diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/circuitbuild.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index ddb186bea4..9620a23655 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2014, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2015, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* Update began timestamp for circuits starting their first hop */ if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) { - if (circ->n_chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN) { + if (!CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(circ->n_chan)) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Got first hop for a circuit without an opened channel. " "State: %s.", channel_state_to_string(circ->n_chan->state)); @@ -1378,8 +1378,10 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.", circ->is_first_hop ? "created_fast" : "created"); - if (!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) && - !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) { + /* Ignore the local bit when testing - many test networks run on local + * addresses */ + if ((!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) || get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) + && !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) { /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells * can reach us too. */ @@ -1863,7 +1865,7 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit) choose_good_exit_server(circ->base_.purpose, state->need_uptime, state->need_capacity, state->is_internal); if (!node) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to choose an exit server"); + log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to choose an exit server"); return -1; } exit = extend_info_from_node(node, 0); @@ -1990,7 +1992,8 @@ choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ <= purpose && purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_); - log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice."); + log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop %d: random choice.", + cur_len); excluded = smartlist_new(); if ((r = build_state_get_exit_node(state))) { nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, r); @@ -2052,9 +2055,18 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state) smartlist_add(excluded, (void*)node); }); } - /* and exclude current entry guards and their families, if applicable */ + /* and exclude current entry guards and their families, + * unless we're in a test network, and excluding guards + * would exclude all nodes (i.e. we're in an incredibly small tor network, + * or we're using TestingAuthVoteGuard *). + * This is an incomplete fix, but is no worse than the previous behaviour, + * and only applies to minimal, testing tor networks + * (so it's no less secure) */ /*XXXX025 use the using_as_guard flag to accomplish this.*/ - if (options->UseEntryGuards) { + if (options->UseEntryGuards + && (!options->TestingTorNetwork || + smartlist_len(nodelist_get_list()) > smartlist_len(get_entry_guards()) + )) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(get_entry_guards(), const entry_guard_t *, entry, { if ((node = node_get_by_id(entry->identity))) { |