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Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/channeltls.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/channeltls.c394
1 files changed, 294 insertions, 100 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c
index 09cca95b64..dbed95fb43 100644
--- a/src/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/or/channeltls.c
@@ -49,12 +49,14 @@
#include "connection.h"
#include "connection_or.h"
#include "control.h"
+#include "entrynodes.h"
#include "link_handshake.h"
#include "relay.h"
#include "rephist.h"
#include "router.h"
#include "routerlist.h"
#include "scheduler.h"
+#include "torcert.h"
/** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0;
@@ -170,7 +172,8 @@ channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan)
channel_t *
channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
- const char *id_digest)
+ const char *id_digest,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
{
channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan));
channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_);
@@ -198,7 +201,7 @@ channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
channel_mark_outgoing(chan);
/* Set up or_connection stuff */
- tlschan->conn = connection_or_connect(addr, port, id_digest, tlschan);
+ tlschan->conn = connection_or_connect(addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, tlschan);
/* connection_or_connect() will fill in tlschan->conn */
if (!(tlschan->conn)) {
chan->reason_for_closing = CHANNEL_CLOSE_FOR_ERROR;
@@ -598,7 +601,7 @@ channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags)
break;
default:
/* Something's broken in channel.c */
- tor_assert(1);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
}
} else {
strlcpy(buf, "(No connection)", sizeof(buf));
@@ -667,7 +670,7 @@ channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req)
break;
default:
/* This shouldn't happen; channel.c is broken if it does */
- tor_assert(1);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
}
}
/* else return 0 for tlschan->conn == NULL */
@@ -1092,6 +1095,10 @@ channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 1);
+ /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is
+ * a fast operation. */
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info());
+
switch (cell->command) {
case CELL_PADDING:
++stats_n_padding_cells_processed;
@@ -1270,6 +1277,10 @@ channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn)
return;
}
+ /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is
+ * a fast operation. */
+ entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info());
+
/* Now handle the cell */
switch (var_cell->command) {
@@ -1639,15 +1650,20 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) {
tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero(
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
- authenticated_peer_id)));
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id)));
+ tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32));
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL,
chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
&(chan->conn->base_.addr),
chan->conn->base_.port,
+ /* zero, checked above */
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
- authenticated_peer_id),
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
+ NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */
0);
}
}
@@ -1744,6 +1760,41 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(chan->conn),time(NULL));
}
+/** Types of certificates that we know how to parse from CERTS cells. Each
+ * type corresponds to a different encoding format. */
+typedef enum cert_encoding_t {
+ CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN, /**< We don't recognize this. */
+ CERT_ENCODING_X509, /**< It's an RSA key, signed with RSA, encoded in x509.
+ * (Actually, it might not be RSA. We test that later.) */
+ CERT_ENCODING_ED25519, /**< It's something signed with an Ed25519 key,
+ * encoded asa a tor_cert_t.*/
+ CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT, /**< It's an Ed key signed with an RSA key. */
+} cert_encoding_t;
+
+/**
+ * Given one of the certificate type codes used in a CERTS cell,
+ * return the corresponding cert_encoding_t that we should use to parse
+ * the certificate.
+ */
+static cert_encoding_t
+certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(int typenum)
+{
+ switch (typenum) {
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK:
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID:
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_X509;
+ case CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN:
+ case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK:
+ case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_ED25519;
+ case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT;
+ default:
+ return CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+}
+
/**
* Process a CERTS cell from a channel.
*
@@ -1763,14 +1814,21 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
STATIC void
channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
{
-#define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024
- tor_x509_cert_t *certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1];
+#define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID
+ /* These arrays will be sparse, since a cert type can be at most one
+ * of ed/x509 */
+ tor_x509_cert_t *x509_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1];
+ tor_cert_t *ed_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1];
+ uint8_t *rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL;
+ size_t rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = 0;
+
int n_certs, i;
certs_cell_t *cc = NULL;
int send_netinfo = 0;
- memset(certs, 0, sizeof(certs));
+ memset(x509_certs, 0, sizeof(x509_certs));
+ memset(ed_certs, 0, sizeof(ed_certs));
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(chan);
tor_assert(chan->conn);
@@ -1814,77 +1872,149 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED)
continue;
+ const cert_encoding_t ct = certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(cert_type);
+ switch (ct) {
+ default:
+ case CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN:
+ break;
+ case CERT_ENCODING_X509: {
+ tor_x509_cert_t *x509_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len);
+ if (!x509_cert) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ } else {
+ if (x509_certs[cert_type]) {
+ tor_x509_cert_free(x509_cert);
+ ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate");
+ } else {
+ x509_certs[cert_type] = x509_cert;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case CERT_ENCODING_ED25519: {
+ tor_cert_t *ed_cert = tor_cert_parse(cert_body, cert_len);
+ if (!ed_cert) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received undecodable Ed certificate "
+ "in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ } else {
+ if (ed_certs[cert_type]) {
+ tor_cert_free(ed_cert);
+ ERR("Duplicate Ed25519 certificate");
+ } else {
+ ed_certs[cert_type] = ed_cert;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
- tor_x509_cert_t *cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len);
- if (!cert) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
- safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
- chan->conn->base_.port);
- } else {
- if (certs[cert_type]) {
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate");
- } else {
- certs[cert_type] = cert;
+ case CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT: {
+ if (rsa_ed_cc_cert) {
+ ERR("Duplicate RSA->Ed25519 crosscert");
+ } else {
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert = tor_memdup(cert_body, cert_len);
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = cert_len;
+ }
+ break;
}
}
}
- tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024];
- tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024];
- tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK];
+ /* Move the certificates we (might) want into the handshake_state->certs
+ * structure. */
+ tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID];
+ tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH];
+ tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK];
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert = auth_cert;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->link_cert = link_cert;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = id_cert;
+ x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID] =
+ x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH] =
+ x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK] = NULL;
+
+ tor_cert_t *ed_id_sign = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN];
+ tor_cert_t *ed_sign_link = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK];
+ tor_cert_t *ed_sign_auth = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH];
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign = ed_id_sign;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_link = ed_sign_link;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth = ed_sign_auth;
+ ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN] =
+ ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK] =
+ ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH] = NULL;
+
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert = rsa_ed_cc_cert;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert_len =
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert_len;
+ rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL;
+
+ int severity;
+ /* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were
+ * _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect
+ * to one. */
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here &&
+ router_digest_is_trusted_dir(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->identity_digest))
+ severity = LOG_WARN;
+ else
+ severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
+
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *checked_ed_id = NULL;
+ const common_digests_t *checked_rsa_id = NULL;
+ or_handshake_certs_check_both(severity,
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs,
+ chan->conn->tls,
+ time(NULL),
+ &checked_ed_id,
+ &checked_rsa_id);
+
+ if (!checked_rsa_id)
+ ERR("Invalid certificate chain!");
if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
- int severity;
- if (! (id_cert && link_cert))
- ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
- /* Okay. We should be able to check the certificates now. */
- if (! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(chan->conn->tls, link_cert)) {
- ERR("The link certificate didn't match the TLS public key");
- }
- /* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were
- * _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect
- * to one. */
- if (router_digest_is_trusted_dir(
- TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->identity_digest))
- severity = LOG_WARN;
- else
- severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
-
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, link_cert, id_cert, 0))
- ERR("The link certificate was not valid");
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(severity, id_cert, id_cert, 1))
- ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
+ /* No more information is needed. */
chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1;
{
- const common_digests_t *id_digests =
- tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+ const common_digests_t *id_digests = checked_rsa_id;
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd;
if (!id_digests)
ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert");
identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert);
- if (!identity_rcvd)
- ERR("Internal error: Couldn't get RSA key from ID cert.");
- memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
+ if (!identity_rcvd) {
+ ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from ID cert.");
+ }
+ memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id,
id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd,
chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
}
+ if (checked_ed_id) {
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1;
+ memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id,
+ checked_ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "calling client_learned_peer_id from "
+ "process_certs_cell");
+
if (connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(chan->conn,
- chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id) < 0)
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id,
+ checked_ed_id) < 0)
ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id");
- log_info(LD_OR,
- "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: Authenticated it.",
- safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port);
-
- chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
- certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024] = NULL;
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: Authenticated it with "
+ "RSA%s",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port,
+ checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : "");
if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) {
/* If we initiated the connection and we are not a public server, we
@@ -1893,25 +2023,14 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
send_netinfo = 1;
}
} else {
- if (! (id_cert && auth_cert))
- ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
-
- /* Remember these certificates so we can check an AUTHENTICATE cell */
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, auth_cert, id_cert, 1))
- ERR("The authentication certificate was not valid");
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, id_cert, id_cert, 1))
- ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
-
+ /* We can't call it authenticated till we see an AUTHENTICATE cell. */
log_info(LD_OR,
- "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: "
+ "Got some good RSA%s certificates from %s:%d. "
"Waiting for AUTHENTICATE.",
+ checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : "",
safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
chan->conn->base_.port);
/* XXXX check more stuff? */
-
- chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
- chan->conn->handshake_state->auth_cert = auth_cert;
- certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024] = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024] = NULL;
}
chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1;
@@ -1925,9 +2044,13 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
}
err:
- for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(certs); ++u) {
- tor_x509_cert_free(certs[u]);
+ for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(x509_certs); ++u) {
+ tor_x509_cert_free(x509_certs[u]);
+ }
+ for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(ed_certs); ++u) {
+ tor_cert_free(ed_certs[u]);
}
+ tor_free(rsa_ed_cc_cert);
certs_cell_free(cc);
#undef ERR
}
@@ -1984,8 +2107,12 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
/* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */
for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i) {
uint16_t authtype = auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(ac, i);
- if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
- use_type = authtype;
+ if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) {
+ if (use_type == -1 ||
+ authchallenge_type_is_better(authtype, use_type)) {
+ use_type = authtype;
+ }
+ }
}
chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1;
@@ -2000,9 +2127,10 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (use_type >= 0) {
log_info(LD_OR,
"Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending "
- "authentication",
+ "authentication type %d",
safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
- chan->conn->base_.port);
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ use_type);
if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(chan->conn, use_type) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,
@@ -2043,9 +2171,11 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
STATIC void
channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
{
- uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN+256];
+ var_cell_t *expected_cell = NULL;
const uint8_t *auth;
int authlen;
+ int authtype;
+ int bodylen;
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(chan);
@@ -2058,6 +2188,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \
chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \
connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \
+ var_cell_free(expected_cell); \
return; \
} while (0)
@@ -2075,9 +2206,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
}
if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell))
ERR("We never got a certs cell");
- if (chan->conn->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL)
- ERR("We never got an authentication certificate");
- if (chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert == NULL)
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert == NULL)
ERR("We never got an identity certificate");
if (cell->payload_len < 4)
ERR("Cell was way too short");
@@ -2089,8 +2218,9 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (4 + len > cell->payload_len)
ERR("Authenticator was truncated");
- if (type != AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
+ if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(type))
ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized");
+ authtype = type;
auth += 4;
authlen = len;
@@ -2099,25 +2229,55 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
ERR("Authenticator was too short");
- ssize_t bodylen =
- connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
- chan->conn, expected, sizeof(expected), NULL, 1);
- if (bodylen < 0 || bodylen != V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN)
+ expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+ chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1);
+ if (! expected_cell)
ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
- if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, bodylen))
+ int sig_is_rsa;
+ if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET ||
+ authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) {
+ bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN;
+ sig_is_rsa = 1;
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(authtype == AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
+ /* Our earlier check had better have made sure we had room
+ * for an ed25519 sig (inadvertently) */
+ tor_assert(V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+ sig_is_rsa = 0;
+ }
+ if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) {
+ ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected.");
+ }
+
+ /* Length of random part. */
+ if (BUG(bodylen < 24)) {
+ // LCOV_EXCL_START
+ ERR("Bodylen is somehow less than 24, which should really be impossible");
+ // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
+ }
+
+ if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24))
ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
- {
+ if (sig_is_rsa) {
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign != NULL)
+ ERR("RSA-signed AUTHENTICATE response provided with an ED25519 cert");
+
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an RSA authentication certificate");
+
crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key(
- chan->conn->handshake_state->auth_cert);
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert);
char d[DIGEST256_LEN];
char *signed_data;
size_t keysize;
int signed_len;
- if (!pk)
- ERR("Internal error: couldn't get RSA key from AUTH cert.");
+ if (! pk) {
+ ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from AUTH cert.");
+ }
crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256);
keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk);
@@ -2128,7 +2288,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
crypto_pk_free(pk);
if (signed_len < 0) {
tor_free(signed_data);
- ERR("Signature wasn't valid");
+ ERR("RSA signature wasn't valid");
}
if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) {
tor_free(signed_data);
@@ -2141,41 +2301,75 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed.");
}
tor_free(signed_data);
+ } else {
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an Ed25519 identity certificate.");
+ if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an Ed25519 authentication certificate.");
+
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *authkey =
+ &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth->signed_key;
+ ed25519_signature_t sig;
+ tor_assert(authlen > ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ memcpy(&sig.sig, auth + authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ if (ed25519_checksig(&sig, auth, authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, authkey)<0) {
+ ERR("Ed25519 signature wasn't valid.");
+ }
}
/* Okay, we are authenticated. */
chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1;
chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1;
chan->conn->handshake_state->digest_received_data = 0;
{
- crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd =
- tor_tls_cert_get_key(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
- const common_digests_t *id_digests =
- tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert;
+ crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert);
+ const common_digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity_received = NULL;
+
+ if (! sig_is_rsa) {
+ chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1;
+ ed_identity_received =
+ &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key;
+ memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id,
+ ed_identity_received, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+ }
/* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */
tor_assert(id_digests);
- memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
+ memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id,
id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd,
chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Calling connection_or_init_conn_from_address for %s "
+ " from %s, with%s ed25519 id.",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ __func__,
+ ed_identity_received ? "" : "out");
+
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
&(chan->conn->base_.addr),
chan->conn->base_.port,
(const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
- authenticated_peer_id),
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
+ ed_identity_received,
0);
- log_info(LD_OR,
- "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d: Looks good.",
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d, type %d: Looks good.",
safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
- chan->conn->base_.port);
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ authtype);
}
+ var_cell_free(expected_cell);
+
#undef ERR
}