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Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/channeltls.c')
-rw-r--r--src/or/channeltls.c172
1 files changed, 80 insertions, 92 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c
index 1cf697ccc5..2a8451467c 100644
--- a/src/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/or/channeltls.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
+#define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE
+
#include "or.h"
#include "channel.h"
#include "channeltls.h"
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@
#include "connection.h"
#include "connection_or.h"
#include "control.h"
+#include "link_handshake.h"
#include "relay.h"
#include "rephist.h"
#include "router.h"
@@ -48,9 +51,6 @@ uint64_t stats_n_authorize_cells_processed = 0;
/** Active listener, if any */
channel_listener_t *channel_tls_listener = NULL;
-/* Utility function declarations */
-static void channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-
/* channel_tls_t method declarations */
static void channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan);
@@ -92,12 +92,6 @@ static void channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
channel_tls_t *tlschan);
static void channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell,
channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-static void channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
- channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-static void channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
- channel_tls_t *tlschan);
-static void channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
- channel_tls_t *tlschan);
static int command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command);
static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
channel_tls_t *tlschan);
@@ -107,7 +101,7 @@ static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
* and channel_tls_handle_incoming().
*/
-static void
+STATIC void
channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan)
{
channel_t *chan;
@@ -1015,6 +1009,11 @@ channel_tls_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan, int *time,
* for cell types specific to the handshake for this transport protocol and
* handles them, and queues all other cells to the channel_t layer, which
* eventually will hand them off to command.c.
+ *
+ * The channel layer itself decides whether the cell should be queued or
+ * can be handed off immediately to the upper-layer code. It is responsible
+ * for copying in the case that it queues; we merely pass pointers through
+ * which we get from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf().
*/
void
@@ -1112,6 +1111,12 @@ channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
* related and live below the channel_t layer, so no variable-length
* cells ever get delivered in the current implementation, but I've left
* the mechanism in place for future use.
+ *
+ * If we were handing them off to the upper layer, the channel_t queueing
+ * code would be responsible for memory management, and we'd just be passing
+ * pointers through from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). That
+ * caller always frees them after this function returns, so this function
+ * should never free var_cell.
*/
void
@@ -1747,16 +1752,17 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
* If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell.
*/
-static void
+STATIC void
channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
{
- tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
- tor_cert_t *id_cert = NULL;
- tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
- uint8_t *ptr;
+#define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024
+ tor_x509_cert_t *certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1];
int n_certs, i;
+ certs_cell_t *cc = NULL;
+
int send_netinfo = 0;
+ memset(certs, 0, sizeof(certs));
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(chan);
tor_assert(chan->conn);
@@ -1786,63 +1792,41 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (cell->circ_id)
ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
- n_certs = cell->payload[0];
- ptr = cell->payload + 1;
+ if (certs_cell_parse(&cc, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0)
+ ERR("It couldn't be parsed.");
+
+ n_certs = cc->n_certs;
+
for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) {
- uint8_t cert_type;
- uint16_t cert_len;
- if (cell->payload_len < 3)
- goto truncated;
- if (ptr > cell->payload + cell->payload_len - 3) {
- goto truncated;
- }
- cert_type = *ptr;
- cert_len = ntohs(get_uint16(ptr+1));
- if (cell->payload_len < 3 + cert_len)
- goto truncated;
- if (ptr > cell->payload + cell->payload_len - cert_len - 3) {
- goto truncated;
- }
- if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK ||
- cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 ||
- cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024) {
- tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_decode(ptr + 3, cert_len);
- if (!cert) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
- safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
- chan->conn->base_.port);
+ certs_cell_cert_t *c = certs_cell_get_certs(cc, i);
+
+ uint16_t cert_type = c->cert_type;
+ uint16_t cert_len = c->cert_len;
+ uint8_t *cert_body = certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(c);
+
+ if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED)
+ continue;
+
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len);
+ if (!cert) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d",
+ safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),
+ chan->conn->base_.port);
+ } else {
+ if (certs[cert_type]) {
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate");
} else {
- if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK) {
- if (link_cert) {
- tor_cert_free(cert);
- ERR("Too many TLS_LINK certificates");
- }
- link_cert = cert;
- } else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024) {
- if (id_cert) {
- tor_cert_free(cert);
- ERR("Too many ID_1024 certificates");
- }
- id_cert = cert;
- } else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024) {
- if (auth_cert) {
- tor_cert_free(cert);
- ERR("Too many AUTH_1024 certificates");
- }
- auth_cert = cert;
- } else {
- tor_cert_free(cert);
- }
+ certs[cert_type] = cert;
}
}
- ptr += 3 + cert_len;
- continue;
-
- truncated:
- ERR("It ends in the middle of a certificate");
}
+ tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024];
+ tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024];
+ tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK];
+
if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
int severity;
if (! (id_cert && link_cert))
@@ -1867,7 +1851,7 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
{
- const digests_t *id_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+ const digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd;
if (!id_digests)
ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert");
@@ -1891,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port);
chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
- id_cert = NULL;
+ certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024] = NULL;
if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) {
/* If we initiated the connection and we are not a public server, we
@@ -1918,7 +1902,7 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
chan->conn->handshake_state->auth_cert = auth_cert;
- id_cert = auth_cert = NULL;
+ certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024] = certs[OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024] = NULL;
}
chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1;
@@ -1932,9 +1916,10 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
}
err:
- tor_cert_free(id_cert);
- tor_cert_free(link_cert);
- tor_cert_free(auth_cert);
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(certs); ++i) {
+ tor_x509_cert_free(certs[i]);
+ }
+ certs_cell_free(cc);
#undef ERR
}
@@ -1949,11 +1934,11 @@ channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
* want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO cell.
*/
-static void
+STATIC void
channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
{
int n_types, i, use_type = -1;
- uint8_t *cp;
+ auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = NULL;
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(chan);
@@ -1966,7 +1951,7 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \
chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \
connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \
- return; \
+ goto done; \
} while (0)
if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
@@ -1979,19 +1964,17 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
ERR("We already received one");
if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell))
ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet");
- if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2)
- ERR("It was too short");
if (cell->circ_id)
ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
- n_types = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload + OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN));
- if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2 + 2*n_types)
- ERR("It looks truncated");
+ if (auth_challenge_cell_parse(&ac, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0)
+ ERR("It was not well-formed.");
+
+ n_types = ac->n_methods;
/* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */
- cp = cell->payload+OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2;
- for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i, cp += 2) {
- uint16_t authtype = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
+ for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i) {
+ uint16_t authtype = auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(ac, i);
if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
use_type = authtype;
}
@@ -2002,7 +1985,7 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
/* If we're not a public server then we don't want to authenticate on a
connection we originated, and we already sent a NETINFO cell when we
got the CERTS cell. We have nothing more to do. */
- return;
+ goto done;
}
if (use_type >= 0) {
@@ -2016,7 +1999,7 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
log_warn(LD_OR,
"Couldn't send authenticate cell");
connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
- return;
+ goto done;
}
} else {
log_info(LD_OR,
@@ -2029,9 +2012,12 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);
- return;
+ goto done;
}
+ done:
+ auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
+
#undef ERR
}
@@ -2045,10 +2031,10 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
* the identity of the router on the other side of the connection.
*/
-static void
+STATIC void
channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
{
- uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN];
+ uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN+256];
const uint8_t *auth;
int authlen;
@@ -2104,11 +2090,13 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
ERR("Authenticator was too short");
- if (connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
- chan->conn, expected, sizeof(expected), NULL, 1) < 0)
+ ssize_t bodylen =
+ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+ chan->conn, expected, sizeof(expected), NULL, 1);
+ if (bodylen < 0 || bodylen != V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN)
ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
- if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, sizeof(expected)))
+ if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, bodylen))
ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
{
@@ -2154,7 +2142,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd =
tor_tls_cert_get_key(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
const digests_t *id_digests =
- tor_cert_get_id_digests(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(chan->conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
/* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */
tor_assert(id_digests);