diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/config.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/config.c | 221 |
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 46 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9c5514f1da..b30832d1c4 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuitmux.h" #include "circuitmux_ewma.h" +#include "circuitstats.h" #include "config.h" #include "connection.h" #include "connection_edge.h" @@ -297,6 +298,8 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(HidServAuth, LINELIST, NULL), V(CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), V(CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout, BOOL, "0"), + V(HiddenServiceSingleHopMode, BOOL, "0"), + V(HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode,BOOL, "0"), V(HTTPProxy, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPProxyAuthenticator, STRING, NULL), V(HTTPSProxy, STRING, NULL), @@ -434,7 +437,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { OBSOLETE("TunnelDirConns"), V(UpdateBridgesFromAuthority, BOOL, "0"), V(UseBridges, BOOL, "0"), - V(UseEntryGuards, BOOL, "1"), + VAR("UseEntryGuards", BOOL, UseEntryGuards_option, "1"), V(UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards, BOOL, "1"), V(UseGuardFraction, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), V(UseMicrodescriptors, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), @@ -1558,10 +1561,10 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) if (consider_adding_dir_servers(options, old_options) < 0) return -1; -#ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED - log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "This copy of Tor was compiled to run in a " - "non-anonymous mode. It will provide NO ANONYMITY."); -#endif + if (rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "This copy of Tor was compiled or configured to run " + "in a non-anonymous mode. It will provide NO ANONYMITY."); + } #ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ @@ -1723,8 +1726,27 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) monitor_owning_controller_process(options->OwningControllerProcess); + /* We must create new keys after we poison the directories, because our + * poisoning code checks for existing keys, and refuses to modify their + * directories. */ + + /* If we use non-anonymous single onion services, make sure we poison any + new hidden service directories, so that we never accidentally launch the + non-anonymous hidden services thinking they are anonymous. */ + if (running_tor && rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)) { + if (options->RendConfigLines && !num_rend_services()) { + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error: hidden services configured, but not parsed."); + return -1; + } + if (rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dirs(NULL) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Failed to mark new hidden services as non-anonymous" + "."); + return -1; + } + } + /* reload keys as needed for rendezvous services. */ - if (rend_service_load_all_keys()<0) { + if (rend_service_load_all_keys(NULL)<0) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading rendezvous service keys"); return -1; } @@ -2796,6 +2818,86 @@ warn_about_relative_paths(or_options_t *options) } } +/* Validate options related to single onion services. + * Modifies some options that are incompatible with single onion services. + * On failure returns -1, and sets *msg to an error string. + * Returns 0 on success. */ +STATIC int +options_validate_single_onion(or_options_t *options, char **msg) +{ + /* The two single onion service options must have matching values. */ + if (options->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode && + !options->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode) { + REJECT("HiddenServiceSingleHopMode does not provide any server anonymity. " + "It must be used with HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode set to 1."); + } + if (options->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode && + !options->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode) { + REJECT("HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode does not provide any server " + "anonymity. It must be used with HiddenServiceSingleHopMode set to " + "1."); + } + + /* Now that we've checked that the two options are consistent, we can safely + * call the rend_service_* functions that abstract these options. */ + + /* If you run an anonymous client with an active Single Onion service, the + * client loses anonymity. */ + const int client_port_set = (options->SocksPort_set || + options->TransPort_set || + options->NATDPort_set || + options->DNSPort_set); + if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && client_port_set && + !options->Tor2webMode) { + REJECT("HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode is incompatible with using Tor as " + "an anonymous client. Please set Socks/Trans/NATD/DNSPort to 0, or " + "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to 0, or use the non-anonymous " + "Tor2webMode."); + } + + /* If you run a hidden service in non-anonymous mode, the hidden service + * loses anonymity, even if SOCKSPort / Tor2web mode isn't used. */ + if (!rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && + options->RendConfigLines && options->Tor2webMode) { + REJECT("Non-anonymous (Tor2web) mode is incompatible with using Tor as a " + "hidden service. Please remove all HiddenServiceDir lines, or use " + "a version of tor compiled without --enable-tor2web-mode, or use " + " HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode."); + } + + if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) + && options->UseEntryGuards) { + /* Single Onion services only use entry guards when uploading descriptors, + * all other connections are one-hop. Further, Single Onions causes the + * hidden service code to do things which break the path bias + * detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and + * thus the path bias detector with it) than to figure out how to + * make path bias compatible with single onions. + */ + log_notice(LD_CONFIG, + "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is enabled; disabling " + "UseEntryGuards."); + options->UseEntryGuards = 0; + } + + /* Check if existing hidden service keys were created in a different + * single onion service mode, and refuse to launch if they + * have. We'll poison new keys in options_act() just before we create them. + */ + if (rend_service_list_verify_single_onion_poison(NULL, options) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We are configured with " + "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode %d, but one or more hidden " + "service keys were created in %s mode. This is not allowed.", + rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) ? 1 : 0, + rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) ? + "an anonymous" : "a non-anonymous" + ); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + /** Return 0 if every setting in <b>options</b> is reasonable, is a * permissible transition from <b>old_options</b>, and none of the * testing-only settings differ from <b>default_options</b> unless in @@ -2822,6 +2924,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, tor_assert(msg); *msg = NULL; + /* Set UseEntryGuards from the configured value, before we check it below. + * We change UseEntryGuards whenn it's incompatible with other options, + * but leave UseEntryGuards_option with the original value. + * Always use the value of UseEntryGuards, not UseEntryGuards_option. */ + options->UseEntryGuards = options->UseEntryGuards_option; + warn_about_relative_paths(options); if (server_mode(options) && @@ -3197,10 +3305,6 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, if (options->UseBridges && options->EntryNodes) REJECT("You cannot set both UseBridges and EntryNodes."); - if (options->EntryNodes && !options->UseEntryGuards) { - REJECT("If EntryNodes is set, UseEntryGuards must be enabled."); - } - options->MaxMemInQueues = compute_real_max_mem_in_queues(options->MaxMemInQueues_raw, server_mode(options)); @@ -3291,25 +3395,11 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, options->PredictedPortsRelevanceTime = MAX_PREDICTED_CIRCS_RELEVANCE; } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - if (options->Tor2webMode && options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout) { - /* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Tor2webMode are incompatible in - * two ways: - * - * - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout results in a low CBT, which - * Tor2webMode's use of one-hop rendezvous circuits lowers - * much further, producing *far* too many timeouts. - * - * - The adaptive CBT code does not update its timeout estimate - * using build times for single-hop circuits. - * - * If we fix both of these issues someday, we should test - * Tor2webMode with LearnCircuitBuildTimeout on again. */ - log_notice(LD_CONFIG,"Tor2webMode is enabled; turning " - "LearnCircuitBuildTimeout off."); - options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout = 0; - } + /* Check the Single Onion Service options */ + if (options_validate_single_onion(options, msg) < 0) + return -1; +#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE if (options->Tor2webMode && options->UseEntryGuards) { /* tor2web mode clients do not (and should not) use entry guards * in any meaningful way. Further, tor2web mode causes the hidden @@ -3329,8 +3419,13 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, REJECT("Tor2webRendezvousPoints cannot be set without Tor2webMode."); } + if (options->EntryNodes && !options->UseEntryGuards) { + REJECT("If EntryNodes is set, UseEntryGuards must be enabled."); + } + if (!(options->UseEntryGuards) && - (options->RendConfigLines != NULL)) { + (options->RendConfigLines != NULL) && + !rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options)) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "UseEntryGuards is disabled, but you have configured one or more " "hidden services on this Tor instance. Your hidden services " @@ -3353,6 +3448,17 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, return -1; } + /* Single Onion Services: non-anonymous hidden services */ + if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, + "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode is set. Every hidden service on " + "this tor instance is NON-ANONYMOUS. If " + "the HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode option is changed, Tor will " + "refuse to launch hidden services from the same directories, to " + "protect your anonymity against config errors. This setting is " + "for experimental use only."); + } + if (!options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout && options->CircuitBuildTimeout && options->CircuitBuildTimeout < RECOMMENDED_MIN_CIRCUIT_BUILD_TIMEOUT) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, @@ -3364,8 +3470,15 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, RECOMMENDED_MIN_CIRCUIT_BUILD_TIMEOUT ); } else if (!options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout && !options->CircuitBuildTimeout) { - log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "You disabled LearnCircuitBuildTimeout, but didn't " - "a CircuitBuildTimeout. I'll pick a plausible default."); + int severity = LOG_NOTICE; + /* Be a little quieter if we've deliberately disabled + * LearnCircuitBuildTimeout. */ + if (circuit_build_times_disabled()) { + severity = LOG_INFO; + } + log_fn(severity, LD_CONFIG, "You disabled LearnCircuitBuildTimeout, but " + "didn't specify a CircuitBuildTimeout. I'll pick a plausible " + "default."); } if (options->PathBiasNoticeRate > 1.0) { @@ -4295,6 +4408,19 @@ options_transition_allowed(const or_options_t *old, return -1; } + if (old->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode != new_val->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode) { + *msg = tor_strdup("While Tor is running, changing " + "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is not allowed."); + return -1; + } + + if (old->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode != + new_val->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode) { + *msg = tor_strdup("While Tor is running, changing " + "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode is not allowed."); + return -1; + } + if (old->DisableDebuggerAttachment && !new_val->DisableDebuggerAttachment) { *msg = tor_strdup("While Tor is running, disabling " @@ -6777,14 +6903,17 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, } /** Return the number of ports which are actually going to listen with type - * <b>listenertype</b>. Do not count no_listen ports. Do not count unix - * sockets. */ + * <b>listenertype</b>. Do not count no_listen ports. Only count unix + * sockets if count_sockets is true. */ static int -count_real_listeners(const smartlist_t *ports, int listenertype) +count_real_listeners(const smartlist_t *ports, int listenertype, + int count_sockets) { int n = 0; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, port_cfg_t *, port) { - if (port->server_cfg.no_listen || port->is_unix_addr) + if (port->server_cfg.no_listen) + continue; + if (!count_sockets && port->is_unix_addr) continue; if (port->type != listenertype) continue; @@ -6793,9 +6922,8 @@ count_real_listeners(const smartlist_t *ports, int listenertype) return n; } -/** Parse all client port types (Socks, DNS, Trans, NATD) from - * <b>options</b>. On success, set *<b>n_ports_out</b> to the number - * of ports that are listed, update the *Port_set values in +/** Parse all ports from <b>options</b>. On success, set *<b>n_ports_out</b> + * to the number of ports that are listed, update the *Port_set values in * <b>options</b>, and return 0. On failure, set *<b>msg</b> to a * description of the problem and return -1. * @@ -6921,21 +7049,22 @@ parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only, /* Update the *Port_set options. The !! here is to force a boolean out of an integer. */ options->ORPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER, 0); options->SocksPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER, 1); options->TransPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER, 1); options->NATDPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER, 1); + /* Use options->ControlSocket to test if a control socket is set */ options->ControlPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER, 0); options->DirPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER, 0); options->DNSPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER, 1); options->ExtORPort_set = - !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER); + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER, 0); if (world_writable_control_socket) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(ports, port_cfg_t *, p, |