diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/routerparse.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerparse.c | 792 |
1 files changed, 672 insertions, 120 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 524a575480..b6a90431a7 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ * \brief Code to parse and validate router descriptors and directories. **/ +#define ROUTERPARSE_PRIVATE + #include "or.h" #include "config.h" #include "circuitstats.h" @@ -22,15 +24,20 @@ #include "microdesc.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "rephist.h" +#include "routerkeys.h" #include "routerparse.h" +#include "entrynodes.h" +#include "torcert.h" + #undef log #include <math.h> /****************************************************************************/ /** Enumeration of possible token types. The ones starting with K_ correspond - * to directory 'keywords'. ERR_ is an error in the tokenizing process, EOF_ - * is an end-of-file marker, and NIL_ is used to encode not-a-token. + * to directory 'keywords'. A_ is for an annotation, R or C is related to + * hidden services, ERR_ is an error in the tokenizing process, EOF_ is an + * end-of-file marker, and NIL_ is used to encode not-a-token. */ typedef enum { K_ACCEPT = 0, @@ -66,6 +73,7 @@ typedef enum { K_CLIENT_VERSIONS, K_SERVER_VERSIONS, K_OR_ADDRESS, + K_ID, K_P, K_P6, K_R, @@ -80,6 +88,11 @@ typedef enum { K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR, K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS, K_IPV6_POLICY, + K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, + K_IDENTITY_ED25519, + K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519, + K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, + K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, K_DIRREQ_END, K_DIRREQ_V2_IPS, @@ -113,6 +126,7 @@ typedef enum { K_DIR_KEY_CERTIFICATION, K_DIR_KEY_CROSSCERT, K_DIR_ADDRESS, + K_DIR_TUNNELLED, K_VOTE_STATUS, K_VALID_AFTER, @@ -131,6 +145,7 @@ typedef enum { K_CONSENSUS_METHOD, K_LEGACY_DIR_KEY, K_DIRECTORY_FOOTER, + K_PACKAGE, A_PURPOSE, A_LAST_LISTED, @@ -289,6 +304,13 @@ static token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = { T01("write-history", K_WRITE_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T01("extra-info-digest", K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), T01("hidden-service-dir", K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("identity-ed25519", K_IDENTITY_ED25519, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T01("master-key-ed25519", K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("router-sig-ed25519", K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("onion-key-crosscert", K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T01("ntor-onion-key-crosscert", K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, + EQ(1), NEED_OBJ ), + T01("allow-single-hop-exits",K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T01("family", K_FAMILY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), @@ -298,6 +320,7 @@ static token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = { T0N("opt", K_OPT, CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ), T1( "bandwidth", K_BANDWIDTH, GE(3), NO_OBJ ), A01("@purpose", A_PURPOSE, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T01("tunnelled-dir-server",K_DIR_TUNNELLED, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), END_OF_TABLE }; @@ -306,6 +329,8 @@ static token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = { static token_rule_t extrainfo_token_table[] = { T1_END( "router-signature", K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), T1( "published", K_PUBLISHED, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("identity-ed25519", K_IDENTITY_ED25519, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ), + T01("router-sig-ed25519", K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), T0N("opt", K_OPT, CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ), T01("read-history", K_READ_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T01("write-history", K_WRITE_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), @@ -349,6 +374,7 @@ static token_rule_t rtrstatus_token_table[] = { T01("v", K_V, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T01("w", K_W, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T0N("m", K_M, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T0N("id", K_ID, GE(2), NO_OBJ ), T0N("opt", K_OPT, CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ), END_OF_TABLE }; @@ -420,6 +446,7 @@ static token_rule_t networkstatus_token_table[] = { T1("known-flags", K_KNOWN_FLAGS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T01("params", K_PARAMS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T( "fingerprint", K_FINGERPRINT, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T0N("package", K_PACKAGE, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), CERTIFICATE_MEMBERS @@ -485,6 +512,7 @@ static token_rule_t networkstatus_detached_signature_token_table[] = { static token_rule_t microdesc_token_table[] = { T1_START("onion-key", K_ONION_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_KEY_1024), T01("ntor-onion-key", K_ONION_KEY_NTOR, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), + T0N("id", K_ID, GE(2), NO_OBJ ), T0N("a", K_A, GE(1), NO_OBJ ), T01("family", K_FAMILY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T01("p", K_P, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), @@ -501,12 +529,16 @@ static addr_policy_t *router_parse_addr_policy(directory_token_t *tok, unsigned fmt_flags); static addr_policy_t *router_parse_addr_policy_private(directory_token_t *tok); +static int router_get_hash_impl_helper(const char *s, size_t s_len, + const char *start_str, + const char *end_str, char end_c, + const char **start_out, const char **end_out); static int router_get_hash_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest, const char *start_str, const char *end_str, char end_char, digest_algorithm_t alg); static int router_get_hashes_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, - digests_t *digests, + common_digests_t *digests, const char *start_str, const char *end_str, char end_char); static void token_clear(directory_token_t *tok); @@ -606,7 +638,7 @@ router_get_router_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest) /** Set <b>digests</b> to all the digests of the consensus document in * <b>s</b> */ int -router_get_networkstatus_v3_hashes(const char *s, digests_t *digests) +router_get_networkstatus_v3_hashes(const char *s, common_digests_t *digests) { return router_get_hashes_impl(s,strlen(s),digests, "network-status-version", @@ -632,7 +664,7 @@ router_get_extrainfo_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest) char * router_get_dirobj_signature(const char *digest, size_t digest_len, - crypto_pk_t *private_key) + const crypto_pk_t *private_key) { char *signature; size_t i, keysize; @@ -659,7 +691,8 @@ router_get_dirobj_signature(const char *digest, goto truncated; i = strlen(buf); - if (base64_encode(buf+i, buf_len-i, signature, siglen) < 0) { + if (base64_encode(buf+i, buf_len-i, signature, siglen, + BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"couldn't base64-encode signature"); goto err; } @@ -852,8 +885,8 @@ check_signature_token(const char *digest, tor_free(signed_digest); return -1; } -// log_debug(LD_DIR,"Signed %s hash starts %s", doctype, -// hex_str(signed_digest,4)); + // log_debug(LD_DIR,"Signed %s hash starts %s", doctype, + // hex_str(signed_digest,4)); if (tor_memneq(digest, signed_digest, digest_len)) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error reading %s: signature does not match.", doctype); tor_free(signed_digest); @@ -911,7 +944,9 @@ find_start_of_next_router_or_extrainfo(const char **s_ptr, * descriptor in the signed_descriptor_body field of each routerinfo_t. If it * isn't SAVED_NOWHERE, remember the offset of each descriptor. * - * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. Adds a digest to + * <b>invalid_digests_out</b> for every entry that was unparseable or + * invalid. (This may cause duplicate entries.) */ int router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, const char *eos, @@ -919,7 +954,8 @@ router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, const char *eos, saved_location_t saved_location, int want_extrainfo, int allow_annotations, - const char *prepend_annotations) + const char *prepend_annotations, + smartlist_t *invalid_digests_out) { routerinfo_t *router; extrainfo_t *extrainfo; @@ -939,6 +975,9 @@ router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, const char *eos, tor_assert(eos >= *s); while (1) { + char raw_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + int have_raw_digest = 0; + int dl_again = 0; if (find_start_of_next_router_or_extrainfo(s, eos, &have_extrainfo) < 0) break; @@ -955,18 +994,20 @@ router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, const char *eos, if (have_extrainfo && want_extrainfo) { routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist(); + have_raw_digest = router_get_extrainfo_hash(*s, end-*s, raw_digest) == 0; extrainfo = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(*s, end, saved_location != SAVED_IN_CACHE, - rl->identity_map); + rl->identity_map, &dl_again); if (extrainfo) { signed_desc = &extrainfo->cache_info; elt = extrainfo; } } else if (!have_extrainfo && !want_extrainfo) { + have_raw_digest = router_get_router_hash(*s, end-*s, raw_digest) == 0; router = router_parse_entry_from_string(*s, end, saved_location != SAVED_IN_CACHE, allow_annotations, - prepend_annotations); + prepend_annotations, &dl_again); if (router) { log_debug(LD_DIR, "Read router '%s', purpose '%s'", router_describe(router), @@ -975,6 +1016,9 @@ router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, const char *eos, elt = router; } } + if (! elt && ! dl_again && have_raw_digest && invalid_digests_out) { + smartlist_add(invalid_digests_out, tor_memdup(raw_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + } if (!elt) { *s = end; continue; @@ -1068,11 +1112,17 @@ find_single_ipv6_orport(const smartlist_t *list, * around when caching the router. * * Only one of allow_annotations and prepend_annotations may be set. + * + * If <b>can_dl_again_out</b> is provided, set *<b>can_dl_again_out</b> to 1 + * if it's okay to try to download a descriptor with this same digest again, + * and 0 if it isn't. (It might not be okay to download it again if part of + * the part covered by the digest is invalid.) */ routerinfo_t * router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, int cache_copy, int allow_annotations, - const char *prepend_annotations) + const char *prepend_annotations, + int *can_dl_again_out) { routerinfo_t *router = NULL; char digest[128]; @@ -1083,6 +1133,10 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, size_t prepend_len = prepend_annotations ? strlen(prepend_annotations) : 0; int ok = 1; memarea_t *area = NULL; + tor_cert_t *ntor_cc_cert = NULL; + /* Do not set this to '1' until we have parsed everything that we intend to + * parse that's covered by the hash. */ + int can_dl_again = 0; tor_assert(!allow_annotations || !prepend_annotations); @@ -1152,9 +1206,11 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, } tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER); + const int router_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, tok); tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 5); router = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t)); + router->cert_expiration_time = TIME_MAX; router->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1; router->cache_info.annotations_len = s-start_of_annotations + prepend_len; router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s; @@ -1285,6 +1341,173 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't calculate key digest"); goto err; } + { + directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok, *cc_tap_tok, *cc_ntor_tok, + *master_key_tok; + ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519); + ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519); + master_key_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519); + cc_tap_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT); + cc_ntor_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT); + int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok + + !!cc_tap_tok + !!cc_ntor_tok; + if ((n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 4) || + (n_ed_toks == 4 && !router->onion_curve25519_pkey)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/" + "cross-certification support"); + goto err; + } + if (master_key_tok && !ed_sig_tok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor has ed25519 master key but no " + "certificate"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok) { + tor_assert(ed_cert_tok && cc_tap_tok && cc_ntor_tok); + const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok); + if (ed_cert_token_pos == -1 || router_token_pos == -1 || + (ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos + 1 && + ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos - 1)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on ntor-onion-key-crosscert " + "in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(cc_tap_tok->object_type, "CROSSCERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on onion-key-crosscert " + "in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "0") && + strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad sign bit on ntor-onion-key-crosscert"); + goto err; + } + int ntor_cc_sign_bit = !strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1"); + + uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN]; + const char *signed_start, *signed_end; + tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse( + (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body, + ed_cert_tok->object_size); + if (! cert) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + /* makes sure it gets freed. */ + router->cache_info.signing_key_cert = cert; + + if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING || + ! cert->signing_key_included) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + + if (master_key_tok) { + /* This token is optional, but if it's present, it must match + * the signature in the signing cert, or supplant it. */ + tor_assert(master_key_tok->n_args >= 1); + ed25519_public_key_t pkey; + if (ed25519_public_from_base64(&pkey, master_key_tok->args[0])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't parse ed25519 master key"); + goto err; + } + + if (fast_memneq(&cert->signing_key.pubkey, + pkey.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 master key does not match " + "key in certificate"); + goto err; + } + } + ntor_cc_cert = tor_cert_parse((const uint8_t*)cc_ntor_tok->object_body, + cc_ntor_tok->object_size); + if (!ntor_cc_cert) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert"); + goto err; + } + if (ntor_cc_cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID || + ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ntor_cc_cert->signed_key, &cert->signing_key)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid contents for ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert"); + goto err; + } + + ed25519_public_key_t ntor_cc_pk; + if (ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&ntor_cc_pk, + router->onion_curve25519_pkey, + ntor_cc_sign_bit)<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error converting onion key to ed25519"); + goto err; + } + + if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "router ", + "\nrouter-sig-ed25519", + ' ', &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of descriptor"); + goto err; + } + crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX, + strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX)); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start); + crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256)); + crypto_digest_free(d); + + ed25519_checkable_t check[3]; + int check_ok[3]; + if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert."); + goto err; + } + if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[1], + ntor_cc_cert, &ntor_cc_pk) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for ntor_cc_cert."); + goto err; + } + + if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[2].signature, + ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature"); + goto err; + } + check[2].pubkey = &cert->signed_key; + check[2].msg = d256; + check[2].len = DIGEST256_LEN; + + if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 3) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)"); + goto err; + } + + if (check_tap_onion_key_crosscert( + (const uint8_t*)cc_tap_tok->object_body, + (int)cc_tap_tok->object_size, + router->onion_pkey, + &cert->signing_key, + (const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect TAP cross-verification"); + goto err; + } + + /* We check this before adding it to the routerlist. */ + if (cert->valid_until < ntor_cc_cert->valid_until) + router->cert_expiration_time = cert->valid_until; + else + router->cert_expiration_time = ntor_cc_cert->valid_until; + } + } + if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_FINGERPRINT))) { /* If there's a fingerprint line, it must match the identity digest. */ char d[DIGEST_LEN]; @@ -1376,12 +1599,26 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, } else { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest %s", escaped(tok->args[0])); } + + if (tok->n_args >= 2) { + if (digest256_from_base64(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256, + tok->args[1]) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest256 %s", + escaped(tok->args[1])); + } + } } if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR)) { router->wants_to_be_hs_dir = 1; } + /* This router accepts tunnelled directory requests via begindir if it has + * an open dirport or it included "tunnelled-dir-server". */ + if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_TUNNELLED) || router->dir_port > 0) { + router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests = 1; + } + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE); note_crypto_pk_op(VERIFY_RTR); #ifdef COUNT_DISTINCT_DIGESTS @@ -1389,19 +1626,21 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, verified_digests = digestmap_new(); digestmap_set(verified_digests, signed_digest, (void*)(uintptr_t)1); #endif - if (check_signature_token(digest, DIGEST_LEN, tok, router->identity_pkey, 0, - "router descriptor") < 0) - goto err; if (!router->or_port) { log_warn(LD_DIR,"or_port unreadable or 0. Failing."); goto err; } + /* We've checked everything that's covered by the hash. */ + can_dl_again = 1; + if (check_signature_token(digest, DIGEST_LEN, tok, router->identity_pkey, 0, + "router descriptor") < 0) + goto err; + if (!router->platform) { router->platform = tor_strdup("<unknown>"); } - goto done; err: @@ -1409,6 +1648,7 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, routerinfo_free(router); router = NULL; done: + tor_cert_free(ntor_cc_cert); if (tokens) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t)); smartlist_free(tokens); @@ -1418,6 +1658,8 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, DUMP_AREA(area, "routerinfo"); memarea_drop_all(area); } + if (can_dl_again_out) + *can_dl_again_out = can_dl_again; return router; } @@ -1426,10 +1668,16 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, * <b>cache_copy</b> is true, make a copy of the extra-info document in the * cache_info fields of the result. If <b>routermap</b> is provided, use it * as a map from router identity to routerinfo_t when looking up signing keys. + * + * If <b>can_dl_again_out</b> is provided, set *<b>can_dl_again_out</b> to 1 + * if it's okay to try to download an extrainfo with this same digest again, + * and 0 if it isn't. (It might not be okay to download it again if part of + * the part covered by the digest is invalid.) */ extrainfo_t * extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, - int cache_copy, struct digest_ri_map_t *routermap) + int cache_copy, struct digest_ri_map_t *routermap, + int *can_dl_again_out) { extrainfo_t *extrainfo = NULL; char digest[128]; @@ -1439,6 +1687,9 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, routerinfo_t *router = NULL; memarea_t *area = NULL; const char *s_dup = s; + /* Do not set this to '1' until we have parsed everything that we intend to + * parse that's covered by the hash. */ + int can_dl_again = 0; if (!end) { end = s + strlen(s); @@ -1464,6 +1715,7 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, goto err; } + /* XXXX Accept this in position 1 too, and ed identity in position 0. */ tok = smartlist_get(tokens,0); if (tok->tp != K_EXTRA_INFO) { log_warn(LD_DIR,"Entry does not start with \"extra-info\""); @@ -1476,6 +1728,7 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_memdup_nulterm(s,end-s); extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s; memcpy(extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + crypto_digest256((char*)extrainfo->digest256, s, end-s, DIGEST_SHA256); tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 2); if (!is_legal_nickname(tok->args[0])) { @@ -1498,6 +1751,92 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, goto err; } + { + directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok; + ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519); + ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519); + int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok; + if (n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 2) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/" + "cross-certification support"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok) { + tor_assert(ed_cert_tok); + const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok); + if (ed_cert_token_pos != 1) { + /* Accept this in position 0 XXXX */ + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position"); + goto err; + } + if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor"); + goto err; + } + + uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN]; + const char *signed_start, *signed_end; + tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse( + (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body, + ed_cert_tok->object_size); + if (! cert) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + /* makes sure it gets freed. */ + extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert = cert; + + if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING || + ! cert->signing_key_included) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert"); + goto err; + } + + if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "extra-info ", + "\nrouter-sig-ed25519", + ' ', &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of extrainfo"); + goto err; + } + crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX, + strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX)); + crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start); + crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256)); + crypto_digest_free(d); + + ed25519_checkable_t check[2]; + int check_ok[2]; + if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert."); + goto err; + } + + if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[1].signature, + ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature"); + goto err; + } + check[1].pubkey = &cert->signed_key; + check[1].msg = d256; + check[1].len = DIGEST256_LEN; + + if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 2) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)"); + goto err; + } + /* We don't check the certificate expiration time: checking that it + * matches the cert in the router descriptor is adequate. */ + } + } + + /* We've checked everything that's covered by the hash. */ + can_dl_again = 1; + if (routermap && (router = digestmap_get((digestmap_t*)routermap, extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest))) { @@ -1540,6 +1879,8 @@ extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end, DUMP_AREA(area, "extrainfo"); memarea_drop_all(area); } + if (can_dl_again_out) + *can_dl_again_out = can_dl_again; return extrainfo; } @@ -1732,7 +2073,7 @@ authority_cert_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char **end_of_string) * object (starting with "r " at the start of a line). If none is found, * return the start of the directory footer, or the next directory signature. * If none is found, return the end of the string. */ -static INLINE const char * +static inline const char * find_start_of_next_routerstatus(const char *s) { const char *eos, *footer, *sig; @@ -1754,6 +2095,63 @@ find_start_of_next_routerstatus(const char *s) return eos; } +/** Parse the GuardFraction string from a consensus or vote. + * + * If <b>vote</b> or <b>vote_rs</b> are set the document getting + * parsed is a vote routerstatus. Otherwise it's a consensus. This is + * the same semantic as in routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(). */ +STATIC int +routerstatus_parse_guardfraction(const char *guardfraction_str, + networkstatus_t *vote, + vote_routerstatus_t *vote_rs, + routerstatus_t *rs) +{ + int ok; + const char *end_of_header = NULL; + int is_consensus = !vote_rs; + uint32_t guardfraction; + + tor_assert(bool_eq(vote, vote_rs)); + + /* If this info comes from a consensus, but we should't apply + guardfraction, just exit. */ + if (is_consensus && !should_apply_guardfraction(NULL)) { + return 0; + } + + end_of_header = strchr(guardfraction_str, '='); + if (!end_of_header) { + return -1; + } + + guardfraction = (uint32_t)tor_parse_ulong(end_of_header+1, + 10, 0, 100, &ok, NULL); + if (!ok) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid GuardFraction %s", escaped(guardfraction_str)); + return -1; + } + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "[*] Parsed %s guardfraction '%s' for '%s'.", + is_consensus ? "consensus" : "vote", + guardfraction_str, rs->nickname); + + if (!is_consensus) { /* We are parsing a vote */ + vote_rs->status.guardfraction_percentage = guardfraction; + vote_rs->status.has_guardfraction = 1; + } else { + /* We are parsing a consensus. Only apply guardfraction to guards. */ + if (rs->is_possible_guard) { + rs->guardfraction_percentage = guardfraction; + rs->has_guardfraction = 1; + } else { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got GuardFraction for non-guard %s. " + "This is not supposed to happen. Not applying. ", rs->nickname); + } + } + + return 0; +} + /** Given a string at *<b>s</b>, containing a routerstatus object, and an * empty smartlist at <b>tokens</b>, parse and return the first router status * object in the string, and advance *<b>s</b> to just after the end of the @@ -1900,8 +2298,6 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, rs->is_possible_guard = 1; else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "BadExit")) rs->is_bad_exit = 1; - else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "BadDirectory")) - rs->is_bad_directory = 1; else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "Authority")) rs->is_authority = 1; else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "Unnamed") && @@ -1910,6 +2306,8 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, rs->is_unnamed = 1; } else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "HSDir")) { rs->is_hs_dir = 1; + } else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "V2Dir")) { + rs->is_v2_dir = 1; } } } @@ -1917,13 +2315,7 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); rs->version_known = 1; if (strcmpstart(tok->args[0], "Tor ")) { - rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache = 1; - rs->version_supports_optimistic_data = 1; } else { - rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache = - tor_version_supports_microdescriptors(tok->args[0]); - rs->version_supports_optimistic_data = - tor_version_as_new_as(tok->args[0], "0.2.3.1-alpha"); rs->version_supports_extend2_cells = tor_version_as_new_as(tok->args[0], "0.2.4.8-alpha"); } @@ -1961,6 +2353,11 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, vote->has_measured_bws = 1; } else if (!strcmpstart(tok->args[i], "Unmeasured=1")) { rs->bw_is_unmeasured = 1; + } else if (!strcmpstart(tok->args[i], "GuardFraction=")) { + if (routerstatus_parse_guardfraction(tok->args[i], + vote, vote_rs, rs) < 0) { + goto err; + } } } } @@ -1991,6 +2388,18 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t *area, line->microdesc_hash_line = tor_strdup(t->args[0]); vote_rs->microdesc = line; } + if (t->tp == K_ID) { + tor_assert(t->n_args >= 2); + if (!strcmp(t->args[0], "ed25519")) { + vote_rs->has_ed25519_listing = 1; + if (strcmp(t->args[1], "none") && + digest256_from_base64((char*)vote_rs->ed25519_id, + t->args[1])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bogus ed25519 key in networkstatus vote"); + goto err; + } + } + } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t); } else if (flav == FLAV_MICRODESC) { tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_M); @@ -2048,6 +2457,7 @@ networkstatus_verify_bw_weights(networkstatus_t *ns, int consensus_method) double Gtotal=0, Mtotal=0, Etotal=0; const char *casename = NULL; int valid = 1; + (void) consensus_method; weight_scale = networkstatus_get_weight_scale_param(ns); Wgg = networkstatus_get_bw_weight(ns, "Wgg", -1); @@ -2127,12 +2537,8 @@ networkstatus_verify_bw_weights(networkstatus_t *ns, int consensus_method) // Then, gather G, M, E, D, T to determine case SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ns->routerstatus_list, routerstatus_t *, rs) { int is_exit = 0; - if (consensus_method >= MIN_METHOD_TO_CUT_BADEXIT_WEIGHT) { - /* Bug #2203: Don't count bad exits as exits for balancing */ - is_exit = rs->is_exit && !rs->is_bad_exit; - } else { - is_exit = rs->is_exit; - } + /* Bug #2203: Don't count bad exits as exits for balancing */ + is_exit = rs->is_exit && !rs->is_bad_exit; if (rs->has_bandwidth) { T += rs->bandwidth_kb; if (is_exit && rs->is_possible_guard) { @@ -2444,7 +2850,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, smartlist_t *rs_tokens = NULL, *footer_tokens = NULL; networkstatus_voter_info_t *voter = NULL; networkstatus_t *ns = NULL; - digests_t ns_digests; + common_digests_t ns_digests; const char *cert, *end_of_header, *end_of_footer, *s_dup = s; directory_token_t *tok; int ok; @@ -2470,7 +2876,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, (ns_type == NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) ? networkstatus_consensus_token_table : networkstatus_token_table, 0)) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing network-status vote header"); + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing network-status header"); goto err; } @@ -2568,11 +2974,15 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, (int) tor_parse_long(tok->args[1], 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, NULL); if (!ok) goto err; - if (ns->valid_after + MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL > ns->fresh_until) { + if (ns->valid_after + + (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork ? + MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL_TESTING : MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL) > ns->fresh_until) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Vote/consensus freshness interval is too short"); goto err; } - if (ns->valid_after + MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL*2 > ns->valid_until) { + if (ns->valid_after + + (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork ? + MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL_TESTING : MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL)*2 > ns->valid_until) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Vote/consensus liveness interval is too short"); goto err; } @@ -2592,6 +3002,16 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, ns->server_versions = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]); } + { + smartlist_t *package_lst = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_PACKAGE); + ns->package_lines = smartlist_new(); + if (package_lst) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(package_lst, directory_token_t *, t, + smartlist_add(ns->package_lines, tor_strdup(t->args[0]))); + } + smartlist_free(package_lst); + } + tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_KNOWN_FLAGS); ns->known_flags = smartlist_new(); inorder = 1; @@ -2679,7 +3099,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, base16_decode(voter->identity_digest, sizeof(voter->identity_digest), tok->args[1], HEX_DIGEST_LEN) < 0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error decoding identity digest %s in " - "network-status vote.", escaped(tok->args[1])); + "network-status document.", escaped(tok->args[1])); goto err; } if (ns->type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS && @@ -2738,7 +3158,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, voter = NULL; } if (smartlist_len(ns->voters) == 0) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Missing dir-source elements in a vote networkstatus."); + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Missing dir-source elements in a networkstatus."); goto err; } else if (ns->type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS && smartlist_len(ns->voters) != 1) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Too many dir-source elements in a vote networkstatus."); @@ -2799,11 +3219,27 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, } if (fast_memcmp(rs1->identity_digest, rs2->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) >= 0) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Vote networkstatus entries not sorted by identity " - "digest"); + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Networkstatus entries not sorted by identity digest"); goto err; } } + if (ns_type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) { + digest256map_t *ed_id_map = digest256map_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ns->routerstatus_list, vote_routerstatus_t *, + vrs) { + if (! vrs->has_ed25519_listing || + tor_mem_is_zero((const char *)vrs->ed25519_id, DIGEST256_LEN)) + continue; + if (digest256map_get(ed_id_map, vrs->ed25519_id) != NULL) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Vote networkstatus ed25519 identities were not " + "unique"); + digest256map_free(ed_id_map, NULL); + goto err; + } + digest256map_set(ed_id_map, vrs->ed25519_id, (void*)1); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(vrs); + digest256map_free(ed_id_map, NULL); + } /* Parse footer; check signature. */ footer_tokens = smartlist_new(); @@ -2896,12 +3332,12 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, base16_decode(declared_identity, sizeof(declared_identity), id_hexdigest, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) < 0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error decoding declared identity %s in " - "network-status vote.", escaped(id_hexdigest)); + "network-status document.", escaped(id_hexdigest)); goto err; } if (!(v = networkstatus_get_voter_by_id(ns, declared_identity))) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "ID on signature on network-status vote does not match " - "any declared directory source."); + log_warn(LD_DIR, "ID on signature on network-status document does " + "not match any declared directory source."); goto err; } sig = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(document_signature_t)); @@ -2911,7 +3347,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, base16_decode(sig->signing_key_digest, sizeof(sig->signing_key_digest), sk_hexdigest, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) < 0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error decoding declared signing key digest %s in " - "network-status vote.", escaped(sk_hexdigest)); + "network-status document.", escaped(sk_hexdigest)); tor_free(sig); goto err; } @@ -2930,8 +3366,8 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, /* We already parsed a vote with this algorithm from this voter. Use the first one. */ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR, "We received a networkstatus " - "that contains two votes from the same voter with the same " - "algorithm. Ignoring the second vote."); + "that contains two signatures from the same voter with the same " + "algorithm. Ignoring the second signature."); tor_free(sig); continue; } @@ -2939,7 +3375,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, if (ns->type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) { if (check_signature_token(ns_digests.d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN, tok, ns->cert->signing_key, 0, - "network-status vote")) { + "network-status document")) { tor_free(sig); goto err; } @@ -2958,7 +3394,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(_tok); if (! n_signatures) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "No signatures on networkstatus vote."); + log_warn(LD_DIR, "No signatures on networkstatus document."); goto err; } else if (ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE && n_signatures != 1) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Received more than one signature on a " @@ -3009,15 +3445,16 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, return ns; } -/** Return the digests_t that holds the digests of the +/** Return the common_digests_t that holds the digests of the * <b>flavor_name</b>-flavored networkstatus according to the detached - * signatures document <b>sigs</b>, allocating a new digests_t as neeeded. */ -static digests_t * + * signatures document <b>sigs</b>, allocating a new common_digests_t as + * neeeded. */ +static common_digests_t * detached_get_digests(ns_detached_signatures_t *sigs, const char *flavor_name) { - digests_t *d = strmap_get(sigs->digests, flavor_name); + common_digests_t *d = strmap_get(sigs->digests, flavor_name); if (!d) { - d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(digests_t)); + d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(common_digests_t)); strmap_set(sigs->digests, flavor_name, d); } return d; @@ -3025,7 +3462,7 @@ detached_get_digests(ns_detached_signatures_t *sigs, const char *flavor_name) /** Return the list of signatures of the <b>flavor_name</b>-flavored * networkstatus according to the detached signatures document <b>sigs</b>, - * allocating a new digests_t as neeeded. */ + * allocating a new common_digests_t as neeeded. */ static smartlist_t * detached_get_signatures(ns_detached_signatures_t *sigs, const char *flavor_name) @@ -3047,7 +3484,7 @@ networkstatus_parse_detached_signatures(const char *s, const char *eos) * networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(). */ directory_token_t *tok; memarea_t *area = NULL; - digests_t *digests; + common_digests_t *digests; smartlist_t *tokens = smartlist_new(); ns_detached_signatures_t *sigs = @@ -3243,24 +3680,43 @@ networkstatus_parse_detached_signatures(const char *s, const char *eos) * assume_action is nonnegative, then insert its action (ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT or * ADDR_POLICY_REJECT) for items that specify no action. * + * Returns NULL on policy errors. + * + * Set *<b>malformed_list</b> to true if the entire policy list should be + * discarded. Otherwise, set it to false, and only this item should be ignored + * on error - the rest of the policy list can continue to be processed and + * used. + * * The addr_policy_t returned by this function can have its address set to * AF_UNSPEC for '*'. Use policy_expand_unspec() to turn this into a pair * of AF_INET and AF_INET6 items. */ -addr_policy_t * -router_parse_addr_policy_item_from_string(const char *s, int assume_action) +MOCK_IMPL(addr_policy_t *, +router_parse_addr_policy_item_from_string,(const char *s, int assume_action, + int *malformed_list)) { directory_token_t *tok = NULL; const char *cp, *eos; - /* Longest possible policy is "accept ffff:ffff:..255/ffff:...255:0-65535". + /* Longest possible policy is + * "accept6 [ffff:ffff:..255]/128:10000-65535", + * which contains a max-length IPv6 address, plus 26 characters. * But note that there can be an arbitrary amount of space between the - * accept and the address:mask/port element. */ + * accept and the address:mask/port element. + * We don't need to multiply TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN by 2, as there is only one + * IPv6 address. But making the buffer shorter might cause valid long lines, + * which parsed in previous versions, to fail to parse in new versions. + * (These lines would have to have excessive amounts of whitespace.) */ char line[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN*2 + 32]; addr_policy_t *r; memarea_t *area = NULL; + tor_assert(malformed_list); + *malformed_list = 0; + s = eat_whitespace(s); - if ((*s == '*' || TOR_ISDIGIT(*s)) && assume_action >= 0) { + /* We can only do assume_action on []-quoted IPv6, as "a" (accept) + * and ":" (port separator) are ambiguous */ + if ((*s == '*' || *s == '[' || TOR_ISDIGIT(*s)) && assume_action >= 0) { if (tor_snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "%s %s", assume_action == ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT?"accept":"reject", s)<0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Policy %s is too long.", escaped(s)); @@ -3285,9 +3741,34 @@ router_parse_addr_policy_item_from_string(const char *s, int assume_action) goto err; } + /* Use the extended interpretation of accept/reject *, + * expanding it into an IPv4 wildcard and an IPv6 wildcard. + * Also permit *4 and *6 for IPv4 and IPv6 only wildcards. */ r = router_parse_addr_policy(tok, TAPMP_EXTENDED_STAR); + if (!r) { + goto err; + } + + /* Ensure that accept6/reject6 fields are followed by IPv6 addresses. + * AF_UNSPEC addresses are only permitted on the accept/reject field type. + * Unlike descriptors, torrcs exit policy accept/reject can be followed by + * either an IPv4 or IPv6 address. */ + if ((tok->tp == K_ACCEPT6 || tok->tp == K_REJECT6) && + tor_addr_family(&r->addr) != AF_INET6) { + /* This is a non-fatal error, just ignore this one entry. */ + *malformed_list = 0; + log_warn(LD_DIR, "IPv4 address '%s' with accept6/reject6 field type in " + "exit policy. Ignoring, but continuing to parse rules. (Use " + "accept/reject with IPv4 addresses.)", + tok->n_args == 1 ? tok->args[0] : ""); + addr_policy_free(r); + r = NULL; + goto done; + } + goto done; err: + *malformed_list = 1; r = NULL; done: token_clear(tok); @@ -3304,19 +3785,27 @@ static int router_add_exit_policy(routerinfo_t *router, directory_token_t *tok) { addr_policy_t *newe; + /* Use the standard interpretation of accept/reject *, an IPv4 wildcard. */ newe = router_parse_addr_policy(tok, 0); if (!newe) return -1; if (! router->exit_policy) router->exit_policy = smartlist_new(); + /* Ensure that in descriptors, accept/reject fields are followed by + * IPv4 addresses, and accept6/reject6 fields are followed by + * IPv6 addresses. Unlike torrcs, descriptor exit policies do not permit + * accept/reject followed by IPv6. */ if (((tok->tp == K_ACCEPT6 || tok->tp == K_REJECT6) && tor_addr_family(&newe->addr) == AF_INET) || ((tok->tp == K_ACCEPT || tok->tp == K_REJECT) && tor_addr_family(&newe->addr) == AF_INET6)) { + /* There's nothing the user can do about other relays' descriptors, + * so we don't provide usage advice here. */ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Mismatch between field type and address type in exit " - "policy"); + "policy '%s'. Discarding entire router descriptor.", + tok->n_args == 1 ? tok->args[0] : ""); addr_policy_free(newe); return -1; } @@ -3326,8 +3815,11 @@ router_add_exit_policy(routerinfo_t *router, directory_token_t *tok) return 0; } -/** Given a K_ACCEPT or K_REJECT token and a router, create and return - * a new exit_policy_t corresponding to the token. */ +/** Given a K_ACCEPT[6] or K_REJECT[6] token and a router, create and return + * a new exit_policy_t corresponding to the token. If TAPMP_EXTENDED_STAR + * is set in fmt_flags, K_ACCEPT6 and K_REJECT6 tokens followed by * + * expand to IPv6-only policies, otherwise they expand to IPv4 and IPv6 + * policies */ static addr_policy_t * router_parse_addr_policy(directory_token_t *tok, unsigned fmt_flags) { @@ -3351,6 +3843,13 @@ router_parse_addr_policy(directory_token_t *tok, unsigned fmt_flags) else newe.policy_type = ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT; + /* accept6/reject6 * produces an IPv6 wildcard address only. + * (accept/reject * produces rules for IPv4 and IPv6 wildcard addresses.) */ + if ((fmt_flags & TAPMP_EXTENDED_STAR) + && (tok->tp == K_ACCEPT6 || tok->tp == K_REJECT6)) { + fmt_flags |= TAPMP_STAR_IPV6_ONLY; + } + if (tor_addr_parse_mask_ports(arg, fmt_flags, &newe.addr, &newe.maskbits, &newe.prt_min, &newe.prt_max) < 0) { log_warn(LD_DIR,"Couldn't parse line %s. Dropping", escaped(arg)); @@ -3360,9 +3859,12 @@ router_parse_addr_policy(directory_token_t *tok, unsigned fmt_flags) return addr_policy_get_canonical_entry(&newe); } -/** Parse an exit policy line of the format "accept/reject private:...". +/** Parse an exit policy line of the format "accept[6]/reject[6] private:...". * This didn't exist until Tor 0.1.1.15, so nobody should generate it in * router descriptors until earlier versions are obsolete. + * + * accept/reject and accept6/reject6 private all produce rules for both + * IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. */ static addr_policy_t * router_parse_addr_policy_private(directory_token_t *tok) @@ -3392,6 +3894,13 @@ router_parse_addr_policy_private(directory_token_t *tok) result.prt_min = port_min; result.prt_max = port_max; + if (tok->tp == K_ACCEPT6 || tok->tp == K_REJECT6) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, + "'%s' expands into rules which apply to all private IPv4 and " + "IPv6 addresses. (Use accept/reject private:* for IPv4 and " + "IPv6.)", tok->n_args == 1 ? tok->args[0] : ""); + } + return addr_policy_get_canonical_entry(&result); } @@ -3438,7 +3947,7 @@ token_clear(directory_token_t *tok) * Return <b>tok</b> on success, or a new ERR_ token if the token didn't * conform to the syntax we wanted. **/ -static INLINE directory_token_t * +static inline directory_token_t * token_check_object(memarea_t *area, const char *kwd, directory_token_t *tok, obj_syntax o_syn) { @@ -3503,7 +4012,7 @@ token_check_object(memarea_t *area, const char *kwd, * number of parsed elements into the n_args field of <b>tok</b>. Allocate * all storage in <b>area</b>. Return the number of arguments parsed, or * return -1 if there was an insanely high number of arguments. */ -static INLINE int +static inline int get_token_arguments(memarea_t *area, directory_token_t *tok, const char *s, const char *eol) { @@ -3938,7 +4447,7 @@ router_get_hash_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest, /** As router_get_hash_impl, but compute all hashes. */ static int -router_get_hashes_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, digests_t *digests, +router_get_hashes_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, common_digests_t *digests, const char *start_str, const char *end_str, char end_c) { @@ -3947,7 +4456,7 @@ router_get_hashes_impl(const char *s, size_t s_len, digests_t *digests, &start,&end)<0) return -1; - if (crypto_digest_all(digests, start, end-start)) { + if (crypto_common_digests(digests, start, end-start)) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"couldn't compute digests"); return -1; } @@ -4014,12 +4523,15 @@ find_start_of_next_microdesc(const char *s, const char *eos) * If <b>saved_location</b> isn't SAVED_IN_CACHE, make a local copy of each * descriptor in the body field of each microdesc_t. * - * Return all newly - * parsed microdescriptors in a newly allocated smartlist_t. */ + * Return all newly parsed microdescriptors in a newly allocated + * smartlist_t. If <b>invalid_disgests_out</b> is provided, add a SHA256 + * microdesc digest to it for every microdesc that we found to be badly + * formed. (This may cause duplicates) */ smartlist_t * microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, int allow_annotations, - saved_location_t where) + saved_location_t where, + smartlist_t *invalid_digests_out) { smartlist_t *tokens; smartlist_t *result; @@ -4041,21 +4553,20 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, tokens = smartlist_new(); while (s < eos) { + int okay = 0; + start_of_next_microdesc = find_start_of_next_microdesc(s, eos); if (!start_of_next_microdesc) start_of_next_microdesc = eos; - if (tokenize_string(area, s, start_of_next_microdesc, tokens, - microdesc_token_table, flags)) { - log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unparseable microdescriptor"); - goto next; - } - md = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(microdesc_t)); { const char *cp = tor_memstr(s, start_of_next_microdesc-s, "onion-key"); - tor_assert(cp); + const int no_onion_key = (cp == NULL); + if (no_onion_key) { + cp = s; /* So that we have *some* junk to put in the body */ + } md->bodylen = start_of_next_microdesc - cp; md->saved_location = where; @@ -4064,6 +4575,17 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, else md->body = (char*)cp; md->off = cp - start; + crypto_digest256(md->digest, md->body, md->bodylen, DIGEST_SHA256); + if (no_onion_key) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR, "Malformed or truncated descriptor"); + goto next; + } + } + + if (tokenize_string(area, s, start_of_next_microdesc, tokens, + microdesc_token_table, flags)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unparseable microdescriptor"); + goto next; } if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, A_LAST_LISTED))) { @@ -4093,6 +4615,26 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, tor_memdup(&k, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); } + smartlist_t *id_lines = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_ID); + if (id_lines) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(id_lines, directory_token_t *, t) { + tor_assert(t->n_args >= 2); + if (!strcmp(t->args[0], "ed25519")) { + if (md->ed25519_identity_pkey) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Extra ed25519 key in microdesc"); + goto next; + } + ed25519_public_key_t k; + if (ed25519_public_from_base64(&k, t->args[1])<0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bogus ed25519 key in microdesc"); + goto next; + } + md->ed25519_identity_pkey = tor_memdup(&k, sizeof(k)); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t); + smartlist_free(id_lines); + } + { smartlist_t *a_lines = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_A); if (a_lines) { @@ -4121,12 +4663,15 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, md->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(tok->args[0]); } - crypto_digest256(md->digest, md->body, md->bodylen, DIGEST_SHA256); - smartlist_add(result, md); + okay = 1; md = NULL; next: + if (! okay && invalid_digests_out) { + smartlist_add(invalid_digests_out, + tor_memdup(md->digest, DIGEST256_LEN)); + } microdesc_free(md); md = NULL; @@ -4143,14 +4688,6 @@ microdescs_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, return result; } -/** Return true iff this Tor version can answer directory questions - * about microdescriptors. */ -int -tor_version_supports_microdescriptors(const char *platform) -{ - return tor_version_as_new_as(platform, "0.2.3.1-alpha"); -} - /** Parse the Tor version of the platform string <b>platform</b>, * and compare it to the version in <b>cutoff</b>. Return 1 if * the router is at least as new as the cutoff, else return 0. @@ -4207,40 +4744,50 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out) char *eos=NULL; const char *cp=NULL; /* Format is: - * "Tor " ? NUM dot NUM dot NUM [ ( pre | rc | dot ) NUM [ - tag ] ] + * "Tor " ? NUM dot NUM [ dot NUM [ ( pre | rc | dot ) NUM ] ] [ - tag ] */ tor_assert(s); tor_assert(out); memset(out, 0, sizeof(tor_version_t)); - + out->status = VER_RELEASE; if (!strcasecmpstart(s, "Tor ")) s += 4; - /* Get major. */ - out->major = (int)strtol(s,&eos,10); - if (!eos || eos==s || *eos != '.') return -1; - cp = eos+1; - - /* Get minor */ - out->minor = (int) strtol(cp,&eos,10); - if (!eos || eos==cp || *eos != '.') return -1; - cp = eos+1; - - /* Get micro */ - out->micro = (int) strtol(cp,&eos,10); - if (!eos || eos==cp) return -1; - if (!*eos) { - out->status = VER_RELEASE; - out->patchlevel = 0; + cp = s; + +#define NUMBER(m) \ + do { \ + out->m = (int)strtol(cp, &eos, 10); \ + if (!eos || eos == cp) \ + return -1; \ + cp = eos; \ + } while (0) + +#define DOT() \ + do { \ + if (*cp != '.') \ + return -1; \ + ++cp; \ + } while (0) + + NUMBER(major); + DOT(); + NUMBER(minor); + if (*cp == 0) return 0; - } - cp = eos; + else if (*cp == '-') + goto status_tag; + DOT(); + NUMBER(micro); /* Get status */ - if (*cp == '.') { - out->status = VER_RELEASE; + if (*cp == 0) { + return 0; + } else if (*cp == '.') { ++cp; + } else if (*cp == '-') { + goto status_tag; } else if (0==strncmp(cp, "pre", 3)) { out->status = VER_PRE; cp += 3; @@ -4251,11 +4798,9 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out) return -1; } - /* Get patchlevel */ - out->patchlevel = (int) strtol(cp,&eos,10); - if (!eos || eos==cp) return -1; - cp = eos; + NUMBER(patchlevel); + status_tag: /* Get status tag. */ if (*cp == '-' || *cp == '.') ++cp; @@ -4291,6 +4836,8 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out) } return 0; +#undef NUMBER +#undef DOT } /** Compare two tor versions; Return <0 if a < b; 0 if a ==b, >0 if a > @@ -4389,6 +4936,9 @@ sort_version_list(smartlist_t *versions, int remove_duplicates) * to *<b>encoded_size_out</b>, and a pointer to the possibly next * descriptor to *<b>next_out</b>; return 0 for success (including validation) * and -1 for failure. + * + * If <b>as_hsdir</b> is 1, we're parsing this as an HSDir, and we should + * be strict about time formats. */ int rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out, @@ -4396,7 +4946,8 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out, char **intro_points_encrypted_out, size_t *intro_points_encrypted_size_out, size_t *encoded_size_out, - const char **next_out, const char *desc) + const char **next_out, const char *desc, + int as_hsdir) { rend_service_descriptor_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t)); @@ -4410,6 +4961,8 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out, char public_key_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; char test_desc_id[DIGEST_LEN]; memarea_t *area = NULL; + const int strict_time_fmt = as_hsdir; + tor_assert(desc); /* Check if desc starts correctly. */ if (strncmp(desc, "rendezvous-service-descriptor ", @@ -4458,8 +5011,7 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out, tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_RENDEZVOUS_SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR); tor_assert(tok == smartlist_get(tokens, 0)); tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); - if (strlen(tok->args[0]) != REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 || - strspn(tok->args[0], BASE32_CHARS) != REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32) { + if (!rend_valid_descriptor_id(tok->args[0])) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid descriptor ID: '%s'", tok->args[0]); goto err; } @@ -4504,7 +5056,7 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out, * descriptor. */ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, R_PUBLICATION_TIME); tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1); - if (parse_iso_time(tok->args[0], &result->timestamp) < 0) { + if (parse_iso_time_(tok->args[0], &result->timestamp, strict_time_fmt) < 0) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Invalid publication time: '%s'", tok->args[0]); goto err; } |