diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/circuitbuild.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 121 |
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index c309a8dac5..70d1a10f46 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *routers); static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); -static int circuits_can_use_ntor(void); /** This function tries to get a channel to the specified endpoint, * and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right @@ -780,10 +779,13 @@ should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) tor_assert(circ->cpath); tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); - if (!circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key) - return 1; /* our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */ + if (!circuit_has_usable_onion_key(circ)) { + /* We don't have ntor, and we don't have or can't use TAP, + * so our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */ + return 1; + } if (public_server_mode(options)) { - /* We're a server, and we know an onion key. We can choose. + /* We're a server, and we have a usable onion key. We can choose. * Prefer to blend our circuit into the other circuits we are * creating on behalf of others. */ return 0; @@ -808,28 +810,20 @@ circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ) && circ->build_state->desired_path_len == DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN; } -/** Return true if the ntor handshake is enabled in the configuration, or if - * it's been set to "auto" in the configuration and it's enabled in the - * consensus. */ -static int -circuits_can_use_ntor(void) -{ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - if (options->UseNTorHandshake != -1) - return options->UseNTorHandshake; - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "UseNTorHandshake", 0, 0, 1); -} - /** Decide whether to use a TAP or ntor handshake for connecting to <b>ei</b> * directly, and set *<b>cell_type_out</b> and *<b>handshake_type_out</b> - * accordingly. */ + * accordingly. + * Note that TAP handshakes are only used for direct connections: + * - from Tor2web to intro points not in the client's consensus, and + * - from Single Onions to rend points not in the service's consensus. + * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */ static void circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, uint16_t *handshake_type_out, const extend_info_t *ei) { - /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ - if (extend_info_supports_ntor(ei) && circuits_can_use_ntor()) { + /* XXXX030 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ + if (extend_info_supports_ntor(ei)) { *cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; *handshake_type_out = ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR; return; @@ -841,9 +835,13 @@ circuit_pick_create_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, /** Decide whether to use a TAP or ntor handshake for connecting to <b>ei</b> * directly, and set *<b>handshake_type_out</b> accordingly. Decide whether, - * in extending through <b>node_prev</b> to do so, we should use an EXTEND2 or - * an EXTEND cell to do so, and set *<b>cell_type_out</b> and - * *<b>create_cell_type_out</b> accordingly. */ + * in extending through <b>node</b> to do so, we should use an EXTEND2 or an + * EXTEND cell to do so, and set *<b>cell_type_out</b> and + * *<b>create_cell_type_out</b> accordingly. + * Note that TAP handshakes are only used for extend handshakes: + * - from clients to intro points, and + * - from hidden services to rend points. + * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */ static void circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, uint8_t *create_cell_type_out, @@ -854,18 +852,27 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, uint8_t t; circuit_pick_create_handshake(&t, handshake_type_out, ei); - /* XXXX029 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ + /* XXXX030 Remove support for deciding to use TAP. */ + + /* It is an error to extend if there is no previous node. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(node_prev); + /* It is an error for a node with a known version to be so old it does not + * support ntor. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1)); + + /* Assume relays without tor versions or routerstatuses support ntor. + * The authorities enforce ntor support, and assuming and failing is better + * than allowing a malicious node to perform a protocol downgrade to TAP. */ if (node_prev && *handshake_type_out != ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP && (node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node_prev) || - (node_prev->rs && - routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 0)))) { - *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; - *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; - } else { - *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; - *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE; - } + (routerstatus_version_supports_ntor(node_prev->rs, 1)))) { + *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; + *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE2; + } else { + *cell_type_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND; + *create_cell_type_out = CELL_CREATE; + } } /** This is the backbone function for building circuits. @@ -2468,6 +2475,15 @@ extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr) return 0; } +/* Does ei have a valid TAP key? */ +int +extend_info_supports_tap(const extend_info_t* ei) +{ + tor_assert(ei); + /* Valid TAP keys are not NULL */ + return ei->onion_key != NULL; +} + /* Does ei have a valid ntor key? */ int extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei) @@ -2478,3 +2494,46 @@ extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei) (const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); } + +/* Is circuit purpose allowed to use the deprecated TAP encryption protocol? + * The hidden service protocol still uses TAP for some connections, because + * ntor onion keys aren't included in HS descriptors or INTRODUCE cells. */ +static int +circuit_purpose_can_use_tap_impl(uint8_t purpose) +{ + return (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND || + purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING); +} + +/* Is circ allowed to use the deprecated TAP encryption protocol? + * The hidden service protocol still uses TAP for some connections, because + * ntor onion keys aren't included in HS descriptors or INTRODUCE cells. */ +int +circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(circ->cpath); + tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); + return (circuit_purpose_can_use_tap_impl(circ->base_.purpose) && + extend_info_supports_tap(circ->cpath->extend_info)); +} + +/* Does circ have an onion key which it's allowed to use? */ +int +circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(circ->cpath); + tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); + return (extend_info_supports_ntor(circ->cpath->extend_info) || + circuit_can_use_tap(circ)); +} + +/* Does ei have an onion key which it would prefer to use? + * Currently, we prefer ntor keys*/ +int +extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei) +{ + tor_assert(ei); + return extend_info_supports_ntor(ei); +} |