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-rw-r--r--src/test/test_crypto.c271
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 96 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index 8fd9ca7671..83d97f2867 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#include "orconfig.h"
@@ -15,9 +15,6 @@
#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
#include "ed25519_vectors.inc"
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
/** Run unit tests for Diffie-Hellman functionality. */
static void
test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
@@ -331,38 +328,6 @@ test_crypto_rng_strongest(void *arg)
#undef N
}
-/* Test for rectifying openssl RAND engine. */
-static void
-test_crypto_rng_engine(void *arg)
-{
- (void)arg;
- RAND_METHOD dummy_method;
- memset(&dummy_method, 0, sizeof(dummy_method));
-
- /* We should be a no-op if we're already on RAND_OpenSSL */
- tt_int_op(0, ==, crypto_force_rand_ssleay());
- tt_assert(RAND_get_rand_method() == RAND_OpenSSL());
-
- /* We should correct the method if it's a dummy. */
- RAND_set_rand_method(&dummy_method);
-#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
- /* On libressl, you can't override the RNG. */
- tt_assert(RAND_get_rand_method() == RAND_OpenSSL());
- tt_int_op(0, ==, crypto_force_rand_ssleay());
-#else
- tt_assert(RAND_get_rand_method() == &dummy_method);
- tt_int_op(1, ==, crypto_force_rand_ssleay());
-#endif
- tt_assert(RAND_get_rand_method() == RAND_OpenSSL());
-
- /* Make sure we aren't calling dummy_method */
- crypto_rand((void *) &dummy_method, sizeof(dummy_method));
- crypto_rand((void *) &dummy_method, sizeof(dummy_method));
-
- done:
- ;
-}
-
/** Run unit tests for our AES128 functionality */
static void
test_crypto_aes128(void *arg)
@@ -1135,6 +1100,54 @@ test_crypto_sha3_xof(void *arg)
tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp);
}
+/* Test our MAC-SHA3 function. There are not actually any MAC-SHA3 test
+ * vectors out there for our H(len(k) || k || m) construction. Hence what we
+ * are gonna do is test our crypto_mac_sha3_256() function against manually
+ * doing H(len(k) || k||m). If in the future the Keccak group decides to
+ * standarize an MAC construction and make test vectors, we should
+ * incorporate them here. */
+static void
+test_crypto_mac_sha3(void *arg)
+{
+ const char msg[] = "i am in a library somewhere using my computer";
+ const char key[] = "i'm from the past talking to the future.";
+
+ uint8_t hmac_test[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ char hmac_manual[DIGEST256_LEN];
+
+ (void) arg;
+
+ /* First let's use our nice HMAC-SHA3 function */
+ crypto_mac_sha3_256(hmac_test, sizeof(hmac_test),
+ (uint8_t *) key, strlen(key),
+ (uint8_t *) msg, strlen(msg));
+
+ /* Now let's try a manual H(len(k) || k || m) construction */
+ {
+ char *key_msg_concat = NULL, *all = NULL;
+ int result;
+ const uint64_t key_len_netorder = tor_htonll(strlen(key));
+ size_t all_len;
+
+ tor_asprintf(&key_msg_concat, "%s%s", key, msg);
+ all_len = sizeof(key_len_netorder) + strlen(key_msg_concat);
+ all = tor_malloc_zero(all_len);
+ memcpy(all, &key_len_netorder, sizeof(key_len_netorder));
+ memcpy(all + sizeof(key_len_netorder), key_msg_concat,
+ strlen(key_msg_concat));
+
+ result = crypto_digest256(hmac_manual, all, all_len, DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ tor_free(key_msg_concat);
+ tor_free(all);
+ tt_int_op(result, OP_EQ, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Now compare the two results */
+ tt_mem_op(hmac_test, OP_EQ, hmac_manual, DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+ done: ;
+}
+
/** Run unit tests for our public key crypto functions */
static void
test_crypto_pk(void *arg)
@@ -1195,12 +1208,12 @@ test_crypto_pk(void *arg)
tt_assert(! crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(pk1,
get_fname("pkey1")));
/* failing case for read: can't read. */
- tt_assert(crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2,
- get_fname("xyzzy")) < 0);
+ tt_int_op(crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2, get_fname("xyzzy")),
+ OP_LT, 0);
write_str_to_file(get_fname("xyzzy"), "foobar", 6);
/* Failing case for read: no key. */
- tt_assert(crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2,
- get_fname("xyzzy")) < 0);
+ tt_int_op(crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2, get_fname("xyzzy")),
+ OP_LT, 0);
tt_assert(! crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(pk2,
get_fname("pkey1")));
tt_int_op(15,OP_EQ,
@@ -1232,17 +1245,17 @@ test_crypto_pk(void *arg)
i = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(pk1, data1, 1024);
tt_int_op(i, OP_GT, 0);
pk2 = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(data1, i);
- tt_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,pk2) == 0);
+ tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1, pk2), OP_EQ, 0);
/* Try with hybrid encryption wrappers. */
crypto_rand(data1, 1024);
for (i = 85; i < 140; ++i) {
memset(data2,0,1024);
memset(data3,0,1024);
- len = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2),
+ len = crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2),
data1,i,PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,0);
tt_int_op(len, OP_GE, 0);
- len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(pk1,data3,sizeof(data3),
+ len = crypto_pk_obsolete_private_hybrid_decrypt(pk1,data3,sizeof(data3),
data2,len,PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1);
tt_int_op(len,OP_EQ, i);
tt_mem_op(data1,OP_EQ, data3,i);
@@ -1251,9 +1264,9 @@ test_crypto_pk(void *arg)
/* Try copy_full */
crypto_pk_free(pk2);
pk2 = crypto_pk_copy_full(pk1);
- tt_assert(pk2 != NULL);
+ tt_ptr_op(pk2, OP_NE, NULL);
tt_ptr_op(pk1, OP_NE, pk2);
- tt_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,pk2) == 0);
+ tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1, pk2), OP_EQ, 0);
done:
if (pk1)
@@ -1331,17 +1344,17 @@ test_crypto_pk_base64(void *arg)
/* Test decoding a valid key. */
pk2 = crypto_pk_base64_decode(encoded, strlen(encoded));
tt_assert(pk2);
- tt_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,pk2) == 0);
+ tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1, pk2), OP_EQ, 0);
crypto_pk_free(pk2);
/* Test decoding a invalid key (not Base64). */
static const char *invalid_b64 = "The key is in another castle!";
pk2 = crypto_pk_base64_decode(invalid_b64, strlen(invalid_b64));
- tt_assert(!pk2);
+ tt_ptr_op(pk2, OP_EQ, NULL);
/* Test decoding a truncated Base64 blob. */
pk2 = crypto_pk_base64_decode(encoded, strlen(encoded)/2);
- tt_assert(!pk2);
+ tt_ptr_op(pk2, OP_EQ, NULL);
done:
crypto_pk_free(pk1);
@@ -1410,7 +1423,7 @@ do_truncate(const char *fname, size_t len)
tor_free(bytes);
return r;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_TRUNCATE) */
/** Sanity check for crypto pk digests */
static void
@@ -1433,6 +1446,7 @@ test_crypto_digests(void *arg)
AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_A_DIGEST, HEX_DIGEST_LEN);
r = crypto_pk_get_common_digests(k, &pkey_digests);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_mem_op(hex_str(pkey_digests.d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN),OP_EQ,
AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_A_DIGEST, HEX_DIGEST_LEN);
@@ -1469,28 +1483,6 @@ test_crypto_digest_names(void *arg)
;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
-#define EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new() tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX))
-#define EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx) tor_free(ctx)
-#endif
-
-/** Encode src into dest with OpenSSL's EVP Encode interface, returning the
- * length of the encoded data in bytes.
- */
-static int
-base64_encode_evp(char *dest, char *src, size_t srclen)
-{
- const unsigned char *s = (unsigned char*)src;
- EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
- int len, ret;
-
- EVP_EncodeInit(ctx);
- EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dest, &len, s, (int)srclen);
- EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)(dest + len), &ret);
- EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
- return ret+ len;
-}
-
/** Run unit tests for misc crypto formatting functionality (base64, base32,
* fingerprints, etc) */
static void
@@ -1519,7 +1511,7 @@ test_crypto_formats(void *arg)
tt_int_op(i, OP_GE, 0);
tt_int_op(i, OP_EQ, strlen(data2));
tt_assert(! strchr(data2, '='));
- j = base64_decode_nopad((uint8_t*)data3, 1024, data2, i);
+ j = base64_decode(data3, 1024, data2, i);
tt_int_op(j, OP_EQ, idx);
tt_mem_op(data3,OP_EQ, data1, idx);
}
@@ -1544,21 +1536,7 @@ test_crypto_formats(void *arg)
tt_mem_op(data1,OP_EQ, data3, DIGEST_LEN);
tt_int_op(99,OP_EQ, data3[DIGEST_LEN+1]);
- tt_assert(digest_from_base64(data3, "###") < 0);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
- /* Test the multiline format Base64 encoder with 0 .. 256 bytes of
- * output against OpenSSL.
- */
- const size_t enclen = base64_encode_size(i, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
- data1[i] = i;
- j = base64_encode(data2, 1024, data1, i, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
- tt_int_op(j, OP_EQ, enclen);
- j = base64_encode_evp(data3, data1, i);
- tt_int_op(j, OP_EQ, enclen);
- tt_mem_op(data2, OP_EQ, data3, enclen);
- tt_int_op(j, OP_EQ, strlen(data2));
- }
+ tt_int_op(digest_from_base64(data3, "###"), OP_LT, 0);
/* Encoding SHA256 */
crypto_rand(data2, DIGEST256_LEN);
@@ -1969,7 +1947,7 @@ test_crypto_curve25519_impl(void *arg)
"e0544770bc7de853b38f9100489e3e79";
const char e1e2k_expected[] = "cd6e8269104eb5aaee886bd2071fba88"
"bd13861475516bc2cd2b6e005e805064";
-#else
+#else /* !(defined(SLOW_CURVE25519_TEST)) */
const int loop_max=200;
const char e1_expected[] = "bc7112cde03f97ef7008cad1bdc56be3"
"c6a1037d74cceb3712e9206871dcf654";
@@ -1977,7 +1955,7 @@ test_crypto_curve25519_impl(void *arg)
"8e3ee1a63c7d14274ea5d4c67f065467";
const char e1e2k_expected[] = "7ddb98bd89025d2347776b33901b3e7e"
"c0ee98cb2257a4545c0cfb2ca3e1812b";
-#endif
+#endif /* defined(SLOW_CURVE25519_TEST) */
unsigned char e1k[32];
unsigned char e2k[32];
@@ -2233,6 +2211,9 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_simple(void *arg)
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub1, &sec1));
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&pub2, &sec1));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub2), OP_EQ, 0);
+
tt_mem_op(pub1.pubkey, OP_EQ, pub2.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub2));
tt_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&pub1, &pub1));
@@ -2604,6 +2585,39 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_blinding(void *arg)
;
}
+/** Test that our blinding functions will fail if we pass them bad pubkeys */
+static void
+test_crypto_ed25519_blinding_fail(void *arg)
+{
+ int retval;
+ uint8_t param[32] = {2};
+ ed25519_public_key_t pub;
+ ed25519_public_key_t pub_blinded;
+
+ (void)arg;
+
+ /* This point is not on the curve: the blind routines should fail */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "e19c65de75c68cf3b7643ea732ba9eb1a3d20d6d57ba223c2ece1df66feb5af0";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub.pubkey, sizeof(pub.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub.pubkey));
+ retval = ed25519_public_blind(&pub_blinded, &pub, param);
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ /* This point is legit: blind routines should be happy */
+ const char goodkey[] =
+ "4ba2e44760dff4c559ef3c38768c1c14a8a54740c782c8d70803e9d6e3ad8794";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub.pubkey, sizeof(pub.pubkey),
+ goodkey, strlen(goodkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub.pubkey));
+ retval = ed25519_public_blind(&pub_blinded, &pub, param);
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ done:
+ ;
+}
+
static void
test_crypto_ed25519_testvectors(void *arg)
{
@@ -2621,6 +2635,8 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_testvectors(void *arg)
ed25519_signature_t sig;
int sign;
+ memset(&curvekp, 0xd0, sizeof(curvekp));
+
#define DECODE(p,s) base16_decode((char*)(p),sizeof(p),(s),strlen(s))
#define EQ(a,h) test_memeq_hex((const char*)(a), (h))
@@ -2702,8 +2718,8 @@ test_crypto_ed25519_storage(void *arg)
tor_free(tag);
/* whitebox test: truncated keys. */
- tt_int_op(0, ==, do_truncate(fname_1, 40));
- tt_int_op(0, ==, do_truncate(fname_2, 40));
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, do_truncate(fname_1, 40));
+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, do_truncate(fname_2, 40));
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pub, &tag, fname_2));
tt_ptr_op(tag, OP_EQ, NULL);
tor_free(tag);
@@ -2895,6 +2911,67 @@ crypto_rand_check_failure_mode_predict(void)
#undef FAILURE_MODE_BUFFER_SIZE
+/** Test that our ed25519 validation function rejects evil public keys and
+ * accepts good ones. */
+static void
+test_crypto_ed25519_validation(void *arg)
+{
+ (void) arg;
+
+ int retval;
+ ed25519_public_key_t pub1;
+
+ /* See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-April/012230.html
+ for a list of points with torsion components in ed25519. */
+
+ { /* Point with torsion component (order 8l) */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "300ef2e64e588e1df55b48e4da0416ffb64cc85d5b00af6463d5cc6c2b1c185e";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* Point with torsion component (order 4l) */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "f43e3a046db8749164c6e69b193f1e942c7452e7d888736f40b98093d814d5e7";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* Point with torsion component (order 2l) */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "c9fff3af0471c28e33e98c2043e44f779d0427b1e37c521a6bddc011ed1869af";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* This point is not even on the curve */
+ const char badkey[] =
+ "e19c65de75c68cf3b7643ea732ba9eb1a3d20d6d57ba223c2ece1df66feb5af0";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ badkey, strlen(badkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, -1);
+ }
+
+ { /* This one is a good key */
+ const char goodkey[] =
+ "4ba2e44760dff4c559ef3c38768c1c14a8a54740c782c8d70803e9d6e3ad8794";
+ retval = base16_decode((char*)pub1.pubkey, sizeof(pub1.pubkey),
+ goodkey, strlen(goodkey));
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, sizeof(pub1.pubkey));
+ tt_int_op(ed25519_validate_pubkey(&pub1), OP_EQ, 0);
+ }
+
+ done: ;
+}
+
static void
test_crypto_failure_modes(void *arg)
{
@@ -2902,17 +2979,17 @@ test_crypto_failure_modes(void *arg)
(void)arg;
rv = crypto_early_init();
- tt_assert(rv == 0);
+ tt_int_op(rv, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Check random works */
rv = crypto_rand_check_failure_mode_zero();
- tt_assert(rv == 0);
+ tt_int_op(rv, OP_EQ, 0);
rv = crypto_rand_check_failure_mode_identical();
- tt_assert(rv == 0);
+ tt_int_op(rv, OP_EQ, 0);
rv = crypto_rand_check_failure_mode_predict();
- tt_assert(rv == 0);
+ tt_int_op(rv, OP_EQ, 0);
done:
;
@@ -2933,7 +3010,6 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = {
CRYPTO_LEGACY(formats),
CRYPTO_LEGACY(rng),
{ "rng_range", test_crypto_rng_range, 0, NULL, NULL },
- { "rng_engine", test_crypto_rng_engine, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "rng_strongest", test_crypto_rng_strongest, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "rng_strongest_nosyscall", test_crypto_rng_strongest, TT_FORK,
&passthrough_setup, (void*)"nosyscall" },
@@ -2959,6 +3035,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = {
{ "digest_names", test_crypto_digest_names, 0, NULL, NULL },
{ "sha3", test_crypto_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL},
{ "sha3_xof", test_crypto_sha3_xof, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL},
+ { "mac_sha3", test_crypto_mac_sha3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL},
CRYPTO_LEGACY(dh),
{ "aes_iv_AES", test_crypto_aes_iv, TT_FORK, &passthrough_setup,
(void*)"aes" },
@@ -2981,7 +3058,9 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = {
ED25519_TEST(encode, 0),
ED25519_TEST(convert, 0),
ED25519_TEST(blinding, 0),
+ ED25519_TEST(blinding_fail, 0),
ED25519_TEST(testvectors, 0),
+ ED25519_TEST(validation, 0),
{ "ed25519_storage", test_crypto_ed25519_storage, 0, NULL, NULL },
{ "siphash", test_crypto_siphash, 0, NULL, NULL },
{ "failure_modes", test_crypto_failure_modes, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },