diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/relay.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/relay.c | 362 |
1 files changed, 157 insertions, 205 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index ae231b89b9..b6886e2bb8 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ #include "connection_edge.h" #include "connection_or.h" #include "control.h" +#include "crypto_rand.h" +#include "crypto_util.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "hs_cache.h" #include "main.h" @@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ #include "policies.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "relay.h" +#include "relay_crypto.h" #include "rendcache.h" #include "rendcommon.h" #include "router.h" @@ -82,9 +85,6 @@ static edge_connection_t *relay_lookup_conn(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction, crypt_path_t *layer_hint); -static int connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, - edge_connection_t *conn, - crypt_path_t *layer_hint); static void circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint); static void circuit_resume_edge_reading(circuit_t *circ, @@ -122,77 +122,6 @@ uint64_t stats_n_circ_max_cell_reached = 0; /** Used to tell which stream to read from first on a circuit. */ static tor_weak_rng_t stream_choice_rng = TOR_WEAK_RNG_INIT; -/** Update digest from the payload of cell. Assign integrity part to - * cell. - */ -static void -relay_set_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell) -{ - char integrity[4]; - relay_header_t rh; - - crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*)cell->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); - crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, integrity, 4); -// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Putting digest of %u %u %u %u into relay cell.", -// integrity[0], integrity[1], integrity[2], integrity[3]); - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); - memcpy(rh.integrity, integrity, 4); - relay_header_pack(cell->payload, &rh); -} - -/** Does the digest for this circuit indicate that this cell is for us? - * - * Update digest from the payload of cell (with the integrity part set - * to 0). If the integrity part is valid, return 1, else restore digest - * and cell to their original state and return 0. - */ -static int -relay_digest_matches(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell) -{ - uint32_t received_integrity, calculated_integrity; - relay_header_t rh; - crypto_digest_t *backup_digest=NULL; - - backup_digest = crypto_digest_dup(digest); - - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); - memcpy(&received_integrity, rh.integrity, 4); - memset(rh.integrity, 0, 4); - relay_header_pack(cell->payload, &rh); - -// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Reading digest of %u %u %u %u from relay cell.", -// received_integrity[0], received_integrity[1], -// received_integrity[2], received_integrity[3]); - - crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*) cell->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); - crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char*) &calculated_integrity, 4); - - if (calculated_integrity != received_integrity) { -// log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Recognized=0 but bad digest. Not recognizing."); -// (%d vs %d).", received_integrity, calculated_integrity); - /* restore digest to its old form */ - crypto_digest_assign(digest, backup_digest); - /* restore the relay header */ - memcpy(rh.integrity, &received_integrity, 4); - relay_header_pack(cell->payload, &rh); - crypto_digest_free(backup_digest); - return 0; - } - crypto_digest_free(backup_digest); - return 1; -} - -/** Apply <b>cipher</b> to CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE bytes of <b>in</b> - * (in place). - * - * Note that we use the same operation for encrypting and for decrypting. - */ -static void -relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in) -{ - crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, (char*) in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); -} - /** * Update channel usage state based on the type of relay cell and * circuit properties. @@ -297,7 +226,8 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (circ->marked_for_close) return 0; - if (relay_crypt(circ, cell, cell_direction, &layer_hint, &recognized) < 0) { + if (relay_decrypt_cell(circ, cell, cell_direction, &layer_hint, &recognized) + < 0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "relay crypt failed. Dropping connection."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; @@ -309,7 +239,9 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn = NULL; if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) { - pathbias_check_probe_response(circ, cell); + if (pathbias_check_probe_response(circ, cell) == -1) { + pathbias_count_valid_cells(circ, cell); + } /* We need to drop this cell no matter what to avoid code that expects * a certain purpose (such as the hidserv code). */ @@ -402,87 +334,6 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, return 0; } -/** Do the appropriate en/decryptions for <b>cell</b> arriving on - * <b>circ</b> in direction <b>cell_direction</b>. - * - * If cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN: - * - If we're at the origin (we're the OP), for hops 1..N, - * decrypt cell. If recognized, stop. - * - Else (we're not the OP), encrypt one hop. Cell is not recognized. - * - * If cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT: - * - decrypt one hop. Check if recognized. - * - * If cell is recognized, set *recognized to 1, and set - * *layer_hint to the hop that recognized it. - * - * Return -1 to indicate that we should mark the circuit for close, - * else return 0. - */ -int -relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction, - crypt_path_t **layer_hint, char *recognized) -{ - relay_header_t rh; - - tor_assert(circ); - tor_assert(cell); - tor_assert(recognized); - tor_assert(cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN || - cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT); - - if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) { - if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* We're at the beginning of the circuit. - * We'll want to do layered decrypts. */ - crypt_path_t *thishop, *cpath = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath; - thishop = cpath; - if (thishop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Relay cell before first created cell? Closing."); - return -1; - } - do { /* Remember: cpath is in forward order, that is, first hop first. */ - tor_assert(thishop); - - /* decrypt one layer */ - relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->b_crypto, cell->payload); - - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); - if (rh.recognized == 0) { - /* it's possibly recognized. have to check digest to be sure. */ - if (relay_digest_matches(thishop->b_digest, cell)) { - *recognized = 1; - *layer_hint = thishop; - return 0; - } - } - - thishop = thishop->next; - } while (thishop != cpath && thishop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, - "Incoming cell at client not recognized. Closing."); - return -1; - } else { - /* We're in the middle. Encrypt one layer. */ - relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_crypto, cell->payload); - } - } else /* cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT */ { - /* We're in the middle. Decrypt one layer. */ - - relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_crypto, cell->payload); - - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); - if (rh.recognized == 0) { - /* it's possibly recognized. have to check digest to be sure. */ - if (relay_digest_matches(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_digest, cell)) { - *recognized = 1; - return 0; - } - } - } - return 0; -} - /** Package a relay cell from an edge: * - Encrypt it to the right layer * - Append it to the appropriate cell_queue on <b>circ</b>. @@ -501,7 +352,6 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, } if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { - crypt_path_t *thishop; /* counter for repeated crypts */ chan = circ->n_chan; if (!chan) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"outgoing relay cell sent from %s:%d has n_chan==NULL." @@ -524,20 +374,14 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, return 0; /* just drop it */ } - relay_set_digest(layer_hint->f_digest, cell); + relay_encrypt_cell_outbound(cell, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), layer_hint); - thishop = layer_hint; - /* moving from farthest to nearest hop */ - do { - tor_assert(thishop); - log_debug(LD_OR,"encrypting a layer of the relay cell."); - relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->f_crypto, cell->payload); - - thishop = thishop->prev; - } while (thishop != TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath->prev); + /* Update circ written totals for control port */ + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + ocirc->n_written_circ_bw = tor_add_u32_nowrap(ocirc->n_written_circ_bw, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); } else { /* incoming cell */ - or_circuit_t *or_circ; if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* We should never package an _incoming_ cell from the circuit * origin; that means we messed up somewhere. */ @@ -545,11 +389,9 @@ circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, assert_circuit_ok(circ); return 0; /* just drop it */ } - or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); + or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); + relay_encrypt_cell_inbound(cell, or_circ); chan = or_circ->p_chan; - relay_set_digest(or_circ->p_digest, cell); - /* encrypt one layer */ - relay_crypt_one_payload(or_circ->p_crypto, cell->payload); } ++stats_n_relay_cells_relayed; @@ -770,6 +612,10 @@ relay_send_command_from_edge_,(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ, tor_free(commands); smartlist_free(commands_list); } + + /* Let's assume we're well-behaved: Anything that we decide to send is + * valid, delivered data. */ + circuit_sent_valid_data(origin_circ, rh.length); } if (circuit_package_relay_cell(&cell, circ, cell_direction, cpath_layer, @@ -899,6 +745,9 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( } } + /* This end cell is now valid. */ + circuit_read_valid_data(circ, rh->length); + if (rh->length == 0) { reason = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC; } @@ -1118,7 +967,12 @@ remap_event_helper(entry_connection_t *conn, const tor_addr_t *new_addr) * header has already been parsed into <b>rh</b>. On success, set * <b>addr_out</b> to the address we're connected to, and <b>ttl_out</b> to * the ttl of that address, in seconds, and return 0. On failure, return - * -1. */ + * -1. + * + * Note that the resulting address can be UNSPEC if the connected cell had no + * address (as for a stream to an union service or a tunneled directory + * connection), and that the ttl can be absent (in which case <b>ttl_out</b> + * is set to -1). */ STATIC int connected_cell_parse(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell, tor_addr_t *addr_out, int *ttl_out) @@ -1389,6 +1243,12 @@ connection_edge_process_resolved_cell(edge_connection_t *conn, } } + /* This is valid data at this point. Count it */ + if (conn->on_circuit && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(conn->on_circuit)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(conn->on_circuit), + rh->length); + } + connection_ap_handshake_socks_got_resolved_cell(entry_conn, errcode, resolved_addresses); @@ -1449,7 +1309,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( "after %d seconds.", (unsigned)circ->n_circ_id, rh->stream_id, - (int)(time(NULL) - conn->base_.timestamp_lastread)); + (int)(time(NULL) - conn->base_.timestamp_last_read_allowed)); if (connected_cell_parse(rh, cell, &addr, &ttl) < 0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP, "Got a badly formatted connected cell. Closing."); @@ -1458,6 +1318,9 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( return 0; } if (tor_addr_family(&addr) != AF_UNSPEC) { + /* The family is not UNSPEC: so we were given an address in the + * connected cell. (This is normal, except for BEGINDIR and onion + * service streams.) */ const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr); if (tor_addr_is_null(&addr) || (get_options()->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses && @@ -1524,6 +1387,9 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data = NULL; } + /* This is valid data at this point. Count it */ + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh->length); + /* handle anything that might have queued */ if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, 1, NULL) < 0) { /* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */ @@ -1556,7 +1422,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( * * Return -reason if you want to warn and tear down the circuit, else 0. */ -static int +STATIC int connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) @@ -1656,7 +1522,6 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, circ->dirreq_id = ++next_id; TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id; } - return connection_exit_begin_conn(cell, circ); case RELAY_COMMAND_DATA: ++stats_n_data_cells_received; @@ -1682,6 +1547,17 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, "stream_id. Dropping."); return 0; } else if (!conn) { + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_data(ocirc->half_streams, + rh.stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + log_info(domain, + "data cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " + "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + } + } + log_info(domain,"data cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).", rh.stream_id); return 0; @@ -1692,6 +1568,10 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, "(relay data) conn deliver_window below 0. Killing."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } + /* Total all valid application bytes delivered */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && rh.length > 0) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh.length); + } stats_n_data_bytes_received += rh.length; connection_buf_add((char*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE), @@ -1719,6 +1599,20 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, reason = rh.length > 0 ? get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC; if (!conn) { + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_end(ocirc->half_streams, + rh.stream_id)) { + + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + log_info(domain, + "end cell (%s) on circ %u valid on half-closed " + "stream id %d", + stream_end_reason_to_string(reason), + ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + return 0; + } + } log_info(domain,"end cell (%s) dropped, unknown stream.", stream_end_reason_to_string(reason)); return 0; @@ -1744,6 +1638,11 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, /* only mark it if not already marked. it's possible to * get the 'end' right around when the client hangs up on us. */ connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn)); + + /* Total all valid application bytes delivered */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh.length); + } } return 0; case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND: @@ -1809,6 +1708,10 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, log_info(domain,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin() failed."); return reason; } + /* Total all valid bytes delivered. */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh.length); + } return 0; case RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATE: if (layer_hint) { @@ -1846,7 +1749,14 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, "'truncated' unsupported at non-origin. Dropping."); return 0; } - circuit_truncated(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), layer_hint, + + /* Count the truncated as valid, for completeness. The + * circuit is being torn down anyway, though. */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), + rh.length); + } + circuit_truncated(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), get_uint8(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE)); return 0; case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED: @@ -1855,6 +1765,19 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, "'connected' unsupported while open. Closing circ."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } + + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_connected(ocirc->half_streams, + rh.stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + log_info(domain, + "connected cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " + "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + return 0; + } + } + log_info(domain, "'connected' received on circid %u for streamid %d, " "no conn attached anymore. Ignoring.", @@ -1875,6 +1798,15 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, log_debug(LD_APP,"circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.", layer_hint->package_window); circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint); + + /* We count circuit-level sendme's as valid delivered data because + * they are rate limited. + */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), + rh.length); + } + } else { if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT > CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { @@ -1894,10 +1826,42 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, return 0; } if (!conn) { + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_sendme(ocirc->half_streams, + rh.stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + log_info(domain, + "sendme cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " + "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + } + } + log_info(domain,"sendme cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).", rh.stream_id); return 0; } + + /* Don't allow the other endpoint to request more than our maximim + * (ie initial) stream SENDME window worth of data. Well-behaved + * stock clients will not request more than this max (as per the check + * in the while loop of connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme()). + */ + if (conn->package_window + STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT > + STREAMWINDOW_START_MAX) { + static struct ratelim_t stream_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&stream_warn_ratelim,LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Unexpected stream sendme cell. Closing circ (window %d).", + conn->package_window); + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + + /* At this point, the stream sendme is valid */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), + rh.length); + } + conn->package_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT; log_debug(domain,"stream-level sendme, packagewindow now %d.", conn->package_window); @@ -1936,6 +1900,19 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, "'resolved' unsupported while open. Closing circ."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } + + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_resolved(ocirc->half_streams, + rh.stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + log_info(domain, + "resolved cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " + "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + return 0; + } + } + log_info(domain, "'resolved' received, no conn attached anymore. Ignoring."); return 0; @@ -2399,13 +2376,6 @@ circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) } } -#ifdef ACTIVE_CIRCUITS_PARANOIA -#define assert_cmux_ok_paranoid(chan) \ - assert_circuit_mux_okay(chan) -#else -#define assert_cmux_ok_paranoid(chan) -#endif /* defined(ACTIVE_CIRCUITS_PARANOIA) */ - /** The total number of cells we have allocated. */ static size_t total_cells_allocated = 0; @@ -2617,6 +2587,7 @@ cell_queues_check_size(void) { time_t now = time(NULL); size_t alloc = cell_queues_get_total_allocation(); + alloc += half_streams_get_total_allocation(); alloc += buf_get_total_allocation(); alloc += tor_compress_get_total_allocation(); const size_t rend_cache_total = rend_cache_get_total_allocation(); @@ -2693,16 +2664,12 @@ update_circuit_on_cmux_(circuit_t *circ, cell_direction_t direction, } tor_assert(circuitmux_attached_circuit_direction(cmux, circ) == direction); - assert_cmux_ok_paranoid(chan); - /* Update the number of cells we have for the circuit mux */ if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { circuitmux_set_num_cells(cmux, circ, circ->n_chan_cells.n); } else { circuitmux_set_num_cells(cmux, circ, or_circ->p_chan_cells.n); } - - assert_cmux_ok_paranoid(chan); } /** Remove all circuits from the cmux on <b>chan</b>. @@ -2847,7 +2814,6 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit, (channel_t *chan, int max)) } /* If it returns NULL, no cells left to send */ if (!circ) break; - assert_cmux_ok_paranoid(chan); if (circ->n_chan == chan) { queue = &circ->n_chan_cells; @@ -2951,8 +2917,6 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit, (channel_t *chan, int max)) } /* Okay, we're done sending now */ - assert_cmux_ok_paranoid(chan); - return n_flushed; } @@ -3013,7 +2977,7 @@ relay_consensus_has_changed(const networkstatus_t *ns) /** Add <b>cell</b> to the queue of <b>circ</b> writing to <b>chan</b> * transmitting in <b>direction</b>. * - * The given <b>cell</b> is copied over the circuit queue so the caller must + * The given <b>cell</b> is copied onto the circuit queue so the caller must * cleanup the memory. * * This function is part of the fast path. */ @@ -3168,17 +3132,6 @@ circuit_clear_cell_queue(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan) update_circuit_on_cmux(circ, direction); } -/** Fail with an assert if the circuit mux on chan is corrupt - */ -void -assert_circuit_mux_okay(channel_t *chan) -{ - tor_assert(chan); - tor_assert(chan->cmux); - - circuitmux_assert_okay(chan->cmux); -} - /** Return 1 if we shouldn't restart reading on this circuit, even if * we get a SENDME. Else return 0. */ @@ -3191,4 +3144,3 @@ circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circuit_t *circ) return circ->streams_blocked_on_p_chan; } } - |