,
- collapsed, unusable, timeouts);
- smartlist_add(entry_state_lines, state_line);
- }
+ /* One had a connection that startied earlier: it has higher priority. */
+ g2->last_tried_to_connect -= 10;
+ tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g2, g1));
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g1, g2));
- /* Inject our lines in the state */
- state_insert_entry_guard_helper(state, entry_state_lines);
+ /* Now, say that g1 is confirmed. It will get higher priority. */
+ g1->confirmed_idx = 5;
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g2, g1));
+ tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g1, g2));
- /* Parse state */
- retval = entry_guards_parse_state(state, 1, &msg);
- tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0);
+ /* But if g2 was confirmed first, it will get priority */
+ g2->confirmed_idx = 2;
+ tt_int_op(1, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g2, g1));
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, entry_guard_has_higher_priority(g1, g2));
- /* Test that the guard was registered */
- all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1);
+ done:
+ tor_free(g1);
+ tor_free(g2);
+}
- { /* Test the path bias of this guard */
- const entry_guard_t *e = smartlist_get(all_entry_guards, 0);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg)
+{
+ /* Simpler cases: no gaurds are confirmed yet. */
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL;
+
+ /* simple starting configuration */
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+ unsigned state = 9999;
+
+ entry_guard_t *g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
+ NULL, &state);
+
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_assert(g->is_primary);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+ tt_uint_op(g->is_pending, OP_EQ, 0); // primary implies non-pending.
+ tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time());
+
+ // If we do that again, we should get the same guard.
+ entry_guard_t *g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
+ NULL, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g);
+
+ // if we mark that guard down, we should get a different primary guard.
+ // auto-retry it.
+ g->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO;
+ g->failing_since = approx_time() - 10;
+ g->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 10;
+ state = 9999;
+ g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g);
+ tt_assert(g2);
+ tt_assert(g2->is_primary);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+ tt_uint_op(g2->is_pending, OP_EQ, 0); // primary implies non-pending.
+ tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ tt_i64_op(g2->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time());
+
+ // If we say that the first primary guard was last tried a long time ago, we
+ // should get an automatic retry on it.
+ g->failing_since = approx_time() - 72*60*60;
+ g->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 72*60*60;
+ state = 9999;
+ g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g);
+ tt_assert(g2);
+ tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ tt_i64_op(g2->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time());
+ tt_int_op(g2->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+
+ // And if we mark ALL the primary guards down, we should get another guard
+ // at random.
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard, {
+ guard->is_reachable = GUARD_REACHABLE_NO;
+ guard->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time() - 5;
+ guard->failing_since = approx_time() - 30;
+ });
+ state = 9999;
+ g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_assert(g2);
+ tt_assert(!g2->is_primary);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+ tt_uint_op(g2->is_pending, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+ tt_i64_op(g2->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time());
+ tt_int_op(g2->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+
+ // As a bonus, maybe we should be retrying the primary guards. Let's say so.
+ mark_primary_guards_maybe_reachable(gs);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard, {
+ tt_int_op(guard->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+ tt_assert(guard->is_usable_filtered_guard == 1);
+ // no change to these fields.
+ tt_i64_op(guard->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time() - 5);
+ tt_i64_op(guard->failing_since, OP_EQ, approx_time() - 30);
+ });
+
+ /* Let's try again and we should get the first primary guard again */
+ g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, smartlist_get(gs->primary_entry_guards, 0));
+ g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, g);
+
+ /* But if we impose a restriction, we don't get the same guard */
+ rst = guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)g->identity);
+ g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, rst, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g);
- tt_assert(!e->is_dir_cache);
- tt_assert(!e->can_retry);
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ entry_guard_restriction_free(rst);
+}
- /* XXX tt_double_op doesn't support equality. Cast to int for now. */
- tt_int_op((int)e->circ_attempts, OP_EQ, (int)circ_attempts);
- tt_int_op((int)e->circ_successes, OP_EQ, (int)circ_successes);
- tt_int_op((int)e->successful_circuits_closed, OP_EQ,
- (int)successful_closed);
- tt_int_op((int)e->timeouts, OP_EQ, (int)timeouts);
- tt_int_op((int)e->collapsed_circuits, OP_EQ, (int)collapsed);
- tt_int_op((int)e->unusable_circuits, OP_EQ, (int)unusable);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg)
+{
+ /* Case 2: if all the primary guards are down, and there are more confirmed
+ guards, we use a confirmed guard. */
+ (void)arg;
+ int i;
+ entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ const int N_CONFIRMED = 10;
+
+ /* slightly more complicated simple starting configuration */
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+ for (i = 0; i < N_CONFIRMED; ++i) {
+ entry_guard_t *guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, guard);
+ }
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs); // rebuild the primary list.
+
+ unsigned state = 9999;
+
+ // As above, this gives us a primary guard.
+ entry_guard_t *g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
+ NULL, &state);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_assert(g->is_primary);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_uint_op(g->is_pending, OP_EQ, 0); // primary implies non-pending.
+ tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time());
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_EQ, smartlist_get(gs->primary_entry_guards, 0));
+
+ // But if we mark all the primary guards down...
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard, {
+ guard->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time();
+ entry_guards_note_guard_failure(gs, guard);
+ });
+
+ // ... we should get a confirmed guard.
+ state = 9999;
+ g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_assert(! g->is_primary);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards));
+ tt_assert(g->is_pending);
+ tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+ tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time());
+
+ // And if we try again, we should get a different confirmed guard, since
+ // that one is pending.
+ state = 9999;
+ entry_guard_t *g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
+ NULL, &state);
+ tt_assert(g2);
+ tt_assert(! g2->is_primary);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ,
+ smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)+1);
+ tt_assert(g2->is_pending);
+ tt_uint_op(state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+ tt_i64_op(g2->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, approx_time());
+
+ // If we say that the next confirmed guard in order is excluded, and
+ // we disable EnforceDistinctSubnets, we get the guard AFTER the
+ // one we excluded.
+ get_options_mutable()->EnforceDistinctSubnets = 0;
+ g = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards,
+ smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)+2);
+ rst = guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)g->identity);
+ g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, rst, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, NULL);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_NE, g);
+ tt_int_op(g2->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ,
+ smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards)+3);
+
+ // If we make every confirmed guard become pending then we start poking
+ // other guards.
+ const int n_remaining_confirmed =
+ N_CONFIRMED - 3 - smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards);
+ for (i = 0; i < n_remaining_confirmed; ++i) {
+ g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_GE, 0);
+ tt_assert(g);
}
+ state = 9999;
+ g = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &state);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_assert(g->is_pending);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ // If we EnforceDistinctSubnets and apply a restriction, we get
+ // nothing, since we put all of the nodes in the same /16.
+ // Regression test for bug 22753/TROVE-2017-006.
+ get_options_mutable()->EnforceDistinctSubnets = 1;
+ g = smartlist_get(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, 0);
+ memcpy(rst->exclude_id, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ g2 = select_entry_guard_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, rst, &state);
+ tt_ptr_op(g2, OP_EQ, NULL);
done:
- or_state_free(state);
- state_lines_free(entry_state_lines);
- tor_free(msg);
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ entry_guard_restriction_free(rst);
}
-/* Simple test of entry_guards_set_from_config() by specifying a
- particular EntryNode and making sure it gets picked. */
static void
-test_entry_guards_set_from_config(void *arg)
+test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary(void *arg)
{
- or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
- const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
- const char *entrynodes_str = "test003r";
- const node_t *chosen_entry = NULL;
- int retval;
+ /* Play around with selecting primary guards for circuits and markign
+ * them up and down */
+ (void)arg;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+
+ time_t start = approx_time();
+
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard = NULL;
+ entry_guard_t *g;
+ guard_usable_t u;
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the pick-for-circuit API basically works. We'll get
+ * a primary guard, so it'll be usable on completion.
+ */
+ int r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_mem_op(g->identity, OP_EQ, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, start);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ /* Call that circuit successful. */
+ update_approx_time(start+15);
+ u = entry_guard_succeeded(&guard);
+ tt_int_op(u, OP_EQ, GUARD_USABLE_NOW); /* We can use it now. */
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_YES);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ guard = NULL;
+ node = NULL;
+ g = NULL;
+
+ /* Try again. We'll also get a primary guard this time. (The same one,
+ in fact.) But this time, we'll say the connection has failed. */
+ update_approx_time(start+35);
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ tt_i64_op(guard->state_set_at, OP_EQ, start+35);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_mem_op(g->identity, OP_EQ, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, start+35);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0); // same one.
+
+ /* It's failed! What will happen to our poor guard? */
+ update_approx_time(start+45);
+ entry_guard_failed(&guard);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_DEAD);
+ tt_i64_op(guard->state_set_at, OP_EQ, start+45);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_NO);
+ tt_i64_op(g->failing_since, OP_EQ, start+45);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0); // still confirmed.
+
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ guard = NULL;
+ node = NULL;
+ entry_guard_t *g_prev = g;
+ g = NULL;
+
+ /* Now try a third time. Since the other one is down, we'll get a different
+ * (still primary) guard.
+ */
+ update_approx_time(start+60);
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_NE, g_prev);
+ tt_mem_op(g->identity, OP_EQ, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tt_mem_op(g->identity, OP_NE, g_prev->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, start+60);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1); // not confirmed now.
+
+ /* Call this one up; watch it get confirmed. */
+ update_approx_time(start+90);
+ u = entry_guard_succeeded(&guard);
+ tt_int_op(u, OP_EQ, GUARD_USABLE_NOW);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_YES);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 1);
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+}
+
+static void
+test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_confirm_other(void *arg)
+{
(void) arg;
+ const int N_PRIMARY = DFLT_N_PRIMARY_GUARDS;
+
+ /* At the start, we have no confirmed guards. We'll mark the primary guards
+ * down, then confirm something else. As soon as we do, it should become
+ * primary, and we should get it next time. */
+
+ time_t start = approx_time();
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard = NULL;
+ int i, r;
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ guard_usable_t u;
+
+ /* Declare that we're on the internet. */
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(gs);
+
+ /* Primary guards are down! */
+ for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) {
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ entry_guard_failed(&guard);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ guard = NULL;
+ node = NULL;
+ }
- /* Prase EntryNodes as a routerset. */
- options->EntryNodes = routerset_new();
- retval = routerset_parse(options->EntryNodes,
- entrynodes_str,
- "test_entrynodes");
- tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0);
+ /* Next guard should be non-primary. */
+ node = NULL;
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ entry_guard_t *g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_assert(g);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_pending, OP_EQ, 1);
+ (void)start;
+
+ u = entry_guard_succeeded(&guard);
+ /* We're on the internet (by fiat), so this guard will get called "confirmed"
+ * and should immediately become primary.
+ */
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE);
+ tt_assert(u == GUARD_USABLE_NOW);
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_pending, OP_EQ, 0);
- /* Read nodes from EntryNodes */
- entry_guards_set_from_config(options);
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+}
- /* Test that only one guard was added. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 1);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary_retry(void *arg)
+{
+ (void) arg;
+ const int N_PRIMARY = DFLT_N_PRIMARY_GUARDS;
+
+ /* At the start, we have no confirmed guards. We'll mark the primary guards
+ * down, then confirm something else. As soon as we do, it should become
+ * primary, and we should get it next time. */
+
+ time_t start = approx_time();
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard = NULL, *guard2 = NULL;
+ int i, r;
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ entry_guard_t *g;
+ guard_usable_t u;
+
+ /* Declare that we're on the internet. */
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(gs);
+
+ /* Make primary guards confirmed (so they won't be superseded by a later
+ * guard), then mark them down. */
+ for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) {
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, g);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
+ entry_guard_failed(&guard);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_NO);
+ guard = NULL;
+ node = NULL;
+ }
- /* Make sure it was the guard we specified. */
- chosen_entry = choose_random_entry(NULL);
- tt_str_op(chosen_entry->ri->nickname, OP_EQ, entrynodes_str);
+ /* Get another guard that we might try. */
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tt_assert(entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(gs));
+
+ /* And an hour has passed ... */
+ update_approx_time(start + 3600);
+
+ /* Say that guard has succeeded! */
+ u = entry_guard_succeeded(&guard);
+ tt_int_op(u, OP_EQ, GUARD_MAYBE_USABLE_LATER);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+
+ /* The primary guards should have been marked up! */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, pg, {
+ tt_int_op(pg->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_ptr_op(g, OP_NE, pg);
+ tt_int_op(pg->is_reachable, OP_EQ, GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE);
+ });
+
+ /* Have a circuit to a primary guard succeed. */
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard2);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(guard2->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ u = entry_guard_succeeded(&guard2);
+ tt_assert(u == GUARD_USABLE_NOW);
+ tt_int_op(guard2->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE);
+
+ tt_assert(! entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(gs));
done:
- routerset_free(options->EntryNodes);
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard2);
}
static void
-test_entry_is_time_to_retry(void *arg)
+test_entry_guard_select_and_cancel(void *arg)
{
- entry_guard_t *test_guard;
- time_t now;
- int retval;
- (void)arg;
+ (void) arg;
+ const int N_PRIMARY = DFLT_N_PRIMARY_GUARDS;
+ int i,r;
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ entry_guard_t *g;
+
+ /* Once more, we mark all the primary guards down. */
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(gs);
+ for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) {
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_pending, OP_EQ, 0);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, g);
+ entry_guard_failed(&guard);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ guard = NULL;
+ node = NULL;
+ }
- now = time(NULL);
+ tt_assert(entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(gs));
+
+ /* Now get another guard we could try... */
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_assert(node);
+ tt_assert(guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(guard->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_pending, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ /* Whoops! We should never have asked for this guard. Cancel the request! */
+ entry_guard_cancel(&guard);
+ tt_ptr_op(guard, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(g->is_pending, OP_EQ, 0);
- test_guard = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
+ done:
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+}
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - 10;
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - 1;
+static void
+test_entry_guard_drop_guards(void *arg)
+{
+ (void) arg;
+ int r;
+ const node_t *node = NULL;
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard;
+ guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info();
+
+ // Pick a guard, to get things set up.
+ r = entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &guard);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_GE,
+ DFLT_MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE_SIZE);
+ tt_ptr_op(gs, OP_EQ, get_guard_selection_info());
+
+ // Drop all the guards! (This is a bad idea....)
+ remove_all_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(gs);
+ gs = get_guard_selection_info();
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->primary_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(gs->confirmed_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+ done:
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ guard_selection_free(gs);
+}
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - (6*60*60 - 1);
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (60*60 + 1);
+/* Unit test setup function: Create a fake network, and set everything up
+ * for testing the upgrade-a-waiting-circuit code. */
+typedef struct {
+ guard_selection_t *gs;
+ time_t start;
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard1_state;
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard2_state;
+ entry_guard_t *guard1;
+ entry_guard_t *guard2;
+ origin_circuit_t *circ1;
+ origin_circuit_t *circ2;
+ smartlist_t *all_origin_circuits;
+} upgrade_circuits_data_t;
+static void *
+upgrade_circuits_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*data));
+ guard_selection_t *gs = data->gs =
+ guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ circuit_guard_state_t *guard;
+ const node_t *node;
+ entry_guard_t *g;
+ int i;
+ const int N_PRIMARY = DFLT_N_PRIMARY_GUARDS;
+ const char *argument = testcase->setup_data;
+ const int make_circ1_succeed = strstr(argument, "c1-done") != NULL;
+ const int make_circ2_succeed = strstr(argument, "c2-done") != NULL;
+
+ big_fake_network_setup(testcase);
+
+ /* We're going to set things up in a state where a circuit will be ready to
+ * be upgraded. Each test can make a single change (or not) that should
+ * block the upgrade.
+ */
+
+ /* First, make all the primary guards confirmed, and down. */
+ data->start = approx_time();
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(gs);
+ for (i = 0; i < N_PRIMARY; ++i) {
+ entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL, &node, &guard);
+ g = entry_guard_handle_get(guard->guard);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, g);
+ entry_guard_failed(&guard);
+ circuit_guard_state_free(guard);
+ }
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+ /* Grab another couple of guards */
+ data->all_origin_circuits = smartlist_new();
+
+ update_approx_time(data->start + 27);
+ entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &data->guard1_state);
+ origin_circuit_t *circ;
+ data->circ1 = circ = origin_circuit_new();
+ circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL;
+ circ->guard_state = data->guard1_state;
+ smartlist_add(data->all_origin_circuits, circ);
+
+ update_approx_time(data->start + 30);
+ entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(gs, GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, NULL,
+ &node, &data->guard2_state);
+ data->circ2 = circ = origin_circuit_new();
+ circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL;
+ circ->guard_state = data->guard2_state;
+ smartlist_add(data->all_origin_circuits, circ);
+
+ data->guard1 = entry_guard_handle_get(data->guard1_state->guard);
+ data->guard2 = entry_guard_handle_get(data->guard2_state->guard);
+ tor_assert(data->guard1 != data->guard2);
+ tor_assert(data->guard1_state->state ==
+ GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+ tor_assert(data->guard2_state->state ==
+ GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD);
+
+ guard_usable_t r;
+ update_approx_time(data->start + 32);
+ if (make_circ1_succeed) {
+ r = entry_guard_succeeded(&data->guard1_state);
+ tor_assert(r == GUARD_MAYBE_USABLE_LATER);
+ tor_assert(data->guard1_state->state ==
+ GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD);
+ }
+ update_approx_time(data->start + 33);
+ if (make_circ2_succeed) {
+ r = entry_guard_succeeded(&data->guard2_state);
+ tor_assert(r == GUARD_MAYBE_USABLE_LATER);
+ tor_assert(data->guard2_state->state ==
+ GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD);
+ }
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (60*60 - 1);
+ return data;
+}
+static int
+upgrade_circuits_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = ptr;
+ // circuit_guard_state_free(data->guard1_state); // held in circ1
+ // circuit_guard_state_free(data->guard2_state); // held in circ2
+ guard_selection_free(data->gs);
+ smartlist_free(data->all_origin_circuits);
+ circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(data->circ1));
+ circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(data->circ2));
+ tor_free(data);
+ return big_fake_network_cleanup(testcase, NULL);
+}
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,0);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_a_circuit(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - (6*60*60 + 1);
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (4*60*60 + 1);
+ /* This is the easy case: we have no COMPLETED circuits, all the
+ * primary guards are down, we have two WAITING circuits: one will
+ * get upgraded to COMPLETED! (The one that started first.)
+ */
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ int r;
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1);
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0);
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - (3*24*60*60 - 1);
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (4*60*60 + 1);
+ /* circ1 was started first, so we'll get told to ugrade it... */
+ tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ1);
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+ /* And the guard state should be complete */
+ tt_ptr_op(data->guard1_state, OP_NE, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(data->guard1_state->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE);
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - (3*24*60*60 + 1);
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (18*60*60 + 1);
+ done:
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_blocked_by_live_primary_guards(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+
+ /* If any primary guards might be up, we can't upgrade any waiting
+ * circuits.
+ */
+ mark_primary_guards_maybe_reachable(data->gs);
+
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ int r;
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 0);
+ expect_log_msg_containing("not all primary guards were definitely down.");
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - (7*24*60*60 - 1);
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (18*60*60 + 1);
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_blocked_by_lack_of_waiting_circuits(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+
+ /* If no circuits are waiting, we can't upgrade anything. (The test
+ * setup in this case was told not to make any of the circuits "waiting".)
+ */
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ int r;
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 0);
+ expect_log_msg_containing("Considered upgrading guard-stalled circuits, "
+ "but didn't find any.");
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (18*60*60 - 1);
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,0);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_complete(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+
+ /* We'll run through the logic of upgrade_a_circuit below...
+ * and then try again to make sure that circ2 isn't also upgraded.
+ */
+
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ int r;
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1);
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ1);
+ tt_ptr_op(data->guard1_state, OP_NE, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(data->guard1_state->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE);
+
+ /* Now, try again. Make sure that circ2 isn't upgraded. */
+ smartlist_clear(result);
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 0);
+ expect_log_msg_containing("At least one complete circuit had higher "
+ "priority, so not upgrading.");
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - (7*24*60*60 + 1);
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (36*60*60 + 1);
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_complete(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+
+ /* Once more, let circ1 become complete. But this time, we'll claim
+ * that circ2 was restricted to not use the same guard as circ1. */
+ data->guard2_state->restrictions =
+ guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)data->guard1->identity);
+
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ int r;
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1);
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ1);
+ tt_ptr_op(data->guard1_state, OP_NE, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(data->guard1_state->state, OP_EQ, GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE);
+
+ /* Now, we try again. Since circ2 has a restriction that circ1 doesn't obey,
+ * circ2 _is_ eligible for upgrade. */
+ smartlist_clear(result);
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1);
+ origin_circuit_t *oc2 = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(oc2, OP_EQ, data->circ2);
- test_guard->unreachable_since = now - (7*24*60*60 + 1);
- test_guard->last_attempted = now - (36*60*60 + 1);
+ done:
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
- retval = entry_is_time_to_retry(test_guard,now);
- tt_int_op(retval,OP_EQ,1);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_complete(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ /* here we manually make circ2 COMPLETE, and make sure that circ1
+ * gets made complete anyway, since guard1 has higher priority
+ */
+ update_approx_time(data->start + 300);
+ data->guard2_state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_COMPLETE;
+ data->guard2_state->state_set_at = approx_time();
+ update_approx_time(data->start + 301);
+
+ /* Now, try again. Make sure that circ1 is approved. */
+ int r;
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1);
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ1);
done:
- tor_free(test_guard);
+ smartlist_free(result);
}
-/** XXX Do some tests that entry_is_live() */
static void
-test_entry_is_live(void *arg)
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_pending(void *arg)
{
- smartlist_t *our_nodelist = NULL;
- const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards = get_entry_guards();
- const node_t *test_node = NULL;
- const entry_guard_t *test_entry = NULL;
- const char *msg;
- int which_node;
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+
+ /* circ2 is done, but circ1 is still pending. Since circ1 is better,
+ * we won't upgrade circ2. */
+
+ /* XXXX Prop271 -- this is a kludge. I'm making sure circ1 _is_ better,
+ * by messing with the guards' confirmed_idx */
+ make_guard_confirmed(data->gs, data->guard1);
+ {
+ int tmp;
+ tmp = data->guard1->confirmed_idx;
+ data->guard1->confirmed_idx = data->guard2->confirmed_idx;
+ data->guard2->confirmed_idx = tmp;
+ }
- (void) arg;
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
+ int r;
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 0);
+ expect_log_msg_containing("but 1 pending circuit(s) had higher guard "
+ "priority, so not upgrading.");
- /* The global entry guards smartlist should be empty now. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ, 0);
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
- /* Walk the nodelist and add all nodes as entry guards. */
- our_nodelist = nodelist_get_list();
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(our_nodelist), OP_EQ, HELPER_NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_pending(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+ /* circ2 is done, but circ1 is still pending. But when there is a
+ restriction on circ2 that circ1 can't satisfy, circ1 can't block
+ circ2. */
+
+ /* XXXX Prop271 -- this is a kludge. I'm making sure circ1 _is_ better,
+ * by messing with the guards' confirmed_idx */
+ make_guard_confirmed(data->gs, data->guard1);
+ {
+ int tmp;
+ tmp = data->guard1->confirmed_idx;
+ data->guard1->confirmed_idx = data->guard2->confirmed_idx;
+ data->guard2->confirmed_idx = tmp;
+ }
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(our_nodelist, const node_t *, node) {
- const node_t *node_tmp;
- node_tmp = add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 1, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(node_tmp);
+ data->guard2_state->restrictions =
+ guard_create_exit_restriction((uint8_t*)data->guard1->identity);
- tt_int_op(node->is_stable, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(node->is_fast, OP_EQ, 0);
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ int r;
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1);
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ2);
- /* Make sure the nodes were added as entry guards. */
- tt_int_op(smartlist_len(all_entry_guards), OP_EQ,
- HELPER_NUMBER_OF_DESCRIPTORS);
+ done:
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
- /* Now get a random test entry that we will use for this unit test. */
- which_node = 3; /* (chosen by fair dice roll) */
- test_entry = smartlist_get(all_entry_guards, which_node);
+static void
+test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending(void *arg)
+{
+ upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = arg;
+
+ /* circ1 is done, but circ2 is still pending. Since circ1 is better,
+ * we will upgrade it. */
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ int r;
+ r = entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(data->gs,
+ data->all_origin_circuits,
+ result);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(result), OP_EQ, 1);
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(oc, OP_EQ, data->circ1);
+
+ done:
+ smartlist_free(result);
+}
+
+static void
+test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ circuit_guard_state_t *fake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*fake_state));
+ /* We'll leave "guard" unset -- it won't matter here. */
- /* Let's do some entry_is_live() tests! */
+ /* No state? Can't expire. */
+ tt_assert(! entry_guard_state_should_expire(NULL));
- /* Require the node to be stable, but it's not. Should fail.
- Also enable 'assume_reachable' because why not. */
- test_node = entry_is_live(test_entry,
- ENTRY_NEED_UPTIME | ENTRY_ASSUME_REACHABLE,
- &msg);
- tt_assert(!test_node);
+ /* Let's try one that expires. */
+ fake_state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD;
+ fake_state->state_set_at =
+ approx_time() - DFLT_NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT - 1;
- /* Require the node to be fast, but it's not. Should fail. */
- test_node = entry_is_live(test_entry,
- ENTRY_NEED_CAPACITY | ENTRY_ASSUME_REACHABLE,
- &msg);
- tt_assert(!test_node);
+ tt_assert(entry_guard_state_should_expire(fake_state));
- /* Don't impose any restrictions on the node. Should succeed. */
- test_node = entry_is_live(test_entry, 0, &msg);
- tt_assert(test_node);
- tt_ptr_op(test_node, OP_EQ, node_get_by_id(test_entry->identity));
+ /* But it wouldn't expire if we changed the state. */
+ fake_state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD;
+ tt_assert(! entry_guard_state_should_expire(fake_state));
- /* Require descriptor for this node. It has one so it should succeed. */
- test_node = entry_is_live(test_entry, ENTRY_NEED_DESCRIPTOR, &msg);
- tt_assert(test_node);
- tt_ptr_op(test_node, OP_EQ, node_get_by_id(test_entry->identity));
+ /* And it wouldn't have expired a few seconds ago. */
+ fake_state->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_WAITING_FOR_BETTER_GUARD;
+ fake_state->state_set_at =
+ approx_time() - DFLT_NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT + 5;
+ tt_assert(! entry_guard_state_should_expire(fake_state));
done:
- ; /* XXX */
+ tor_free(fake_state);
}
-#define TEST_IPV4_ADDR "123.45.67.89"
-#define TEST_IPV6_ADDR "[1234:5678:90ab:cdef::]"
-
static void
-test_node_preferred_orport(void *arg)
+mock_directory_initiate_request(directory_request_t *req)
{
- (void)arg;
- tor_addr_t ipv4_addr;
- const uint16_t ipv4_port = 4444;
- tor_addr_t ipv6_addr;
- const uint16_t ipv6_port = 6666;
- routerinfo_t node_ri;
- node_t node;
- tor_addr_port_t ap;
-
- /* Setup options */
- memset(&mocked_options, 0, sizeof(mocked_options));
- /* We don't test ClientPreferIPv6ORPort here, because it's used in
- * nodelist_set_consensus to setup node.ipv6_preferred, which we set
- * directly. */
- MOCK(get_options, mock_get_options);
-
- /* Setup IP addresses */
- tor_addr_parse(&ipv4_addr, TEST_IPV4_ADDR);
- tor_addr_parse(&ipv6_addr, TEST_IPV6_ADDR);
+ if (req->guard_state) {
+ circuit_guard_state_free(req->guard_state);
+ }
+}
- /* Setup node_ri */
- memset(&node_ri, 0, sizeof(node_ri));
- node_ri.addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&ipv4_addr);
- node_ri.or_port = ipv4_port;
- tor_addr_copy(&node_ri.ipv6_addr, &ipv6_addr);
- node_ri.ipv6_orport = ipv6_port;
+static networkstatus_t *mock_ns_val = NULL;
+static networkstatus_t *
+mock_ns_get_by_flavor(consensus_flavor_t f)
+{
+ (void)f;
+ return mock_ns_val;
+}
- /* Setup node */
- memset(&node, 0, sizeof(node));
- node.ri = &node_ri;
+/** Test that when we fetch microdescriptors we skip guards that have
+ * previously failed to serve us needed microdescriptors. */
+static void
+test_entry_guard_outdated_dirserver_exclusion(void *arg)
+{
+ int retval;
+ response_handler_args_t *args = NULL;
+ dir_connection_t *conn = NULL;
+ (void) arg;
- /* Check the preferred address is IPv4 if we're only using IPv4, regardless
- * of whether we prefer it or not */
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 0;
- node.ipv6_preferred = 0;
- node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
- tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv4_addr));
- tt_assert(ap.port == ipv4_port);
+ /* Test prep: Make a new guard selection */
+ guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_by_name("default",
+ GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
- node.ipv6_preferred = 1;
- node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
- tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv4_addr));
- tt_assert(ap.port == ipv4_port);
+ /* ... we want to use entry guards */
+ or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
+ options->UseEntryGuards = 1;
+ options->UseBridges = 0;
+
+ /* ... prepare some md digests we want to download in the future */
+ smartlist_t *digests = smartlist_new();
+ const char *prose = "unhurried and wise, we perceive.";
+ for (int i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+ smartlist_add(digests, (char*)prose);
+ }
- /* Check the preferred address is IPv4 if we're using IPv4 and IPv6, but
- * don't prefer the IPv6 address */
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
- node.ipv6_preferred = 0;
- node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
- tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv4_addr));
- tt_assert(ap.port == ipv4_port);
+ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(digests), OP_EQ, 20);
+
+ /* ... now mock some functions */
+ mock_ns_val = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(networkstatus_t));
+ MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor, mock_ns_get_by_flavor);
+ MOCK(directory_initiate_request, mock_directory_initiate_request);
+
+ /* Test logic:
+ * 0. Create a proper guard set and primary guard list.
+ * 1. Pretend to fail microdescriptor fetches from all the primary guards.
+ * 2. Order another microdescriptor fetch and make sure that primary guards
+ * get skipped since they failed previous fetches.
+ */
+
+ { /* Setup primary guard list */
+ int i;
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+ for (i = 0; i < DFLT_N_PRIMARY_GUARDS; ++i) {
+ entry_guard_t *guard = smartlist_get(gs->sampled_entry_guards, i);
+ make_guard_confirmed(gs, guard);
+ }
+ entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
+ }
- /* Check the preferred address is IPv6 if we prefer it and
- * ClientUseIPv6 is 1, regardless of ClientUseIPv4 */
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 1;
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
- node.ipv6_preferred = 1;
- node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
- tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv6_addr));
- tt_assert(ap.port == ipv6_port);
+ {
+ /* Fail microdesc fetches with all the primary guards */
+ args = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(response_handler_args_t));
+ args->status_code = 404;
+ args->reason = NULL;
+ args->body = NULL;
+ args->body_len = 0;
+
+ conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(dir_connection_t));
+ conn->requested_resource = tor_strdup("d/jlinblackorigami");
+ conn->base_.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC;
+
+ /* Pretend to fail fetches with all primary guards */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->primary_entry_guards,const entry_guard_t *,g) {
+ memcpy(conn->identity_digest, g->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ retval = handle_response_fetch_microdesc(conn, args);
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(g);
+ }
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0;
- node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
- tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv6_addr));
- tt_assert(ap.port == ipv6_port);
+ {
+ /* Now order the final md download */
+ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+ initiate_descriptor_downloads(NULL, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC,
+ digests, 3, 7, 0);
- /* Check the preferred address is IPv6 if we don't prefer it, but
- * ClientUseIPv4 is 0 */
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv4 = 0;
- mocked_options.ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
- node.ipv6_preferred = fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(&mocked_options);
- node_get_pref_orport(&node, &ap);
- tt_assert(tor_addr_eq(&ap.addr, &ipv6_addr));
- tt_assert(ap.port == ipv6_port);
+ /* ... and check that because we failed to fetch microdescs from all our
+ * primaries, we didn't end up selecting a primary for fetching dir info */
+ expect_log_msg_containing("No primary or confirmed guards available.");
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ }
done:
- UNMOCK(get_options);
+ UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor);
+ UNMOCK(directory_initiate_request);
+ smartlist_free(digests);
+ tor_free(mock_ns_val);
+ tor_free(args);
+ if (conn) {
+ tor_free(conn->requested_resource);
+ tor_free(conn);
+ }
}
-static const struct testcase_setup_t fake_network = {
- fake_network_setup, fake_network_cleanup
+static const struct testcase_setup_t big_fake_network = {
+ big_fake_network_setup, big_fake_network_cleanup
+};
+
+static const struct testcase_setup_t upgrade_circuits = {
+ upgrade_circuits_setup, upgrade_circuits_cleanup
};
+#define BFN_TEST(name) \
+ { #name, test_entry_guard_ ## name, TT_FORK, &big_fake_network, NULL }
+
+#define UPGRADE_TEST(name, arg) \
+ { #name, test_entry_guard_ ## name, TT_FORK, &upgrade_circuits, \
+ (void*)(arg) }
+
struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = {
- { "entry_is_time_to_retry", test_entry_is_time_to_retry,
- TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
- { "choose_random_entry_no_guards", test_choose_random_entry_no_guards,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
- { "choose_random_entry_one_possibleguard",
- test_choose_random_entry_one_possible_guard,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
- { "populate_live_entry_guards_1guard",
- test_populate_live_entry_guards_1guard,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
- { "populate_live_entry_guards_3guards",
- test_populate_live_entry_guards_3guards,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
- { "entry_guards_parse_state_simple",
- test_entry_guards_parse_state_simple,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
- { "entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias",
- test_entry_guards_parse_state_pathbias,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
- { "entry_guards_set_from_config",
- test_entry_guards_set_from_config,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
- { "entry_is_live",
- test_entry_is_live,
- TT_FORK, &fake_network, NULL },
{ "node_preferred_orport",
test_node_preferred_orport,
0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "entry_guard_describe", test_entry_guard_describe, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "randomize_time", test_entry_guard_randomize_time, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "encode_for_state_minimal",
+ test_entry_guard_encode_for_state_minimal, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "encode_for_state_maximal",
+ test_entry_guard_encode_for_state_maximal, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "parse_from_state_minimal",
+ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_minimal, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "parse_from_state_maximal",
+ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_maximal, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "parse_from_state_failure",
+ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_failure, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "parse_from_state_partial_failure",
+ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_partial_failure, 0, NULL, NULL },
+ { "parse_from_state_full",
+ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_full, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+ { "parse_from_state_broken",
+ test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_broken, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+ { "get_guard_selection_by_name",
+ test_entry_guard_get_guard_selection_by_name, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+ BFN_TEST(choose_selection_initial),
+ BFN_TEST(add_single_guard),
+ BFN_TEST(node_filter),
+ BFN_TEST(expand_sample),
+ BFN_TEST(expand_sample_small_net),
+ BFN_TEST(update_from_consensus_status),
+ BFN_TEST(update_from_consensus_repair),
+ BFN_TEST(update_from_consensus_remove),
+ BFN_TEST(confirming_guards),
+ BFN_TEST(sample_reachable_filtered),
+ BFN_TEST(sample_reachable_filtered_empty),
+ BFN_TEST(retry_unreachable),
+ BFN_TEST(manage_primary),
+ { "guard_preferred", test_entry_guard_guard_preferred, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+ BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_no_confirmed),
+ BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_confirmed),
+ BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary),
+ BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_highlevel_confirm_other),
+ BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary_retry),
+ BFN_TEST(select_and_cancel),
+ BFN_TEST(drop_guards),
+ BFN_TEST(outdated_dirserver_exclusion),
+
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_a_circuit, "c1-done c2-done"),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_live_primary_guards, "c1-done c2-done"),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_lack_of_waiting_circuits, ""),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_complete, "c1-done c2-done"),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_complete,
+ "c1-done c2-done"),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_complete, "c1-done c2-done"),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_blocked_by_better_circ_pending, "c2-done"),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_pending,
+ "c2-done"),
+ UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending, "c1-done"),
+ { "should_expire_waiting", test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting, TT_FORK,
+ NULL, NULL },
+
END_OF_TESTCASES
};