diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_edge.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_or.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/dirserv.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/or.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/policies.c | 2 |
6 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index efe804df28..123c33a876 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -3606,7 +3606,7 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, } /* Call even if result is 0, since the global read bucket may - * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this guy needs to + * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to * know to stop reading. */ connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(conn); if (n_written > 0 && connection_is_writing(conn)) @@ -4102,7 +4102,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) } /* Call even if result is 0, since the global write bucket may - * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this guy needs to + * have reached 0 on a different conn, and this connection needs to * know to stop writing. */ connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(conn); if (n_read > 0 && connection_is_reading(conn)) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 758d583c39..dd81142094 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2951,8 +2951,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) return 0; } /* Make sure to get the 'real' address of the previous hop: the - * caller might want to know whether his IP address has changed, and - * we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's + * caller might want to know whether the remote IP address has changed, + * and we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's * canonical IP address. */ if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_address(or_circ->p_chan)); diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index d778eb3b4f..29e8153d89 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1585,7 +1585,7 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn) * * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the - * connection, make sure it's the right guy. + * connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate. * * Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for * the certificate to be weird or absent. @@ -1601,7 +1601,7 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn) * 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt. * 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all * descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't - * this guy; and note that this guy is reachable. + * this relay; and note that this relay is reachable. * 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity * fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned. */ diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 620d324704..491557e9cd 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -3135,7 +3135,7 @@ dirserv_get_routerdescs(smartlist_t *descs_out, const char *key, * router listening at <b>address</b>:<b>or_port</b>, and has yielded * a certificate with digest <b>digest_rcvd</b>. * - * Inform the reachability checker that we could get to this guy. + * Inform the reachability checker that we could get to this relay. */ void dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 103e76dff6..6faeb34d56 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ typedef struct connection_t { * marked.) */ const char *marked_for_close_file; /**< For debugging: in which file were * we marked for close? */ - char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) of the guy on the other end. + char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) of the other end. * strdup into this, because free_connection() frees it. */ /** Another connection that's connected to this one in lieu of a socket. */ struct connection_t *linked_conn; diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c index c9bce1b234..4706a9da72 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.c +++ b/src/or/policies.c @@ -2036,7 +2036,7 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, * allows exit enclaving. Trying it anyway would open up a cool attack * where the node refuses due to exitpolicy, the client reacts in * surprise by rewriting the node's exitpolicy to reject *:*, and then - * a bad guy targets users by causing them to attempt such connections + * an adversary targets users by causing them to attempt such connections * to 98% of the exits. * * Once microdescriptors can handle addresses in special cases (e.g. if |