diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/or.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/or.h | 40 |
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index c7d259853b..4e19140b4b 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1417,8 +1417,8 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t { unsigned int is_outgoing:1; unsigned int proxy_type:2; /**< One of PROXY_NONE...PROXY_SOCKS5 */ unsigned int wide_circ_ids:1; - uint8_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for - * "none negotiated yet." */ + uint16_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for + * "none negotiated yet." */ or_handshake_state_t *handshake_state; /**< If we are setting this connection * up, state information to do so. */ @@ -2249,6 +2249,9 @@ typedef struct node_t { /** Local info: we treat this node as if it rejects everything */ unsigned int rejects_all:1; + /** Local info: this node is in our list of guards */ + unsigned int using_as_guard:1; + /* Local info: derived. */ /** True if the IPv6 OR port is preferred over the IPv4 OR port. */ @@ -2942,6 +2945,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { */ ENUM_BF(path_state_t) path_state : 3; + /* If this flag is set, we should not consider attaching any more + * connections to this circuit. */ + unsigned int unusable_for_new_conns : 1; + /** * Tristate variable to guard against pathbias miscounting * due to circuit purpose transitions changing the decision @@ -3059,6 +3066,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * ISO_STREAM. */ uint64_t associated_isolated_stream_global_id; /**@}*/ + /** A list of addr_policy_t for this circuit in particular. Used by + * adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure. + */ + smartlist_t *prepend_policy; } origin_circuit_t; struct onion_queue_t; @@ -3868,6 +3879,10 @@ typedef struct { * consensus vote on the 'params' line. */ char *ConsensusParams; + /** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see + * before we only beliee measured bandwidths to assign flags. */ + int MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised; + /** The length of time that we think an initial consensus should be fresh. * Only altered on testing networks. */ int TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval; @@ -3895,6 +3910,12 @@ typedef struct { * of certain configuration options. */ int TestingTorNetwork; + /** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */ + uint64_t TestingMinExitFlagThreshold; + + /** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */ + uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold; + /** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country * count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help * the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */ @@ -4012,6 +4033,8 @@ typedef struct { * should guess a suitable value. */ int SSLKeyLifetime; + /** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */ + int GuardLifetime; } or_options_t; /** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */ @@ -4465,15 +4488,6 @@ typedef struct vote_timing_t { /********************************* geoip.c **************************/ -/** Round all GeoIP results to the next multiple of this value, to avoid - * leaking information. */ -#define DIR_RECORD_USAGE_GRANULARITY 8 -/** Time interval: Flush geoip data to disk this often. */ -#define DIR_ENTRY_RECORD_USAGE_RETAIN_IPS (24*60*60) -/** How long do we have to have observed per-country request history before - * we are willing to talk about it? */ -#define DIR_RECORD_USAGE_MIN_OBSERVATION_TIME (12*60*60) - /** Indicates an action that we might be noting geoip statistics on. * Note that if we're noticing CONNECT, we're a bridge, and if we're noticing * the others, we're not. @@ -4793,6 +4807,10 @@ typedef struct dir_server_t { #define PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH (1<<3) #define PDS_NO_EXISTING_MICRODESC_FETCH (1<<4) +/** This node is to be chosen as a directory guard, so don't choose any + * node that's currently a guard. */ +#define PDS_FOR_GUARD (1<<5) + #define PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS_ (1<<16) /** Possible ways to weight routers when choosing one randomly. See |