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-rw-r--r--src/or/torcert.c297
1 files changed, 297 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/torcert.c b/src/or/torcert.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a6a33c675a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/torcert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file torcert.c
+ *
+ * \brief Implementation for ed25519-signed certificates as used in the Tor
+ * protocol.
+ */
+
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
+#include "ed25519_cert.h"
+#include "torlog.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "link_handshake.h"
+
+/** Helper for tor_cert_create(): signs any 32 bytes, not just an ed25519
+ * key.
+ */
+static tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_sign_impl(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ uint8_t signed_key_type,
+ const uint8_t signed_key_info[32],
+ time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ tor_cert_t *torcert = NULL;
+
+ ed25519_cert_t *cert = ed25519_cert_new();
+ cert->cert_type = cert_type;
+ cert->exp_field = (uint32_t) CEIL_DIV(now + lifetime, 3600);
+ cert->cert_key_type = signed_key_type;
+ memcpy(cert->certified_key, signed_key_info, 32);
+
+ if (flags & CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY) {
+ ed25519_cert_extension_t *ext = ed25519_cert_extension_new();
+ ext->ext_type = CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY;
+ memcpy(ext->un_signing_key, signing_key->pubkey.pubkey, 32);
+ ed25519_cert_add_ext(cert, ext);
+ ++cert->n_extensions;
+ }
+
+ const ssize_t alloc_len = ed25519_cert_encoded_len(cert);
+ tor_assert(alloc_len > 0);
+ uint8_t *encoded = tor_malloc(alloc_len);
+ const ssize_t real_len = ed25519_cert_encode(encoded, alloc_len, cert);
+ if (real_len < 0)
+ goto err;
+ tor_assert(real_len == alloc_len);
+ tor_assert(real_len > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ uint8_t *sig = encoded + (real_len - ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN));
+
+ ed25519_signature_t signature;
+ if (ed25519_sign(&signature, encoded,
+ real_len-ED25519_SIG_LEN, signing_key)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't sign certificate");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, signature.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
+ torcert = tor_cert_parse(encoded, real_len);
+ if (! torcert) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Generated a certificate we cannot parse");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_cert_checksig(torcert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Generated a certificate whose signature we can't check");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tor_free(encoded);
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ tor_cert_free(torcert);
+ torcert = NULL;
+ done:
+ ed25519_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_free(encoded);
+ return torcert;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create and return a new new certificate of type <b>cert_type</b> to
+ * authenticate <b>signed_key</b> using the key <b>signing_key</b>. The
+ * certificate should remain valid for at least <b>lifetime</b> seconds after
+ * <b>now</b>.
+ *
+ * If CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY is set in <b>flags</b>, embed
+ * the public part of <b>signing_key</b> in the certificate.
+ */
+tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_create(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *signed_key,
+ time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ return tor_cert_sign_impl(signing_key, cert_type,
+ SIGNED_KEY_TYPE_ED25519, signed_key->pubkey,
+ now, lifetime, flags);
+}
+
+/** Release all storage held for <b>cert</b>. */
+void
+tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (! cert)
+ return;
+
+ if (cert->encoded)
+ memwipe(cert->encoded, 0, cert->encoded_len);
+ tor_free(cert->encoded);
+
+ memwipe(cert, 0, sizeof(tor_cert_t));
+ tor_free(cert);
+}
+
+/** Parse a certificate encoded with <b>len</b> bytes in <b>encoded</b>. */
+tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_parse(const uint8_t *encoded, const size_t len)
+{
+ tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+ ed25519_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
+ ssize_t got_len = ed25519_cert_parse(&parsed, encoded, len);
+ if (got_len < 0 || (size_t) got_len != len)
+ goto err;
+
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_cert_t));
+ cert->encoded = tor_memdup(encoded, len);
+ cert->encoded_len = len;
+
+ memcpy(cert->signed_key.pubkey, parsed->certified_key, 32);
+ cert->valid_until = parsed->exp_field * 3600;
+ cert->cert_type = parsed->cert_type;
+
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < ed25519_cert_getlen_ext(parsed); ++i) {
+ ed25519_cert_extension_t *ext = ed25519_cert_get_ext(parsed, i);
+ if (ext->ext_type == CERTEXT_SIGNED_WITH_KEY) {
+ if (cert->signing_key_included)
+ goto err;
+
+ cert->signing_key_included = 1;
+ memcpy(cert->signing_key.pubkey, ext->un_signing_key, 32);
+ } else if (ext->ext_flags & CERTEXT_FLAG_AFFECTS_VALIDATION) {
+ /* Unrecognized extension with affects_validation set */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+ cert = NULL;
+ done:
+ ed25519_cert_free(parsed);
+ return cert;
+}
+
+/** Fill in <b>checkable_out</b> with the information needed to check
+ * the signature on <b>cert</b> with <b>pubkey</b>. */
+int
+tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(ed25519_checkable_t *checkable_out,
+ const tor_cert_t *cert,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
+{
+ if (! pubkey) {
+ if (cert->signing_key_included)
+ pubkey = &cert->signing_key;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ checkable_out->msg = cert->encoded;
+ checkable_out->pubkey = pubkey;
+ tor_assert(cert->encoded_len > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ const size_t signed_len = cert->encoded_len - ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+ checkable_out->len = signed_len;
+ memcpy(checkable_out->signature.sig,
+ cert->encoded + signed_len, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Validates the signature on <b>cert</b> with <b>pubkey</b> relative to the
+ * current time <b>now</b>. (If <b>now</b> is 0, do not check the expiration
+ * time.) Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. Sets flags in <b>cert</b> as
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+int
+tor_cert_checksig(tor_cert_t *cert,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey, time_t now)
+{
+ ed25519_checkable_t checkable;
+ int okay;
+
+ if (now && now > cert->valid_until) {
+ cert->cert_expired = 1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&checkable, cert, pubkey) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (ed25519_checksig_batch(&okay, &checkable, 1) < 0) {
+ cert->sig_bad = 1;
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ cert->sig_ok = 1;
+ /* Only copy the checkable public key when it is different from the signing
+ * key of the certificate to avoid undefined behavior. */
+ if (cert->signing_key.pubkey != checkable.pubkey->pubkey) {
+ memcpy(cert->signing_key.pubkey, checkable.pubkey->pubkey, 32);
+ }
+ cert->cert_valid = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b> */
+tor_cert_t *
+tor_cert_dup(const tor_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ tor_cert_t *newcert = tor_memdup(cert, sizeof(tor_cert_t));
+ if (cert->encoded)
+ newcert->encoded = tor_memdup(cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+ return newcert;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff cert1 and cert2 are the same cert. */
+int
+tor_cert_eq(const tor_cert_t *cert1, const tor_cert_t *cert2)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert1);
+ tor_assert(cert2);
+ return cert1->encoded_len == cert2->encoded_len &&
+ tor_memeq(cert1->encoded, cert2->encoded, cert1->encoded_len);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff cert1 and cert2 are the same cert, or if they are both
+ * NULL. */
+int
+tor_cert_opt_eq(const tor_cert_t *cert1, const tor_cert_t *cert2)
+{
+ if (cert1 == NULL && cert2 == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if (!cert1 || !cert2)
+ return 0;
+ return tor_cert_eq(cert1, cert2);
+}
+
+/** Create new cross-certification object to certify <b>ed_key</b> as the
+ * master ed25519 identity key for the RSA identity key <b>rsa_key</b>.
+ * Allocates and stores the encoded certificate in *<b>cert</b>, and returns
+ * the number of bytes stored. Returns negative on error.*/
+ssize_t
+tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_key,
+ const crypto_pk_t *rsa_key,
+ time_t expires,
+ uint8_t **cert)
+{
+ uint8_t *res;
+
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_t *cc = rsa_ed_crosscert_new();
+ memcpy(cc->ed_key, ed_key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ cc->expiration = (uint32_t) CEIL_DIV(expires, 3600);
+ cc->sig_len = crypto_pk_keysize(rsa_key);
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(cc, crypto_pk_keysize(rsa_key));
+
+ ssize_t alloc_sz = rsa_ed_crosscert_encoded_len(cc);
+ tor_assert(alloc_sz > 0);
+ res = tor_malloc_zero(alloc_sz);
+ ssize_t sz = rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(res, alloc_sz, cc);
+ tor_assert(sz > 0 && sz <= alloc_sz);
+
+ const int signed_part_len = 32 + 4;
+ int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(rsa_key,
+ (char*)rsa_ed_crosscert_getarray_sig(cc),
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_getlen_sig(cc),
+ (char*)res, signed_part_len);
+ tor_assert(siglen > 0 && siglen <= (int)crypto_pk_keysize(rsa_key));
+ tor_assert(siglen <= UINT8_MAX);
+ cc->sig_len = siglen;
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_setlen_sig(cc, siglen);
+
+ sz = rsa_ed_crosscert_encode(res, alloc_sz, cc);
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_free(cc);
+ *cert = res;
+ return sz;
+}
+