diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/circuitbuild.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 48 |
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 753eaf8c16..45da6b02a5 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@ pathbias_get_min_use(const or_options_t *options) static double pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(const or_options_t *options) { -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT 90 +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT 80 if (options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate >= 0.0) return options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate; else @@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@ pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(const or_options_t *options) double pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(const or_options_t *options) { -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT 70 +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT 60 if (options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate >= 0.0) return options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate; else @@ -1308,7 +1308,8 @@ pathbias_is_new_circ_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* cpath is a circular list. We want circs with more than one hop, * and the second hop must be waiting for keys still (it's just * about to get them). */ - return circ->cpath->next != circ->cpath && + return circ->cpath && + circ->cpath->next != circ->cpath && circ->cpath->next->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; #else /* If tagging attacks are no longer possible, we probably want to @@ -1316,7 +1317,8 @@ pathbias_is_new_circ_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) * timing-based tagging is still more useful than per-hop failure. * In which case, we'd never want to use this. */ - return circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; + return circ->cpath && + circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; #endif } @@ -2165,11 +2167,11 @@ pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t *guard, path_state_t from, path_state_t to) { - circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist; + circuit_t *circ; int open_circuits = 0; - /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */ - for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) { + /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */ + for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ @@ -2184,8 +2186,8 @@ pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t *guard, ocirc->path_state <= to && pathbias_should_count(ocirc) && fast_memeq(guard->identity, - ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { + ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, + DIGEST_LEN)) { log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found opened circuit %d in path_state %s", ocirc->global_identifier, pathbias_state_to_string(ocirc->path_state)); @@ -2253,7 +2255,7 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Your Guard %s=%s is failing to carry an extremely large " "amount of stream on its circuits. " - "To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, Tor has " + "To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has " "disabled use of this guard. " "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. " "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " @@ -2274,8 +2276,8 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) entry_guards_changed(); return; } - } else if (!guard->path_bias_extreme) { - guard->path_bias_extreme = 1; + } else if (!guard->path_bias_use_extreme) { + guard->path_bias_use_extreme = 1; log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Your Guard %s=%s is failing to carry an extremely large " "amount of streams on its circuits. " @@ -2298,8 +2300,8 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) } } else if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)/guard->use_attempts < pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(options)) { - if (!guard->path_bias_noticed) { - guard->path_bias_noticed = 1; + if (!guard->path_bias_use_noticed) { + guard->path_bias_use_noticed = 1; log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Your Guard %s=%s is failing to carry more streams on its " "circuits than usual. " @@ -2337,7 +2339,10 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) * pathbias_measure_use_rate(). It may be possible to combine them * eventually, especially if we can ever remove the need for 3 * levels of closure warns (if the overall circuit failure rate - * goes down with ntor). + * goes down with ntor). One way to do so would be to multiply + * the build rate with the use rate to get an idea of the total + * fraction of the total network paths the user is able to use. + * See ticket #8159. */ static void pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) @@ -2356,7 +2361,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large " "amount of circuits. " - "To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, Tor has " + "To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has " "disabled use of this guard. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " @@ -2458,7 +2463,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) * * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done * better by keeping separate pending counters that get - * transfered at circuit close. + * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. */ static void pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) @@ -2504,7 +2509,7 @@ pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) * * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done * better by keeping separate pending counters that get - * transfered at circuit close. + * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. */ void pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) @@ -2532,9 +2537,10 @@ pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) } /** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to - * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should - * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the - * guard looks fine. */ + * <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that + * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; + * return 0 if the guard looks fine. + */ static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { |