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-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.c731
1 files changed, 528 insertions, 203 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 6c934c8c12..0329d70924 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "circuituse.h"
#include "config.h"
+#include "control.h"
#include "directory.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "networkstatus.h"
@@ -42,9 +43,15 @@ static int intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro);
static int intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
time_t now);
struct rend_service_t;
+static int rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s);
static int rend_service_load_keys(struct rend_service_t *s);
static int rend_service_load_auth_keys(struct rend_service_t *s,
const char *hfname);
+static struct rend_service_t *rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(
+ const char* digest);
+static struct rend_service_t *rend_service_get_by_service_id(const char *id);
+static const char *rend_service_escaped_dir(
+ const struct rend_service_t *s);
static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1(
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
@@ -65,7 +72,7 @@ static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3(
/** Represents the mapping from a virtual port of a rendezvous service to
* a real port on some IP.
*/
-typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t {
+struct rend_service_port_config_s {
/* The incoming HS virtual port we're mapping */
uint16_t virtual_port;
/* Is this an AF_UNIX port? */
@@ -76,7 +83,7 @@ typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t {
tor_addr_t real_addr;
/* The socket path to connect to, if is_unix_addr */
char unix_addr[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
-} rend_service_port_config_t;
+};
/** Try to maintain this many intro points per service by default. */
#define NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT 3
@@ -90,7 +97,7 @@ typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t {
#define MAX_INTRO_CIRCS_PER_PERIOD 10
/** How many times will a hidden service operator attempt to connect to
* a requested rendezvous point before giving up? */
-#define MAX_REND_FAILURES 8
+#define MAX_REND_FAILURES 1
/** How many seconds should we spend trying to connect to a requested
* rendezvous point before giving up? */
#define MAX_REND_TIMEOUT 30
@@ -102,7 +109,8 @@ typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t {
/** Represents a single hidden service running at this OP. */
typedef struct rend_service_t {
/* Fields specified in config file */
- char *directory; /**< where in the filesystem it stores it */
+ char *directory; /**< where in the filesystem it stores it. Will be NULL if
+ * this service is ephemeral. */
int dir_group_readable; /**< if 1, allow group read
permissions on directory */
smartlist_t *ports; /**< List of rend_service_port_config_t */
@@ -139,8 +147,23 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t {
/** If true, we don't close circuits for making requests to unsupported
* ports. */
int allow_unknown_ports;
+ /** The maximum number of simultanious streams-per-circuit that are allowed
+ * to be established, or 0 if no limit is set.
+ */
+ int max_streams_per_circuit;
+ /** If true, we close circuits that exceed the max_streams_per_circuit
+ * limit. */
+ int max_streams_close_circuit;
} rend_service_t;
+/** Returns a escaped string representation of the service, <b>s</b>.
+ */
+static const char *
+rend_service_escaped_dir(const struct rend_service_t *s)
+{
+ return (s->directory) ? escaped(s->directory) : "[EPHEMERAL]";
+}
+
/** A list of rend_service_t's for services run on this OP.
*/
static smartlist_t *rend_service_list = NULL;
@@ -173,7 +196,7 @@ rend_authorized_client_free(rend_authorized_client_t *client)
return;
if (client->client_key)
crypto_pk_free(client->client_key);
- tor_strclear(client->client_name);
+ memwipe(client->client_name, 0, strlen(client->client_name));
tor_free(client->client_name);
memwipe(client->descriptor_cookie, 0, sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie));
tor_free(client);
@@ -195,7 +218,8 @@ rend_service_free(rend_service_t *service)
return;
tor_free(service->directory);
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, void*, p, tor_free(p));
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t*, p,
+ rend_service_port_config_free(p));
smartlist_free(service->ports);
if (service->private_key)
crypto_pk_free(service->private_key);
@@ -232,8 +256,9 @@ rend_service_free_all(void)
}
/** Validate <b>service</b> and add it to rend_service_list if possible.
+ * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
*/
-static void
+static int
rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service)
{
int i;
@@ -241,20 +266,38 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service)
service->intro_nodes = smartlist_new();
+ if (service->max_streams_per_circuit < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with negative max "
+ "streams per circuit; ignoring.",
+ rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (service->max_streams_close_circuit < 0 ||
+ service->max_streams_close_circuit > 1) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with invalid "
+ "max streams handling; ignoring.",
+ rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with client authorization but no "
"clients; ignoring.",
- escaped(service->directory));
+ rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
- return;
+ return -1;
}
if (!smartlist_len(service->ports)) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with no ports configured; "
"ignoring.",
- escaped(service->directory));
+ rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
} else {
int dupe = 0;
/* XXX This duplicate check has two problems:
@@ -272,14 +315,17 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service)
* lock file. But this is enough to detect a simple mistake that
* at least one person has actually made.
*/
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
- dupe = dupe ||
- !strcmp(ptr->directory, service->directory));
- if (dupe) {
- log_warn(LD_REND, "Another hidden service is already configured for "
- "directory %s, ignoring.", service->directory);
- rend_service_free(service);
- return;
+ if (service->directory != NULL) { /* Skip dupe for ephemeral services. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
+ dupe = dupe ||
+ !strcmp(ptr->directory, service->directory));
+ if (dupe) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Another hidden service is already configured for "
+ "directory %s, ignoring.",
+ rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
smartlist_add(rend_service_list, service);
log_debug(LD_REND,"Configuring service with directory \"%s\"",
@@ -305,7 +351,9 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service)
#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
}
}
+ return 0;
}
+ /* NOTREACHED */
}
/** Return a new rend_service_port_config_t with its path set to
@@ -324,15 +372,17 @@ rend_service_port_config_new(const char *socket_path)
return conf;
}
-/** Parses a real-port to virtual-port mapping and returns a new
- * rend_service_port_config_t.
+/** Parses a real-port to virtual-port mapping separated by the provided
+ * separator and returns a new rend_service_port_config_t, or NULL and an
+ * optional error string on failure.
*
- * The format is: VirtualPort (IP|RealPort|IP:RealPort|'socket':path)?
+ * The format is: VirtualPort SEP (IP|RealPort|IP:RealPort|'socket':path)?
*
* IP defaults to 127.0.0.1; RealPort defaults to VirtualPort.
*/
-static rend_service_port_config_t *
-parse_port_config(const char *string)
+rend_service_port_config_t *
+rend_service_parse_port_config(const char *string, const char *sep,
+ char **err_msg_out)
{
smartlist_t *sl;
int virtport;
@@ -343,19 +393,24 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
rend_service_port_config_t *result = NULL;
unsigned int is_unix_addr = 0;
char *socket_path = NULL;
+ char *err_msg = NULL;
sl = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_split_string(sl, string, " ",
+ smartlist_split_string(sl, string, sep,
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
if (smartlist_len(sl) < 1 || smartlist_len(sl) > 2) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Bad syntax in hidden service port configuration.");
+ if (err_msg_out)
+ err_msg = tor_strdup("Bad syntax in hidden service port configuration.");
+
goto err;
}
virtport = (int)tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(sl,0), 10, 1, 65535, NULL,NULL);
if (!virtport) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Missing or invalid port %s in hidden service port "
- "configuration", escaped(smartlist_get(sl,0)));
+ if (err_msg_out)
+ tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "Missing or invalid port %s in hidden service "
+ "port configuration", escaped(smartlist_get(sl,0)));
+
goto err;
}
@@ -369,10 +424,11 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
addrport = smartlist_get(sl,1);
ret = config_parse_unix_port(addrport, &socket_path);
if (ret < 0 && ret != -ENOENT) {
- if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "Empty socket path in hidden service port configuration.");
- }
+ if (ret == -EINVAL)
+ if (err_msg_out)
+ err_msg = tor_strdup("Empty socket path in hidden service port "
+ "configuration.");
+
goto err;
}
if (socket_path) {
@@ -380,8 +436,10 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
} else if (strchr(addrport, ':') || strchr(addrport, '.')) {
/* else try it as an IP:port pair if it has a : or . in it */
if (tor_addr_port_lookup(addrport, &addr, &p)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Unparseable address in hidden service port "
- "configuration.");
+ if (err_msg_out)
+ err_msg = tor_strdup("Unparseable address in hidden service port "
+ "configuration.");
+
goto err;
}
realport = p?p:virtport;
@@ -389,8 +447,11 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
/* No addr:port, no addr -- must be port. */
realport = (int)tor_parse_long(addrport, 10, 1, 65535, NULL, NULL);
if (!realport) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Unparseable or out-of-range port %s in hidden "
- "service port configuration.", escaped(addrport));
+ if (err_msg_out)
+ tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "Unparseable or out-of-range port %s in "
+ "hidden service port configuration.",
+ escaped(addrport));
+
goto err;
}
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, 0x7F000001u); /* Default to 127.0.0.1 */
@@ -408,6 +469,7 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
}
err:
+ if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
smartlist_free(sl);
if (socket_path) tor_free(socket_path);
@@ -415,6 +477,13 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
return result;
}
+/** Release all storage held in a rend_service_port_config_t. */
+void
+rend_service_port_config_free(rend_service_port_config_t *p)
+{
+ tor_free(p);
+}
+
/** Set up rend_service_list, based on the values of HiddenServiceDir and
* HiddenServicePort in <b>options</b>. Return 0 on success and -1 on
* failure. (If <b>validate_only</b> is set, parse, warn and return as
@@ -439,113 +508,145 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
if (service) { /* register the one we just finished parsing */
if (validate_only)
rend_service_free(service);
- else
- rend_add_service(service);
- }
- service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t));
- service->directory = tor_strdup(line->value);
- service->ports = smartlist_new();
- service->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
- service->n_intro_points_wanted = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
- continue;
- }
- if (!service) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s with no preceding HiddenServiceDir directive",
- line->key);
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServicePort")) {
- portcfg = parse_port_config(line->value);
- if (!portcfg) {
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- smartlist_add(service->ports, portcfg);
- } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts")) {
- service->allow_unknown_ports = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
- 10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL);
- if (!ok) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts should be 0 or 1, not %s",
- line->value);
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- log_info(LD_CONFIG,
- "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts=%d for %s",
- (int)service->allow_unknown_ports, service->directory);
- } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key,
- "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable")) {
- service->dir_group_readable = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
- 10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL);
- if (!ok) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable should be 0 or 1, not %s",
- line->value);
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- log_info(LD_CONFIG,
- "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable=%d for %s",
- service->dir_group_readable, service->directory);
- } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient")) {
- /* Parse auth type and comma-separated list of client names and add a
- * rend_authorized_client_t for each client to the service's list
- * of authorized clients. */
- smartlist_t *type_names_split, *clients;
- const char *authname;
- int num_clients;
- if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Got multiple HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient "
- "lines for a single service.");
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- type_names_split = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_split_string(type_names_split, line->value, " ", 0, 2);
- if (smartlist_len(type_names_split) < 1) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient has no value. This "
- "should have been prevented when parsing the "
- "configuration.");
- smartlist_free(type_names_split);
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- authname = smartlist_get(type_names_split, 0);
- if (!strcasecmp(authname, "basic")) {
- service->auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH;
- } else if (!strcasecmp(authname, "stealth")) {
- service->auth_type = REND_STEALTH_AUTH;
- } else {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
- "unrecognized auth-type '%s'. Only 'basic' or 'stealth' "
- "are recognized.",
- (char *) smartlist_get(type_names_split, 0));
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(type_names_split);
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- service->clients = smartlist_new();
- if (smartlist_len(type_names_split) < 2) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
- "auth-type '%s', but no client names.",
- service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? "basic" : "stealth");
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(type_names_split);
- continue;
- }
- clients = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_split_string(clients, smartlist_get(type_names_split, 1),
- ",", SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0);
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(type_names_split);
- /* Remove duplicate client names. */
- num_clients = smartlist_len(clients);
- smartlist_sort_strings(clients);
- smartlist_uniq_strings(clients);
- if (smartlist_len(clients) < num_clients) {
+ else
+ rend_add_service(service);
+ }
+ service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t));
+ service->directory = tor_strdup(line->value);
+ service->ports = smartlist_new();
+ service->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
+ service->n_intro_points_wanted = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!service) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s with no preceding HiddenServiceDir directive",
+ line->key);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServicePort")) {
+ char *err_msg = NULL;
+ portcfg = rend_service_parse_port_config(line->value, " ", &err_msg);
+ if (!portcfg) {
+ if (err_msg)
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s", err_msg);
+ tor_free(err_msg);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ tor_assert(!err_msg);
+ smartlist_add(service->ports, portcfg);
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts")) {
+ service->allow_unknown_ports = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+ 10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts should be 0 or 1, not %s",
+ line->value);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts=%d for %s",
+ (int)service->allow_unknown_ports, service->directory);
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key,
+ "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable")) {
+ service->dir_group_readable = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+ 10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable should be 0 or 1, not %s",
+ line->value);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable=%d for %s",
+ service->dir_group_readable, service->directory);
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreams")) {
+ service->max_streams_per_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+ 10, 0, 65535, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreams should be between 0 and %d, not %s",
+ 65535, line->value);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreams=%d for %s",
+ service->max_streams_per_circuit, service->directory);
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit")) {
+ service->max_streams_close_circuit = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value,
+ 10, 0, 1, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit should be 0 or 1, not %s",
+ line->value);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,
+ "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit=%d for %s",
+ (int)service->max_streams_close_circuit, service->directory);
+
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient")) {
+ /* Parse auth type and comma-separated list of client names and add a
+ * rend_authorized_client_t for each client to the service's list
+ * of authorized clients. */
+ smartlist_t *type_names_split, *clients;
+ const char *authname;
+ int num_clients;
+ if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Got multiple HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient "
+ "lines for a single service.");
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ type_names_split = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_split_string(type_names_split, line->value, " ", 0, 2);
+ if (smartlist_len(type_names_split) < 1) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient has no value. This "
+ "should have been prevented when parsing the "
+ "configuration.");
+ smartlist_free(type_names_split);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ authname = smartlist_get(type_names_split, 0);
+ if (!strcasecmp(authname, "basic")) {
+ service->auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH;
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(authname, "stealth")) {
+ service->auth_type = REND_STEALTH_AUTH;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
+ "unrecognized auth-type '%s'. Only 'basic' or 'stealth' "
+ "are recognized.",
+ (char *) smartlist_get(type_names_split, 0));
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(type_names_split);
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ service->clients = smartlist_new();
+ if (smartlist_len(type_names_split) < 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
+ "auth-type '%s', but no client names.",
+ service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? "basic" : "stealth");
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(type_names_split);
+ continue;
+ }
+ clients = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_split_string(clients, smartlist_get(type_names_split, 1),
+ ",", SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(type_names_split);
+ /* Remove duplicate client names. */
+ num_clients = smartlist_len(clients);
+ smartlist_sort_strings(clients);
+ smartlist_uniq_strings(clients);
+ if (smartlist_len(clients) < num_clients) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains %d "
"duplicate client name(s); removing.",
num_clients - smartlist_len(clients));
@@ -632,12 +733,35 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
if (old_service_list && !validate_only) {
smartlist_t *surviving_services = smartlist_new();
+ /* Preserve the existing ephemeral services.
+ *
+ * This is the ephemeral service equivalent of the "Copy introduction
+ * points to new services" block, except there's no copy required since
+ * the service structure isn't regenerated.
+ *
+ * After this is done, all ephemeral services will be:
+ * * Removed from old_service_list, so the equivalent non-ephemeral code
+ * will not attempt to preserve them.
+ * * Added to the new rend_service_list (that previously only had the
+ * services listed in the configuration).
+ * * Added to surviving_services, which is the list of services that
+ * will NOT have their intro point closed.
+ */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_service_list, rend_service_t *, old, {
+ if (!old->directory) {
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(old_service_list, old);
+ smartlist_add(surviving_services, old);
+ smartlist_add(rend_service_list, old);
+ }
+ });
+
/* Copy introduction points to new services. */
/* XXXX This is O(n^2), but it's only called on reconfigure, so it's
* probably ok? */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, new) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(old_service_list, rend_service_t *, old) {
- if (!strcmp(old->directory, new->directory)) {
+ if (new->directory && old->directory &&
+ !strcmp(old->directory, new->directory)) {
smartlist_add_all(new->intro_nodes, old->intro_nodes);
smartlist_clear(old->intro_nodes);
smartlist_add(surviving_services, old);
@@ -685,6 +809,125 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
return 0;
}
+/** Add the ephemeral service <b>pk</b>/<b>ports</b> if possible, with
+ * <b>max_streams_per_circuit</b> streams allowed per rendezvous circuit,
+ * and circuit closure on max streams being exceeded set by
+ * <b>max_streams_close_circuit</b>.
+ *
+ * Regardless of sucess/failure, callers should not touch pk/ports after
+ * calling this routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has been done
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ * Return an appropriate rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t.
+ */
+rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t
+rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk,
+ smartlist_t *ports,
+ int max_streams_per_circuit,
+ int max_streams_close_circuit,
+ char **service_id_out)
+{
+ *service_id_out = NULL;
+ /* Allocate the service structure, and initialize the key, and key derived
+ * parameters.
+ */
+ rend_service_t *s = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t));
+ s->directory = NULL; /* This indicates the service is ephemeral. */
+ s->private_key = pk;
+ s->auth_type = REND_NO_AUTH;
+ s->ports = ports;
+ s->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
+ s->n_intro_points_wanted = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
+ s->max_streams_per_circuit = max_streams_per_circuit;
+ s->max_streams_close_circuit = max_streams_close_circuit;
+ if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0) {
+ rend_service_free(s);
+ return RSAE_BADPRIVKEY;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->ports || smartlist_len(s->ports) == 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "At least one VIRTPORT/TARGET must be specified.");
+ rend_service_free(s);
+ return RSAE_BADVIRTPORT;
+ }
+
+ /* Enforcing pk/id uniqueness should be done by rend_service_load_keys(), but
+ * it's not, see #14828.
+ */
+ if (rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(s->pk_digest)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service private key collides with an "
+ "existing service.");
+ rend_service_free(s);
+ return RSAE_ADDREXISTS;
+ }
+ if (rend_service_get_by_service_id(s->service_id)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service id collides with an existing service.");
+ rend_service_free(s);
+ return RSAE_ADDREXISTS;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the service. */
+ if (rend_add_service(s)) {
+ rend_service_free(s);
+ return RSAE_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ *service_id_out = tor_strdup(s->service_id);
+
+ log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Added ephemeral Onion Service: %s", s->service_id);
+ return RSAE_OKAY;
+}
+
+/** Remove the ephemeral service <b>service_id</b> if possible. Returns 0 on
+ * success, and -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id)
+{
+ rend_service_t *s;
+ if (!rend_valid_service_id(service_id)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed Onion Service id for removal.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((s = rend_service_get_by_service_id(service_id)) == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent Onion Service id for "
+ "removal.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (s->directory) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral Onion Service for removal.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Kill the intro point circuit for the Onion Service, and remove it from
+ * the list. Closing existing connections is the application's problem.
+ *
+ * XXX: As with the comment in rend_config_services(), a nice abstraction
+ * would be ideal here, but for now just duplicate the code.
+ */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
+ circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
+ (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) {
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+ tor_assert(oc->rend_data);
+ if (!tor_memeq(s->pk_digest, oc->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
+ continue;
+ log_debug(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.",
+ safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(
+ oc->build_state->chosen_exit)),
+ oc->rend_data->onion_address);
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+ smartlist_remove(rend_service_list, s);
+ rend_service_free(s);
+
+ log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral Onion Service: %s", service_id);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/** Replace the old value of <b>service</b>-\>desc with one that reflects
* the other fields in service.
*/
@@ -769,6 +1012,7 @@ rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(smartlist_t *lst, const rend_service_t *s)
{
tor_assert(lst);
tor_assert(s);
+ tor_assert(s->directory);
smartlist_add_asprintf(lst, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"private_key",
s->directory);
smartlist_add_asprintf(lst, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname",
@@ -787,11 +1031,31 @@ rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(smartlist_t *open_lst,
if (!rend_service_list)
return;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, s) {
- rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(open_lst, s);
- smartlist_add(stat_lst, tor_strdup(s->directory));
+ if (s->directory) {
+ rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(open_lst, s);
+ smartlist_add(stat_lst, tor_strdup(s->directory));
+ }
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
}
+/** Derive all rend_service_t internal material based on the service's key.
+ * Returns 0 on sucess, -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s)
+{
+ if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/** Load and/or generate private keys for the hidden service <b>s</b>,
* possibly including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1
* on failure. */
@@ -830,15 +1094,10 @@ rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s)
if (!s->private_key)
return -1;
- /* Create service file */
- if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
- return -1;
- }
- if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
+ if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0)
return -1;
- }
+
+ /* Create service file */
if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) ||
strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname",sizeof(fname))
>= sizeof(fname)) {
@@ -941,7 +1200,7 @@ rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname)
}
if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
client->descriptor_cookie,
- REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) < 0) {
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
goto err;
}
@@ -968,7 +1227,6 @@ rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname)
client->client_key = prkey;
}
/* Add entry to client_keys file. */
- desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-1] = '\0'; /* Remove newline. */
written = tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"client-name %s\ndescriptor-cookie %s\n",
client->client_name, desc_cook_out);
@@ -1023,12 +1281,11 @@ rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname)
((int)s->auth_type - 1) << 4;
if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
extended_desc_cookie,
- REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1) < 0) {
+ REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+1, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
goto err;
}
- desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-3] = '\0'; /* Remove A= and
- newline. */
+ desc_cook_out[strlen(desc_cook_out)-2] = '\0'; /* Remove A=. */
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
service_id, desc_cook_out, client->client_name);
}
@@ -1052,7 +1309,7 @@ rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname)
abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
done:
if (client_keys_str) {
- tor_strclear(client_keys_str);
+ memwipe(client_keys_str, 0, strlen(client_keys_str));
tor_free(client_keys_str);
}
strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free);
@@ -1080,6 +1337,20 @@ rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(const char* digest)
return NULL;
}
+/** Return the service whose service id is <b>id</b>, or NULL if no such
+ * service exists.
+ */
+static struct rend_service_t *
+rend_service_get_by_service_id(const char *id)
+{
+ tor_assert(strlen(id) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, s, {
+ if (tor_memeq(s->service_id, id, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32))
+ return s;
+ });
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/** Return 1 if any virtual port in <b>service</b> wants a circuit
* to have good uptime. Else return 0.
*/
@@ -1098,11 +1369,13 @@ rend_service_requires_uptime(rend_service_t *service)
return 0;
}
-/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> for
- * <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success and 0 for failure. */
+/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of
+ * length <b>cookie_len</b> for <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success
+ * and 0 for failure. */
static int
rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
- const char *descriptor_cookie)
+ const char *descriptor_cookie,
+ size_t cookie_len)
{
rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL;
tor_assert(service);
@@ -1113,6 +1386,13 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
return 0;
}
+ if (cookie_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie is %lu bytes, but we expected "
+ "%lu bytes. Dropping cell.",
+ (unsigned long)cookie_len, (unsigned long)REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, {
if (tor_memeq(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie,
@@ -1124,7 +1404,7 @@ rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
if (!auth_client) {
char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64];
base64_encode(descriptor_cookie_base64, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64),
- descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
+ descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN, 0);
log_info(LD_REND, "No authorization found for descriptor cookie '%s'! "
"Dropping cell!",
descriptor_cookie_base64);
@@ -1158,16 +1438,17 @@ rend_service_note_removing_intro_point(rend_service_t *service,
/* This intro point was never used. Don't change
* n_intro_points_wanted. */
} else {
+
/* We want to increase the number of introduction points service
* operates if intro was heavily used, or decrease the number of
* intro points if intro was lightly used.
*
* We consider an intro point's target 'usage' to be
- * INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS introductions in
+ * maximum of INTRODUCE2 cells divided by
* INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS seconds. To calculate intro's
- * fraction of target usage, we divide the fraction of
- * _LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS introductions that it has handled by
- * the fraction of _LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS for which it existed.
+ * fraction of target usage, we divide the amount of INTRODUCE2 cells
+ * that it has handled by the fraction of _LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS for
+ * which it existed.
*
* Then we multiply that fraction of desired usage by a fudge
* factor of 1.5, to decide how many new introduction points
@@ -1189,7 +1470,7 @@ rend_service_note_removing_intro_point(rend_service_t *service,
intro_point_accepted_intro_count(intro) /
(double)(now - intro->time_published);
const double intro_point_target_usage =
- INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS /
+ intro->max_introductions /
(double)INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS;
const double fractional_n_intro_points_wanted_to_replace_this_one =
(1.5 * (intro_point_usage / intro_point_target_usage));
@@ -1459,7 +1740,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
if (service->clients) {
if (parsed_req->version == 3 && parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len > 0) {
if (rend_check_authorization(service,
- (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data)) {
+ (const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data,
+ parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len)) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid.");
} else {
log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in "
@@ -1523,13 +1805,11 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
hexcookie, serviceid);
tor_assert(launched->build_state);
/* Fill in the circuit's state. */
- launched->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
- memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN);
- memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_cookie, parsed_req->rc, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
- strlcpy(launched->rend_data->onion_address, service->service_id,
- sizeof(launched->rend_data->onion_address));
+
+ launched->rend_data =
+ rend_data_service_create(service->service_id,
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
+ parsed_req->rc, service->auth_type);
launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_reference_t));
@@ -1940,6 +2220,16 @@ rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2(
goto err;
}
+ if (128 != crypto_pk_keysize(extend_info->onion_key)) {
+ if (err_msg_out) {
+ tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
+ "invalid onion key size in version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
+ intro->version,
+ (intro->type));
+ }
+
+ goto err;
+ }
ver_specific_len = 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
@@ -2491,10 +2781,9 @@ rend_service_launch_establish_intro(rend_service_t *service,
intro->extend_info = extend_info_dup(launched->build_state->chosen_exit);
}
- launched->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
- strlcpy(launched->rend_data->onion_address, service->service_id,
- sizeof(launched->rend_data->onion_address));
- memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, service->pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ launched->rend_data = rend_data_service_create(service->service_id,
+ service->pk_digest, NULL,
+ service->auth_type);
launched->intro_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(intro->intro_key);
if (launched->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
rend_service_intro_has_opened(launched);
@@ -2879,14 +3168,16 @@ find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ)
return NULL;
}
-/** Determine the responsible hidden service directories for the
- * rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t's in <b>descs</b> and upload them;
- * <b>service_id</b> and <b>seconds_valid</b> are only passed for logging
- * purposes. */
-static void
+/** Upload the rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t's in <b>descs</b>
+ * associated with the rend_service_descriptor_t <b>renddesc</b> to
+ * the responsible hidden service directories OR the hidden service
+ * directories specified by <b>hs_dirs</b>; <b>service_id</b> and
+ * <b>seconds_valid</b> are only passed for logging purposes.
+ */
+void
directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc,
- smartlist_t *descs, const char *service_id,
- int seconds_valid)
+ smartlist_t *descs, smartlist_t *hs_dirs,
+ const char *service_id, int seconds_valid)
{
int i, j, failed_upload = 0;
smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
@@ -2894,14 +3185,21 @@ directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc,
routerstatus_t *hs_dir;
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(descs); i++) {
rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t *desc = smartlist_get(descs, i);
- /* Determine responsible dirs. */
- if (hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs,
- desc->desc_id) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not determine the responsible hidden service "
- "directories to post descriptors to.");
- smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
- smartlist_free(successful_uploads);
- return;
+ /** If any HSDirs are specified, they should be used instead of
+ * the responsible directories */
+ if (hs_dirs && smartlist_len(hs_dirs) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add_all(responsible_dirs, hs_dirs);
+ } else {
+ /* Determine responsible dirs. */
+ if (hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs,
+ desc->desc_id) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not determine the responsible hidden service "
+ "directories to post descriptors to.");
+ control_event_hs_descriptor_upload(service_id,
+ "UNKNOWN",
+ "UNKNOWN");
+ goto done;
+ }
}
for (j = 0; j < smartlist_len(responsible_dirs); j++) {
char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
@@ -2941,6 +3239,9 @@ directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc,
hs_dir->nickname,
hs_dir_ip,
hs_dir->or_port);
+ control_event_hs_descriptor_upload(service_id,
+ hs_dir->identity_digest,
+ desc_id_base32);
tor_free(hs_dir_ip);
/* Remember successful upload to this router for next time. */
if (!smartlist_contains_digest(successful_uploads,
@@ -2968,6 +3269,7 @@ directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc,
}
});
}
+ done:
smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
smartlist_free(successful_uploads);
}
@@ -3032,7 +3334,7 @@ upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
rend_get_service_id(service->desc->pk, serviceid);
log_info(LD_REND, "Launching upload for hidden service %s",
serviceid);
- directory_post_to_hs_dir(service->desc, descs, serviceid,
+ directory_post_to_hs_dir(service->desc, descs, NULL, serviceid,
seconds_valid);
/* Free memory for descriptors. */
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(descs); i++)
@@ -3061,7 +3363,7 @@ upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
smartlist_free(client_cookies);
return;
}
- directory_post_to_hs_dir(service->desc, descs, serviceid,
+ directory_post_to_hs_dir(service->desc, descs, NULL, serviceid,
seconds_valid);
/* Free memory for descriptors. */
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(descs); i++)
@@ -3113,7 +3415,7 @@ intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
}
if (intro_point_accepted_intro_count(intro) >=
- INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS) {
+ intro->max_introductions) {
/* This intro point has been used too many times. Expire it now. */
return 1;
}
@@ -3122,9 +3424,8 @@ intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
/* This intro point has been published, but we haven't picked an
* expiration time for it. Pick one now. */
int intro_point_lifetime_seconds =
- INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS +
- crypto_rand_int(INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS -
- INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS);
+ crypto_rand_int_range(INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS,
+ INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS);
/* Start the expiration timer now, rather than when the intro
* point was first published. There shouldn't be much of a time
@@ -3309,7 +3610,8 @@ rend_services_introduce(void)
log_warn(LD_REND,
"Could only establish %d introduction points for %s; "
"wanted %u.",
- smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes), service->service_id,
+ smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes),
+ safe_str_client(service->service_id),
n_intro_points_to_open);
break;
}
@@ -3320,10 +3622,14 @@ rend_services_introduce(void)
intro = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t));
intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
intro->intro_key = crypto_pk_new();
- tor_assert(!crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key));
+ const int fail = crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key);
+ tor_assert(!fail);
intro->time_published = -1;
intro->time_to_expire = -1;
intro->time_expiring = -1;
+ intro->max_introductions =
+ crypto_rand_int_range(INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
+ INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS);
smartlist_add(service->intro_nodes, intro);
log_info(LD_REND, "Picked router %s as an intro point for %s.",
safe_str_client(node_describe(node)),
@@ -3547,6 +3853,25 @@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn,
serviceid, (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
return -2;
}
+ if (service->max_streams_per_circuit > 0) {
+ /* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a
+ * mapping if this circuit will exceed the limit. */
+#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600
+ static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim =
+ RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL);
+ if (circ->rend_data->nr_streams >= service->max_streams_per_circuit) {
+ log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND,
+ "Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on rendezvous "
+ "circuit %u; %s. Circuit has %d out of %d streams.",
+ (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id,
+ service->max_streams_close_circuit ?
+ "closing circuit" :
+ "ignoring open stream request",
+ circ->rend_data->nr_streams,
+ service->max_streams_per_circuit);
+ return service->max_streams_close_circuit ? -2 : -1;
+ }
+ }
matching_ports = smartlist_new();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p,
{