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-/* Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
-/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-
-/**
- * \file keypin.c
- *
- * \brief Functions and structures for associating routers' RSA key
- * fingerprints with their ED25519 keys.
- */
-
-#define KEYPIN_PRIVATE
-
-#include "orconfig.h"
-
-#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
-#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
-#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
-#include "lib/encoding/binascii.h"
-#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
-#include "lib/fdio/fdio.h"
-#include "lib/fs/files.h"
-#include "lib/fs/mmap.h"
-#include "lib/log/torlog.h"
-#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
-#include "lib/string/compat_ctype.h"
-#include "lib/string/printf.h"
-#include "lib/wallclock/approx_time.h"
-
-#include "ht.h"
-#include "or/keypin.h"
-
-#include "siphash.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef _WIN32
-#include <io.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-/**
- * @file keypin.c
- * @brief Key-pinning for RSA and Ed25519 identity keys at directory
- * authorities.
- *
- * Many older clients, and many internal interfaces, still refer to relays by
- * their RSA1024 identity keys. We can make this more secure, however:
- * authorities use this module to track which RSA keys have been used along
- * with which Ed25519 keys, and force such associations to be permanent.
- *
- * This module implements a key-pinning mechanism to ensure that it's safe
- * to use RSA keys as identitifers even as we migrate to Ed25519 keys. It
- * remembers, for every Ed25519 key we've seen, what the associated Ed25519
- * key is. This way, if we see a different Ed25519 key with that RSA key,
- * we'll know that there's a mismatch.
- *
- * (As of this writing, these key associations are advisory only, mostly
- * because some relay operators kept mishandling their Ed25519 keys during
- * the initial Ed25519 rollout. We should fix this problem, and then toggle
- * the AuthDirPinKeys option.)
- *
- * We persist these entries to disk using a simple format, where each line
- * has a base64-encoded RSA SHA1 hash, then a base64-endoded Ed25519 key.
- * Empty lines, misformed lines, and lines beginning with # are
- * ignored. Lines beginning with @ are reserved for future extensions.
- *
- * The dirserv.c module is the main user of these functions.
- */
-
-static int keypin_journal_append_entry(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
- const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key);
-static int keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
- const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
- const int do_not_add,
- const int replace);
-static int keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(keypin_ent_t *ent);
-
-static HT_HEAD(rsamap, keypin_ent_st) the_rsa_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
-static HT_HEAD(edmap, keypin_ent_st) the_ed_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
-
-/** Hashtable helper: compare two keypin table entries and return true iff
- * they have the same RSA key IDs. */
-static inline int
-keypin_ents_eq_rsa(const keypin_ent_t *a, const keypin_ent_t *b)
-{
- return tor_memeq(a->rsa_id, b->rsa_id, sizeof(a->rsa_id));
-}
-
-/** Hashtable helper: hash a keypin table entries based on its RSA key ID */
-static inline unsigned
-keypin_ent_hash_rsa(const keypin_ent_t *a)
-{
-return (unsigned) siphash24g(a->rsa_id, sizeof(a->rsa_id));
-}
-
-/** Hashtable helper: compare two keypin table entries and return true iff
- * they have the same ed25519 keys */
-static inline int
-keypin_ents_eq_ed(const keypin_ent_t *a, const keypin_ent_t *b)
-{
- return tor_memeq(a->ed25519_key, b->ed25519_key, sizeof(a->ed25519_key));
-}
-
-/** Hashtable helper: hash a keypin table entries based on its ed25519 key */
-static inline unsigned
-keypin_ent_hash_ed(const keypin_ent_t *a)
-{
-return (unsigned) siphash24g(a->ed25519_key, sizeof(a->ed25519_key));
-}
-
-HT_PROTOTYPE(rsamap, keypin_ent_st, rsamap_node, keypin_ent_hash_rsa,
- keypin_ents_eq_rsa)
-HT_GENERATE2(rsamap, keypin_ent_st, rsamap_node, keypin_ent_hash_rsa,
- keypin_ents_eq_rsa, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_)
-
-HT_PROTOTYPE(edmap, keypin_ent_st, edmap_node, keypin_ent_hash_ed,
- keypin_ents_eq_ed)
-HT_GENERATE2(edmap, keypin_ent_st, edmap_node, keypin_ent_hash_ed,
- keypin_ents_eq_ed, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_)
-
-/**
- * Check whether we already have an entry in the key pinning table for a
- * router with RSA ID digest <b>rsa_id_digest</b> or for ed25519 key
- * <b>ed25519_id_key</b>. If we have an entry that matches both keys,
- * return KEYPIN_FOUND. If we find an entry that matches one key but
- * not the other, return KEYPIN_MISMATCH. If we have no entry for either
- * key, add such an entry to the table and return KEYPIN_ADDED.
- *
- * If <b>replace_existing_entry</b> is true, then any time we would have said
- * KEYPIN_FOUND, we instead add this entry anyway and return KEYPIN_ADDED.
- */
-int
-keypin_check_and_add(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
- const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
- const int replace_existing_entry)
-{
- return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 0,
- replace_existing_entry);
-}
-
-/**
- * As keypin_check_and_add, but do not add. Return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND if
- * we would add.
- */
-int
-keypin_check(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
- const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key)
-{
- return keypin_check_and_add_impl(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key, 1, 0);
-}
-
-/**
- * Helper: implements keypin_check and keypin_check_and_add.
- */
-static int
-keypin_check_and_add_impl(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
- const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key,
- const int do_not_add,
- const int replace)
-{
- keypin_ent_t search, *ent;
- memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search));
- memcpy(search.rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(search.rsa_id));
- memcpy(search.ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key, sizeof(search.ed25519_key));
-
- /* Search by RSA key digest first */
- ent = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, &search);
- if (ent) {
- tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id)));
- if (tor_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,sizeof(ent->ed25519_key))) {
- return KEYPIN_FOUND; /* Match on both keys. Great. */
- } else {
- if (!replace)
- return KEYPIN_MISMATCH; /* Found RSA with different Ed key */
- }
- }
-
- /* See if we know a different RSA key for this ed key */
- if (! replace) {
- ent = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, &search);
- if (ent) {
- /* If we got here, then the ed key matches and the RSA doesn't */
- tor_assert(fast_memeq(ent->ed25519_key, ed25519_id_key,
- sizeof(ent->ed25519_key)));
- tor_assert(fast_memneq(ent->rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(ent->rsa_id)));
- return KEYPIN_MISMATCH;
- }
- }
-
- /* Okay, this one is new to us. */
- if (do_not_add)
- return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
-
- ent = tor_memdup(&search, sizeof(search));
- int r = keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(ent);
- if (! replace) {
- tor_assert(r == 1);
- } else {
- tor_assert(r != 0);
- }
- keypin_journal_append_entry(rsa_id_digest, ed25519_id_key);
- return KEYPIN_ADDED;
-}
-
-/**
- * Helper: add <b>ent</b> to the hash tables.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void,
-keypin_add_entry_to_map, (keypin_ent_t *ent))
-{
- HT_INSERT(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent);
- HT_INSERT(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent);
-}
-
-/**
- * Helper: add 'ent' to the maps, replacing any entries that contradict it.
- * Take ownership of 'ent', freeing it if needed.
- *
- * Return 0 if the entry was a duplicate, -1 if there was a conflict,
- * and 1 if there was no conflict.
- */
-static int
-keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(keypin_ent_t *ent)
-{
- int r = 1;
- keypin_ent_t *ent2 = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent);
- keypin_ent_t *ent3 = HT_FIND(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent);
- if (ent2 &&
- fast_memeq(ent2->ed25519_key, ent->ed25519_key, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
- /* We already have this mapping stored. Ignore it. */
- tor_free(ent);
- return 0;
- } else if (ent2 || ent3) {
- /* We have a conflict. (If we had no entry, we would have ent2 == ent3
- * == NULL. If we had a non-conflicting duplicate, we would have found
- * it above.)
- *
- * We respond by having this entry (ent) supersede all entries that it
- * contradicts (ent2 and/or ent3). In other words, if we receive
- * <rsa,ed>, we remove all <rsa,ed'> and all <rsa',ed>, for rsa'!=rsa
- * and ed'!= ed.
- */
- const keypin_ent_t *t;
- if (ent2) {
- t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent2);
- tor_assert(ent2 == t);
- t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent2);
- tor_assert(ent2 == t);
- }
- if (ent3 && ent2 != ent3) {
- t = HT_REMOVE(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent3);
- tor_assert(ent3 == t);
- t = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, ent3);
- tor_assert(ent3 == t);
- tor_free(ent3);
- }
- tor_free(ent2);
- r = -1;
- /* Fall through */
- }
-
- keypin_add_entry_to_map(ent);
- return r;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether we already have an entry in the key pinning table for a
- * router with RSA ID digest <b>rsa_id_digest</b>. If we have no such entry,
- * return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND. If we find an entry that matches the RSA key but
- * which has an ed25519 key, return KEYPIN_MISMATCH.
- */
-int
-keypin_check_lone_rsa(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest)
-{
- keypin_ent_t search, *ent;
- memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search));
- memcpy(search.rsa_id, rsa_id_digest, sizeof(search.rsa_id));
-
- /* Search by RSA key digest first */
- ent = HT_FIND(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, &search);
- if (ent) {
- return KEYPIN_MISMATCH;
- } else {
- return KEYPIN_NOT_FOUND;
- }
-}
-
-/** Open fd to the keypinning journal file. */
-static int keypin_journal_fd = -1;
-
-/** Open the key-pinning journal to append to <b>fname</b>. Return 0 on
- * success, -1 on failure. */
-int
-keypin_open_journal(const char *fname)
-{
-#ifndef O_SYNC
-#define O_SYNC 0
-#endif
- int fd = tor_open_cloexec(fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_BINARY|O_SYNC, 0600);
- if (fd < 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (tor_fd_seekend(fd) < 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Add a newline in case the last line was only partially written */
- if (write(fd, "\n", 1) < 1)
- goto err;
-
- /* Add something about when we opened this file. */
- char buf[80];
- char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
- format_iso_time(tbuf, approx_time());
- tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "@opened-at %s\n", tbuf);
- if (write_all_to_fd(fd, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0)
- goto err;
-
- keypin_journal_fd = fd;
- return 0;
- err:
- if (fd >= 0)
- close(fd);
- return -1;
-}
-
-/** Close the keypinning journal file. */
-int
-keypin_close_journal(void)
-{
- if (keypin_journal_fd >= 0)
- close(keypin_journal_fd);
- keypin_journal_fd = -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/** Length of a keypinning journal line, including terminating newline. */
-#define JOURNAL_LINE_LEN (BASE64_DIGEST_LEN + BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN + 2)
-
-/** Add an entry to the keypinning journal to map <b>rsa_id_digest</b> and
- * <b>ed25519_id_key</b>. */
-static int
-keypin_journal_append_entry(const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest,
- const uint8_t *ed25519_id_key)
-{
- if (keypin_journal_fd == -1)
- return -1;
- char line[JOURNAL_LINE_LEN];
- digest_to_base64(line, (const char*)rsa_id_digest);
- line[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN] = ' ';
- digest256_to_base64(line + BASE64_DIGEST_LEN + 1,
- (const char*)ed25519_id_key);
- line[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1+BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN] = '\n';
-
- if (write_all_to_fd(keypin_journal_fd, line, JOURNAL_LINE_LEN)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_DIRSERV, "Error while adding a line to the key-pinning "
- "journal: %s", strerror(errno));
- keypin_close_journal();
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/** Load a journal from the <b>size</b>-byte region at <b>data</b>. Return 0
- * on success, -1 on failure. */
-STATIC int
-keypin_load_journal_impl(const char *data, size_t size)
-{
- const char *start = data, *end = data + size, *next;
-
- int n_corrupt_lines = 0;
- int n_entries = 0;
- int n_duplicates = 0;
- int n_conflicts = 0;
-
- for (const char *cp = start; cp < end; cp = next) {
- const char *eol = memchr(cp, '\n', end-cp);
- const char *eos = eol ? eol : end;
- const size_t len = eos - cp;
-
- next = eol ? eol + 1 : end;
-
- if (len == 0) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if (*cp == '@') {
- /* Lines that start with @ are reserved. Ignore for now. */
- continue;
- }
- if (*cp == '#') {
- /* Lines that start with # are comments. */
- continue;
- }
-
- /* Is it the right length? (The -1 here is for the newline.) */
- if (len != JOURNAL_LINE_LEN - 1) {
- /* Lines with a bad length are corrupt unless they are empty.
- * Ignore them either way */
- for (const char *s = cp; s < eos; ++s) {
- if (! TOR_ISSPACE(*s)) {
- ++n_corrupt_lines;
- break;
- }
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- keypin_ent_t *ent = keypin_parse_journal_line(cp);
-
- if (ent == NULL) {
- ++n_corrupt_lines;
- continue;
- }
-
- const int r = keypin_add_or_replace_entry_in_map(ent);
- if (r == 0) {
- ++n_duplicates;
- } else if (r == -1) {
- ++n_conflicts;
- }
-
- ++n_entries;
- }
-
- int severity = (n_corrupt_lines || n_duplicates) ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_INFO;
- tor_log(severity, LD_DIRSERV,
- "Loaded %d entries from keypin journal. "
- "Found %d corrupt lines (ignored), %d duplicates (harmless), "
- "and %d conflicts (resolved in favor or more recent entry).",
- n_entries, n_corrupt_lines, n_duplicates, n_conflicts);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Load a journal from the file called <b>fname</b>. Return 0 on success,
- * -1 on failure.
- */
-int
-keypin_load_journal(const char *fname)
-{
- tor_mmap_t *map = tor_mmap_file(fname);
- if (!map) {
- if (errno == ENOENT)
- return 0;
- else
- return -1;
- }
- int r = keypin_load_journal_impl(map->data, map->size);
- tor_munmap_file(map);
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Parse a single keypinning journal line entry from <b>cp</b>. The input
- * does not need to be NUL-terminated, but it <em>does</em> need to have
- * KEYPIN_JOURNAL_LINE_LEN -1 bytes available to read. Return a new entry
- * on success, and NULL on failure.
- */
-STATIC keypin_ent_t *
-keypin_parse_journal_line(const char *cp)
-{
- /* XXXX assumes !USE_OPENSSL_BASE64 */
- keypin_ent_t *ent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(keypin_ent_t));
-
- if (base64_decode((char*)ent->rsa_id, sizeof(ent->rsa_id),
- cp, BASE64_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN ||
- cp[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN] != ' ' ||
- base64_decode((char*)ent->ed25519_key, sizeof(ent->ed25519_key),
- cp+BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1, BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN) != DIGEST256_LEN) {
- tor_free(ent);
- return NULL;
- } else {
- return ent;
- }
-}
-
-/** Remove all entries from the keypinning table.*/
-void
-keypin_clear(void)
-{
- int bad_entries = 0;
- {
- keypin_ent_t **ent, **next, *this;
- for (ent = HT_START(rsamap, &the_rsa_map); ent != NULL; ent = next) {
- this = *ent;
- next = HT_NEXT_RMV(rsamap, &the_rsa_map, ent);
-
- keypin_ent_t *other_ent = HT_REMOVE(edmap, &the_ed_map, this);
- bad_entries += (other_ent != this);
-
- tor_free(this);
- }
- }
- bad_entries += HT_SIZE(&the_ed_map);
-
- HT_CLEAR(edmap,&the_ed_map);
- HT_CLEAR(rsamap,&the_rsa_map);
-
- if (bad_entries) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found %d discrepencies in the keypin database.",
- bad_entries);
- }
-}