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-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.c255
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuituse.c2
-rw-r--r--src/or/config.c264
-rw-r--r--src/or/config.h5
-rw-r--r--src/or/control.c15
-rw-r--r--src/or/directory.c5
-rw-r--r--src/or/directory.h2
-rw-r--r--src/or/dirserv.c12
-rw-r--r--src/or/dirvote.c55
-rw-r--r--src/or/dns.c48
-rw-r--r--src/or/microdesc.c9
-rw-r--r--src/or/or.h60
-rw-r--r--src/or/policies.c6
-rw-r--r--src/or/relay.c14
-rw-r--r--src/or/rephist.c3
-rw-r--r--src/or/router.c5
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.c33
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerparse.c9
18 files changed, 610 insertions, 192 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index b82cce9881..9d52b5e021 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ static entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest);
static void bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge);
+static int entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
+static void pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ);
+
/**
* This function decides if CBT learning should be disabled. It returns
* true if one or more of the following four conditions are met:
@@ -1624,7 +1627,7 @@ circuit_build_times_set_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
return;
if (cbt->timeout_ms < circuit_build_times_min_timeout()) {
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Set buildtimeout to low value %fms. Setting to %dms",
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Set buildtimeout to low value %fms. Setting to %dms",
cbt->timeout_ms, circuit_build_times_min_timeout());
cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_min_timeout();
if (cbt->close_ms < cbt->timeout_ms) {
@@ -2285,28 +2288,11 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!");
circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
- /* Don't count cannibalized or onehop circs for path bias */
+
if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || circ->has_opened) {
control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0);
- } else {
- entry_guard_t *guard =
- entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
-
- if (guard) {
- guard->circuit_successes++;
-
- log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
- guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
-
- if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) "
- "for guard %s",
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
- guard->nickname);
- }
- }
}
+
if (!can_complete_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
can_complete_circuit=1;
@@ -2322,6 +2308,8 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
consider_testing_reachability(1, 1);
}
}
+
+ pathbias_count_success(circ);
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
@@ -2444,6 +2432,13 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
return -1;
}
+ if (tor_addr_is_internal(&n_addr, 0) &&
+ !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Client asked me to extend to a private address");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using
* an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay),
* but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty
@@ -2621,6 +2616,194 @@ pathbias_get_scale_factor(const or_options_t *options)
DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD, 1, INT32_MAX);
}
+static const char *
+pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state)
+{
+ switch (state) {
+ case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC:
+ return "new";
+ case PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP:
+ return "first hop";
+ case PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED:
+ return "succeeded";
+ }
+
+ return "unknown";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful first hop.
+ * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias first_hop count.
+ *
+ * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
+ */
+static int
+pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+#define FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
+ static ratelim_t first_hop_notice_limit =
+ RATELIM_INIT(FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
+ char *rate_msg = NULL;
+
+ /* Completely ignore one hop circuits */
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
+ /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
+ if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
+ approx_time()))) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
+ "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
+ rate_msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Don't count cannibalized circs for path bias */
+ if (!circ->has_opened) {
+ entry_guard_t *guard;
+
+ guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(
+ circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
+ if (guard) {
+ if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
+ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP;
+
+ if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) {
+ /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
+ approx_time()))) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
+ "Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
+ rate_msg);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
+ approx_time()))) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
+ "Unopened circuit has no known guard. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
+ rate_msg);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
+ if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
+ approx_time()))) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
+ "A %s circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
+ rate_msg);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit
+ * completion. If so, record it in the current guard's path bias
+ * success count.
+ *
+ * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
+ */
+static void
+pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+#define SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
+ static ratelim_t success_notice_limit =
+ RATELIM_INIT(SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
+ char *rate_msg = NULL;
+
+ /* Ignore one hop circuits */
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias */
+ if (!circ->has_opened) {
+ entry_guard_t *guard =
+ entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
+
+ if (guard) {
+ if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
+ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED;
+ guard->circuit_successes++;
+
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
+ } else {
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
+ approx_time()))) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
+ "Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
+ rate_msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) "
+ "for guard %s=%s",
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
+ approx_time()))) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
+ "Completed circuit has no known guard. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
+ rate_msg);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED) {
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
+ approx_time()))) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
+ "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
+ rate_msg);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
* 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should
* eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the
@@ -2639,7 +2822,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (guard->circuit_successes/((double)guard->first_hops)
< pathbias_get_disable_rate(options)) {
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Extremely low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s. "
"This might indicate an attack, or a bug.",
guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
@@ -2652,7 +2835,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
< pathbias_get_notice_rate(options)
&& !guard->path_bias_notice) {
guard->path_bias_notice = 1;
- log_notice(LD_PROTOCOL,
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s.",
guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
@@ -2666,8 +2849,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
guard->circuit_successes /= scale_factor;
}
guard->first_hops++;
- log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s",
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname);
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
+ hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
return 0;
}
@@ -2687,22 +2871,13 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
{
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
crypt_path_t *hop;
+ int rv;
+
+ if ((rv = pathbias_count_first_hop(circ)) < 0)
+ return rv;
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
hop = circ->cpath;
- /* Don't count cannibalized or onehop circs for path bias */
- if (!circ->has_opened && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
- entry_guard_t *guard;
-
- guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(
- circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
- if (guard) {
- if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) {
- /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */
- return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
- }
- }
- }
} else {
hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */
@@ -4702,6 +4877,12 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
unsigned hop_cnt, success_cnt;
+ if (!node) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "EntryGuardPathBias without EntryGuard");
+ break;
+ }
+
if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%u %u", &success_cnt, &hop_cnt) != 2) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse guard path bias info: "
"Misformated EntryGuardPathBias %s", escaped(line->value));
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index c34b698fa1..20f124eb4e 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
} while (0)
SET_CUTOFF(general_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms);
- SET_CUTOFF(begindir_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms / 2.0);
+ SET_CUTOFF(begindir_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms);
SET_CUTOFF(fourhop_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (4/3.0));
SET_CUTOFF(cannibalize_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms / 2.0);
SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms);
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index 8703667945..b9170f4200 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -168,6 +168,9 @@ typedef struct config_var_t {
/** An entry for config_vars: "The option <b>name</b> is obsolete." */
#define OBSOLETE(name) { name, CONFIG_TYPE_OBSOLETE, 0, NULL }
+#define VPORT(member,conftype,initvalue) \
+ VAR(#member, conftype, member ## _lines, initvalue)
+
/** Array of configuration options. Until we disallow nonstandard
* abbreviations, order is significant, since the first matching option will
* be chosen first.
@@ -229,7 +232,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(ConstrainedSockSize, MEMUNIT, "8192"),
V(ContactInfo, STRING, NULL),
V(ControlListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
- V(ControlPort, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(ControlPort, LINELIST, NULL),
V(ControlPortFileGroupReadable,BOOL, "0"),
V(ControlPortWriteToFile, FILENAME, NULL),
V(ControlSocket, LINELIST, NULL),
@@ -246,7 +249,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(DirListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
OBSOLETE("DirFetchPeriod"),
V(DirPolicy, LINELIST, NULL),
- V(DirPort, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(DirPort, LINELIST, NULL),
V(DirPortFrontPage, FILENAME, NULL),
OBSOLETE("DirPostPeriod"),
OBSOLETE("DirRecordUsageByCountry"),
@@ -259,7 +262,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(DisableDebuggerAttachment, BOOL, "1"),
V(DisableIOCP, BOOL, "1"),
V(DynamicDHGroups, BOOL, "0"),
- V(DNSPort, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(DNSPort, LINELIST, NULL),
V(DNSListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
V(DownloadExtraInfo, BOOL, "0"),
V(EnforceDistinctSubnets, BOOL, "1"),
@@ -273,6 +276,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(ExitPolicy, LINELIST, NULL),
V(ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, BOOL, "1"),
V(ExitPortStatistics, BOOL, "0"),
+ V(ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses, BOOL, "0"),
V(ExtraInfoStatistics, BOOL, "1"),
#if defined (WINCE)
@@ -345,7 +349,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(NewCircuitPeriod, INTERVAL, "30 seconds"),
VAR("NamingAuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL, NamingAuthoritativeDir, "0"),
V(NATDListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
- V(NATDPort, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(NATDPort, LINELIST, NULL),
V(Nickname, STRING, NULL),
V(WarnUnsafeSocks, BOOL, "1"),
OBSOLETE("NoPublish"),
@@ -353,7 +357,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(NumCPUs, UINT, "0"),
V(NumEntryGuards, UINT, "3"),
V(ORListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
- V(ORPort, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(ORPort, LINELIST, NULL),
V(OutboundBindAddress, STRING, NULL),
V(PathBiasCircThreshold, INT, "-1"),
@@ -406,7 +410,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(ShutdownWaitLength, INTERVAL, "30 seconds"),
V(SocksListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
V(SocksPolicy, LINELIST, NULL),
- V(SocksPort, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(SocksPort, LINELIST, NULL),
V(SocksTimeout, INTERVAL, "2 minutes"),
OBSOLETE("StatusFetchPeriod"),
V(StrictNodes, BOOL, "0"),
@@ -419,7 +423,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
V(TrackHostExitsExpire, INTERVAL, "30 minutes"),
OBSOLETE("TrafficShaping"),
V(TransListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
- V(TransPort, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(TransPort, LINELIST, NULL),
V(TunnelDirConns, BOOL, "1"),
V(UpdateBridgesFromAuthority, BOOL, "0"),
V(UseBridges, BOOL, "0"),
@@ -460,7 +464,7 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = {
/** Override default values with these if the user sets the TestingTorNetwork
* option. */
static const config_var_t testing_tor_network_defaults[] = {
- V(ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig, BOOL, "1"),
+ V(ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig, BOOL, "1"),
V(DirAllowPrivateAddresses, BOOL, "1"),
V(EnforceDistinctSubnets, BOOL, "0"),
V(AssumeReachable, BOOL, "1"),
@@ -470,6 +474,7 @@ static const config_var_t testing_tor_network_defaults[] = {
V(ClientRejectInternalAddresses, BOOL, "0"),
V(CountPrivateBandwidth, BOOL, "1"),
V(ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, BOOL, "0"),
+ V(ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses, BOOL, "1"),
V(V3AuthVotingInterval, INTERVAL, "5 minutes"),
V(V3AuthVoteDelay, INTERVAL, "20 seconds"),
V(V3AuthDistDelay, INTERVAL, "20 seconds"),
@@ -594,6 +599,7 @@ static void option_reset(const config_format_t *fmt, or_options_t *options,
const config_var_t *var, int use_defaults);
static void config_free(const config_format_t *fmt, void *options);
static int config_lines_eq(config_line_t *a, config_line_t *b);
+static int config_count_key(const config_line_t *a, const char *key);
static int option_is_same(const config_format_t *fmt,
const or_options_t *o1, const or_options_t *o2,
const char *name);
@@ -621,7 +627,7 @@ static int parse_dir_server_line(const char *line,
dirinfo_type_t required_type,
int validate_only);
static void port_cfg_free(port_cfg_t *port);
-static int parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
+static int parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
char **msg_out, int *n_ports_out);
static int check_server_ports(const smartlist_t *ports,
const or_options_t *options);
@@ -1166,7 +1172,7 @@ options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg)
#if defined(HAVE_NET_IF_H) && defined(HAVE_NET_PFVAR_H)
/* Open /dev/pf before dropping privileges. */
- if (options->TransPort) {
+ if (options->TransPort_set) {
if (get_pf_socket() < 0) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to open /dev/pf for transparent proxy.");
goto rollback;
@@ -1464,7 +1470,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
}
}
- if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin && server_mode(options)) {
for (cl = options->ServerTransportPlugin; cl; cl = cl->next) {
if (parse_server_transport_line(cl->value, 0)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
@@ -1649,7 +1655,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
int was_relay = 0;
if (options->BridgeRelay) {
time_t int_start = time(NULL);
- if (config_lines_eq(old_options->ORPort, options->ORPort)) {
+ if (config_lines_eq(old_options->ORPort_lines,options->ORPort_lines)) {
int_start += RELAY_BRIDGE_STATS_DELAY;
was_relay = 1;
}
@@ -1733,7 +1739,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
} else {
options->DirReqStatistics = 0;
/* Don't warn Tor clients, they don't use statistics */
- if (options->ORPort)
+ if (options->ORPort_set)
log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Configured to measure directory request "
"statistics, but no GeoIP database found. "
"Please specify a GeoIP database using the "
@@ -3066,6 +3072,20 @@ config_lines_eq(config_line_t *a, config_line_t *b)
return 1;
}
+/** Return the number of lines in <b>a</b> whose key is <b>key</b>. */
+static int
+config_count_key(const config_line_t *a, const char *key)
+{
+ int n = 0;
+ while (a) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(a->key, key)) {
+ ++n;
+ }
+ a = a->next;
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+
/** Return true iff the option <b>name</b> has the same value in <b>o1</b>
* and <b>o2</b>. Must not be called for LINELIST_S or OBSOLETE options.
*/
@@ -3433,7 +3453,8 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
"Tor will still run, but probably won't do anything.");
#ifndef USE_TRANSPARENT
- if (options->TransPort || options->TransListenAddress)
+ /* XXXX024 I think we can remove this TransListenAddress */
+ if (options->TransPort_set || options->TransListenAddress)
REJECT("TransPort and TransListenAddress are disabled in this build.");
#endif
@@ -3503,10 +3524,10 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
}
}
- if (options->AuthoritativeDir && !options->DirPort)
+ if (options->AuthoritativeDir && !options->DirPort_set)
REJECT("Running as authoritative directory, but no DirPort set.");
- if (options->AuthoritativeDir && !options->ORPort)
+ if (options->AuthoritativeDir && !options->ORPort_set)
REJECT("Running as authoritative directory, but no ORPort set.");
if (options->AuthoritativeDir && options->ClientOnly)
@@ -3693,11 +3714,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
"PublishServerDescriptor line.");
}
- if (options->BridgeRelay && options->DirPort) {
+ if (options->BridgeRelay && options->DirPort_set) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Can't set a DirPort on a bridge relay; disabling "
"DirPort");
- config_free_lines(options->DirPort);
- options->DirPort = NULL;
+ config_free_lines(options->DirPort_lines);
+ options->DirPort_lines = NULL;
+ options->DirPort_set = 0;
}
if (options->MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 < 0) {
@@ -3848,6 +3870,20 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
if (accounting_parse_options(options, 1)<0)
REJECT("Failed to parse accounting options. See logs for details.");
+ if (options->AccountingMax) {
+ if (options->RendConfigLines && server_mode(options)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Using accounting with a hidden service and an "
+ "ORPort is risky: your hidden service(s) and your public "
+ "address will all turn off at the same time, which may alert "
+ "observers that they are being run by the same party.");
+ } else if (config_count_key(options->RendConfigLines,
+ "HiddenServiceDir") > 1) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Using accounting with multiple hidden services is "
+ "risky: they will all turn off at the same time, which may "
+ "alert observers that they are being run by the same party.");
+ }
+ }
+
if (options->HTTPProxy) { /* parse it now */
if (tor_addr_port_lookup(options->HTTPProxy,
&options->HTTPProxyAddr, &options->HTTPProxyPort) < 0)
@@ -3958,7 +3994,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
}
}
- if (options->ControlPort && !options->HashedControlPassword &&
+ if (options->ControlPort_set && !options->HashedControlPassword &&
!options->HashedControlSessionPassword &&
!options->CookieAuthentication) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "ControlPort is open, but no authentication method "
@@ -4019,6 +4055,13 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
REJECT("Server transport line did not parse. See logs for details.");
}
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin && !server_mode(options)) {
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Tor is not configured as a relay but you specified"
+ " a ServerTransportPlugin line (%s). The ServerTransportPlugin "
+ "line will be ignored.",
+ esc_for_log(options->ServerTransportPlugin->value));
+ }
+
if (options->ConstrainedSockets) {
/* If the user wants to constrain socket buffer use, make sure the desired
* limit is between MIN|MAX_TCPSOCK_BUFFER in k increments. */
@@ -4031,7 +4074,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
MIN_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER, MAX_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER);
return -1;
}
- if (options->DirPort) {
+ if (options->DirPort_set) {
/* Providing cached directory entries while system TCP buffers are scarce
* will exacerbate the socket errors. Suggest that this be disabled. */
COMPLAIN("You have requested constrained socket buffers while also "
@@ -4190,7 +4233,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
}
});
- if (options->BridgeRelay == 1 && ! options->ORPort)
+ if (options->BridgeRelay == 1 && ! options->ORPort_set)
REJECT("BridgeRelay is 1, ORPort is not set. This is an invalid "
"combination.");
@@ -4290,7 +4333,7 @@ options_transition_affects_workers(const or_options_t *old_options,
{
if (!opt_streq(old_options->DataDirectory, new_options->DataDirectory) ||
old_options->NumCPUs != new_options->NumCPUs ||
- !config_lines_eq(old_options->ORPort, new_options->ORPort) ||
+ !config_lines_eq(old_options->ORPort_lines, new_options->ORPort_lines) ||
old_options->ServerDNSSearchDomains !=
new_options->ServerDNSSearchDomains ||
old_options->_SafeLogging != new_options->_SafeLogging ||
@@ -4320,8 +4363,10 @@ options_transition_affects_descriptor(const or_options_t *old_options,
!config_lines_eq(old_options->ExitPolicy,new_options->ExitPolicy) ||
old_options->ExitPolicyRejectPrivate !=
new_options->ExitPolicyRejectPrivate ||
- !config_lines_eq(old_options->ORPort, new_options->ORPort) ||
- !config_lines_eq(old_options->DirPort, new_options->DirPort) ||
+ !config_lines_eq(old_options->ORPort_lines,
+ new_options->ORPort_lines) ||
+ !config_lines_eq(old_options->DirPort_lines,
+ new_options->DirPort_lines) ||
old_options->ClientOnly != new_options->ClientOnly ||
old_options->DisableNetwork != new_options->DisableNetwork ||
old_options->_PublishServerDescriptor !=
@@ -4828,12 +4873,11 @@ config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options)
{
smartlist_t *elts;
config_line_t *opt;
- char *from, *to;
+ const char *from, *to, *msg;
addressmap_clear_configured();
elts = smartlist_new();
for (opt = options->AddressMap; opt; opt = opt->next) {
- int from_wildcard = 0, to_wildcard = 0;
smartlist_split_string(elts, opt->value, NULL,
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 2);
if (smartlist_len(elts) < 2) {
@@ -4851,11 +4895,39 @@ config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options)
goto cleanup;
}
- if (!strcmp(to, "*") || !strcmp(from, "*")) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"MapAddress '%s' is unsupported - can't remap from "
- "or to *. Ignoring.",opt->value);
+ if (addressmap_register_auto(from, to, 0, ADDRMAPSRC_TORRC, &msg) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"MapAddress '%s' failed: %s. Ignoring.", opt->value,
+ msg);
goto cleanup;
}
+
+ if (smartlist_len(elts) > 2)
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Ignoring extra arguments to MapAddress.");
+
+ cleanup:
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elts, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_clear(elts);
+ }
+ smartlist_free(elts);
+}
+
+/** As addressmap_register(), but detect the wildcarded status of "from" and
+ * "to", and do not steal a reference to <b>to</b>. */
+/* XXXX024 move to connection_edge.c */
+int
+addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to,
+ time_t expires,
+ addressmap_entry_source_t addrmap_source,
+ const char **msg)
+{
+ int from_wildcard = 0, to_wildcard = 0;
+
+ *msg = "whoops, forgot the error message";
+ if (1) {
+ if (!strcmp(to, "*") || !strcmp(from, "*")) {
+ *msg = "can't remap from or to *";
+ return -1;
+ }
/* Detect asterisks in expressions of type: '*.example.com' */
if (!strncmp(from,"*.",2)) {
from += 2;
@@ -4867,30 +4939,20 @@ config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options)
}
if (to_wildcard && !from_wildcard) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "Skipping invalid argument '%s' to MapAddress: "
- "can only use wildcard (i.e. '*.') if 'from' address "
- "uses wildcard also", opt->value);
- goto cleanup;
+ *msg = "can only use wildcard (i.e. '*.') if 'from' address "
+ "uses wildcard also";
+ return -1;
}
if (address_is_invalid_destination(to, 1)) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "Skipping invalid argument '%s' to MapAddress", opt->value);
- goto cleanup;
+ *msg = "destination is invalid";
+ return -1;
}
- addressmap_register(from, tor_strdup(to), 0, ADDRMAPSRC_TORRC,
+ addressmap_register(from, tor_strdup(to), expires, addrmap_source,
from_wildcard, to_wildcard);
-
- if (smartlist_len(elts) > 2)
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Ignoring extra arguments to MapAddress.");
-
- cleanup:
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elts, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_clear(elts);
}
- smartlist_free(elts);
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -5607,13 +5669,13 @@ warn_nonlocal_controller_ports(smartlist_t *ports, unsigned forbid)
*/
static int
parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out,
- const config_line_t *ports,
- const config_line_t *listenaddrs,
- const char *portname,
- int listener_type,
- const char *defaultaddr,
- int defaultport,
- unsigned flags)
+ const config_line_t *ports,
+ const config_line_t *listenaddrs,
+ const char *portname,
+ int listener_type,
+ const char *defaultaddr,
+ int defaultport,
+ unsigned flags)
{
smartlist_t *elts;
int retval = -1;
@@ -5624,6 +5686,7 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out,
const unsigned forbid_nonlocal = flags & CL_PORT_FORBID_NONLOCAL;
const unsigned allow_spurious_listenaddr =
flags & CL_PORT_ALLOW_EXTRA_LISTENADDR;
+ int got_zero_port=0, got_nonzero_port=0;
/* FooListenAddress is deprecated; let's make it work like it used to work,
* though. */
@@ -5651,7 +5714,7 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out,
if (mainport == 0) {
if (allow_spurious_listenaddr)
- return 1;
+ return 1; /*DOCDOC*/
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%sPort must be defined if %sListenAddress is used",
portname, portname);
return -1;
@@ -5876,6 +5939,11 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out,
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(elt);
}
+ if (port)
+ got_nonzero_port = 1;
+ else
+ got_zero_port = 1;
+
if (out && port) {
port_cfg_t *cfg = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(port_cfg_t));
tor_addr_copy(&cfg->addr, &addr);
@@ -5902,6 +5970,13 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out,
warn_nonlocal_client_ports(out, portname);
}
+ if (got_zero_port && got_nonzero_port) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You specified a nonzero %sPort along with '%sPort 0' "
+ "in the same configuration. Did you mean to disable %sPort or "
+ "not?", portname, portname, portname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
retval = 0;
err:
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elts, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
@@ -5932,16 +6007,34 @@ parse_unix_socket_config(smartlist_t *out, const config_line_t *cfg,
return 0;
}
+/** Return the number of ports which are actually going to listen with type
+ * <b>listenertype</b>. Do not count no_listen ports. Do not count unix
+ * sockets. */
+static int
+count_real_listeners(const smartlist_t *ports, int listenertype)
+{
+ int n = 0;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, port_cfg_t *, port) {
+ if (port->no_listen || port->is_unix_addr)
+ continue;
+ if (port->type != listenertype)
+ continue;
+ ++n;
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(port);
+ return n;
+}
+
/** Parse all client port types (Socks, DNS, Trans, NATD) from
- * <b>options</b>. On success, set *<b>n_ports_out</b> to the number of
- * ports that are listed and return 0. On failure, set *<b>msg</b> to a
+ * <b>options</b>. On success, set *<b>n_ports_out</b> to the number
+ * of ports that are listed, update the *Port_set values in
+ * <b>options</b>, and return 0. On failure, set *<b>msg</b> to a
* description of the problem and return -1.
*
* If <b>validate_only</b> is false, set configured_client_ports to the
* new list of ports parsed from <b>options</b>.
**/
static int
-parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
+parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
char **msg, int *n_ports_out)
{
smartlist_t *ports;
@@ -5952,7 +6045,7 @@ parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
*n_ports_out = 0;
if (parse_port_config(ports,
- options->SocksPort, options->SocksListenAddress,
+ options->SocksPort_lines, options->SocksListenAddress,
"Socks", CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER,
"127.0.0.1", 9050,
CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL|CL_PORT_ALLOW_EXTRA_LISTENADDR) < 0) {
@@ -5960,26 +6053,26 @@ parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
goto err;
}
if (parse_port_config(ports,
- options->DNSPort, options->DNSListenAddress,
- "DNS", CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER,
- "127.0.0.1", 0,
- CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) {
+ options->DNSPort_lines, options->DNSListenAddress,
+ "DNS", CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER,
+ "127.0.0.1", 0,
+ CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Invalid DNSPort/DNSListenAddress configuration");
goto err;
}
if (parse_port_config(ports,
- options->TransPort, options->TransListenAddress,
- "Trans", CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER,
- "127.0.0.1", 0,
- CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) {
+ options->TransPort_lines, options->TransListenAddress,
+ "Trans", CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER,
+ "127.0.0.1", 0,
+ CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Invalid TransPort/TransListenAddress configuration");
goto err;
}
if (parse_port_config(ports,
- options->NATDPort, options->NATDListenAddress,
- "NATD", CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER,
- "127.0.0.1", 0,
- CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) {
+ options->NATDPort_lines, options->NATDListenAddress,
+ "NATD", CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER,
+ "127.0.0.1", 0,
+ CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Invalid NatdPort/NatdListenAddress configuration");
goto err;
}
@@ -5992,7 +6085,8 @@ parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
control_port_flags |= CL_PORT_FORBID_NONLOCAL;
if (parse_port_config(ports,
- options->ControlPort, options->ControlListenAddress,
+ options->ControlPort_lines,
+ options->ControlListenAddress,
"Control", CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER,
"127.0.0.1", 0,
control_port_flags) < 0) {
@@ -6009,7 +6103,7 @@ parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
}
if (! options->ClientOnly) {
if (parse_port_config(ports,
- options->ORPort, options->ORListenAddress,
+ options->ORPort_lines, options->ORListenAddress,
"OR", CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
"0.0.0.0", 0,
CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS) < 0) {
@@ -6017,7 +6111,7 @@ parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
goto err;
}
if (parse_port_config(ports,
- options->DirPort, options->DirListenAddress,
+ options->DirPort_lines, options->DirListenAddress,
"Dir", CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER,
"0.0.0.0", 0,
CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS) < 0) {
@@ -6033,6 +6127,25 @@ parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
*n_ports_out = smartlist_len(ports);
+ retval = 0;
+
+ /* Update the *Port_set options. The !! here is to force a boolean out of
+ an integer. */
+ options->ORPort_set =
+ !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER);
+ options->SocksPort_set =
+ !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER);
+ options->TransPort_set =
+ !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER);
+ options->NATDPort_set =
+ !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER);
+ options->ControlPort_set =
+ !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER);
+ options->DirPort_set =
+ !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
+ options->DNSPort_set =
+ !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER);
+
if (!validate_only) {
if (configured_ports) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(configured_ports,
@@ -6043,7 +6156,6 @@ parse_ports(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only,
ports = NULL; /* prevent free below. */
}
- retval = 0;
err:
if (ports) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(ports, port_cfg_t *, p, port_cfg_free(p));
@@ -6584,7 +6696,7 @@ init_libevent(const or_options_t *options)
suppress_libevent_log_msg(NULL);
tor_check_libevent_version(tor_libevent_get_method(),
- get_options()->ORPort != NULL,
+ server_mode(get_options()),
&badness);
if (badness) {
const char *v = tor_libevent_get_version_str();
diff --git a/src/or/config.h b/src/or/config.h
index ce7e319746..dd76edcf1d 100644
--- a/src/or/config.h
+++ b/src/or/config.h
@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ or_options_t *options_new(void);
#endif
void config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options);
+/* XXXX024 move to connection_edge.h */
+int addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to,
+ time_t expires,
+ addressmap_entry_source_t addrmap_source,
+ const char **msg);
#endif
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index ce571f99f3..913d18a7fc 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -1366,9 +1366,18 @@ handle_control_mapaddress(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "250-%s=%s", address, to);
}
} else {
- addressmap_register(from, tor_strdup(to), 1,
- ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER, 0, 0);
- smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "250-%s", line);
+ const char *msg;
+ if (addressmap_register_auto(from, to, 1,
+ ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER, &msg) < 0) {
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(reply,
+ "512-syntax error: invalid address mapping "
+ " '%s': %s", line, msg);
+ log_warn(LD_CONTROL,
+ "Skipping invalid argument '%s' in MapAddress msg: %s",
+ line, msg);
+ } else {
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "250-%s", line);
+ }
}
} else {
smartlist_add_asprintf(reply, "512-syntax error: mapping '%s' is "
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c
index f58aab256b..f1510b970a 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.c
+++ b/src/or/directory.c
@@ -2646,7 +2646,8 @@ directory_handle_command_get(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers,
if ((header = http_get_header(headers, "If-Modified-Since: "))) {
struct tm tm;
if (parse_http_time(header, &tm) == 0) {
- if_modified_since = tor_timegm(&tm);
+ if (tor_timegm(&tm, &if_modified_since)<0)
+ if_modified_since = 0;
}
/* The correct behavior on a malformed If-Modified-Since header is to
* act as if no If-Modified-Since header had been given. */
@@ -3732,7 +3733,7 @@ download_status_reset(download_status_t *dls)
const int *schedule;
size_t schedule_len;
- find_dl_schedule_and_len(dls, get_options()->DirPort != NULL,
+ find_dl_schedule_and_len(dls, get_options()->DirPort_set,
&schedule, &schedule_len);
dls->n_download_failures = 0;
diff --git a/src/or/directory.h b/src/or/directory.h
index 584fe84311..1ca1c5a6e0 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.h
+++ b/src/or/directory.h
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ time_t download_status_increment_failure(download_status_t *dls,
* the optional status code <b>sc</b>. */
#define download_status_failed(dls, sc) \
download_status_increment_failure((dls), (sc), NULL, \
- get_options()->DirPort!=NULL, time(NULL))
+ get_options()->DirPort_set, time(NULL))
void download_status_reset(download_status_t *dls);
static int download_status_is_ready(download_status_t *dls, time_t now,
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index e21f5113f2..f1c9c6232d 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -1214,7 +1214,7 @@ directory_fetches_from_authorities(const or_options_t *options)
return 1; /* we don't know our IP address; ask an authority. */
refuseunknown = ! router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star() &&
should_refuse_unknown_exits(options);
- if (options->DirPort == NULL && !refuseunknown)
+ if (!options->DirPort_set && !refuseunknown)
return 0;
if (!server_mode(options) || !advertised_server_mode())
return 0;
@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ directory_fetches_dir_info_later(const or_options_t *options)
int
directory_caches_v2_dir_info(const or_options_t *options)
{
- return options->DirPort != NULL;
+ return options->DirPort_set;
}
/** Return true iff we want to fetch and keep certificates for authorities
@@ -1259,7 +1259,7 @@ directory_caches_v2_dir_info(const or_options_t *options)
int
directory_caches_unknown_auth_certs(const or_options_t *options)
{
- return options->DirPort || options->BridgeRelay;
+ return options->DirPort_set || options->BridgeRelay;
}
/** Return 1 if we want to keep descriptors, networkstatuses, etc around
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ directory_caches_unknown_auth_certs(const or_options_t *options)
int
directory_caches_dir_info(const or_options_t *options)
{
- if (options->BridgeRelay || options->DirPort)
+ if (options->BridgeRelay || options->DirPort_set)
return 1;
if (!server_mode(options) || !advertised_server_mode())
return 0;
@@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ directory_caches_dir_info(const or_options_t *options)
int
directory_permits_begindir_requests(const or_options_t *options)
{
- return options->BridgeRelay != 0 || options->DirPort != NULL;
+ return options->BridgeRelay != 0 || options->DirPort_set;
}
/** Return 1 if we want to allow controllers to ask us directory
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ directory_permits_begindir_requests(const or_options_t *options)
int
directory_permits_controller_requests(const or_options_t *options)
{
- return options->DirPort != NULL;
+ return options->DirPort_set;
}
/** Return 1 if we have no need to fetch new descriptors. This generally
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 79958739a5..144859ae04 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int dirvote_publish_consensus(void);
static char *make_consensus_method_list(int low, int high, const char *sep);
/** The highest consensus method that we currently support. */
-#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 12
+#define MAX_SUPPORTED_CONSENSUS_METHOD 13
/** Lowest consensus method that contains a 'directory-footer' marker */
#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_FOOTER 9
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ static char *make_consensus_method_list(int low, int high, const char *sep);
* for a param. */
#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_MAJORITY_PARAMS 12
+/** Lowest consensus method where microdesc consensuses omit any entry
+ * with no microdesc. */
+#define MIN_METHOD_FOR_MANDATORY_MICRODESC 13
+
/* =====
* Voting
* =====*/
@@ -1752,6 +1756,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
rs = compute_routerstatus_consensus(matching_descs, consensus_method,
microdesc_digest);
/* Copy bits of that into rs_out. */
+ memset(&rs_out, 0, sizeof(rs_out));
tor_assert(fast_memeq(lowest_id, rs->status.identity_digest,DIGEST_LEN));
memcpy(rs_out.identity_digest, lowest_id, DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(rs_out.descriptor_digest, rs->status.descriptor_digest,
@@ -1935,6 +1940,13 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
}
}
+ if (flavor == FLAV_MICRODESC &&
+ consensus_method >= MIN_METHOD_FOR_MANDATORY_MICRODESC &&
+ tor_digest256_is_zero(microdesc_digest)) {
+ /* With no microdescriptor digest, we omit the entry entirely. */
+ continue;
+ }
+
{
char buf[4096];
/* Okay!! Now we can write the descriptor... */
@@ -2503,7 +2515,7 @@ time_t
dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(time_t now, int interval)
{
struct tm tm;
- time_t midnight_today;
+ time_t midnight_today=0;
time_t midnight_tomorrow;
time_t next;
@@ -2512,7 +2524,9 @@ dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(time_t now, int interval)
tm.tm_min = 0;
tm.tm_sec = 0;
- midnight_today = tor_timegm(&tm);
+ if (tor_timegm(&tm, &midnight_today) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Ran into an invalid time when trying to find midnight.");
+ }
midnight_tomorrow = midnight_today + (24*60*60);
next = midnight_today + ((now-midnight_today)/interval + 1)*interval;
@@ -3502,9 +3516,9 @@ dirvote_create_microdescriptor(const routerinfo_t *ri)
{
microdesc_t *result = NULL;
char *key = NULL, *summary = NULL, *family = NULL;
- char buf[1024];
size_t keylen;
- char *out = buf, *end = buf+sizeof(buf);
+ smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
+ char *output = NULL;
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(ri->onion_pkey, &key, &keylen)<0)
goto done;
@@ -3512,23 +3526,19 @@ dirvote_create_microdescriptor(const routerinfo_t *ri)
if (ri->declared_family)
family = smartlist_join_strings(ri->declared_family, " ", 0, NULL);
- if (tor_snprintf(out, end-out, "onion-key\n%s", key)<0)
- goto done;
- out += strlen(out);
- if (family) {
- if (tor_snprintf(out, end-out, "family %s\n", family)<0)
- goto done;
- out += strlen(out);
- }
- if (summary && strcmp(summary, "reject 1-65535")) {
- if (tor_snprintf(out, end-out, "p %s\n", summary)<0)
- goto done;
- out += strlen(out);
- }
- *out = '\0'; /* Make sure it's nul-terminated. This should be a no-op */
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "onion-key\n%s", key);
+
+ if (family)
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "family %s\n", family);
+
+ if (summary && strcmp(summary, "reject 1-65535"))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "p %s\n", summary);
+
+ output = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
{
- smartlist_t *lst = microdescs_parse_from_string(buf, out, 0, 1);
+ smartlist_t *lst = microdescs_parse_from_string(output,
+ output+strlen(output), 0, 1);
if (smartlist_len(lst) != 1) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "We generated a microdescriptor we couldn't parse.");
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(lst, microdesc_t *, md, microdesc_free(md));
@@ -3540,9 +3550,14 @@ dirvote_create_microdescriptor(const routerinfo_t *ri)
}
done:
+ tor_free(output);
tor_free(key);
tor_free(summary);
tor_free(family);
+ if (chunks) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
+ }
return result;
}
diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c
index 02447ece81..78893bfbed 100644
--- a/src/or/dns.c
+++ b/src/or/dns.c
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ static void add_wildcarded_test_address(const char *address);
static int configure_nameservers(int force);
static int answer_is_wildcarded(const char *ip);
static int dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
- or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **resolved_to_hostname);
+ or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **resolved_to_hostname,
+ int *made_connection_pending_out);
#ifdef DEBUG_DNS_CACHE
static void _assert_cache_ok(void);
#define assert_cache_ok() _assert_cache_ok()
@@ -449,16 +450,17 @@ purge_expired_resolves(time_t now)
if (resolve->pending_connections) {
log_debug(LD_EXIT,
"Closing pending connections on timed-out DNS resolve!");
- tor_fragile_assert();
while (resolve->pending_connections) {
pend = resolve->pending_connections;
resolve->pending_connections = pend->next;
/* Connections should only be pending if they have no socket. */
tor_assert(!SOCKET_OK(pend->conn->_base.s));
pendconn = pend->conn;
- connection_edge_end(pendconn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
- circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(pendconn), pendconn);
- connection_free(TO_CONN(pendconn));
+ if (!pendconn->_base.marked_for_close) {
+ connection_edge_end(pendconn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
+ circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(pendconn), pendconn);
+ connection_free(TO_CONN(pendconn));
+ }
tor_free(pend);
}
}
@@ -567,7 +569,7 @@ send_resolved_hostname_cell(edge_connection_t *conn, const char *hostname)
// log_notice(LD_EXIT, "Sent");
}
-/** See if we have a cache entry for <b>exitconn</b>-\>address. if so,
+/** See if we have a cache entry for <b>exitconn</b>-\>address. If so,
* if resolve valid, put it into <b>exitconn</b>-\>addr and return 1.
* If resolve failed, free exitconn and return -1.
*
@@ -596,10 +598,12 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
{
or_circuit_t *oncirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(exitconn->on_circuit);
int is_resolve, r;
+ int made_connection_pending = 0;
char *hostname = NULL;
is_resolve = exitconn->_base.purpose == EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE;
- r = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, is_resolve, oncirc, &hostname);
+ r = dns_resolve_impl(exitconn, is_resolve, oncirc, &hostname,
+ &made_connection_pending);
switch (r) {
case 1:
@@ -639,16 +643,11 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
dns_cancel_pending_resolve(exitconn->_base.address);
- if (!exitconn->_base.marked_for_close) {
+ if (!made_connection_pending && !exitconn->_base.marked_for_close) {
+ /* If we made the connection pending, then we freed it already in
+ * dns_cancel_pending_resolve(). If we marked it for close, it'll
+ * get freed from the main loop. Otherwise, can free it now. */
connection_free(TO_CONN(exitconn));
- // XXX ... and we just leak exitconn otherwise? -RD
- // If it's marked for close, it's on closeable_connection_lst in
- // main.c. If it's on the closeable list, it will get freed from
- // main.c. -NM
- // "<armadev> If that's true, there are other bugs around, where we
- // don't check if it's marked, and will end up double-freeing."
- // On the other hand, I don't know of any actual bugs here, so this
- // shouldn't be holding up the rc. -RD
}
break;
default:
@@ -667,10 +666,15 @@ dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
* Return -2 on a transient error. If it's a reverse resolve and it's
* successful, sets *<b>hostname_out</b> to a newly allocated string
* holding the cached reverse DNS value.
+ *
+ * Set *<b>made_connection_pending_out</b> to true if we have placed
+ * <b>exitconn</b> on the list of pending connections for some resolve; set it
+ * to false otherwise.
*/
static int
dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
- or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out)
+ or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out,
+ int *made_connection_pending_out)
{
cached_resolve_t *resolve;
cached_resolve_t search;
@@ -684,6 +688,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
tor_assert(!SOCKET_OK(exitconn->_base.s));
assert_cache_ok();
tor_assert(oncirc);
+ *made_connection_pending_out = 0;
/* first check if exitconn->_base.address is an IP. If so, we already
* know the answer. */
@@ -757,6 +762,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
pending_connection->conn = exitconn;
pending_connection->next = resolve->pending_connections;
resolve->pending_connections = pending_connection;
+ *made_connection_pending_out = 1;
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"Connection (fd %d) waiting for pending DNS "
"resolve of %s", exitconn->_base.s,
escaped_safe_str(exitconn->_base.address));
@@ -797,6 +803,7 @@ dns_resolve_impl(edge_connection_t *exitconn, int is_resolve,
pending_connection = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(pending_connection_t));
pending_connection->conn = exitconn;
resolve->pending_connections = pending_connection;
+ *made_connection_pending_out = 1;
/* Add this resolve to the cache and priority queue. */
HT_INSERT(cache_map, &cache_root, resolve);
@@ -1085,6 +1092,13 @@ dns_found_answer(const char *address, uint8_t is_reverse, uint32_t addr,
pendconn = pend->conn; /* don't pass complex things to the
connection_mark_for_close macro */
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(pendconn),time(NULL));
+ if (pendconn->_base.marked_for_close) {
+ /* prevent double-remove. */
+ pendconn->_base.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED;
+ resolve->pending_connections = pend->next;
+ tor_free(pend);
+ continue;
+ }
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&pendconn->_base.addr, addr);
pendconn->address_ttl = ttl;
diff --git a/src/or/microdesc.c b/src/or/microdesc.c
index 9395a9a051..b4d22c1c62 100644
--- a/src/or/microdesc.c
+++ b/src/or/microdesc.c
@@ -643,13 +643,8 @@ microdesc_list_missing_digest256(networkstatus_t *ns, microdesc_cache_t *cache,
continue;
if (skip && digestmap_get(skip, rs->descriptor_digest))
continue;
- if (tor_mem_is_zero(rs->descriptor_digest, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
- log_info(LD_BUG, "Found an entry in networkstatus with no "
- "microdescriptor digest. (Router %s=%s at %s:%d.)",
- rs->nickname, hex_str(rs->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
- fmt_addr32(rs->addr), rs->or_port);
+ if (tor_mem_is_zero(rs->descriptor_digest, DIGEST256_LEN))
continue;
- }
/* XXXX Also skip if we're a noncache and wouldn't use this router.
* XXXX NM Microdesc
*/
@@ -658,7 +653,7 @@ microdesc_list_missing_digest256(networkstatus_t *ns, microdesc_cache_t *cache,
return result;
}
-/** Launch download requests for mircodescriptors as appropriate.
+/** Launch download requests for microdescriptors as appropriate.
*
* Specifically, we should launch download requests if we are configured to
* download mirodescriptors, and there are some microdescriptors listed the
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 3a53e5ed86..9074083a04 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -2596,6 +2596,23 @@ typedef struct circuit_t {
* circuit. */
#define MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8
+/**
+ * Describes the circuit building process in simplified terms based
+ * on the path bias accounting state for a circuit. Created to prevent
+ * overcounting due to unknown cases of circuit reuse. See Bug #6475.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ /** This circuit is "new". It has not yet completed a first hop
+ * or been counted by the path bias code. */
+ PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC = 0,
+ /** This circuit has completed a first hop, and has been counted by
+ * the path bias logic. */
+ PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP = 1,
+ /** This circuit has been completely built, and has been counted as
+ * successful by the path bias logic. */
+ PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED = 2,
+} path_state_t;
+
/** An origin_circuit_t holds data necessary to build and use a circuit.
*/
typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
@@ -2629,6 +2646,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
* cannibalized circuits. */
unsigned int has_opened : 1;
+ /** Kludge to help us prevent the warn in bug #6475 and eventually
+ * debug why we are not seeing first hops in some cases. */
+ path_state_t path_state : 2;
+
/** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out
* according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has
* been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to
@@ -3008,23 +3029,46 @@ typedef struct {
config_line_t *RecommendedVersions;
config_line_t *RecommendedClientVersions;
config_line_t *RecommendedServerVersions;
- /** Whether dirservers refuse router descriptors with private IPs. */
+ /** Whether dirservers allow router descriptors with private IPs. */
int DirAllowPrivateAddresses;
+ /** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */
+ int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses;
char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */
char *Group; /**< Name of group to run Tor as. */
- config_line_t *ORPort; /**< Ports to listen on for OR connections. */
- config_line_t *SocksPort; /**< Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */
+ config_line_t *ORPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for OR connections. */
+ /** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */
+ config_line_t *SocksPort_lines;
/** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */
- config_line_t *TransPort;
- config_line_t *NATDPort; /**< Ports to listen on for transparent natd
+ config_line_t *TransPort_lines;
+ config_line_t *NATDPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for transparent natd
* connections. */
- config_line_t *ControlPort; /**< Port to listen on for control
+ config_line_t *ControlPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for control
* connections. */
config_line_t *ControlSocket; /**< List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on
* for control connections. */
+
int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */
- config_line_t *DirPort; /**< Port to listen on for directory connections. */
- config_line_t *DNSPort; /**< Port to listen on for DNS requests. */
+ /** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */
+ config_line_t *DirPort_lines;
+ config_line_t *DNSPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */
+
+ /** @name port booleans
+ *
+ * Derived booleans: True iff there is a non-listener port on an AF_INET or
+ * AF_INET6 address of the given type configured in one of the _lines
+ * options above.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+ unsigned int ORPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int TransPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int DirPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1;
+ /**@}*/
+
int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */
int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */
int V1AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c
index 3018803bc4..6e984211ba 100644
--- a/src/or/policies.c
+++ b/src/or/policies.c
@@ -712,7 +712,11 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
/* no policy? accept all. */
return ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
} else if (addr == NULL || tor_addr_is_null(addr)) {
- tor_assert(port != 0);
+ if (port == 0) {
+ log_info(LD_BUG, "Rejecting null address with 0 port (family %d)",
+ addr ? tor_addr_family(addr) : -1);
+ return ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED;
+ }
return compare_unknown_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(port, policy);
} else if (port == 0) {
return compare_known_tor_addr_to_addr_policy_noport(addr, policy);
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c
index b1913e766f..5f7fcd8b7c 100644
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@ -1265,11 +1265,25 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
case RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME:
if (!rh.stream_id) {
if (layer_hint) {
+ if (layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
+ CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. "
+ "Closing circ.");
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
+ }
layer_hint->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,"circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.",
layer_hint->package_window);
circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint);
} else {
+ if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
+ CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from client. "
+ "Closing circ.");
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
+ }
circ->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,
"circ-level sendme at non-origin, packagewindow %d.",
diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c
index 720d14cf45..3b0d9dd35f 100644
--- a/src/or/rephist.c
+++ b/src/or/rephist.c
@@ -1675,7 +1675,8 @@ rep_hist_load_bwhist_state_section(bw_array_t *b,
uint64_t v, mv;
int i,ok,ok_m;
- int have_maxima = (smartlist_len(s_values) == smartlist_len(s_maxima));
+ int have_maxima = s_maxima && s_values &&
+ (smartlist_len(s_values) == smartlist_len(s_maxima));
if (s_values && s_begins >= now - NUM_SECS_BW_SUM_INTERVAL*NUM_TOTALS) {
start = s_begins - s_interval*(smartlist_len(s_values));
diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c
index 352c456f1f..38f1cdd495 100644
--- a/src/or/router.c
+++ b/src/or/router.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ int
check_whether_dirport_reachable(void)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
- return !options->DirPort ||
+ return !options->DirPort_set ||
options->AssumeReachable ||
net_is_disabled() ||
can_reach_dir_port;
@@ -1115,7 +1115,8 @@ int
server_mode(const or_options_t *options)
{
if (options->ClientOnly) return 0;
- return (options->ORPort || options->ORListenAddress);
+ /* XXXX024 I believe we can kill off ORListenAddress here.*/
+ return (options->ORPort_set || options->ORListenAddress);
}
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a non-bridge server.
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index de1a66ce16..3c39e362df 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -1709,6 +1709,8 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth_weights(smartlist_t *sl,
double *bandwidths;
double tmp = 0;
unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int i_chosen;
+ unsigned int i_has_been_chosen;
int have_unknown = 0; /* true iff sl contains element not in consensus. */
/* Can't choose exit and guard at same time */
@@ -1871,12 +1873,17 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth_weights(smartlist_t *sl,
* from 1 below. See bug 1203 for details. */
/* Last, count through sl until we get to the element we picked */
+ i_chosen = (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl);
+ i_has_been_chosen = 0;
tmp = 0.0;
for (i=0; i < (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); i++) {
tmp += bandwidths[i];
- if (tmp >= rand_bw)
- break;
+ if (tmp >= rand_bw && !i_has_been_chosen) {
+ i_chosen = i;
+ i_has_been_chosen = 1;
+ }
}
+ i = i_chosen;
if (i == (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl)) {
/* This was once possible due to round-off error, but shouldn't be able
@@ -1909,7 +1916,9 @@ static const node_t *
smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule)
{
- unsigned i;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int i_chosen;
+ unsigned int i_has_been_chosen;
int32_t *bandwidths;
int is_exit;
int is_guard;
@@ -1983,9 +1992,10 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
if (is_guard)
bitarray_set(guard_bits, i);
if (is_known) {
- bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw; // safe since MAX_BELIEVABLE<INT32_MAX
- // XXX this is no longer true! We don't always cap the bw anymore. Can
- // a consensus make us overflow?-sh
+ bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw;
+ /* Casting this_bw to int32_t is safe because both kb_to_bytes
+ and bridge_get_advertised_bandwidth_bounded limit it to below
+ INT32_MAX. */
tor_assert(bandwidths[i] >= 0);
if (is_guard)
total_guard_bw += this_bw;
@@ -2108,6 +2118,8 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
/* Last, count through sl until we get to the element we picked */
tmp = 0;
+ i_chosen = (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl);
+ i_has_been_chosen = 0;
for (i=0; i < (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl); i++) {
is_exit = bitarray_is_set(exit_bits, i);
is_guard = bitarray_is_set(guard_bits, i);
@@ -2122,9 +2134,12 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
else
tmp += bandwidths[i];
- if (tmp >= rand_bw)
- break;
+ if (tmp >= rand_bw && !i_has_been_chosen) {
+ i_chosen = i;
+ i_has_been_chosen = 1;
+ }
}
+ i = i_chosen;
if (i == (unsigned)smartlist_len(sl)) {
/* This was once possible due to round-off error, but shouldn't be able
* to occur any longer. */
@@ -5145,6 +5160,8 @@ router_differences_are_cosmetic(const routerinfo_t *r1, const routerinfo_t *r2)
if (strcasecmp(r1->address, r2->address) ||
strcasecmp(r1->nickname, r2->nickname) ||
r1->or_port != r2->or_port ||
+ !tor_addr_eq(&r1->ipv6_addr, &r2->ipv6_addr) ||
+ r1->ipv6_orport != r2->ipv6_orport ||
r1->dir_port != r2->dir_port ||
r1->purpose != r2->purpose ||
crypto_pk_cmp_keys(r1->onion_pkey, r2->onion_pkey) ||
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c
index 4231a17c67..60a2eae75f 100644
--- a/src/or/routerparse.c
+++ b/src/or/routerparse.c
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ router_parse_runningrouters(const char *str)
/* Now that we know the signature is okay, and we have a
* publication time, cache the list. */
- if (get_options()->DirPort && !authdir_mode_v1(get_options()))
+ if (get_options()->DirPort_set && !authdir_mode_v1(get_options()))
dirserv_set_cached_directory(str, published_on, 1);
r = 0;
@@ -2201,6 +2201,11 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area,
escaped(tok->args[0]));
goto err;
}
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_BUG, "Found an entry in networkstatus with no "
+ "microdescriptor digest. (Router %s=%s at %s:%d.)",
+ rs->nickname, hex_str(rs->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
+ fmt_addr32(rs->addr), rs->or_port);
}
}
@@ -2853,7 +2858,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out,
int flavor = networkstatus_parse_flavor_name(tok->args[1]);
if (flavor < 0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't parse document with unknown flavor %s",
- escaped(tok->args[2]));
+ escaped(tok->args[1]));
goto err;
}
ns->flavor = flav = flavor;
7apu2bq3rhoylwmucxizk54afw5jyda7pho4j5zdcqpwkufke7zdzwad.onion