diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/channel.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/channel.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/channeltls.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/config.c | 50 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_edge.c | 61 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/dirvote.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/dirvote.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/hibernate.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/or.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/policies.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/relay.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/rendclient.c | 41 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/rendservice.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/router.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/shared_random.c | 6 |
17 files changed, 162 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c index 87fa721089..6a78b21988 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ channel_free(channel_t *chan) } /* Call a free method if there is one */ - if (chan->free) chan->free(chan); + if (chan->free_fn) chan->free_fn(chan); channel_clear_remote_end(chan); @@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ channel_listener_free(channel_listener_t *chan_l) tor_assert(!(chan_l->registered)); /* Call a free method if there is one */ - if (chan_l->free) chan_l->free(chan_l); + if (chan_l->free_fn) chan_l->free_fn(chan_l); /* * We're in CLOSED or ERROR, so the incoming channel queue is already @@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ channel_force_free(channel_t *chan) } /* Call a free method if there is one */ - if (chan->free) chan->free(chan); + if (chan->free_fn) chan->free_fn(chan); channel_clear_remote_end(chan); @@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ channel_listener_force_free(channel_listener_t *chan_l) chan_l); /* Call a free method if there is one */ - if (chan_l->free) chan_l->free(chan_l); + if (chan_l->free_fn) chan_l->free_fn(chan_l); /* * The incoming list just gets emptied and freed; we request close on diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h index 78e1b71014..a711b56d44 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.h +++ b/src/or/channel.h @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct channel_s { /* Methods implemented by the lower layer */ /** Free a channel */ - void (*free)(channel_t *); + void (*free_fn)(channel_t *); /** Close an open channel */ void (*close)(channel_t *); /** Describe the transport subclass for this channel */ @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ struct channel_listener_s { /* Methods implemented by the lower layer */ /** Free a channel */ - void (*free)(channel_listener_t *); + void (*free_fn)(channel_listener_t *); /** Close an open channel */ void (*close)(channel_listener_t *); /** Describe the transport subclass for this channel */ diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index a62f80ef91..9c2411ede8 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan) chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING; chan->close = channel_tls_close_method; chan->describe_transport = channel_tls_describe_transport_method; - chan->free = channel_tls_free_method; + chan->free_fn = channel_tls_free_method; chan->get_overhead_estimate = channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method; chan->get_remote_addr = channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method; chan->get_remote_descr = channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method; diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 060a544ec5..cc9b184698 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -856,7 +856,12 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, /* XXXX030 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ /* It is an error to extend if there is no previous node. */ - tor_assert_nonfatal(node_prev); + if (BUG(node_prev == NULL)) { + *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; + *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE; + return; + } + /* It is an error for a node with a known version to be so old it does not * support ntor. */ tor_assert_nonfatal(routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1)); @@ -864,16 +869,15 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, /* Assume relays without tor versions or routerstatuses support ntor. * The authorities enforce ntor support, and assuming and failing is better * than allowing a malicious node to perform a protocol downgrade to TAP. */ - if (node_prev && - *handshake_type_out != ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP && + if (*handshake_type_out != ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP && (node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node_prev) || (routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1)))) { - *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; - *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; - } else { - *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; - *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE; - } + *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; + *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; + } else { + *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; + *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE; + } } /** This is the backbone function for building circuits. @@ -2565,3 +2569,4 @@ extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei) tor_assert(ei); return extend_info_supports_ntor(ei); } + diff --git a/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c b/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c index b784a140ac..13836cdcfa 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c +++ b/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ #define TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_C_ +#include "orconfig.h" + #include <math.h> #include "or.h" diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 949c8a973f..b30832d1c4 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -6180,6 +6180,8 @@ port_cfg_new(size_t namelen) tor_assert(namelen <= SIZE_T_CEILING - sizeof(port_cfg_t) - 1); port_cfg_t *cfg = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(port_cfg_t) + namelen + 1); cfg->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1; + cfg->entry_cfg.dns_request = 1; + cfg->entry_cfg.onion_traffic = 1; cfg->entry_cfg.cache_ipv4_answers = 1; cfg->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6_virtaddr = 1; return cfg; @@ -6450,8 +6452,7 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, tor_addr_make_unspec(&cfg->addr); /* Server ports default to 0.0.0.0 */ cfg->server_cfg.no_listen = 1; cfg->server_cfg.bind_ipv4_only = 1; - cfg->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1; - cfg->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6_virtaddr = 1; + /* cfg->entry_cfg defaults are already set by port_cfg_new */ smartlist_add(out, cfg); } @@ -6522,9 +6523,11 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, char *addrport; uint16_t ptmp=0; int ok; + /* This must be kept in sync with port_cfg_new's defaults */ int no_listen = 0, no_advertise = 0, all_addrs = 0, bind_ipv4_only = 0, bind_ipv6_only = 0, - ipv4_traffic = 1, ipv6_traffic = 0, prefer_ipv6 = 0, + ipv4_traffic = 1, ipv6_traffic = 0, prefer_ipv6 = 0, dns_request = 1, + onion_traffic = 1, cache_ipv4 = 1, use_cached_ipv4 = 0, cache_ipv6 = 0, use_cached_ipv6 = 0, prefer_ipv6_automap = 1, world_writable = 0, group_writable = 0, @@ -6710,6 +6713,24 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, } else if (!strcasecmp(elt, "PreferIPv6")) { prefer_ipv6 = ! no; continue; + } else if (!strcasecmp(elt, "DNSRequest")) { + dns_request = ! no; + continue; + } else if (!strcasecmp(elt, "OnionTraffic")) { + onion_traffic = ! no; + continue; + } else if (!strcasecmp(elt, "OnionTrafficOnly")) { + /* Only connect to .onion addresses. Equivalent to + * NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic, NoIPv6Traffic. The option + * NoOnionTrafficOnly is not supported, it's too confusing. */ + if (no) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unsupported %sPort option 'No%s'. Use " + "DNSRequest, IPv4Traffic, and/or IPv6Traffic instead.", + portname, escaped(elt)); + } else { + ipv4_traffic = ipv6_traffic = dns_request = 0; + } + continue; } } if (!strcasecmp(elt, "CacheIPv4DNS")) { @@ -6778,9 +6799,24 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, else got_zero_port = 1; - if (ipv4_traffic == 0 && ipv6_traffic == 0) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You have a %sPort entry with both IPv4 and " - "IPv6 disabled; that won't work.", portname); + if (dns_request == 0 && listener_type == CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You have a %sPort entry with DNS disabled; that " + "won't work.", portname); + goto err; + } + + if (ipv4_traffic == 0 && ipv6_traffic == 0 && onion_traffic == 0 + && listener_type != CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You have a %sPort entry with all of IPv4 and " + "IPv6 and .onion disabled; that won't work.", portname); + goto err; + } + + if (dns_request == 1 && ipv4_traffic == 0 && ipv6_traffic == 0 + && listener_type != CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You have a %sPort entry with DNSRequest enabled, " + "but IPv4 and IPv6 disabled; DNS-based sites won't work.", + portname); goto err; } @@ -6824,6 +6860,8 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, cfg->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = ipv4_traffic; cfg->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = ipv6_traffic; cfg->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = prefer_ipv6; + cfg->entry_cfg.dns_request = dns_request; + cfg->entry_cfg.onion_traffic = onion_traffic; cfg->entry_cfg.cache_ipv4_answers = cache_ipv4; cfg->entry_cfg.cache_ipv6_answers = cache_ipv6; cfg->entry_cfg.use_cached_ipv4_answers = use_cached_ipv4; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 8ad0f0c71d..a41dcd5360 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn, } /* Hang on, did we find an answer saying that this is a reverse lookup for - * an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're condigured to + * an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're configured to * do so. */ if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) { /* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ @@ -1467,14 +1467,61 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, /* If we're running in Tor2webMode, we don't allow anything BUT .onion * addresses. */ if (options->Tor2webMode) { - log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname %s " - "because tor2web mode is enabled.", + log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname " + "or IP address %s because tor2web mode is enabled.", safe_str_client(socks->address)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); return -1; } #endif + /* socks->address is a non-onion hostname or IP address. + * If we can't do any non-onion requests, refuse the connection. + * If we have a hostname but can't do DNS, refuse the connection. + * If we have an IP address, but we can't use that address family, + * refuse the connection. + * + * If we can do DNS requests, and we can use at least one address family, + * then we have to resolve the address first. Then we'll know if it + * resolves to a usable address family. */ + + /* First, check if all non-onion traffic is disabled */ + if (!conn->entry_cfg.dns_request && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic + && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) { + log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname " + "or IP address %s because Port has OnionTrafficOnly set (or " + "NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic, and NoIPv6Traffic).", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); + return -1; + } + + /* Then check if we have a hostname or IP address, and whether DNS or + * the IP address family are permitted */ + tor_addr_t dummy_addr; + int socks_family = tor_addr_parse(&dummy_addr, socks->address); + /* family will be -1 for a non-onion hostname that's not an IP */ + if (socks_family == -1 && !conn->entry_cfg.dns_request) { + log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to hostname %s " + "because Port has NoDNSRequest set.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); + return -1; + } else if (socks_family == AF_INET && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic) { + log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to IPv4 address %s because " + "Port has NoIPv4Traffic set.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); + return -1; + } else if (socks_family == AF_INET6 && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) { + log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to IPv6 address %s because " + "Port has NoIPv6Traffic set.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); + return -1; + } + /* No else, we've covered all possible returned value. */ + /* See if this is a hostname lookup that we can answer immediately. * (For example, an attempt to look up the IP address for an IP address.) */ @@ -1662,6 +1709,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, /* If we get here, it's a request for a .onion address! */ tor_assert(!automap); + /* If .onion address requests are disabled, refuse the request */ + if (!conn->entry_cfg.onion_traffic) { + log_warn(LD_APP, "Onion address %s requested from a port with .onion " + "disabled", safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); + return -1; + } + /* Check whether it's RESOLVE or RESOLVE_PTR. We don't handle those * for hidden service addresses. */ if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(socks->command)) { diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c index 9748f4ae4d..ae869c9064 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.c +++ b/src/or/dirvote.c @@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, const char *chosen_version; const char *chosen_name = NULL; int exitsummary_disagreement = 0; - int is_named = 0, is_unnamed = 0, is_running = 0; + int is_named = 0, is_unnamed = 0, is_running = 0, is_valid = 0; int is_guard = 0, is_exit = 0, is_bad_exit = 0; int naming_conflict = 0; int n_listing = 0; @@ -1733,6 +1733,8 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, is_running = 1; else if (!strcmp(fl, "BadExit")) is_bad_exit = 1; + else if (!strcmp(fl, "Valid")) + is_valid = 1; } } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(fl); @@ -1742,6 +1744,12 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes, if (!is_running) continue; + /* Starting with consensus method 24, we don't list servers + * that are not valid in a consensus. See Proposal 272 */ + if (!is_valid && + consensus_method >= MIN_METHOD_FOR_EXCLUDING_INVALID_NODES) + continue; + /* Pick the version. */ if (smartlist_len(versions)) { sort_version_list(versions, 0); diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.h b/src/or/dirvote.h index a1f71ce4bb..06bfe671bd 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.h +++ b/src/or/dirvote.h @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ #define MIN_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 13 /** The highest consensus method that we currently support. */ -#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 23 +#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 24 /** Lowest consensus method where microdesc consensuses omit any entry * with no microdesc. */ @@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ * value(s). */ #define MIN_METHOD_FOR_SHARED_RANDOM 23 +/** Lowest consensus method where authorities drop all nodes that don't get + * the Valid flag. */ +#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_EXCLUDING_INVALID_NODES 24 + /** Default bandwidth to clip unmeasured bandwidths to using method >= * MIN_METHOD_TO_CLIP_UNMEASURED_BW. (This is not a consensus method; do not * get confused with the above macros.) */ diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index 209aae01cf..7e25306234 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ read_bandwidth_usage(void) int res; res = unlink(fname); - if (res != 0) { + if (res != 0 && errno != ENOENT) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Failed to unlink %s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9179f08caf..88e06fcaaf 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1151,6 +1151,8 @@ typedef struct entry_port_cfg_t { unsigned int ipv4_traffic : 1; unsigned int ipv6_traffic : 1; unsigned int prefer_ipv6 : 1; + unsigned int dns_request : 1; + unsigned int onion_traffic : 1; /** For a socks listener: should we cache IPv4/IPv6 DNS information that * exit nodes tell us? diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index 07f256f5cc..44a46d2fe2 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -2119,8 +2119,10 @@ exit_policy_is_general_exit_helper(smartlist_t *policy, int port) if (subnet_status[i] != 0) continue; /* We already reject some part of this /8 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, i<<24); - if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) + if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0) && + !get_options()->DirAllowPrivateAddresses) { continue; /* Local or non-routable addresses */ + } if (p->policy_type == ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT) { if (p->maskbits > 8) continue; /* Narrower than a /8. */ diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 38096ad1bb..5fedba28a3 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -2454,7 +2454,7 @@ update_circuit_on_cmux_(circuit_t *circ, cell_direction_t direction, /* Cmux sanity check */ if (! circuitmux_is_circuit_attached(cmux, circ)) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "called on non-attachd circuit from %s:%d", + log_warn(LD_BUG, "called on non-attached circuit from %s:%d", file, lineno); return; } diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 9d16e3b716..a93bc94a9c 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -1370,40 +1370,15 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry, smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } - /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ + /* All version 2 HS descriptors come with a TAP onion key. + * Clients used to try to get the TAP onion key from the consensus, but this + * meant that hidden services could discover which consensus clients have. */ if (!extend_info_supports_tap(intro->extend_info)) { - const node_t *node; - extend_info_t *new_extend_info; - if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) - node = node_get_by_hex_id(intro->extend_info->nickname); - else - node = node_get_by_id(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); - if (!node) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", - intro->extend_info->nickname); - smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); - goto again; - } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - new_extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, options->Tor2webMode); -#else - new_extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); -#endif - if (!new_extend_info) { - const char *alternate_reason = ""; -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - alternate_reason = ", or we cannot connect directly to it"; -#endif - log_info(LD_REND, "We don't have a descriptor for the intro-point relay " - "'%s'%s; trying another.", - extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info), alternate_reason); - smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); - goto again; - } else { - extend_info_free(intro->extend_info); - intro->extend_info = new_extend_info; - } - tor_assert(intro->extend_info != NULL); + log_info(LD_REND, "The HS descriptor is missing a TAP onion key for the " + "intro-point relay '%s'; trying another.", + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info))); + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); + goto again; } /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */ if (strict && diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index cce63f29fa..4f7d7aa726 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceDir")) { if (service) { /* register the one we just finished parsing */ if (validate_only) - rend_service_free(service); + rend_service_free(service); else rend_add_service(service); } @@ -4226,3 +4226,4 @@ rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) tor_assert(rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_consistent(options)); return options->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode ? 1 : 0; } + diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index b664a88760..8fa5799896 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -452,7 +452,8 @@ init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity, goto error; } } else { - log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname); + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname); + goto error; } return prkey; case FN_FILE: @@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out, fname = get_datadir_fname2("keys", legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key"); - signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_INFO, 0); + signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, 0); if (!signing_key) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname); goto done; diff --git a/src/or/shared_random.c b/src/or/shared_random.c index 19564f5924..5f6b03f1ba 100644 --- a/src/or/shared_random.c +++ b/src/or/shared_random.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ verify_commit_and_reveal(const sr_commit_t *commit) if (fast_memneq(received_hashed_reveal, commit->hashed_reveal, sizeof(received_hashed_reveal))) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Received reveal value from authority %s " - "does't match the commit value.", + "doesn't match the commit value.", sr_commit_get_rsa_fpr(commit)); goto invalid; } @@ -578,8 +578,8 @@ commit_is_authoritative(const sr_commit_t *commit, tor_assert(commit); tor_assert(voter_key); - return !memcmp(commit->rsa_identity, voter_key, - sizeof(commit->rsa_identity)); + return fast_memeq(commit->rsa_identity, voter_key, + sizeof(commit->rsa_identity)); } /* Decide if the newly received <b>commit</b> should be kept depending on |