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-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/.may_include1
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c549
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h87
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/dns.c172
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/dns.h68
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h5
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c79
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h57
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/feature_relay.md4
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/include.am46
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c18
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h4
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_config.c1444
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_config.h196
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c133
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h23
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.c565
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.h90
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.c318
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.h31
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_stub.c21
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_sys.c49
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/relay_sys.h25
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/router.c994
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/router.h46
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c20
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h93
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/routermode.c24
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/routermode.h22
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/selftest.c55
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/selftest.h50
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/transport_config.c307
-rw-r--r--src/feature/relay/transport_config.h85
33 files changed, 5177 insertions, 504 deletions
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/.may_include b/src/feature/relay/.may_include
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..424c745c12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/.may_include
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+*.h
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b89866b477
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file circuitbuild_relay.c
+ * @brief Implements the details of exteding circuits (by relaying extend
+ * cells as create cells, and answering create cells).
+ *
+ * On the server side, this module handles the logic of responding to
+ * RELAY_EXTEND requests, using circuit_extend() and onionskin_answer().
+ *
+ * The shared client and server code is in core/or/circuitbuild.c.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+
+#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h"
+
+#include "core/or/cell_st.h"
+#include "core/or/circuit_st.h"
+#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
+
+#include "core/or/channel.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/relay.h"
+
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
+
+/* Before replying to an extend cell, check the state of the circuit
+ * <b>circ</b>, and the configured tor mode.
+ *
+ * <b>circ</b> must not be NULL.
+ *
+ * If the state and mode are valid, return 0.
+ * Otherwise, if they are invalid, log a protocol warning, and return -1.
+ */
+STATIC int
+circuit_extend_state_valid_helper(const struct circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
+ circuitbuild_warn_client_extend();
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->n_chan) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->n_hop) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Make sure the extend cell <b>ec</b> has an ed25519 link specifier.
+ *
+ * First, check that the RSA node id is valid.
+ * If the node id is valid, add the ed25519 link specifier (if required),
+ * and return 0.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, if the node id is invalid, log a protocol warning,
+ * and return -1.(And do not modify the extend cell.)
+ *
+ * Must be called before circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper().
+ */
+STATIC int
+circuit_extend_add_ed25519_helper(struct extend_cell_t *ec)
+{
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!ec) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using
+ * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay),
+ * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty
+ * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack,
+ * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a
+ * new TLS connection for each extend request. */
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero((const char*)ec->node_id)) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Client asked me to extend without specifying an id_digest.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in ed_pubkey if it was not provided and we can infer it from
+ * our networkstatus */
+ if (ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec->ed_pubkey)) {
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)ec->node_id);
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *node_ed_id = NULL;
+ if (node &&
+ node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 1) &&
+ (node_ed_id = node_get_ed25519_id(node))) {
+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ec->ed_pubkey, node_ed_id);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check if the address and port in the tor_addr_port_t <b>ap</b> are valid,
+ * and are allowed by the current ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses config.
+ *
+ * If they are valid, return true.
+ * Otherwise, if they are invalid, return false.
+ *
+ * If <b>log_zero_addrs</b> is true, log warnings about zero addresses at
+ * <b>log_level</b>. If <b>log_internal_addrs</b> is true, log warnings about
+ * internal addresses at <b>log_level</b>.
+ */
+static bool
+circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(const struct tor_addr_port_t *ap,
+ bool log_zero_addrs, bool log_internal_addrs,
+ int log_level)
+{
+ /* It's safe to print the family. But we don't want to print the address,
+ * unless specifically configured to do so. (Zero addresses aren't sensitive,
+ * But some internal addresses might be.)*/
+
+ if (!tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(ap, 0)) {
+ if (log_zero_addrs) {
+ log_fn(log_level, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Client asked me to extend to a zero destination port or "
+ "%s address '%s'.",
+ fmt_addr_family(&ap->addr), safe_str(fmt_addrport_ap(ap)));
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_addr_is_internal(&ap->addr, 0) &&
+ !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) {
+ if (log_internal_addrs) {
+ log_fn(log_level, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Client asked me to extend to a private %s address '%s'.",
+ fmt_addr_family(&ap->addr),
+ safe_str(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&ap->addr)));
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Before replying to an extend cell, check the link specifiers in the extend
+ * cell <b>ec</b>, which was received on the circuit <b>circ</b>.
+ *
+ * If they are valid, return 0.
+ * Otherwise, if they are invalid, log a protocol warning, and return -1.
+ *
+ * Must be called after circuit_extend_add_ed25519_helper().
+ */
+STATIC int
+circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper(const struct extend_cell_t *ec,
+ const struct circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!ec) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the addresses, without logging */
+ const int ipv4_valid = circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv4,
+ false, false, 0);
+ const int ipv6_valid = circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv6,
+ false, false, 0);
+ /* We need at least one valid address */
+ if (!ipv4_valid && !ipv6_valid) {
+ /* Now, log the invalid addresses at protocol warning level */
+ circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv4,
+ true, true, LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN);
+ circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv6,
+ true, true, LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN);
+ /* And fail */
+ return -1;
+ } else if (!ipv4_valid) {
+ /* Always log unexpected internal addresses, but go on to use the other
+ * valid address */
+ circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv4,
+ false, true, LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN);
+ } else if (!ipv6_valid) {
+ circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv6,
+ false, true, LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN);
+ }
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(circ->magic != OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ const channel_t *p_chan = CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan;
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!p_chan) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the
+ * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can
+ * assist circular-path attacks. */
+ if (tor_memeq(ec->node_id, p_chan->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the previous hop Ed25519 ID too */
+ if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec->ed_pubkey) &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ec->ed_pubkey, &p_chan->ed25519_identity)) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop "
+ "(by Ed25519 ID).");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* If possible, return a supported, non-NULL IP address.
+ *
+ * If both addresses are supported and non-NULL, choose one uniformly at
+ * random.
+ *
+ * If we have an IPv6-only extend, but IPv6 is not supported, returns NULL.
+ * If both addresses are NULL, also returns NULL. */
+STATIC const tor_addr_port_t *
+circuit_choose_ip_ap_for_extend(const tor_addr_port_t *ipv4_ap,
+ const tor_addr_port_t *ipv6_ap)
+{
+ const bool ipv6_supported = router_can_extend_over_ipv6(get_options());
+
+ /* If IPv6 is not supported, we can't use the IPv6 address. */
+ if (!ipv6_supported) {
+ ipv6_ap = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If there is no IPv6 address, IPv4 is always supported.
+ * Until clients include IPv6 ORPorts, and most relays support IPv6,
+ * this is the most common case. */
+ if (!ipv6_ap) {
+ return ipv4_ap;
+ }
+
+ /* If there is no IPv4 address, return the (possibly NULL) IPv6 address. */
+ if (!ipv4_ap) {
+ return ipv6_ap;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we have an IPv4 and an IPv6 address, and IPv6 is supported.
+ * So make an IPv6 connection at random, with probability 1 in N.
+ * 1 means "always IPv6 (and no IPv4)"
+ * 2 means "equal probability of IPv4 or IPv6"
+ * ... (and so on) ...
+ * (UINT_MAX - 1) means "almost always IPv4 (and almost never IPv6)"
+ * To disable IPv6, set ipv6_supported to 0.
+ */
+#define IPV6_CONNECTION_ONE_IN_N 2
+
+ bool choose_ipv6 = crypto_fast_rng_one_in_n(get_thread_fast_rng(),
+ IPV6_CONNECTION_ONE_IN_N);
+ if (choose_ipv6) {
+ return ipv6_ap;
+ } else {
+ return ipv4_ap;
+ }
+}
+
+/* When there is no open channel for an extend cell <b>ec</b>, set up the
+ * circuit <b>circ</b> to wait for a new connection.
+ *
+ * If <b>should_launch</b> is true, open a new connection. (Otherwise, we are
+ * already waiting for a new connection to the same relay.)
+ *
+ * Check if IPv6 extends are supported by our current configuration. If they
+ * are, new connections may be made over IPv4 or IPv6. (IPv4 connections are
+ * always supported.)
+ */
+STATIC void
+circuit_open_connection_for_extend(const struct extend_cell_t *ec,
+ struct circuit_t *circ,
+ int should_launch)
+{
+ /* We have to check circ first, so we can close it on all other failures */
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) {
+ /* We can't mark a NULL circuit for close. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we know that circ is not NULL */
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!ec) {
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the addresses, without logging */
+ const int ipv4_valid = circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv4,
+ false, false, 0);
+ const int ipv6_valid = circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec->orport_ipv6,
+ false, false, 0);
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!ipv4_valid && !ipv6_valid) {
+ /* circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper() should have caught this */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const tor_addr_port_t *chosen_ap = circuit_choose_ip_ap_for_extend(
+ ipv4_valid ? &ec->orport_ipv4 : NULL,
+ ipv6_valid ? &ec->orport_ipv6 : NULL);
+ if (!chosen_ap) {
+ /* An IPv6-only extend, but IPv6 is not supported */
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Received IPv6-only extend, but we don't have an IPv6 ORPort.");
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/,
+ (const char*)ec->node_id,
+ &ec->ed_pubkey,
+ NULL, /*onion_key*/
+ NULL, /*curve25519_key*/
+ &chosen_ap->addr,
+ chosen_ap->port);
+
+ circ->n_chan_create_cell = tor_memdup(&ec->create_cell,
+ sizeof(ec->create_cell));
+
+ circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT);
+
+ if (should_launch) {
+ /* we should try to open a connection */
+ channel_t *n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(
+ &circ->n_hop->addr,
+ circ->n_hop->port,
+ circ->n_hop->identity_digest,
+ &circ->n_hop->ed_identity);
+ if (!n_chan) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit.");
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
+ return;
+ }
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
+ }
+}
+
+/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion
+ * skin and identity digest for the next hop. If we're already connected,
+ * pass the onion skin to the next hop using a create cell; otherwise
+ * launch a new OR connection, and <b>circ</b> will notice when the
+ * connection succeeds or fails.
+ *
+ * Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit, else return 0.
+ */
+int
+circuit_extend(struct cell_t *cell, struct circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ channel_t *n_chan;
+ relay_header_t rh;
+ extend_cell_t ec;
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ int should_launch = 0;
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!cell) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (circuit_extend_state_valid_helper(circ) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
+
+ if (extend_cell_parse(&ec, rh.command,
+ cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
+ rh.length) < 0) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Can't parse extend cell. Closing circuit.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (circuit_extend_add_ed25519_helper(&ec) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper(&ec, circ) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Check the addresses, without logging */
+ const int ipv4_valid = circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec.orport_ipv4,
+ false, false, 0);
+ const int ipv6_valid = circuit_extend_addr_port_is_valid(&ec.orport_ipv6,
+ false, false, 0);
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!ipv4_valid && !ipv6_valid) {
+ /* circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper() should have caught this */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id,
+ &ec.ed_pubkey,
+ ipv4_valid ? &ec.orport_ipv4.addr : NULL,
+ ipv6_valid ? &ec.orport_ipv6.addr : NULL,
+ &msg,
+ &should_launch);
+
+ if (!n_chan) {
+ /* We can't use fmt_addr*() twice in the same function call,
+ * because it uses a static buffer. */
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR, "Next router IPv4 (%s): %s.",
+ fmt_addrport_ap(&ec.orport_ipv4),
+ msg ? msg : "????");
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR, "Next router IPv6 (%s).",
+ fmt_addrport_ap(&ec.orport_ipv6));
+
+ circuit_open_connection_for_extend(&ec, circ, should_launch);
+
+ /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
+ * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches
+ * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Connection is already established.
+ * So we need to extend the circuit to the next hop. */
+ tor_assert(!circ->n_hop);
+ circ->n_chan = n_chan;
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,
+ "n_chan is %s.",
+ channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan));
+
+ if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, &ec.create_cell, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/** On a relay, accept a create cell, initialise a circuit, and send a
+ * created cell back.
+ *
+ * Given:
+ * - a response payload consisting of:
+ * - the <b>created_cell</b> and
+ * - an optional <b>rend_circ_nonce</b>, and
+ * - <b>keys</b> of length <b>keys_len</b>, which must be
+ * CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN;
+ * then:
+ * - initialize the circuit <b>circ</b>'s cryptographic material,
+ * - set the circuit's state to open, and
+ * - send a created cell back on that circuit.
+ *
+ * If we haven't found our ORPorts reachable yet, and the channel meets the
+ * necessary conditions, mark the relevant ORPorts as reachable.
+ *
+ * Returns -1 if cell or circuit initialisation fails.
+ */
+int
+onionskin_answer(struct or_circuit_t *circ,
+ const created_cell_t *created_cell,
+ const char *keys, size_t keys_len,
+ const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce)
+{
+ cell_t cell;
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!created_cell) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!keys) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!rend_circ_nonce) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ tor_assert(keys_len == CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN);
+
+ if (created_cell_format(&cell, created_cell) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"couldn't format created cell (type=%d, len=%d).",
+ (int)created_cell->cell_type, (int)created_cell->handshake_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
+
+ circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
+
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
+ (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys),
+ (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20));
+ if (relay_crypto_init(&circ->crypto, keys, keys_len, 0, 0)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(circ->rend_circ_nonce, rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ int used_create_fast = (created_cell->cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
+
+ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
+ circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0);
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.",
+ used_create_fast ? "created_fast" : "created");
+
+ /* Ignore the local bit when ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set:
+ * it violates the assumption that private addresses are local.
+ * Also, many test networks run on local addresses, and
+ * TestingTorNetwork sets ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses. */
+ if ((!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan)
+ || get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses)
+ && !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) {
+ /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn
+ * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells
+ * can reach us too. */
+ router_orport_found_reachable();
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0783161538
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file circuitbuild_relay.h
+ * @brief Header for feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_CIRCUITBUILD_RELAY_H
+#define TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_CIRCUITBUILD_RELAY_H
+
+#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+
+struct cell_t;
+struct created_cell_t;
+
+struct circuit_t;
+struct or_circuit_t;
+struct extend_cell_t;
+
+/* Log a protocol warning about getting an extend cell on a client. */
+static inline void
+circuitbuild_warn_client_extend(void)
+{
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing.");
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
+int circuit_extend(struct cell_t *cell, struct circuit_t *circ);
+
+int onionskin_answer(struct or_circuit_t *circ,
+ const struct created_cell_t *created_cell,
+ const char *keys, size_t keys_len,
+ const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce);
+
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+static inline int
+circuit_extend(struct cell_t *cell, struct circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ (void)cell;
+ (void)circ;
+ circuitbuild_warn_client_extend();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static inline int
+onionskin_answer(struct or_circuit_t *circ,
+ const struct created_cell_t *created_cell,
+ const char *keys, size_t keys_len,
+ const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce)
+{
+ (void)circ;
+ (void)created_cell;
+ (void)keys;
+ (void)keys_len;
+ (void)rend_circ_nonce;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+
+STATIC int circuit_extend_state_valid_helper(const struct circuit_t *circ);
+STATIC int circuit_extend_add_ed25519_helper(struct extend_cell_t *ec);
+STATIC int circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper(const struct extend_cell_t *ec,
+ const struct circuit_t *circ);
+STATIC const tor_addr_port_t * circuit_choose_ip_ap_for_extend(
+ const tor_addr_port_t *ipv4_ap,
+ const tor_addr_port_t *ipv6_ap);
+STATIC void circuit_open_connection_for_extend(const struct extend_cell_t *ec,
+ struct circuit_t *circ,
+ int should_launch);
+
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_CIRCUITBUILD_RELAY_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/dns.c b/src/feature/relay/dns.c
index e20a39482f..b83bd9b758 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/dns.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/dns.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2003-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
-#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
@@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ cached_resolve_hash(cached_resolve_t *a)
}
HT_PROTOTYPE(cache_map, cached_resolve_t, node, cached_resolve_hash,
- cached_resolves_eq)
+ cached_resolves_eq);
HT_GENERATE2(cache_map, cached_resolve_t, node, cached_resolve_hash,
- cached_resolves_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_)
+ cached_resolves_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_);
/** Initialize the DNS cache. */
static void
@@ -268,22 +268,6 @@ has_dns_init_failed(void)
return nameserver_config_failed;
}
-/** Helper: Given a TTL from a DNS response, determine what TTL to give the
- * OP that asked us to resolve it, and how long to cache that record
- * ourselves. */
-uint32_t
-dns_clip_ttl(uint32_t ttl)
-{
- /* This logic is a defense against "DefectTor" DNS-based traffic
- * confirmation attacks, as in https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf .
- * We only give two values: a "low" value and a "high" value.
- */
- if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT)
- return MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT;
- else
- return MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT;
-}
-
/** Helper: free storage held by an entry in the DNS cache. */
static void
free_cached_resolve_(cached_resolve_t *r)
@@ -521,7 +505,7 @@ send_resolved_cell,(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t answer_type,
uint32_t ttl;
buf[0] = answer_type;
- ttl = dns_clip_ttl(conn->address_ttl);
+ ttl = clip_dns_ttl(conn->address_ttl);
switch (answer_type)
{
@@ -593,7 +577,7 @@ send_resolved_hostname_cell,(edge_connection_t *conn,
size_t namelen = strlen(hostname);
tor_assert(namelen < 256);
- ttl = dns_clip_ttl(conn->address_ttl);
+ ttl = clip_dns_ttl(conn->address_ttl);
buf[0] = RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME;
buf[1] = (uint8_t)namelen;
@@ -987,25 +971,6 @@ assert_connection_edge_not_dns_pending(edge_connection_t *conn)
#endif /* 1 */
}
-/** Log an error and abort if any connection waiting for a DNS resolve is
- * corrupted. */
-void
-assert_all_pending_dns_resolves_ok(void)
-{
- pending_connection_t *pend;
- cached_resolve_t **resolve;
-
- HT_FOREACH(resolve, cache_map, &cache_root) {
- for (pend = (*resolve)->pending_connections;
- pend;
- pend = pend->next) {
- assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(pend->conn), 0);
- tor_assert(!SOCKET_OK(pend->conn->base_.s));
- tor_assert(!connection_in_array(TO_CONN(pend->conn)));
- }
- }
-}
-
/** Remove <b>conn</b> from the list of connections waiting for conn-\>address.
*/
void
@@ -1063,7 +1028,7 @@ connection_dns_remove(edge_connection_t *conn)
* the resolve for <b>address</b> itself, and remove any cached results for
* <b>address</b> from the cache.
*/
-MOCK_IMPL(void,
+MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void,
dns_cancel_pending_resolve,(const char *address))
{
pending_connection_t *pend;
@@ -1338,7 +1303,7 @@ make_pending_resolve_cached(cached_resolve_t *resolve)
resolve->ttl_hostname < ttl)
ttl = resolve->ttl_hostname;
- set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + dns_clip_ttl(ttl));
+ set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + clip_dns_ttl(ttl));
}
assert_cache_ok();
@@ -1360,6 +1325,42 @@ evdns_err_is_transient(int err)
}
}
+/**
+ * Return number of configured nameservers in <b>the_evdns_base</b>.
+ */
+size_t
+number_of_configured_nameservers(void)
+{
+ return evdns_base_count_nameservers(the_evdns_base);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EVDNS_BASE_GET_NAMESERVER_ADDR
+/**
+ * Return address of configured nameserver in <b>the_evdns_base</b>
+ * at index <b>idx</b>.
+ */
+tor_addr_t *
+configured_nameserver_address(const size_t idx)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage sa;
+ ev_socklen_t sa_len = sizeof(sa);
+
+ if (evdns_base_get_nameserver_addr(the_evdns_base, (int)idx,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&sa,
+ sa_len) > 0) {
+ tor_addr_t *tor_addr = tor_malloc(sizeof(tor_addr_t));
+ if (tor_addr_from_sockaddr(tor_addr,
+ (const struct sockaddr *)&sa,
+ NULL) == 0) {
+ return tor_addr;
+ }
+ tor_free(tor_addr);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_EVDNS_BASE_GET_NAMESERVER_ADDR) */
+
/** Configure eventdns nameservers if force is true, or if the configuration
* has changed since the last time we called this function, or if we failed on
* our last attempt. On Unix, this reads from /etc/resolv.conf or
@@ -1391,16 +1392,23 @@ configure_nameservers(int force)
evdns_set_log_fn(evdns_log_cb);
if (conf_fname) {
log_debug(LD_FS, "stat()ing %s", conf_fname);
- if (stat(sandbox_intern_string(conf_fname), &st)) {
+ int missing_resolv_conf = 0;
+ int stat_res = stat(sandbox_intern_string(conf_fname), &st);
+
+ if (stat_res) {
log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Unable to stat resolver configuration in '%s': %s",
conf_fname, strerror(errno));
- goto err;
- }
- if (!force && resolv_conf_fname && !strcmp(conf_fname,resolv_conf_fname)
+ missing_resolv_conf = 1;
+ } else if (!force && resolv_conf_fname &&
+ !strcmp(conf_fname,resolv_conf_fname)
&& st.st_mtime == resolv_conf_mtime) {
log_info(LD_EXIT, "No change to '%s'", conf_fname);
return 0;
}
+
+ if (stat_res == 0 && st.st_size == 0)
+ missing_resolv_conf = 1;
+
if (nameservers_configured) {
evdns_base_search_clear(the_evdns_base);
evdns_base_clear_nameservers_and_suspend(the_evdns_base);
@@ -1413,20 +1421,34 @@ configure_nameservers(int force)
sandbox_intern_string("/etc/hosts"));
}
#endif /* defined(DNS_OPTION_HOSTSFILE) && defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP) */
- log_info(LD_EXIT, "Parsing resolver configuration in '%s'", conf_fname);
- if ((r = evdns_base_resolv_conf_parse(the_evdns_base, flags,
- sandbox_intern_string(conf_fname)))) {
- log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Unable to parse '%s', or no nameservers in '%s' (%d)",
- conf_fname, conf_fname, r);
- goto err;
- }
- if (evdns_base_count_nameservers(the_evdns_base) == 0) {
- log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Unable to find any nameservers in '%s'.", conf_fname);
- goto err;
+
+ if (!missing_resolv_conf) {
+ log_info(LD_EXIT, "Parsing resolver configuration in '%s'", conf_fname);
+ if ((r = evdns_base_resolv_conf_parse(the_evdns_base, flags,
+ sandbox_intern_string(conf_fname)))) {
+ log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Unable to parse '%s', or no nameservers "
+ "in '%s' (%d)", conf_fname, conf_fname, r);
+
+ if (r != 6) // "r = 6" means "no DNS servers were in resolv.conf" -
+ goto err; // in which case we expect libevent to add 127.0.0.1 as
+ // fallback.
+ }
+ if (evdns_base_count_nameservers(the_evdns_base) == 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Unable to find any nameservers in '%s'.",
+ conf_fname);
+ }
+
+ tor_free(resolv_conf_fname);
+ resolv_conf_fname = tor_strdup(conf_fname);
+ resolv_conf_mtime = st.st_mtime;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Could not read your DNS config from '%s' - "
+ "please investigate your DNS configuration. "
+ "This is possibly a problem. Meanwhile, falling"
+ " back to local DNS at 127.0.0.1.", conf_fname);
+ evdns_base_nameserver_ip_add(the_evdns_base, "127.0.0.1");
}
- tor_free(resolv_conf_fname);
- resolv_conf_fname = tor_strdup(conf_fname);
- resolv_conf_mtime = st.st_mtime;
+
if (nameservers_configured)
evdns_base_resume(the_evdns_base);
}
@@ -1569,12 +1591,17 @@ evdns_callback(int result, char type, int count, int ttl, void *addresses,
} else if (type == DNS_IPv6_AAAA && count) {
char answer_buf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
char *escaped_address;
+ const char *ip_str;
struct in6_addr *addrs = addresses;
tor_addr_from_in6(&addr, &addrs[0]);
- tor_inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &addrs[0], answer_buf, sizeof(answer_buf));
+ ip_str = tor_inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &addrs[0], answer_buf,
+ sizeof(answer_buf));
escaped_address = esc_for_log(string_address);
- if (answer_is_wildcarded(answer_buf)) {
+ if (BUG(ip_str == NULL)) {
+ log_warn(LD_EXIT, "tor_inet_ntop() failed!");
+ result = DNS_ERR_NOTEXIST;
+ } else if (answer_is_wildcarded(answer_buf)) {
log_debug(LD_EXIT, "eventdns said that %s resolves to ISP-hijacked "
"address %s; treating as a failure.",
safe_str(escaped_address),
@@ -1841,6 +1868,7 @@ evdns_wildcard_check_callback(int result, char type, int count, int ttl,
void *addresses, void *arg)
{
(void)ttl;
+ const char *ip_str;
++n_wildcard_requests;
if (result == DNS_ERR_NONE && count) {
char *string_address = arg;
@@ -1850,16 +1878,22 @@ evdns_wildcard_check_callback(int result, char type, int count, int ttl,
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
char answer_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1];
struct in_addr in;
+ int ntoa_res;
in.s_addr = addrs[i];
- tor_inet_ntoa(&in, answer_buf, sizeof(answer_buf));
- wildcard_increment_answer(answer_buf);
+ ntoa_res = tor_inet_ntoa(&in, answer_buf, sizeof(answer_buf));
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(ntoa_res >= 0);
+ if (ntoa_res > 0)
+ wildcard_increment_answer(answer_buf);
}
} else if (type == DNS_IPv6_AAAA) {
const struct in6_addr *addrs = addresses;
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
char answer_buf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1];
- tor_inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &addrs[i], answer_buf, sizeof(answer_buf));
- wildcard_increment_answer(answer_buf);
+ ip_str = tor_inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &addrs[i], answer_buf,
+ sizeof(answer_buf));
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(ip_str);
+ if (ip_str)
+ wildcard_increment_answer(answer_buf);
}
}
@@ -1994,12 +2028,12 @@ dns_launch_correctness_checks(void)
/* Wait a while before launching requests for test addresses, so we can
* get the results from checking for wildcarding. */
- if (! launch_event)
+ if (!launch_event)
launch_event = tor_evtimer_new(tor_libevent_get_base(),
launch_test_addresses, NULL);
timeout.tv_sec = 30;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
- if (evtimer_add(launch_event, &timeout)<0) {
+ if (evtimer_add(launch_event, &timeout) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't add timer for checking for dns hijacking");
}
}
@@ -2131,7 +2165,7 @@ dns_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes)
total_bytes_removed += bytes_removed;
/* Increase time_inc by a reasonable fraction. */
- time_inc += (MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 4);
+ time_inc += (MAX_DNS_TTL / 4);
} while (total_bytes_removed < min_remove_bytes);
return total_bytes_removed;
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/dns.h b/src/feature/relay/dns.h
index e4474cdf43..120b75bf8d 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/dns.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/dns.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -12,29 +12,14 @@
#ifndef TOR_DNS_H
#define TOR_DNS_H
-/** Lowest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */
-#define MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT (5*60)
-/** Highest value for DNS ttl that a server will give. */
-#define MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT (60*60)
-
-/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of
- * their TTL)? */
-#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (3*60*60)
-/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is
- * known? */
-#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60)
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
int dns_init(void);
int has_dns_init_failed(void);
-void dns_free_all(void);
-uint32_t dns_clip_ttl(uint32_t ttl);
int dns_reset(void);
void connection_dns_remove(edge_connection_t *conn);
void assert_connection_edge_not_dns_pending(edge_connection_t *conn);
-void assert_all_pending_dns_resolves_ok(void);
-MOCK_DECL(void,dns_cancel_pending_resolve,(const char *question));
int dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn);
-void dns_launch_correctness_checks(void);
int dns_seems_to_be_broken(void);
int dns_seems_to_be_broken_for_ipv6(void);
void dns_reset_correctness_checks(void);
@@ -42,9 +27,57 @@ size_t dns_cache_total_allocation(void);
void dump_dns_mem_usage(int severity);
size_t dns_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes);
+/* These functions are only used within the feature/relay module, and don't
+ * need stubs. */
+void dns_free_all(void);
+void dns_launch_correctness_checks(void);
+
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#define dns_init() (0)
+#define dns_seems_to_be_broken() (0)
+#define has_dns_init_failed() (0)
+#define dns_cache_total_allocation() (0)
+
+#define dns_reset_correctness_checks() STMT_NIL
+
+#define assert_connection_edge_not_dns_pending(conn) \
+ ((void)(conn))
+#define dump_dns_mem_usage(severity)\
+ ((void)(severity))
+#define dns_cache_handle_oom(now, bytes) \
+ ((void)(now), (void)(bytes), 0)
+
+#define connection_dns_remove(conn) \
+ STMT_BEGIN \
+ (void)(conn); \
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); \
+ STMT_END
+
+static inline int
+dns_reset(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int
+dns_resolve(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
+{
+ (void)exitconn;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
#ifdef DNS_PRIVATE
#include "feature/relay/dns_structs.h"
+size_t number_of_configured_nameservers(void);
+#ifdef HAVE_EVDNS_BASE_GET_NAMESERVER_ADDR
+tor_addr_t *configured_nameserver_address(const size_t idx);
+#endif
+
+MOCK_DECL(STATIC void,dns_cancel_pending_resolve,(const char *question));
MOCK_DECL(STATIC int,dns_resolve_impl,(edge_connection_t *exitconn,
int is_resolve,or_circuit_t *oncirc, char **hostname_out,
int *made_connection_pending_out, cached_resolve_t **resolve_out));
@@ -69,4 +102,3 @@ launch_resolve,(cached_resolve_t *resolve));
#endif /* defined(DNS_PRIVATE) */
#endif /* !defined(TOR_DNS_H) */
-
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h b/src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h
index e128746f81..27a791b9b3 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2003-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#ifndef TOR_DNS_STRUCTS_H
#define TOR_DNS_STRUCTS_H
+#include "ext/ht.h"
+
/** Longest hostname we're willing to resolve. */
#define MAX_ADDRESSLEN 256
@@ -99,4 +101,3 @@ typedef struct cached_resolve_t {
} cached_resolve_t;
#endif /* !defined(TOR_DNS_STRUCTS_H) */
-
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c b/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c
index 136aee3084..2cf30262f5 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
-#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ connection_ext_or_transition(or_connection_t *conn)
conn->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_OR;
TO_CONN(conn)->state = 0; // set the state to a neutral value
- control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0);
+ connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0);
connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 1);
}
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *or_conn)
command->body, command->len) < 0)
goto err;
} else {
- log_notice(LD_NET,"Got Extended ORPort command we don't regognize (%u).",
+ log_notice(LD_NET,"Got Extended ORPort command we don't recognize (%u).",
command->cmd);
}
@@ -656,6 +656,77 @@ connection_ext_or_start_auth(or_connection_t *or_conn)
return 0;
}
+/** Global map between Extended ORPort identifiers and OR
+ * connections. */
+static digestmap_t *orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
+
+/** Remove the Extended ORPort identifier of <b>conn</b> from the
+ * global identifier list. Also, clear the identifier from the
+ * connection itself. */
+void
+connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ or_connection_t *tmp;
+ if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
+ return;
+ if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
+ return;
+
+ tmp = digestmap_remove(orconn_ext_or_id_map, conn->ext_or_conn_id);
+ if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
+ tor_assert(tmp == conn);
+
+ memset(conn->ext_or_conn_id, 0, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/** Return the connection whose ext_or_id is <b>id</b>. Return NULL if no such
+ * connection is found. */
+or_connection_t *
+connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id)
+{
+ if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
+ return NULL;
+ return digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, id);
+}
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+/** Deallocate the global Extended ORPort identifier list */
+void
+connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void)
+{
+ digestmap_free(orconn_ext_or_id_map, NULL);
+ orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
+}
+
+/** Creates an Extended ORPort identifier for <b>conn</b> and deposits
+ * it into the global list of identifiers. */
+void
+connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ char random_id[EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN];
+ or_connection_t *tmp;
+
+ if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
+ orconn_ext_or_id_map = digestmap_new();
+
+ /* Remove any previous identifiers: */
+ if (conn->ext_or_conn_id && !tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
+ connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(conn);
+
+ do {
+ crypto_rand(random_id, sizeof(random_id));
+ } while (digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id));
+
+ if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
+ conn->ext_or_conn_id = tor_malloc_zero(EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
+
+ memcpy(conn->ext_or_conn_id, random_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
+
+ tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id, conn);
+ tor_assert(!tmp);
+}
+
/** Free any leftover allocated memory of the ext_orport.c subsystem. */
void
ext_orport_free_all(void)
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h b/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h
index 7313ebd03d..416c358397 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+/**
+ * @file ext_orport.h
+ * @brief Header for ext_orport.c
+ **/
+
#ifndef EXT_ORPORT_H
#define EXT_ORPORT_H
@@ -26,26 +31,56 @@
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING 5
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 5
-int connection_ext_or_start_auth(or_connection_t *or_conn);
-
-ext_or_cmd_t *ext_or_cmd_new(uint16_t len);
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
-#define ext_or_cmd_free(cmd) \
- FREE_AND_NULL(ext_or_cmd_t, ext_or_cmd_free_, (cmd))
+int connection_ext_or_start_auth(or_connection_t *or_conn);
-void ext_or_cmd_free_(ext_or_cmd_t *cmd);
void connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn);
void connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn);
void connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void);
-or_connection_t *connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id);
-
int connection_ext_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *or_conn);
+char *get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(void);
+/* (No stub needed for these: they are only called within feature/relay.) */
int init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(int is_enabled);
-char *get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(void);
void ext_orport_free_all(void);
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+static inline int
+connection_ext_or_start_auth(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+static inline int
+connection_ext_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+static inline int
+connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+#define connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(conn) \
+ ((void)(conn))
+#define connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(conn) \
+ ((void)(conn))
+#define connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map() \
+ STMT_NIL
+
+#define get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name() \
+ (NULL)
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
#ifdef EXT_ORPORT_PRIVATE
STATIC int connection_write_ext_or_command(connection_t *conn,
uint16_t command,
@@ -55,9 +90,11 @@ STATIC int handle_client_auth_nonce(const char *client_nonce,
size_t client_nonce_len,
char **client_hash_out,
char **reply_out, size_t *reply_len_out);
+
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
extern uint8_t *ext_or_auth_cookie;
extern int ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set;
+or_connection_t *connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id);
#endif
#endif /* defined(EXT_ORPORT_PRIVATE) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/feature_relay.md b/src/feature/relay/feature_relay.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a7f0c2153a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/feature_relay.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+@dir /feature/relay
+@brief feature/relay: Relay-specific code
+
+(There is also a bunch of relay-specific code in other modules.)
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/include.am b/src/feature/relay/include.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..84bb1ff35e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/include.am
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+
+# Legacy shared relay code: migrate to the relay module over time
+LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \
+ src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c \
+ src/feature/relay/router.c
+
+# The Relay module.
+
+# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT SOURCES HERE.
+MODULE_RELAY_SOURCES = \
+ src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c \
+ src/feature/relay/dns.c \
+ src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c \
+ src/feature/relay/routermode.c \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_config.c \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.c \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.c \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_sys.c \
+ src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c \
+ src/feature/relay/selftest.c \
+ src/feature/relay/transport_config.c
+
+# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT HEADERS HERE.
+noinst_HEADERS += \
+ src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h \
+ src/feature/relay/dns.h \
+ src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h \
+ src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h \
+ src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_config.h \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.h \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.h \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_sys.h \
+ src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h \
+ src/feature/relay/router.h \
+ src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h \
+ src/feature/relay/routermode.h \
+ src/feature/relay/selftest.h \
+ src/feature/relay/transport_config.h
+
+if BUILD_MODULE_RELAY
+LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += $(MODULE_RELAY_SOURCES)
+else
+LIBTOR_APP_A_STUB_SOURCES += src/feature/relay/relay_stub.c
+endif
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c
index 696905cf5e..3cbaa65d28 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -49,10 +49,12 @@ typedef struct onion_queue_t {
/** 5 seconds on the onion queue til we just send back a destroy */
#define ONIONQUEUE_WAIT_CUTOFF 5
+TOR_TAILQ_HEAD(onion_queue_head_t, onion_queue_t);
+typedef struct onion_queue_head_t onion_queue_head_t;
+
/** Array of queues of circuits waiting for CPU workers. An element is NULL
* if that queue is empty.*/
-static TOR_TAILQ_HEAD(onion_queue_head_t, onion_queue_t)
- ol_list[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1] =
+static onion_queue_head_t ol_list[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1] =
{ TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[0]), /* tap */
TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[1]), /* fast */
TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[2]), /* ntor */
@@ -212,10 +214,12 @@ num_ntors_per_tap(void)
#define MIN_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 1
#define MAX_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 100000
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "NumNTorsPerTAP",
- DEFAULT_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
- MIN_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
- MAX_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP);
+ int result = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "NumNTorsPerTAP",
+ DEFAULT_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
+ MIN_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
+ MAX_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP);
+ tor_assert(result > 0);
+ return result;
}
/** Choose which onion queue we'll pull from next. If one is empty choose
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h
index 0df921e057..08379b2c00 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ int onion_num_pending(uint16_t handshake_type);
void onion_pending_remove(or_circuit_t *circ);
void clear_pending_onions(void);
-#endif
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_ONION_QUEUE_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_config.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_config.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fac6a2f577
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_config.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1444 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_config.c
+ * @brief Code to interpret the user's configuration of Tor's relay module.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#define RELAY_CONFIG_PRIVATE
+#include "feature/relay/relay_config.h"
+
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+#include "lib/confmgt/confmgt.h"
+
+#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
+#include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
+#include "lib/meminfo/meminfo.h"
+#include "lib/osinfo/uname.h"
+#include "lib/process/setuid.h"
+
+/* Required for dirinfo_type_t in or_options_t */
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/cpuworker.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
+#include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h"
+
+#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
+#include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h"
+#include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h"
+#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+
+#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
+
+#include "feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.h"
+#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
+
+/** Contents of most recently read DirPortFrontPage file. */
+static char *global_dirfrontpagecontents = NULL;
+
+/* Copied from config.c, we will refactor later in 29211. */
+#define REJECT(arg) \
+ STMT_BEGIN *msg = tor_strdup(arg); return -1; STMT_END
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ <= 3
+#define COMPLAIN(args...) \
+ STMT_BEGIN log_warn(LD_CONFIG, args); STMT_END
+#else
+#define COMPLAIN(args, ...) \
+ STMT_BEGIN log_warn(LD_CONFIG, args, ##__VA_ARGS__); STMT_END
+#endif /* defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ <= 3 */
+
+/* Used in the various options_transition_affects* functions. */
+#define YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(opt) \
+ if (!CFG_EQ_BOOL(old_options, new_options, opt)) return 1;
+#define YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(opt) \
+ if (!CFG_EQ_INT(old_options, new_options, opt)) return 1;
+#define YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(opt) \
+ if (!CFG_EQ_STRING(old_options, new_options, opt)) return 1;
+#define YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(opt) \
+ if (!CFG_EQ_LINELIST(old_options, new_options, opt)) return 1;
+
+/** Return the contents of our frontpage string, or NULL if not configured. */
+MOCK_IMPL(const char*,
+relay_get_dirportfrontpage, (void))
+{
+ return global_dirfrontpagecontents;
+}
+
+/** Release all memory and resources held by global relay configuration
+ * structures.
+ */
+void
+relay_config_free_all(void)
+{
+ tor_free(global_dirfrontpagecontents);
+}
+
+/** Return the bandwidthrate that we are going to report to the authorities
+ * based on the config options. */
+uint32_t
+relay_get_effective_bwrate(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ uint64_t bw = options->BandwidthRate;
+ if (bw > options->MaxAdvertisedBandwidth)
+ bw = options->MaxAdvertisedBandwidth;
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 && bw > options->RelayBandwidthRate)
+ bw = options->RelayBandwidthRate;
+ /* config_ensure_bandwidth_cap() makes sure that this cast can't overflow. */
+ return (uint32_t)bw;
+}
+
+/** Return the bandwidthburst that we are going to report to the authorities
+ * based on the config options. */
+uint32_t
+relay_get_effective_bwburst(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ uint64_t bw = options->BandwidthBurst;
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthBurst > 0 && bw > options->RelayBandwidthBurst)
+ bw = options->RelayBandwidthBurst;
+ /* config_ensure_bandwidth_cap() makes sure that this cast can't overflow. */
+ return (uint32_t)bw;
+}
+
+/** Warn for every Extended ORPort port in <b>ports</b> that is on a
+ * publicly routable address. */
+void
+port_warn_nonlocal_ext_orports(const smartlist_t *ports, const char *portname)
+{
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, const port_cfg_t *, port) {
+ if (port->type != CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER)
+ continue;
+ if (port->is_unix_addr)
+ continue;
+ /* XXX maybe warn even if address is RFC1918? */
+ if (!tor_addr_is_internal(&port->addr, 1)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You specified a public address '%s' for %sPort. "
+ "This is not advised; this address is supposed to only be "
+ "exposed on localhost so that your pluggable transport "
+ "proxies can connect to it.",
+ fmt_addrport(&port->addr, port->port), portname);
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(port);
+}
+
+/** Given a list of <b>port_cfg_t</b> in <b>ports</b>, check them for internal
+ * consistency and warn as appropriate. On Unix-based OSes, set
+ * *<b>n_low_ports_out</b> to the number of sub-1024 ports we will be
+ * binding, and warn if we may be unable to re-bind after hibernation. */
+static int
+check_server_ports(const smartlist_t *ports,
+ const or_options_t *options,
+ int *n_low_ports_out)
+{
+ if (BUG(!ports))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!n_low_ports_out))
+ return -1;
+
+ int n_orport_advertised = 0;
+ int n_orport_advertised_ipv4 = 0;
+ int n_orport_listeners = 0;
+ int n_dirport_advertised = 0;
+ int n_dirport_listeners = 0;
+ int n_low_port = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, const port_cfg_t *, port) {
+ if (port->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER) {
+ if (! port->server_cfg.no_advertise)
+ ++n_dirport_advertised;
+ if (! port->server_cfg.no_listen)
+ ++n_dirport_listeners;
+ } else if (port->type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER) {
+ if (! port->server_cfg.no_advertise) {
+ ++n_orport_advertised;
+ if (port_binds_ipv4(port))
+ ++n_orport_advertised_ipv4;
+ }
+ if (! port->server_cfg.no_listen)
+ ++n_orport_listeners;
+ } else {
+ continue;
+ }
+#ifndef _WIN32
+ if (!port->server_cfg.no_listen && port->port < 1024)
+ ++n_low_port;
+#endif
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(port);
+
+ if (n_orport_advertised && !n_orport_listeners) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "We are advertising an ORPort, but not actually "
+ "listening on one.");
+ r = -1;
+ }
+ if (n_orport_listeners && !n_orport_advertised) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "We are listening on an ORPort, but not advertising "
+ "any ORPorts. This will keep us from building a %s "
+ "descriptor, and make us impossible to use.",
+ options->BridgeRelay ? "bridge" : "router");
+ r = -1;
+ }
+ if (n_dirport_advertised && !n_dirport_listeners) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "We are advertising a DirPort, but not actually "
+ "listening on one.");
+ r = -1;
+ }
+ if (n_dirport_advertised > 1) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Can't advertise more than one DirPort.");
+ r = -1;
+ }
+ if (n_orport_advertised && !n_orport_advertised_ipv4 &&
+ !options->BridgeRelay) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Configured public relay to listen only on an IPv6 "
+ "address. Tor needs to listen on an IPv4 address too.");
+ r = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n_low_port && options->AccountingMax &&
+ (!have_capability_support() || options->KeepBindCapabilities == 0)) {
+ const char *extra = "";
+ if (options->KeepBindCapabilities == 0 && have_capability_support())
+ extra = ", and you have disabled KeepBindCapabilities.";
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "You have set AccountingMax to use hibernation. You have also "
+ "chosen a low DirPort or OrPort%s."
+ "This combination can make Tor stop "
+ "working when it tries to re-attach the port after a period of "
+ "hibernation. Please choose a different port or turn off "
+ "hibernation unless you know this combination will work on your "
+ "platform.", extra);
+ }
+
+ if (n_low_ports_out)
+ *n_low_ports_out = n_low_port;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Parse all relay ports from <b>options</b>. On success, add parsed ports to
+ * <b>ports</b>, and return 0. On failure, set *<b>msg</b> to a newly
+ * allocated string describing the problem, and return -1.
+ **/
+int
+port_parse_ports_relay(or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg,
+ smartlist_t *ports_out,
+ int *have_low_ports_out)
+{
+ int retval = -1;
+ smartlist_t *ports = smartlist_new();
+ int n_low_ports = 0;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BUG(!ports_out))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BUG(!have_low_ports_out))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (options->ClientOnly) {
+ retval = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (port_parse_config(ports,
+ options->ORPort_lines,
+ "OR", CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
+ "0.0.0.0", 0,
+ CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS) < 0) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Invalid ORPort configuration");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (port_parse_config(ports,
+ options->ExtORPort_lines,
+ "ExtOR", CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER,
+ "127.0.0.1", 0,
+ CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS|CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Invalid ExtORPort configuration");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (port_parse_config(ports,
+ options->DirPort_lines,
+ "Dir", CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER,
+ "0.0.0.0", 0,
+ CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS) < 0) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Invalid DirPort configuration");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (check_server_ports(ports, options, &n_low_ports) < 0) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Misconfigured server ports");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ smartlist_add_all(ports_out, ports);
+ smartlist_free(ports);
+ ports = NULL;
+ retval = 0;
+
+ err:
+ if (*have_low_ports_out < 0)
+ *have_low_ports_out = (n_low_ports > 0);
+ if (ports) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(ports, port_cfg_t *, p, port_cfg_free(p));
+ smartlist_free(ports);
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/** Update the relay *Port_set values in <b>options</b> from <b>ports</b>. */
+void
+port_update_port_set_relay(or_options_t *options,
+ const smartlist_t *ports)
+{
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return;
+
+ if (BUG(!ports))
+ return;
+
+ if (options->ClientOnly)
+ return;
+
+ /* Update the relay *Port_set options. The !! here is to force a boolean
+ * out of an integer. */
+ options->ORPort_set =
+ !! port_count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER, 0);
+ options->DirPort_set =
+ !! port_count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER, 0);
+ options->ExtORPort_set =
+ !! port_count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation function, which checks that the current OS is usable in
+ * relay mode, if options is set to a relay mode.
+ *
+ * Warns about OSes with potential issues. Does not set *<b>msg</b>.
+ * Always returns 0.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_relay_os(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!server_mode(options))
+ return 0;
+
+ const char *uname = get_uname();
+
+ if (!strcmpstart(uname, "Windows 95") ||
+ !strcmpstart(uname, "Windows 98") ||
+ !strcmpstart(uname, "Windows Me")) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Tor is running as a server, but you are "
+ "running %s; this probably won't work. See "
+ "https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html#BestOSForRelay "
+ "for details.", uname);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the relay info options.
+ * Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_relay_info(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (options->Nickname == NULL) {
+ if (server_mode(options)) {
+ options->Nickname = tor_strdup(UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!is_legal_nickname(options->Nickname)) {
+ tor_asprintf(msg,
+ "Nickname '%s', nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters "
+ "inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].",
+ options->Nickname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (server_mode(options) && !options->ContactInfo) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Your ContactInfo config option is not set. Please strongly "
+ "consider setting it, so we can contact you if your relay is "
+ "misconfigured, end-of-life, or something else goes wrong. "
+ "It is also possible that your relay might get rejected from "
+ "the network due to a missing valid contact address.");
+ }
+
+ const char *ContactInfo = options->ContactInfo;
+ if (ContactInfo && !string_is_utf8(ContactInfo, strlen(ContactInfo)))
+ REJECT("ContactInfo config option must be UTF-8.");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Parse an authority type from <b>options</b>-\>PublishServerDescriptor
+ * and write it to <b>options</b>-\>PublishServerDescriptor_. Treat "1"
+ * as "v3" unless BridgeRelay is 1, in which case treat it as "bridge".
+ * Treat "0" as "".
+ * Return 0 on success or -1 if not a recognized authority type (in which
+ * case the value of PublishServerDescriptor_ is undefined). */
+static int
+compute_publishserverdescriptor(or_options_t *options)
+{
+ smartlist_t *list = options->PublishServerDescriptor;
+ dirinfo_type_t *auth = &options->PublishServerDescriptor_;
+ *auth = NO_DIRINFO;
+ if (!list) /* empty list, answer is none */
+ return 0;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(list, const char *, string) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(string, "v1"))
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "PublishServerDescriptor v1 has no effect, because "
+ "there are no v1 directory authorities anymore.");
+ else if (!strcmp(string, "1"))
+ if (options->BridgeRelay)
+ *auth |= BRIDGE_DIRINFO;
+ else
+ *auth |= V3_DIRINFO;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(string, "v2"))
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "PublishServerDescriptor v2 has no effect, because "
+ "there are no v2 directory authorities anymore.");
+ else if (!strcasecmp(string, "v3"))
+ *auth |= V3_DIRINFO;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(string, "bridge"))
+ *auth |= BRIDGE_DIRINFO;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(string, "hidserv"))
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "PublishServerDescriptor hidserv is invalid. See "
+ "PublishHidServDescriptors.");
+ else if (!strcasecmp(string, "") || !strcmp(string, "0"))
+ /* no authority */;
+ else
+ return -1;
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(string);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate the configured bridge distribution method from a BridgeDistribution
+ * config line.
+ *
+ * The input <b>bd</b>, is a string taken from the BridgeDistribution config
+ * line (if present). If the option wasn't set, return 0 immediately. The
+ * BridgeDistribution option is then validated. Currently valid, recognised
+ * options are:
+ *
+ * - "none"
+ * - "any"
+ * - "https"
+ * - "email"
+ * - "moat"
+ *
+ * If the option string is unrecognised, a warning will be logged and 0 is
+ * returned. If the option string contains an invalid character, -1 is
+ * returned.
+ **/
+STATIC int
+check_bridge_distribution_setting(const char *bd)
+{
+ if (bd == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ const char *RECOGNIZED[] = {
+ "none", "any", "https", "email", "moat"
+ };
+ unsigned i;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(RECOGNIZED); ++i) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(bd, RECOGNIZED[i]))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const char *cp = bd;
+ // Method = (KeywordChar | "_") +
+ while (TOR_ISALNUM(*cp) || *cp == '-' || *cp == '_')
+ ++cp;
+
+ if (*cp == 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unrecognized BridgeDistribution value %s. I'll "
+ "assume you know what you are doing...", escaped(bd));
+ return 0; // we reached the end of the string; all is well
+ } else {
+ return -1; // we found a bad character in the string.
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the bridge relay options.
+ * Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_publish_server(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (compute_publishserverdescriptor(options) < 0) {
+ tor_asprintf(msg, "Unrecognized value in PublishServerDescriptor");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((options->BridgeRelay
+ || options->PublishServerDescriptor_ & BRIDGE_DIRINFO)
+ && (options->PublishServerDescriptor_ & V3_DIRINFO)) {
+ REJECT("Bridges are not supposed to publish router descriptors to the "
+ "directory authorities. Please correct your "
+ "PublishServerDescriptor line.");
+ }
+
+ if (options->BridgeDistribution) {
+ if (!options->BridgeRelay) {
+ REJECT("You set BridgeDistribution, but you didn't set BridgeRelay!");
+ }
+ if (check_bridge_distribution_setting(options->BridgeDistribution) < 0) {
+ REJECT("Invalid BridgeDistribution value.");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (options->PublishServerDescriptor)
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->PublishServerDescriptor, const char *, pubdes, {
+ if (!strcmp(pubdes, "1") || !strcmp(pubdes, "0"))
+ if (smartlist_len(options->PublishServerDescriptor) > 1) {
+ COMPLAIN("You have passed a list of multiple arguments to the "
+ "PublishServerDescriptor option that includes 0 or 1. "
+ "0 or 1 should only be used as the sole argument. "
+ "This configuration will be rejected in a future release.");
+ break;
+ }
+ });
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the relay padding options.
+ * Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_relay_padding(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!server_mode(options))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (options->ConnectionPadding != -1) {
+ REJECT("Relays must use 'auto' for the ConnectionPadding setting.");
+ }
+
+ if (options->ReducedConnectionPadding != 0) {
+ REJECT("Relays cannot set ReducedConnectionPadding. ");
+ }
+
+ if (options->CircuitPadding == 0) {
+ REJECT("Relays cannot set CircuitPadding to 0. ");
+ }
+
+ if (options->ReducedCircuitPadding == 1) {
+ REJECT("Relays cannot set ReducedCircuitPadding. ");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the relay bandwidth options.
+ * Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_relay_bandwidth(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* 31851: the tests expect us to validate bandwidths, even when we are not
+ * in relay mode. */
+ if (config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->MaxAdvertisedBandwidth,
+ "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth", msg) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->RelayBandwidthRate,
+ "RelayBandwidthRate", msg) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->RelayBandwidthBurst,
+ "RelayBandwidthBurst", msg) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->PerConnBWRate,
+ "PerConnBWRate", msg) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (config_ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->PerConnBWBurst,
+ "PerConnBWBurst", msg) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate && !options->RelayBandwidthBurst)
+ options->RelayBandwidthBurst = options->RelayBandwidthRate;
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthBurst && !options->RelayBandwidthRate)
+ options->RelayBandwidthRate = options->RelayBandwidthBurst;
+
+ if (server_mode(options)) {
+ const unsigned required_min_bw =
+ public_server_mode(options) ?
+ RELAY_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH : BRIDGE_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH;
+ const char * const optbridge =
+ public_server_mode(options) ? "" : "bridge ";
+ if (options->BandwidthRate < required_min_bw) {
+ tor_asprintf(msg,
+ "BandwidthRate is set to %d bytes/second. "
+ "For %sservers, it must be at least %u.",
+ (int)options->BandwidthRate, optbridge,
+ required_min_bw);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (options->MaxAdvertisedBandwidth <
+ required_min_bw/2) {
+ tor_asprintf(msg,
+ "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth is set to %d bytes/second. "
+ "For %sservers, it must be at least %u.",
+ (int)options->MaxAdvertisedBandwidth, optbridge,
+ required_min_bw/2);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate &&
+ options->RelayBandwidthRate < required_min_bw) {
+ tor_asprintf(msg,
+ "RelayBandwidthRate is set to %d bytes/second. "
+ "For %sservers, it must be at least %u.",
+ (int)options->RelayBandwidthRate, optbridge,
+ required_min_bw);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 31851: the tests expect us to validate bandwidths, even when we are not
+ * in relay mode. */
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > options->RelayBandwidthBurst)
+ REJECT("RelayBandwidthBurst must be at least equal "
+ "to RelayBandwidthRate.");
+
+ /* if they set relaybandwidth* really high but left bandwidth*
+ * at the default, raise the defaults. */
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > options->BandwidthRate)
+ options->BandwidthRate = options->RelayBandwidthRate;
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthBurst > options->BandwidthBurst)
+ options->BandwidthBurst = options->RelayBandwidthBurst;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the relay bandwidth accounting
+ * options. Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_relay_accounting(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* 31851: the tests expect us to validate accounting, even when we are not
+ * in relay mode. */
+ if (accounting_parse_options(options, 1)<0)
+ REJECT("Failed to parse accounting options. See logs for details.");
+
+ if (options->AccountingMax) {
+ if (options->RendConfigLines && server_mode(options)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Using accounting with a hidden service and an "
+ "ORPort is risky: your hidden service(s) and your public "
+ "address will all turn off at the same time, which may alert "
+ "observers that they are being run by the same party.");
+ } else if (config_count_key(options->RendConfigLines,
+ "HiddenServiceDir") > 1) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Using accounting with multiple hidden services is "
+ "risky: they will all turn off at the same time, which may "
+ "alert observers that they are being run by the same party.");
+ }
+ }
+
+ options->AccountingRule = ACCT_MAX;
+ if (options->AccountingRule_option) {
+ if (!strcmp(options->AccountingRule_option, "sum"))
+ options->AccountingRule = ACCT_SUM;
+ else if (!strcmp(options->AccountingRule_option, "max"))
+ options->AccountingRule = ACCT_MAX;
+ else if (!strcmp(options->AccountingRule_option, "in"))
+ options->AccountingRule = ACCT_IN;
+ else if (!strcmp(options->AccountingRule_option, "out"))
+ options->AccountingRule = ACCT_OUT;
+ else
+ REJECT("AccountingRule must be 'sum', 'max', 'in', or 'out'");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Verify whether lst is a list of strings containing valid-looking
+ * comma-separated nicknames, or NULL. Will normalise <b>lst</b> to prefix '$'
+ * to any nickname or fingerprint that needs it. Also splits comma-separated
+ * list elements into multiple elements. Return 0 on success.
+ * Warn and return -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+normalize_nickname_list(config_line_t **normalized_out,
+ const config_line_t *lst, const char *name,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ if (!lst)
+ return 0;
+
+ config_line_t *new_nicknames = NULL;
+ config_line_t **new_nicknames_next = &new_nicknames;
+
+ const config_line_t *cl;
+ for (cl = lst; cl; cl = cl->next) {
+ const char *line = cl->value;
+ if (!line)
+ continue;
+
+ int valid_line = 1;
+ smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_split_string(sl, line, ",",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK|SPLIT_STRIP_SPACE, 0);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(sl, char *, s)
+ {
+ char *normalized = NULL;
+ if (!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(s)) {
+ // check if first char is dollar
+ if (s[0] != '$') {
+ // Try again but with a dollar symbol prepended
+ char *prepended;
+ tor_asprintf(&prepended, "$%s", s);
+
+ if (is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(prepended)) {
+ // The nickname is valid when it's prepended, set it as the
+ // normalized version
+ normalized = prepended;
+ } else {
+ // Still not valid, free and fallback to error message
+ tor_free(prepended);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!normalized) {
+ tor_asprintf(msg, "Invalid nickname '%s' in %s line", s, name);
+ valid_line = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ normalized = tor_strdup(s);
+ }
+
+ config_line_t *next = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*next));
+ next->key = tor_strdup(cl->key);
+ next->value = normalized;
+ next->next = NULL;
+
+ *new_nicknames_next = next;
+ new_nicknames_next = &next->next;
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(sl);
+
+ if (!valid_line) {
+ config_free_lines(new_nicknames);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *normalized_out = new_nicknames;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define ONE_MEGABYTE (UINT64_C(1) << 20)
+
+/* If we have less than 300 MB suggest disabling dircache */
+#define DIRCACHE_MIN_MEM_MB 300
+#define DIRCACHE_MIN_MEM_BYTES (DIRCACHE_MIN_MEM_MB*ONE_MEGABYTE)
+#define STRINGIFY(val) #val
+
+/** Create a warning message for emitting if we are a dircache but may not have
+ * enough system memory, or if we are not a dircache but probably should be.
+ * Return -1 when a message is returned in *msg*, else return 0. */
+STATIC int
+have_enough_mem_for_dircache(const or_options_t *options, size_t total_mem,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ *msg = NULL;
+ /* XXX We should possibly be looking at MaxMemInQueues here
+ * unconditionally. Or we should believe total_mem unconditionally. */
+ if (total_mem == 0) {
+ if (get_total_system_memory(&total_mem) < 0) {
+ total_mem = options->MaxMemInQueues >= SIZE_MAX ?
+ SIZE_MAX : (size_t)options->MaxMemInQueues;
+ }
+ }
+ if (options->DirCache) {
+ if (total_mem < DIRCACHE_MIN_MEM_BYTES) {
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ tor_asprintf(msg, "Running a Bridge with less than %d MB of memory "
+ "is not recommended.", DIRCACHE_MIN_MEM_MB);
+ } else {
+ tor_asprintf(msg, "Being a directory cache (default) with less than "
+ "%d MB of memory is not recommended and may consume "
+ "most of the available resources. Consider disabling "
+ "this functionality by setting the DirCache option "
+ "to 0.", DIRCACHE_MIN_MEM_MB);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (total_mem >= DIRCACHE_MIN_MEM_BYTES) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("DirCache is disabled and we are configured as a "
+ "relay. We will not become a Guard.");
+ }
+ }
+ return *msg == NULL ? 0 : -1;
+}
+#undef STRINGIFY
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the relay mode options.
+ * Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_relay_mode(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (server_mode(options) && options->RendConfigLines)
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Tor is currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. "
+ "That's not very secure: you should probably run your hidden service "
+ "in a separate Tor process, at least -- see "
+ "https://trac.torproject.org/8742");
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay && options->DirPort_set) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Can't set a DirPort on a bridge relay; disabling "
+ "DirPort");
+ config_free_lines(options->DirPort_lines);
+ options->DirPort_lines = NULL;
+ options->DirPort_set = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (options->DirPort_set && !options->DirCache) {
+ REJECT("DirPort configured but DirCache disabled. DirPort requires "
+ "DirCache.");
+ }
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay && !options->DirCache) {
+ REJECT("We're a bridge but DirCache is disabled. BridgeRelay requires "
+ "DirCache.");
+ }
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay == 1 && ! options->ORPort_set)
+ REJECT("BridgeRelay is 1, ORPort is not set. This is an invalid "
+ "combination.");
+
+ if (server_mode(options)) {
+ char *dircache_msg = NULL;
+ if (have_enough_mem_for_dircache(options, 0, &dircache_msg)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s", dircache_msg);
+ tor_free(dircache_msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (options->MyFamily_lines && options->BridgeRelay) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Listing a family for a bridge relay is not "
+ "supported: it can reveal bridge fingerprints to censors. "
+ "You should also make sure you aren't listing this bridge's "
+ "fingerprint in any other MyFamily.");
+ }
+ if (options->MyFamily_lines && !options->ContactInfo) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "MyFamily is set but ContactInfo is not configured. "
+ "ContactInfo should always be set when MyFamily option is too.");
+ }
+ if (normalize_nickname_list(&options->MyFamily,
+ options->MyFamily_lines, "MyFamily", msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (options->ConstrainedSockets) {
+ if (options->DirPort_set) {
+ /* Providing cached directory entries while system TCP buffers are scarce
+ * will exacerbate the socket errors. Suggest that this be disabled. */
+ COMPLAIN("You have requested constrained socket buffers while also "
+ "serving directory entries via DirPort. It is strongly "
+ "suggested that you disable serving directory requests when "
+ "system TCP buffer resources are scarce.");
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the relay testing options
+ * in options. Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_relay_testing(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (options->SigningKeyLifetime < options->TestingSigningKeySlop*2)
+ REJECT("SigningKeyLifetime is too short.");
+ if (options->TestingLinkCertLifetime < options->TestingAuthKeySlop*2)
+ REJECT("LinkCertLifetime is too short.");
+ if (options->TestingAuthKeyLifetime < options->TestingLinkKeySlop*2)
+ REJECT("TestingAuthKeyLifetime is too short.");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if any change from <b>old_options</b> to <b>new_options</b>
+ * will require us to rotate the CPU and DNS workers; else return 0. */
+static int
+options_transition_affects_workers(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ const or_options_t *new_options)
+{
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(DataDirectory);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(NumCPUs);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(ORPort_lines);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(ServerDNSSearchDomains);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(SafeLogging_);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(ClientOnly);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(LogMessageDomains);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(Logs);
+
+ if (server_mode(old_options) != server_mode(new_options) ||
+ public_server_mode(old_options) != public_server_mode(new_options) ||
+ dir_server_mode(old_options) != dir_server_mode(new_options))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Nothing that changed matters. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if any change from <b>old_options</b> to <b>new_options</b>
+ * will require us to generate a new descriptor; else return 0. */
+static int
+options_transition_affects_descriptor(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ const or_options_t *new_options)
+{
+ /* XXX We can be smarter here. If your DirPort isn't being
+ * published and you just turned it off, no need to republish. Etc. */
+
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(DataDirectory);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(Nickname);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(Address);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(ExitPolicy);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(ExitRelay);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(ExitPolicyRejectPrivate);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(IPv6Exit);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(ORPort_lines);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(DirPort_lines);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(DirPort_lines);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(ClientOnly);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(DisableNetwork);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(PublishServerDescriptor_);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(ContactInfo);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(BridgeDistribution);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_LINELIST(MyFamily);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_STRING(AccountingStart);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(AccountingMax);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_INT(AccountingRule);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(DirCache);
+ YES_IF_CHANGED_BOOL(AssumeReachable);
+
+ if (relay_get_effective_bwrate(old_options) !=
+ relay_get_effective_bwrate(new_options) ||
+ relay_get_effective_bwburst(old_options) !=
+ relay_get_effective_bwburst(new_options) ||
+ public_server_mode(old_options) != public_server_mode(new_options))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take relay actions based on it. All of
+ * the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If present,
+ * <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_relay(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ const int transition_affects_workers =
+ old_options && options_transition_affects_workers(old_options, options);
+
+ /* We want to reinit keys as needed before we do much of anything else:
+ keys are important, and other things can depend on them. */
+ if (transition_affects_workers ||
+ (authdir_mode_v3(options) && (!old_options ||
+ !authdir_mode_v3(old_options)))) {
+ if (init_keys() < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error initializing keys; exiting");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (server_mode(options)) {
+ static int cdm_initialized = 0;
+ if (cdm_initialized == 0) {
+ cdm_initialized = 1;
+ consdiffmgr_configure(NULL);
+ consdiffmgr_validate();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for transitions that need action. */
+ if (old_options) {
+ if (transition_affects_workers) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Worker-related options changed. Rotating workers.");
+ const int server_mode_turned_on =
+ server_mode(options) && !server_mode(old_options);
+ const int dir_server_mode_turned_on =
+ dir_server_mode(options) && !dir_server_mode(old_options);
+
+ if (server_mode_turned_on || dir_server_mode_turned_on) {
+ cpu_init();
+ }
+
+ if (server_mode_turned_on) {
+ ip_address_changed(0);
+ if (have_completed_a_circuit() || !any_predicted_circuits(time(NULL)))
+ inform_testing_reachability();
+ }
+ cpuworkers_rotate_keyinfo();
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take relay accounting actions based on
+ * it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If
+ * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_relay_accounting(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* Set up accounting */
+ if (accounting_parse_options(options, 0)<0) {
+ // LCOV_EXCL_START
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error in previously validated accounting options");
+ return -1;
+ // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
+ }
+ if (accounting_is_enabled(options))
+ configure_accounting(time(NULL));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take relay bandwidth actions based on
+ * it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If
+ * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_relay_bandwidth(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* Check for transitions that need action. */
+ if (old_options) {
+ if (options->PerConnBWRate != old_options->PerConnBWRate ||
+ options->PerConnBWBurst != old_options->PerConnBWBurst)
+ connection_or_update_token_buckets(get_connection_array(), options);
+
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate != old_options->RelayBandwidthRate ||
+ options->RelayBandwidthBurst != old_options->RelayBandwidthBurst)
+ connection_bucket_adjust(options);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take bridge statistics actions based on
+ * it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If
+ * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_bridge_stats(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+/* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge?
+ * We use this so we don't count clients who used our bridge thinking it is
+ * a relay. If you change this, don't forget to change the log message
+ * below. It's 4 hours (the time it takes to stop being used by clients)
+ * plus some extra time for clock skew. */
+#define RELAY_BRIDGE_STATS_DELAY (6 * 60 * 60)
+
+ /* Check for transitions that need action. */
+ if (old_options) {
+ if (! bool_eq(options->BridgeRelay, old_options->BridgeRelay)) {
+ int was_relay = 0;
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ time_t int_start = time(NULL);
+ if (config_lines_eq(old_options->ORPort_lines,options->ORPort_lines)) {
+ int_start += RELAY_BRIDGE_STATS_DELAY;
+ was_relay = 1;
+ }
+ geoip_bridge_stats_init(int_start);
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "We are acting as a bridge now. Starting new "
+ "GeoIP stats interval%s.", was_relay ? " in 6 "
+ "hours from now" : "");
+ } else {
+ geoip_bridge_stats_term();
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "We are no longer acting as a bridge. "
+ "Forgetting GeoIP stats.");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take relay statistics actions based on
+ * it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If
+ * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Sets <b>*print_notice_out</b> if we enabled stats, and need to print
+ * a stats log using options_act_relay_stats_msg().
+ *
+ * If loading the GeoIP file failed, sets DirReqStatistics and
+ * EntryStatistics to 0. This breaks the normalization/act ordering
+ * introduced in 29211.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_relay_stats(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ bool *print_notice_out)
+{
+ if (BUG(!print_notice_out))
+ return -1;
+
+ or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
+
+ if (options->CellStatistics || options->DirReqStatistics ||
+ options->EntryStatistics || options->ExitPortStatistics ||
+ options->ConnDirectionStatistics ||
+ options->HiddenServiceStatistics) {
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ int print_notice = 0;
+
+ if ((!old_options || !old_options->CellStatistics) &&
+ options->CellStatistics) {
+ rep_hist_buffer_stats_init(now);
+ print_notice = 1;
+ }
+ if ((!old_options || !old_options->DirReqStatistics) &&
+ options->DirReqStatistics) {
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET)) {
+ geoip_dirreq_stats_init(now);
+ print_notice = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* disable statistics collection since we have no geoip file */
+ /* 29211: refactor to avoid the normalisation/act inversion */
+ options->DirReqStatistics = 0;
+ if (options->ORPort_set)
+ log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Configured to measure directory request "
+ "statistics, but no GeoIP database found. "
+ "Please specify a GeoIP database using the "
+ "GeoIPFile option.");
+ }
+ }
+ if ((!old_options || !old_options->EntryStatistics) &&
+ options->EntryStatistics && !should_record_bridge_info(options)) {
+ /* If we get here, we've started recording bridge info when we didn't
+ * do so before. Note that "should_record_bridge_info()" will
+ * always be false at this point, because of the earlier block
+ * that cleared EntryStatistics when public_server_mode() was false.
+ * We're leaving it in as defensive programming. */
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET) || geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6)) {
+ geoip_entry_stats_init(now);
+ print_notice = 1;
+ } else {
+ options->EntryStatistics = 0;
+ log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Configured to measure entry node "
+ "statistics, but no GeoIP database found. "
+ "Please specify a GeoIP database using the "
+ "GeoIPFile option.");
+ }
+ }
+ if ((!old_options || !old_options->ExitPortStatistics) &&
+ options->ExitPortStatistics) {
+ rep_hist_exit_stats_init(now);
+ print_notice = 1;
+ }
+ if ((!old_options || !old_options->ConnDirectionStatistics) &&
+ options->ConnDirectionStatistics) {
+ rep_hist_conn_stats_init(now);
+ }
+ if ((!old_options || !old_options->HiddenServiceStatistics) &&
+ options->HiddenServiceStatistics) {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Configured to measure hidden service statistics.");
+ rep_hist_hs_stats_init(now);
+ }
+ if (print_notice)
+ *print_notice_out = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* If we used to have statistics enabled but we just disabled them,
+ stop gathering them. */
+ if (old_options && old_options->CellStatistics &&
+ !options->CellStatistics)
+ rep_hist_buffer_stats_term();
+ if (old_options && old_options->DirReqStatistics &&
+ !options->DirReqStatistics)
+ geoip_dirreq_stats_term();
+ if (old_options && old_options->EntryStatistics &&
+ !options->EntryStatistics)
+ geoip_entry_stats_term();
+ if (old_options && old_options->HiddenServiceStatistics &&
+ !options->HiddenServiceStatistics)
+ rep_hist_hs_stats_term();
+ if (old_options && old_options->ExitPortStatistics &&
+ !options->ExitPortStatistics)
+ rep_hist_exit_stats_term();
+ if (old_options && old_options->ConnDirectionStatistics &&
+ !options->ConnDirectionStatistics)
+ rep_hist_conn_stats_term();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Print a notice about relay/dirauth stats being enabled. */
+void
+options_act_relay_stats_msg(void)
+{
+ log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Configured to measure statistics. Look for "
+ "the *-stats files that will first be written to the "
+ "data directory in 24 hours from now.");
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take relay descriptor actions based on
+ * it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If
+ * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_relay_desc(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our
+ * server descriptor.
+ */
+ if (!old_options ||
+ options_transition_affects_descriptor(old_options, options))
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("config change");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take relay DoS actions based on
+ * it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If
+ * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_relay_dos(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* DoS mitigation subsystem only applies to public relay. */
+ if (public_server_mode(options)) {
+ /* If we are configured as a relay, initialize the subsystem. Even on HUP,
+ * this is safe to call as it will load data from the current options
+ * or/and the consensus. */
+ dos_init();
+ } else if (old_options && public_server_mode(old_options)) {
+ /* Going from relay to non relay, clean it up. */
+ dos_free_all();
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take dirport actions based on
+ * it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly. If
+ * present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_relay_dir(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (!public_server_mode(options))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Load the webpage we're going to serve every time someone asks for '/' on
+ our DirPort. */
+ tor_free(global_dirfrontpagecontents);
+ if (options->DirPortFrontPage) {
+ global_dirfrontpagecontents =
+ read_file_to_str(options->DirPortFrontPage, 0, NULL);
+ if (!global_dirfrontpagecontents) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "DirPortFrontPage file '%s' not found. Continuing anyway.",
+ options->DirPortFrontPage);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_config.h b/src/feature/relay/relay_config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c70c322d88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_config.h
+ * @brief Header for feature/relay/relay_config.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_CONFIG_H
+#define TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_CONFIG_H
+
+struct or_options_t;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
+#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
+#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
+
+struct smartlist_t;
+
+int options_validate_relay_mode(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+MOCK_DECL(const char*, relay_get_dirportfrontpage, (void));
+void relay_config_free_all(void);
+
+uint32_t relay_get_effective_bwrate(const struct or_options_t *options);
+uint32_t relay_get_effective_bwburst(const struct or_options_t *options);
+
+void port_warn_nonlocal_ext_orports(const struct smartlist_t *ports,
+ const char *portname);
+
+int port_parse_ports_relay(struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg,
+ struct smartlist_t *ports_out,
+ int *have_low_ports_out);
+void port_update_port_set_relay(struct or_options_t *options,
+ const struct smartlist_t *ports);
+
+int options_validate_relay_os(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+int options_validate_relay_info(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+int options_validate_publish_server(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+int options_validate_relay_padding(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+int options_validate_relay_bandwidth(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+int options_validate_relay_accounting(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+int options_validate_relay_testing(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+int options_act_relay(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+int options_act_relay_accounting(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+int options_act_relay_bandwidth(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+int options_act_bridge_stats(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+
+int options_act_relay_stats(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ bool *print_notice_out);
+void options_act_relay_stats_msg(void);
+
+int options_act_relay_desc(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+int options_act_relay_dos(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+int options_act_relay_dir(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+
+#ifdef RELAY_CONFIG_PRIVATE
+
+STATIC int check_bridge_distribution_setting(const char *bd);
+STATIC int have_enough_mem_for_dircache(const struct or_options_t *options,
+ size_t total_mem, char **msg);
+
+#endif /* defined(RELAY_CONFIG_PRIVATE) */
+
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h"
+
+/** When tor is compiled with the relay module disabled, it can't be
+ * configured as a relay or bridge.
+ *
+ * Always sets ClientOnly to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns -1 and sets msg to a newly allocated string, if ORPort, DirPort,
+ * DirCache, or BridgeRelay are set in options. Otherwise returns 0. */
+static inline int
+options_validate_relay_mode(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ /* Only check the primary options for now, #29211 will disable more
+ * options. These ORPort and DirPort checks are too strict, and will
+ * reject valid configs that disable ports, like "ORPort 0". */
+ if (options->DirCache ||
+ options->BridgeRelay ||
+ options->ORPort_lines ||
+ options->DirPort_lines) {
+ /* REJECT() this configuration */
+ *msg = tor_strdup("This tor was built with relay mode disabled. "
+ "It can not be configured with an ORPort, a DirPort, "
+ "DirCache 1, or BridgeRelay 1.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int
+port_parse_ports_relay(or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg,
+ smartlist_t *ports_out,
+ int *have_low_ports_out)
+{
+ (void)options;
+ (void)msg;
+ (void)ports_out;
+ if (*have_low_ports_out < 0)
+ *have_low_ports_out = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define relay_get_dirportfrontpage() \
+ (NULL)
+#define relay_config_free_all() \
+ STMT_BEGIN STMT_END
+
+#define relay_get_effective_bwrate(options) \
+ (((void)(options)),0)
+#define relay_get_effective_bwburst(options) \
+ (((void)(options)),0)
+
+#define port_warn_nonlocal_ext_orports(ports, portname) \
+ (((void)(ports)),((void)(portname)))
+
+#define port_update_port_set_relay(options, ports) \
+ (((void)(options)),((void)(ports)))
+
+#define options_validate_relay_os(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+#define options_validate_relay_info(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+#define options_validate_publish_server(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+#define options_validate_relay_padding(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+#define options_validate_relay_bandwidth(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+#define options_validate_relay_accounting(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+#define options_validate_relay_testing(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+
+#define options_act_relay(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+#define options_act_relay_accounting(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+#define options_act_relay_bandwidth(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+#define options_act_bridge_stats(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+
+#define options_act_relay_stats(old_options, print_notice_out) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(print_notice_out)),0)
+#define options_act_relay_stats_msg() \
+ STMT_BEGIN STMT_END
+
+#define options_act_relay_desc(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+#define options_act_relay_dos(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+#define options_act_relay_dir(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_CONFIG_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..86cd799d42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file relay_find_addr.c
+ * \brief Implement mechanism for a relay to find its address.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/config/resolve_addr.h"
+
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+
+#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+
+/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
+ * headers. */
+static tor_addr_t last_guessed_ip = TOR_ADDR_NULL;
+
+/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
+ * a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
+ * about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
+ * 0; else return -1. */
+static int
+router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
+{
+ if (!tor_addr_is_null(&last_guessed_ip)) {
+ *guess = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** A directory server <b>d_conn</b> told us our IP address is
+ * <b>suggestion</b>.
+ * If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
+ * if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
+void
+router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
+ const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
+{
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ uint32_t cur = 0; /* Current IPv4 address. */
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
+ if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, suggestion) == -1) {
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
+ escaped(suggestion));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
+
+ if (!server_mode(options)) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* XXXX ipv6 */
+ cur = get_last_resolved_addr();
+ if (cur ||
+ resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
+ /* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip, cur); /* store it in case we
+ need it later */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
+ /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) {
+ /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
+ "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.",
+ suggestion);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
+ * us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
+ * resolve it. */
+ if (!tor_addr_eq(&last_guessed_ip, &addr)) {
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
+ suggestion);
+ log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &last_guessed_ip, &addr,
+ d_conn->base_.address);
+ ip_address_changed(0);
+ tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); /* router_rebuild_descriptor()
+ will fetch it */
+ }
+}
+
+/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
+ * it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
+ * dirserver headers. Place the answer in *<b>addr</b> and return
+ * 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess.
+ *
+ * If <b>cache_only</b> is true, just return any cached answers, and
+ * don't try to get any new answers.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+router_pick_published_address, (const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr,
+ int cache_only))
+{
+ /* First, check the cached output from resolve_my_address(). */
+ *addr = get_last_resolved_addr();
+ if (*addr)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Second, consider doing a resolve attempt right here. */
+ if (!cache_only) {
+ if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Third, check the cached output from router_new_address_suggestion(). */
+ if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We have no useful cached answers. Return failure. */
+ return -1;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h b/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac51a977e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file relay_find_addr.h
+ * \brief Header file for relay_find_addr.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_RELAY_FIND_ADDR_H
+#define TOR_RELAY_FIND_ADDR_H
+
+MOCK_DECL(int, router_pick_published_address,
+ (const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr, int cache_only));
+
+void router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
+ const dir_connection_t *d_conn);
+
+#ifdef RELAY_FIND_ADDR_PRIVATE
+
+#endif /* RELAY_FIND_ADDR_PRIVATE */
+
+#endif /* TOR_RELAY_FIND_ADDR_H */
+
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..030dc94956
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.c
@@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_handshake.c
+ * @brief Functions to implement the relay-only parts of our
+ * connection handshake.
+ *
+ * Some parts of our TLS link handshake are only done by relays (including
+ * bridges). Specifically, only relays need to send CERTS cells; only
+ * relays need to send or receive AUTHCHALLENGE cells, and only relays need to
+ * send or receive AUTHENTICATE cells.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_handshake.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "trunnel/link_handshake.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+
+#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h"
+#include "core/or/var_cell_st.h"
+
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+
+/** Helper used to add an encoded certs to a cert cell */
+static void
+add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ const uint8_t *cert_encoded,
+ size_t cert_len)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert_len <= UINT16_MAX);
+ certs_cell_cert_t *ccc = certs_cell_cert_new();
+ ccc->cert_type = cert_type;
+ ccc->cert_len = cert_len;
+ certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(ccc, cert_len);
+ memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(ccc), cert_encoded, cert_len);
+
+ certs_cell_add_certs(certs_cell, ccc);
+}
+
+/** Add an encoded X509 cert (stored as <b>cert_len</b> bytes at
+ * <b>cert_encoded</b>) to the trunnel certs_cell_t object that we are
+ * building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to <b>cert_type</b>.
+ * (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
+static void
+add_x509_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (NULL == cert)
+ return;
+
+ const uint8_t *cert_encoded = NULL;
+ size_t cert_len;
+ tor_x509_cert_get_der(cert, &cert_encoded, &cert_len);
+
+ add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type, cert_encoded, cert_len);
+}
+
+/** Add an Ed25519 cert from <b>cert</b> to the trunnel certs_cell_t object
+ * that we are building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to
+ * <b>cert_type</b>. (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
+static void
+add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ const tor_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (NULL == cert)
+ return;
+
+ add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type,
+ cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing = 0;
+#else
+#define certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing 0
+#endif
+
+/** Send a CERTS cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1
+ * on failure. */
+int
+connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *global_link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *own_link_cert = NULL;
+ var_cell_t *cell;
+
+ certs_cell_t *certs_cell = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
+
+ if (! conn->handshake_state)
+ return -1;
+
+ const int conn_in_server_mode = ! conn->handshake_state->started_here;
+
+ /* Get the encoded values of the X509 certificates */
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(conn_in_server_mode,
+ &global_link_cert, &id_cert) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+ own_link_cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
+ }
+ tor_assert(id_cert);
+
+ certs_cell = certs_cell_new();
+
+ /* Start adding certs. First the link cert or auth1024 cert. */
+ if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(own_link_cert);
+ add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
+ OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK, own_link_cert);
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(global_link_cert);
+ add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
+ OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024, global_link_cert);
+ }
+
+ /* Next the RSA->RSA ID cert */
+ add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
+ OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024, id_cert);
+
+ /* Next the Ed25519 certs */
+ add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN,
+ get_master_signing_key_cert());
+ if (conn_in_server_mode) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert ||
+ certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing);
+ add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK,
+ conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert);
+ } else {
+ add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH,
+ get_current_auth_key_cert());
+ }
+
+ /* And finally the crosscert. */
+ {
+ const uint8_t *crosscert=NULL;
+ size_t crosscert_len;
+ get_master_rsa_crosscert(&crosscert, &crosscert_len);
+ if (crosscert) {
+ add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell,
+ CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID,
+ crosscert, crosscert_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We've added all the certs; make the cell. */
+ certs_cell->n_certs = certs_cell_getlen_certs(certs_cell);
+
+ ssize_t alloc_len = certs_cell_encoded_len(certs_cell);
+ tor_assert(alloc_len >= 0 && alloc_len <= UINT16_MAX);
+ cell = var_cell_new(alloc_len);
+ cell->command = CELL_CERTS;
+ ssize_t enc_len = certs_cell_encode(cell->payload, alloc_len, certs_cell);
+ tor_assert(enc_len > 0 && enc_len <= alloc_len);
+ cell->payload_len = enc_len;
+
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+ var_cell_free(cell);
+ certs_cell_free(certs_cell);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(own_link_cert);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+int testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported = 0;
+#else
+#define testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported 0
+#endif
+
+/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type</b> is an AUTHCHALLENGE type that
+ * we can send and receive. */
+int
+authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type)
+{
+ switch (challenge_type) {
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
+#ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS
+ return 1;
+#else
+ return testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported;
+#endif
+ case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ return 1;
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type_a</b> is one that we would rather
+ * use than <b>challenge_type_b</b>. */
+int
+authchallenge_type_is_better(uint16_t challenge_type_a,
+ uint16_t challenge_type_b)
+{
+ /* Any supported type is better than an unsupported one;
+ * all unsupported types are equally bad. */
+ if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_a))
+ return 0;
+ if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_b))
+ return 1;
+ /* It happens that types are superior in numerically ascending order.
+ * If that ever changes, this must change too. */
+ return (challenge_type_a > challenge_type_b);
+}
+
+/** Send an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0
+ * on success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ var_cell_t *cell = NULL;
+ int r = -1;
+ tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
+
+ if (! conn->handshake_state)
+ return -1;
+
+ auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new();
+
+ tor_assert(sizeof(ac->challenge) == 32);
+ crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge));
+
+ if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET))
+ auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET);
+ /* Disabled, because everything that supports this method also supports
+ * the much-superior ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 */
+ /* auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705); */
+ if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705))
+ auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
+ auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac,
+ auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(ac));
+
+ cell = var_cell_new(auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(ac));
+ ssize_t len = auth_challenge_cell_encode(cell->payload, cell->payload_len,
+ ac);
+ if (len != cell->payload_len) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Encoded auth challenge cell length not as expected");
+ goto done;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE;
+
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+ r = 0;
+
+ done:
+ var_cell_free(cell);
+ auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
+ * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>. Return it
+ * in a var_cell_t.
+ *
+ * If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first
+ * V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
+ * determined by the rest of the handshake, and which match the provided value
+ * exactly.
+ *
+ * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the
+ * first V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything
+ * that should be signed), but don't actually sign it.
+ *
+ * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is provided, calculate the
+ * entire authenticator, signed with <b>signing_key</b>.
+ *
+ * Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure.
+ */
+var_cell_t *
+connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const int authtype,
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
+ int server)
+{
+ auth1_t *auth = NULL;
+ auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
+ var_cell_t *result = NULL;
+ int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
+ const char *authtype_str = NULL;
+
+ int is_ed = 0;
+
+ /* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
+ switch (authtype) {
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
+ authtype_str = "AUTH0001";
+ old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 1;
+ break;
+ case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ authtype_str = "AUTH0002";
+ break;
+ case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
+ authtype_str = "AUTH0003";
+ is_ed = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ tor_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ auth = auth1_new();
+ ctx->is_ed = is_ed;
+
+ /* Type: 8 bytes. */
+ memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8);
+
+ {
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL;
+ const common_digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
+ const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, NULL, &id_cert))
+ goto err;
+ my_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+ their_digests =
+ tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert);
+ tor_assert(my_digests);
+ tor_assert(their_digests);
+ my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
+ their_id = (uint8_t*)their_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
+
+ client_id = server ? their_id : my_id;
+ server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;
+
+ /* Client ID digest: 32 octets. */
+ memcpy(auth->cid, client_id, 32);
+
+ /* Server ID digest: 32 octets. */
+ memcpy(auth->sid, server_id, 32);
+ }
+
+ if (is_ed) {
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *my_ed_id, *their_ed_id;
+ if (!conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Ed authenticate without Ed ID cert from peer.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ my_ed_id = get_master_identity_key();
+ their_ed_id = &conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key;
+
+ const uint8_t *cid_ed = (server ? their_ed_id : my_ed_id)->pubkey;
+ const uint8_t *sid_ed = (server ? my_ed_id : their_ed_id)->pubkey;
+
+ memcpy(auth->u1_cid_ed, cid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ memcpy(auth->u1_sid_ed, sid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ }
+
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *server_d, *client_d;
+ if (server) {
+ server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
+ client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
+ } else {
+ client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
+ server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
+ }
+
+ /* Server log digest : 32 octets */
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(server_d, (char*)auth->slog, 32);
+
+ /* Client log digest : 32 octets */
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(client_d, (char*)auth->clog, 32);
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* Digest of cert used on TLS link : 32 octets. */
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+ if (server) {
+ cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
+ } else {
+ cert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls);
+ }
+ if (!cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making %s data.",
+ authtype_str);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(auth->scert,
+ tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32);
+
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ }
+
+ /* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */
+ if (old_tlssecrets_algorithm) {
+ if (tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets) < 0) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Somebody asked us for an older TLS "
+ "authentication method (AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET) "
+ "which we don't support.");
+ }
+ } else {
+ char label[128];
+ tor_snprintf(label, sizeof(label),
+ "EXPORTER FOR TOR TLS CLIENT BINDING %s", authtype_str);
+ int r = tor_tls_export_key_material(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets,
+ auth->cid, sizeof(auth->cid),
+ label);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r != -2)
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "TLS key export failed for unknown reason.");
+ // If r == -2, this was openssl bug 7712.
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out
+ * of the habit of sending time around willynilly. Fortunately, nothing
+ * checks it. That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
+ crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
+
+ ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx);
+ if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+ maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+ } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
+ maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key);
+ }
+
+ const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */
+ result = var_cell_new(AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN + maxlen);
+ uint8_t *const out = result->payload + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+ const size_t outlen = maxlen;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
+ set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype));
+
+ if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+
+ if (server) {
+ auth1_t *tmp = NULL;
+ ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len, ctx);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data that "
+ "we just encoded");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ result->payload_len = (tmp->end_of_signed - result->payload);
+
+ auth1_free(tmp);
+ if (len2 != len) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+ ed25519_signature_t sig;
+ if (ed25519_sign(&sig, out, len, ed_signing_key) < 0) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to sign ed25519 authentication data");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ auth1_setlen_sig(auth, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+ memcpy(auth1_getarray_sig(auth), sig.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
+
+ } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
+ auth1_setlen_sig(auth, crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key));
+
+ char d[32];
+ crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, len, DIGEST_SHA256);
+ int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key,
+ (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth),
+ auth1_getlen_sig(auth),
+ d, 32);
+ if (siglen < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to sign AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
+ }
+
+ len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
+ goto err;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ tor_assert(len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN <= result->payload_len);
+ result->payload_len = len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+ set_uint16(result->payload+2, htons(len));
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ var_cell_free(result);
+ result = NULL;
+ done:
+ auth1_free(auth);
+ auth_ctx_free(ctx);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Send an AUTHENTICATE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on
+ * success, -1 on failure */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
+{
+ var_cell_t *cell;
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
+ /* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */
+
+ if (!pk) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't compute authenticate cell: no client auth key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to send authenticate cell with unknown "
+ "authentication type %d", authtype);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
+ authtype,
+ pk,
+ get_current_auth_keypair(),
+ 0 /* not server */);
+ if (! cell) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
+ var_cell_free(cell);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.h b/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..99a658cbcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_handshake.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_handshake.h
+ * @brief Header for feature/relay/relay_handshake.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_CORE_OR_RELAY_HANDSHAKE_H
+#define TOR_CORE_OR_RELAY_HANDSHAKE_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+struct ed25519_keypair_t;
+
+int connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
+int connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
+
+var_cell_t *connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+ or_connection_t *conn,
+ const int authtype,
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
+ const struct ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
+ int server);
+
+int authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type);
+int authchallenge_type_is_better(uint16_t challenge_type_a,
+ uint16_t challenge_type_b);
+
+MOCK_DECL(int,connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,
+ (or_connection_t *conn, int type));
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+extern int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing;
+#endif
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+static inline int
+connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+static inline int
+connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static inline var_cell_t *
+connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+ or_connection_t *conn,
+ const int authtype,
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
+ const struct ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
+ int server)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ (void)authtype;
+ (void)signing_key;
+ (void)ed_signing_key;
+ (void)server;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#define authchallenge_type_is_supported(t) (0)
+#define authchallenge_type_is_better(a, b) (0)
+
+static inline int
+connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, int type)
+{
+ (void)conn;
+ (void)type;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+extern int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_CORE_OR_RELAY_HANDSHAKE_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bfe12cd0b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_periodic.c
+ * @brief Periodic functions for the relay subsytem
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+
+#include "core/mainloop/periodic.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/cpuworker.h" // XXXX use a pubsub event.
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h"
+#include "core/or/circuituse.h" // XXXX move have_performed_bandwidth_test
+
+#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_periodic.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
+#include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
+
+#ifndef COCCI
+#define DECLARE_EVENT(name, roles, flags) \
+ static periodic_event_item_t name ## _event = \
+ PERIODIC_EVENT(name, \
+ PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_##roles, \
+ flags)
+#endif /* !defined(COCCI) */
+
+#define FL(name) (PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_##name)
+
+/**
+ * Periodic callback: If we're a server and initializing dns failed, retry.
+ */
+static int
+retry_dns_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ (void)now;
+#define RETRY_DNS_INTERVAL (10*60)
+ if (server_mode(options) && has_dns_init_failed())
+ dns_init();
+ return RETRY_DNS_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(retry_dns, ROUTER, 0);
+
+static int dns_honesty_first_time = 1;
+
+/**
+ * Periodic event: if we're an exit, see if our DNS server is telling us
+ * obvious lies.
+ */
+static int
+check_dns_honesty_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ (void)now;
+ /* 9. and if we're an exit node, check whether our DNS is telling stories
+ * to us. */
+ if (net_is_disabled() ||
+ ! public_server_mode(options) ||
+ router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star())
+ return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE;
+
+ if (dns_honesty_first_time) {
+ /* Don't launch right when we start */
+ dns_honesty_first_time = 0;
+ return crypto_rand_int_range(60, 180);
+ }
+
+ dns_launch_correctness_checks();
+ return 12*3600 + crypto_rand_int(12*3600);
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(check_dns_honesty, RELAY, FL(NEED_NET));
+
+/* Periodic callback: rotate the onion keys after the period defined by the
+ * "onion-key-rotation-days" consensus parameter, shut down and restart all
+ * cpuworkers, and update our descriptor if necessary.
+ */
+static int
+rotate_onion_key_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (server_mode(options)) {
+ int onion_key_lifetime = get_onion_key_lifetime();
+ time_t rotation_time = get_onion_key_set_at()+onion_key_lifetime;
+ if (rotation_time > now) {
+ return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating onion key.");
+ rotate_onion_key();
+ cpuworkers_rotate_keyinfo();
+ if (router_rebuild_descriptor(1)<0) {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Couldn't rebuild router descriptor");
+ }
+ if (advertised_server_mode() && !net_is_disabled())
+ router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(0);
+ return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL;
+ }
+ return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE;
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(rotate_onion_key, ROUTER, 0);
+
+/** Periodic callback: consider rebuilding or and re-uploading our descriptor
+ * (if we've passed our internal checks). */
+static int
+check_descriptor_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+/** How often do we check whether part of our router info has changed in a
+ * way that would require an upload? That includes checking whether our IP
+ * address has changed. */
+#define CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (60)
+
+ (void)options;
+
+ /* 2b. Once per minute, regenerate and upload the descriptor if the old
+ * one is inaccurate. */
+ if (!net_is_disabled()) {
+ check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(now);
+ check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(now);
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(now);
+ consider_publishable_server(0);
+ }
+
+ return CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(check_descriptor, ROUTER, FL(NEED_NET));
+
+static int dirport_reachability_count = 0;
+
+/**
+ * Periodic callback: check whether we're reachable (as a relay), and
+ * whether our bandwidth has changed enough that we need to
+ * publish a new descriptor.
+ */
+static int
+check_for_reachability_bw_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ /* XXXX This whole thing was stuck in the middle of what is now
+ * XXXX check_descriptor_callback. I'm not sure it's right. */
+ /** How often should we consider launching reachability tests in our first
+ * TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT seconds? */
+#define EARLY_CHECK_REACHABILITY_INTERVAL (60)
+
+ /* also, check religiously for reachability, if it's within the first
+ * 20 minutes of our uptime. */
+ if (server_mode(options) &&
+ (have_completed_a_circuit() || !any_predicted_circuits(now)) &&
+ !net_is_disabled()) {
+ if (get_uptime() < TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT) {
+ router_do_reachability_checks(1, dirport_reachability_count==0);
+ if (++dirport_reachability_count > 5)
+ dirport_reachability_count = 0;
+ return EARLY_CHECK_REACHABILITY_INTERVAL;
+ } else {
+ /* If we haven't checked for 12 hours and our bandwidth estimate is
+ * low, do another bandwidth test. This is especially important for
+ * bridges, since they might go long periods without much use. */
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ static int first_time = 1;
+ if (!first_time && me &&
+ me->bandwidthcapacity < me->bandwidthrate &&
+ me->bandwidthcapacity < 51200) {
+ reset_bandwidth_test();
+ }
+ first_time = 0;
+#define BANDWIDTH_RECHECK_INTERVAL (12*60*60)
+ return BANDWIDTH_RECHECK_INTERVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(check_for_reachability_bw, ROUTER, FL(NEED_NET));
+
+/**
+ * Callback: Send warnings if Tor doesn't find its ports reachable.
+ */
+static int
+reachability_warnings_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ (void) now;
+
+ if (get_uptime() < TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT) {
+ return (int)(TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT - get_uptime());
+ }
+
+ if (server_mode(options) &&
+ !net_is_disabled() &&
+ have_completed_a_circuit()) {
+ /* every 20 minutes, check and complain if necessary */
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (me && !check_whether_orport_reachable(options)) {
+ char *address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr);
+ if (address) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Your server (%s:%d) has not managed to confirm that "
+ "its ORPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors "
+ "until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check "
+ "your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.",
+ address, me->or_port);
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN,
+ "REACHABILITY_FAILED ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
+ address, me->or_port);
+ tor_free(address);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (me && !check_whether_dirport_reachable(options)) {
+ char *address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr);
+ if (address) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Your server (%s:%d) has not managed to confirm that its "
+ "DirPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors "
+ "until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check "
+ "your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.",
+ address, me->dir_port);
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN,
+ "REACHABILITY_FAILED DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
+ address, me->dir_port);
+ tor_free(address);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT;
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(reachability_warnings, ROUTER, FL(NEED_NET));
+
+/* Periodic callback: Every 30 seconds, check whether it's time to make new
+ * Ed25519 subkeys.
+ */
+static int
+check_ed_keys_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (server_mode(options)) {
+ if (should_make_new_ed_keys(options, now)) {
+ int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options, now);
+ if (new_signing_key < 0 ||
+ generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0)) {
+ log_err(LD_OR, "Unable to update Ed25519 keys! Exiting.");
+ tor_shutdown_event_loop_and_exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ return 30;
+ }
+ return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE;
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(check_ed_keys, ROUTER, 0);
+
+/* Period callback: Check if our old onion keys are still valid after the
+ * period of time defined by the consensus parameter
+ * "onion-key-grace-period-days", otherwise expire them by setting them to
+ * NULL.
+ */
+static int
+check_onion_keys_expiry_time_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (server_mode(options)) {
+ int onion_key_grace_period = get_onion_key_grace_period();
+ time_t expiry_time = get_onion_key_set_at()+onion_key_grace_period;
+ if (expiry_time > now) {
+ return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Expiring old onion keys.");
+ expire_old_onion_keys();
+ cpuworkers_rotate_keyinfo();
+ return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL;
+ }
+
+ return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE;
+}
+
+DECLARE_EVENT(check_onion_keys_expiry_time, ROUTER, 0);
+
+void
+relay_register_periodic_events(void)
+{
+ periodic_events_register(&retry_dns_event);
+ periodic_events_register(&check_dns_honesty_event);
+ periodic_events_register(&rotate_onion_key_event);
+ periodic_events_register(&check_descriptor_event);
+ periodic_events_register(&check_for_reachability_bw_event);
+ periodic_events_register(&reachability_warnings_event);
+ periodic_events_register(&check_ed_keys_event);
+ periodic_events_register(&check_onion_keys_expiry_time_event);
+
+ dns_honesty_first_time = 1;
+ dirport_reachability_count = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Update our schedule so that we'll check whether we need to update our
+ * descriptor immediately, rather than after up to CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL
+ * seconds.
+ */
+void
+reschedule_descriptor_update_check(void)
+{
+ periodic_event_reschedule(&check_descriptor_event);
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.h b/src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ccda9a440b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_periodic.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_periodic.h
+ * @brief Header for feature/relay/relay_periodic.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_PERIODIC_H
+#define TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_PERIODIC_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
+void relay_register_periodic_events(void);
+void reschedule_descriptor_update_check(void);
+
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h"
+
+#define relay_register_periodic_events() \
+ STMT_NIL
+#define reschedule_descriptor_update_check() \
+ STMT_NIL
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_PERIODIC_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_stub.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_stub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..283aaf6e49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_stub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_stub.c
+ * @brief Stub declarations for use when relay module is disabled.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_sys.h"
+#include "lib/subsys/subsys.h"
+
+const struct subsys_fns_t sys_relay = {
+ .name = "relay",
+ SUBSYS_DECLARE_LOCATION(),
+ .supported = false,
+ .level = RELAY_SUBSYS_LEVEL,
+};
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_sys.c b/src/feature/relay/relay_sys.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e90740925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_sys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_sys.c
+ * @brief Subsystem definitions for the relay module.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+
+#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
+#include "feature/relay/ext_orport.h"
+#include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_periodic.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_sys.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+
+#include "lib/subsys/subsys.h"
+
+static int
+subsys_relay_initialize(void)
+{
+ relay_register_periodic_events();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+subsys_relay_shutdown(void)
+{
+ dns_free_all();
+ ext_orport_free_all();
+ clear_pending_onions();
+ routerkeys_free_all();
+ router_free_all();
+}
+
+const struct subsys_fns_t sys_relay = {
+ .name = "relay",
+ SUBSYS_DECLARE_LOCATION(),
+ .supported = true,
+ .level = RELAY_SUBSYS_LEVEL,
+ .initialize = subsys_relay_initialize,
+ .shutdown = subsys_relay_shutdown,
+};
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/relay_sys.h b/src/feature/relay/relay_sys.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9bad93a6c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/relay_sys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file relay_sys.h
+ * @brief Header for feature/relay/relay_sys.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_SYS_H
+#define TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_SYS_H
+
+extern const struct subsys_fns_t sys_relay;
+
+/**
+ * Subsystem level for the relay system.
+ *
+ * Defined here so that it can be shared between the real and stub
+ * definitions.
+ **/
+#define RELAY_SUBSYS_LEVEL 50
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_RELAY_SYS_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/router.c b/src/feature/relay/router.c
index 283f7c326b..75a3d2f35c 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/router.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.c
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#define ROUTER_PRIVATE
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/config/resolve_addr.h"
#include "app/config/statefile.h"
#include "app/main/main.h"
#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
@@ -16,7 +17,7 @@
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/protover.h"
#include "feature/client/transports.h"
-#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
#include "feature/dirauth/process_descs.h"
#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
@@ -30,10 +31,13 @@
#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodefamily.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_config.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_find_addr.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
@@ -49,6 +53,7 @@
#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
#include "lib/osinfo/uname.h"
#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/version/torversion.h"
#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
@@ -58,6 +63,7 @@
#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
@@ -149,6 +155,8 @@ routerinfo_err_to_string(int err)
return "Cannot generate descriptor";
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING:
return "Descriptor still rebuilding - not ready yet";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG:
+ return "Internal bug, see logs for details";
}
log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown routerinfo error %d - shouldn't happen", err);
@@ -191,8 +199,8 @@ set_onion_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
/** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been
* loaded or generated. */
-crypto_pk_t *
-get_onion_key(void)
+MOCK_IMPL(crypto_pk_t *,
+get_onion_key,(void))
{
tor_assert(onionkey);
return onionkey;
@@ -239,7 +247,7 @@ expire_old_onion_keys(void)
lastonionkey = NULL;
}
- /* We zero out the keypair. See the tor_mem_is_zero() check made in
+ /* We zero out the keypair. See the fast_mem_is_zero() check made in
* construct_ntor_key_map() below. */
memset(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
@@ -266,11 +274,12 @@ expire_old_onion_keys(void)
/** Return the current secret onion key for the ntor handshake. Must only
* be called from the main thread. */
-static const curve25519_keypair_t *
-get_current_curve25519_keypair(void)
+MOCK_IMPL(STATIC const struct curve25519_keypair_t *,
+get_current_curve25519_keypair,(void))
{
return &curve25519_onion_key;
}
+
/** Return a map from KEYID (the key itself) to keypairs for use in the ntor
* handshake. Must only be called from the main thread. */
di_digest256_map_t *
@@ -281,12 +290,12 @@ construct_ntor_key_map(void)
const uint8_t *cur_pk = curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key;
const uint8_t *last_pk = last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key;
- if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char *)cur_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ if (!fast_mem_is_zero((const char *)cur_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
dimap_add_entry(&m, cur_pk,
tor_memdup(&curve25519_onion_key,
sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
}
- if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
+ if (!fast_mem_is_zero((const char*)last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
tor_memneq(cur_pk, last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
dimap_add_entry(&m, last_pk,
tor_memdup(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
@@ -337,6 +346,16 @@ set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
}
}
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/** Testing only -- set the server's RSA identity digest to
+ * be <b>digest</b> */
+void
+set_server_identity_key_digest_testing(const uint8_t *digest)
+{
+ memcpy(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+}
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as
* appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */
static void
@@ -356,11 +375,13 @@ assert_identity_keys_ok(void)
}
}
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has
* been set, and that we are running as a Tor server.
*/
-crypto_pk_t *
-get_server_identity_key(void)
+MOCK_IMPL(crypto_pk_t *,
+get_server_identity_key,(void))
{
tor_assert(server_identitykey);
tor_assert(server_mode(get_options()));
@@ -368,6 +389,8 @@ get_server_identity_key(void)
return server_identitykey;
}
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
/** Return true iff we are a server and the server identity key
* has been set. */
int
@@ -634,7 +657,7 @@ load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
fname);
goto done;
}
- parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, &eos);
+ parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, strlen(cert), &eos);
if (!parsed) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname);
goto done;
@@ -727,8 +750,8 @@ v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void)
}
/** Get the lifetime of an onion key in days. This value is defined by the
- * network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days". Always returns a value
- * between <b>MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b> and
+ * network consensus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days". Always returns a
+ * value between <b>MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b> and
* <b>MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b>.
*/
static int
@@ -742,7 +765,7 @@ get_onion_key_rotation_days_(void)
}
/** Get the current lifetime of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined
- * by the network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days", but the value
+ * by the network consensus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days", but the value
* is converted to seconds.
*/
int
@@ -752,7 +775,7 @@ get_onion_key_lifetime(void)
}
/** Get the grace period of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined by
- * the network consesus parameter "onion-key-grace-period-days", but the value
+ * the network consensus parameter "onion-key-grace-period-days", but the value
* is converted to seconds.
*/
int
@@ -866,15 +889,6 @@ init_keys_common(void)
if (!key_lock)
key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
- /* There are a couple of paths that put us here before we've asked
- * openssl to initialize itself. */
- if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel,
- get_options()->AccelName,
- get_options()->AccelDir)) {
- log_err(LD_BUG, "Unable to initialize OpenSSL. Exiting.");
- return -1;
- }
-
return 0;
}
@@ -1031,7 +1045,7 @@ init_keys(void)
return -1;
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
- if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char *)
+ if (fast_mem_is_zero((const char *)
last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
@@ -1062,8 +1076,10 @@ init_keys(void)
if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
const char *m = NULL;
routerinfo_t *ri;
- /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
- if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key())) {
+ /* We need to add our own fingerprint and ed25519 key so it gets
+ * recognized. */
+ if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
+ get_master_identity_key())) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to set of relays");
return -1;
}
@@ -1202,7 +1218,7 @@ router_should_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port)
* much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
* off if using AccountingRule in. */
int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length();
- uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options);
+ uint32_t effective_bw = relay_get_effective_bwrate(options);
uint64_t acc_bytes;
if (!interval_length) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "An accounting interval is not allowed to be zero "
@@ -1384,7 +1400,7 @@ consider_publishable_server(int force)
}
/** Return the port of the first active listener of type
- * <b>listener_type</b>. */
+ * <b>listener_type</b>. Returns 0 if no port is found. */
/** XXX not a very good interface. it's not reliable when there are
multiple listeners. */
uint16_t
@@ -1406,8 +1422,7 @@ router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(int listener_type,
/** Return the port that we should advertise as our ORPort; this is either
* the one configured in the ORPort option, or the one we actually bound to
- * if ORPort is "auto".
- */
+ * if ORPort is "auto". Returns 0 if no port is found. */
uint16_t
router_get_advertised_or_port(const or_options_t *options)
{
@@ -1456,7 +1471,7 @@ router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(const or_options_t *options,
AF_INET6);
if (!addr || port == 0) {
- log_info(LD_CONFIG, "There is no advertised IPv6 ORPort.");
+ log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "There is no advertised IPv6 ORPort.");
return;
}
@@ -1477,6 +1492,24 @@ router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(const or_options_t *options,
ipv6_ap_out->port = port;
}
+/** Returns true if this router has an advertised IPv6 ORPort. */
+bool
+router_has_advertised_ipv6_orport(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ tor_addr_port_t ipv6_ap;
+ router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(options, &ipv6_ap);
+ return tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(&ipv6_ap, 0);
+}
+
+/** Returns true if this router has an advertised IPv6 ORPort. */
+MOCK_IMPL(bool,
+router_can_extend_over_ipv6,(const or_options_t *options))
+{
+ /* We might add some extra checks here, such as ExtendAllowIPv6Addresses
+ * from ticket 33818. */
+ return router_has_advertised_ipv6_orport(options);
+}
+
/** Return the port that we should advertise as our DirPort;
* this is one of three possibilities:
* The one that is passed as <b>dirport</b> if the DirPort option is 0, or
@@ -1511,9 +1544,9 @@ static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL;
static const char *desc_gen_reason = "uninitialized reason";
/** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"? 0 if we need to regenerate it
* now. */
-static time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
+STATIC time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
/** Why did we mark the descriptor dirty? */
-static const char *desc_dirty_reason = "Tor just started";
+STATIC const char *desc_dirty_reason = "Tor just started";
/** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */
static int desc_needs_upload = 0;
@@ -1732,45 +1765,6 @@ router_get_descriptor_gen_reason(void)
return desc_gen_reason;
}
-/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family
- * declaration verbatim rather than as digests. */
-static smartlist_t *warned_nonexistent_family = NULL;
-
-static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess);
-
-/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
- * it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
- * dirserver headers. Place the answer in *<b>addr</b> and return
- * 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess.
- *
- * If <b>cache_only</b> is true, just return any cached answers, and
- * don't try to get any new answers.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-router_pick_published_address,(const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr,
- int cache_only))
-{
- /* First, check the cached output from resolve_my_address(). */
- *addr = get_last_resolved_addr();
- if (*addr)
- return 0;
-
- /* Second, consider doing a resolve attempt right here. */
- if (!cache_only) {
- if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
- log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr));
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Third, check the cached output from router_new_address_suggestion(). */
- if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) >= 0)
- return 0;
-
- /* We have no useful cached answers. Return failure. */
- return -1;
-}
-
/* Like router_check_descriptor_address_consistency, but specifically for the
* ORPort or DirPort.
* listener_type is either CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER or CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER. */
@@ -1848,26 +1842,159 @@ router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr)
CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
}
-/** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document
- * for this OR. Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated
- * extra-info document. Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error. Failure to
- * generate an extra-info document is not an error and is indicated by setting
- * e to NULL. Caller is responsible for freeing generated documents if 0 is
- * returned.
+/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family,
+ * for one reason or another. */
+static smartlist_t *warned_family = NULL;
+
+/**
+ * Return a new smartlist containing the family members configured in
+ * <b>options</b>. Warn about invalid or missing entries. Return NULL
+ * if this relay should not declare a family.
+ **/
+STATIC smartlist_t *
+get_my_declared_family(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (!options->MyFamily)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!warned_family)
+ warned_family = smartlist_new();
+
+ smartlist_t *declared_family = smartlist_new();
+ config_line_t *family;
+
+ /* First we try to get the whole family in the form of hexdigests. */
+ for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
+ char *name = family->value;
+ const node_t *member;
+ if (options->Nickname && !strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
+ continue; /* Don't list ourself by nickname, that's redundant */
+ else
+ member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
+
+ if (!member) {
+ /* This node doesn't seem to exist, so warn about it if it is not
+ * a hexdigest. */
+ int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name) &&
+ !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
+ if (is_legal)
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "There is a router named %s in my declared family, but "
+ "I have no descriptor for it. I'll use the nickname "
+ "as is, but this may confuse clients. Please list it "
+ "by identity digest instead.", escaped(name));
+ else
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
+ "family, but that isn't a legal digest or nickname. "
+ "Skipping it.", escaped(name));
+ smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
+ }
+ if (is_legal) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(declared_family, name);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* List the node by digest. */
+ char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
+ fp[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(declared_family, fp);
+
+ if (! is_legal_hexdigest(name) &&
+ !smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name)) {
+ /* Warn if this node was not specified by hexdigest. */
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
+ "family, but it wasn't listed by digest. Please consider "
+ "saying %s instead, if that's what you meant.",
+ escaped(name), fp);
+ smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now declared_family should have the closest we can come to the
+ * identities that the user wanted.
+ *
+ * Unlike older versions of Tor, we _do_ include our own identity: this
+ * helps microdescriptor compression, and helps in-memory compression
+ * on clients. */
+ nodefamily_t *nf = nodefamily_from_members(declared_family,
+ router_get_my_id_digest(),
+ NF_WARN_MALFORMED,
+ NULL);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(declared_family, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(declared_family);
+ if (!nf) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ char *s = nodefamily_format(nf);
+ nodefamily_free(nf);
+
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_split_string(result, s, NULL,
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
+ tor_free(s);
+
+ if (smartlist_len(result) == 1) {
+ /* This is a one-element list containing only ourself; instead return
+ * nothing */
+ const char *singleton = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ bool is_me = false;
+ if (singleton[0] == '$') {
+ char d[DIGEST_LEN];
+ int n = base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), singleton+1, strlen(singleton+1));
+ if (n == DIGEST_LEN &&
+ fast_memeq(d, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ is_me = true;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!is_me) {
+ // LCOV_EXCL_START
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found a singleton family list with an element "
+ "that wasn't us! Element was %s", escaped(singleton));
+ // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
+ } else {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(result, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(result);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Allocate a fresh, unsigned routerinfo for this OR, without any of the
+ * fields that depend on the corresponding extrainfo.
+ *
+ * On success, set ri_out to the new routerinfo, and return 0.
+ * Caller is responsible for freeing the generated routerinfo.
+ *
+ * Returns a negative value and sets ri_out to NULL on temporary error.
*/
-int
-router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
+MOCK_IMPL(STATIC int,
+router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo,(routerinfo_t **ri_out))
{
- routerinfo_t *ri;
- extrainfo_t *ei;
+ routerinfo_t *ri = NULL;
uint32_t addr;
char platform[256];
int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
+
+ if (BUG(!ri_out)) {
+ result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Don't know my address while generating descriptor");
- return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR;
+ result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR;
+ goto err;
}
/* Log a message if the address in the descriptor doesn't match the ORPort
@@ -1894,15 +2021,15 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
/* For now, at most one IPv6 or-address is being advertised. */
tor_addr_port_t ipv6_orport;
router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(options, &ipv6_orport);
- /* If there is no valud IPv6 ORPort, the address and port are null. */
+ /* If there is no valid IPv6 ORPort, the address and port are null. */
tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &ipv6_orport.addr);
ri->ipv6_orport = ipv6_orport.port;
ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key());
if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
ri->cache_info.identity_digest) < 0)) {
- routerinfo_free(ri);
- return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED;
+ result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED;
+ goto err;
}
ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
@@ -1913,10 +2040,10 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
ri->protocol_list = tor_strdup(protover_get_supported_protocols());
/* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */
- ri->bandwidthrate = get_effective_bwrate(options);
+ ri->bandwidthrate = relay_get_effective_bwrate(options);
/* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */
- ri->bandwidthburst = get_effective_bwburst(options);
+ ri->bandwidthburst = relay_get_effective_bwburst(options);
/* Report bandwidth, unless we're hibernating or shutting down */
ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
@@ -1939,134 +2066,260 @@ router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
tor_free(p_tmp);
}
- if (options->MyFamily && ! options->BridgeRelay) {
- if (!warned_nonexistent_family)
- warned_nonexistent_family = smartlist_new();
- ri->declared_family = smartlist_new();
- config_line_t *family;
- for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
- char *name = family->value;
- const node_t *member;
- if (!strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
- continue; /* Don't list ourself, that's redundant */
- else
- member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
- if (!member) {
- int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
- if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name) &&
- !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
- if (is_legal)
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "I have no descriptor for the router named \"%s\" in my "
- "declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but "
- "this may confuse clients.", name);
- else
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named \"%s\" in my "
- "declared family, but that isn't a legal nickname. "
- "Skipping it.", escaped(name));
- smartlist_add_strdup(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
- }
- if (is_legal) {
- smartlist_add_strdup(ri->declared_family, name);
- }
- } else if (router_digest_is_me(member->identity)) {
- /* Don't list ourself in our own family; that's redundant */
- /* XXX shouldn't be possible */
- } else {
- char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
- fp[0] = '$';
- base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
- member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
- smartlist_add(ri->declared_family, fp);
- if (smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name))
- smartlist_string_remove(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
- }
- }
+ ri->declared_family = get_my_declared_family(options);
- /* remove duplicates from the list */
- smartlist_sort_strings(ri->declared_family);
- smartlist_uniq_strings(ri->declared_family);
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ ri->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE;
+ /* Bridges shouldn't be able to send their descriptors unencrypted,
+ anyway, since they don't have a DirPort, and always connect to the
+ bridge authority anonymously. But just in case they somehow think of
+ sending them on an unencrypted connection, don't allow them to try. */
+ ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
+ } else {
+ ri->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
+ ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
}
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ *ri_out = NULL;
+ return result;
+
+ done:
+ *ri_out = ri;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Allocate and return a fresh, unsigned extrainfo for this OR, based on the
+ * routerinfo ri.
+ *
+ * Uses options->Nickname to set the nickname, and options->BridgeRelay to set
+ * ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted.
+ *
+ * If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns NULL.
+ * Caller is responsible for freeing the generated extrainfo.
+ */
+static extrainfo_t *
+router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ extrainfo_t *ei = NULL;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (BUG(!ri))
+ return NULL;
+
/* Now generate the extrainfo. */
ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
- strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
+ strlcpy(ei->nickname, options->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
ei->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ /* See note in router_build_fresh_routerinfo(). */
+ ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
+ } else {
+ ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
+ }
+
+ return ei;
+}
+
+/** Dump the extrainfo descriptor body for ei, sign it, and add the body and
+ * signature to ei->cache_info. Note that the extrainfo body is determined by
+ * ei, and some additional config and statistics state: see
+ * extrainfo_dump_to_string() for details.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
+ * If ei is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns -1.
+ * On error, ei->cache_info is not modified.
+ */
+static int
+router_dump_and_sign_extrainfo_descriptor_body(extrainfo_t *ei)
+{
+ if (BUG(!ei))
+ return -1;
+
if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
ei, get_server_identity_key(),
get_master_signing_keypair()) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
- extrainfo_free(ei);
- ei = NULL;
- } else {
- ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
- strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
- router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
- ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
- ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
- crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256,
- ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
- ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
- DIGEST_SHA256);
+ return -1;
}
- /* Now finish the router descriptor. */
- if (ei) {
- memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
- ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN);
- memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
- ei->digest256,
- DIGEST256_LEN);
- } else {
- /* ri was allocated with tor_malloc_zero, so there is no need to
- * zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
+ strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
+
+ router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
+ crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ DIGEST_SHA256);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Allocate and return a fresh, signed extrainfo for this OR, based on the
+ * routerinfo ri.
+ *
+ * If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns NULL.
+ * Caller is responsible for freeing the generated extrainfo.
+ */
+STATIC extrainfo_t *
+router_build_fresh_signed_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ int result = -1;
+ extrainfo_t *ei = NULL;
+
+ if (BUG(!ri))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ei = router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo(ri);
+ /* router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo() should not fail. */
+ if (BUG(!ei))
+ goto err;
+
+ result = router_dump_and_sign_extrainfo_descriptor_body(ei);
+ if (result < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ return NULL;
+
+ done:
+ return ei;
+}
+
+/** Set the fields in ri that depend on ei.
+ *
+ * If ei is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and zeroes the relevant fields.
+ */
+STATIC void
+router_update_routerinfo_from_extrainfo(routerinfo_t *ri,
+ const extrainfo_t *ei)
+{
+ if (BUG(!ei)) {
+ /* Just to be safe, zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
+ memset(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memset(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256, 0, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ return;
}
+
+ /* Now finish the router descriptor. */
+ memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
+ ei->digest256,
+ DIGEST256_LEN);
+}
+
+/** Dump the descriptor body for ri, sign it, and add the body and signature to
+ * ri->cache_info. Note that the descriptor body is determined by ri, and some
+ * additional config and state: see router_dump_router_to_string() for details.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, and a negative value on temporary error.
+ * If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns a negative value.
+ * On error, ri->cache_info is not modified.
+ */
+STATIC int
+router_dump_and_sign_routerinfo_descriptor_body(routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ if (BUG(!ri))
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
+
if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body =
router_dump_router_to_string(ri, get_server_identity_key(),
get_onion_key(),
get_current_curve25519_keypair(),
get_master_signing_keypair())) ) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
- routerinfo_free(ri);
- extrainfo_free(ei);
return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE;
}
+
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
- ri->purpose =
- options->BridgeRelay ? ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
- if (options->BridgeRelay) {
- /* Bridges shouldn't be able to send their descriptors unencrypted,
- anyway, since they don't have a DirPort, and always connect to the
- bridge authority anonymously. But just in case they somehow think of
- sending them on an unencrypted connection, don't allow them to try. */
- ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
- if (ei)
- ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
- } else {
- ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
- if (ei)
- ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
- }
-
router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body),
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and signed extrainfo
+ * document for this OR.
+ *
+ * Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated extrainfo document.
+ * Failure to generate an extra-info document is not an error and is indicated
+ * by setting e to NULL.
+ * Return 0 on success, and a negative value on temporary error.
+ * Caller is responsible for freeing generated documents on success.
+ */
+int
+router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
+{
+ int result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
+ routerinfo_t *ri = NULL;
+ extrainfo_t *ei = NULL;
+
+ if (BUG(!r))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BUG(!e))
+ goto err;
+
+ result = router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo(&ri);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If ri is NULL, then result should be negative. So this check should be
+ * unreachable. */
+ if (BUG(!ri)) {
+ result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ei = router_build_fresh_signed_extrainfo(ri);
+
+ /* Failing to create an ei is not an error. */
if (ei) {
- tor_assert(!
- routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
- &ri->cache_info, NULL));
+ router_update_routerinfo_from_extrainfo(ri, ei);
}
+ result = router_dump_and_sign_routerinfo_descriptor_body(ri);
+ if (result < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (ei) {
+ if (BUG(routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
+ &ri->cache_info, NULL))) {
+ result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ *r = NULL;
+ *e = NULL;
+ return result;
+
+ done:
*r = ri;
*e = ei;
return 0;
@@ -2152,7 +2405,9 @@ mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(time_t now)
/* Now we see whether we want to be retrying frequently or no. The
* rule here is that we'll retry frequently if we aren't listed in the
* live consensus we have, or if the publication time of the
- * descriptor listed for us in the consensus is very old. */
+ * descriptor listed for us in the consensus is very old, or if the
+ * consensus lists us as "stale" and we haven't regenerated since the
+ * consensus was published. */
ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
if (ns) {
rs = networkstatus_vote_find_entry(ns, server_identitykey_digest);
@@ -2160,6 +2415,8 @@ mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(time_t now)
retry_fast_reason = "not listed in consensus";
else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff)
retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old";
+ else if (rs->is_staledesc && ns->valid_after > desc_clean_since)
+ retry_fast_reason = "listed as stale in consensus";
}
if (retry_fast_reason && desc_clean_since < fast_cutoff)
@@ -2231,9 +2488,13 @@ check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now)
}
}
+// This function can be "noreturn" if relay mode is disabled and
+// ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL is set.
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING("-Wmissing-noreturn")
+
/** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from
* <b>prev</b> to <b>cur</b>. */
-static void
+void
log_addr_has_changed(int severity,
const tor_addr_t *prev,
const tor_addr_t *cur,
@@ -2260,6 +2521,7 @@ log_addr_has_changed(int severity,
"Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).",
addrbuf_cur, source);
}
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING("-Wmissing-noreturn")
/** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration
* has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service
@@ -2305,86 +2567,6 @@ check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now)
tor_free(hostname);
}
-/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
- * headers. */
-static tor_addr_t last_guessed_ip = TOR_ADDR_NULL;
-
-/** A directory server <b>d_conn</b> told us our IP address is
- * <b>suggestion</b>.
- * If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
- * if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
-void
-router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
- const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
-{
- tor_addr_t addr;
- uint32_t cur = 0; /* Current IPv4 address. */
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
-
- /* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
- if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, suggestion) == -1) {
- log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
- escaped(suggestion));
- return;
- }
-
- log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
-
- if (!server_mode(options)) {
- tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr);
- return;
- }
-
- /* XXXX ipv6 */
- cur = get_last_resolved_addr();
- if (cur ||
- resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
- /* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
- tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip, cur); /* store it in case we
- need it later */
- return;
- }
- if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
- /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
- return;
- }
- if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) {
- /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
- log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
- "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.",
- suggestion);
- return;
- }
-
- /* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
- * us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
- * resolve it. */
- if (!tor_addr_eq(&last_guessed_ip, &addr)) {
- control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
- "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
- suggestion);
- log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &last_guessed_ip, &addr,
- d_conn->base_.address);
- ip_address_changed(0);
- tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); /* router_rebuild_descriptor()
- will fetch it */
- }
-}
-
-/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
- * a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
- * about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
- * 0; else return -1. */
-static int
-router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
-{
- if (!tor_addr_is_null(&last_guessed_ip)) {
- *guess = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip);
- return 0;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
* string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
* currently running on.
@@ -2405,6 +2587,10 @@ get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
* with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and return a new
* string encoding the result, or NULL on failure.
+ *
+ * In addition to the fields in router, this function calls
+ * onion_key_lifetime(), get_options(), and we_are_hibernating(), and uses the
+ * results to populate some fields in the descriptor.
*/
char *
router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
@@ -2468,11 +2654,8 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
goto err;
}
- if (ed25519_public_to_base64(ed_fp_base64,
- &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key)<0) {
- log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode identity key\n");
- goto err;
- }
+ ed25519_public_to_base64(ed_fp_base64,
+ &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key);
tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
"-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
"%s"
@@ -2606,6 +2789,9 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
}
address = tor_dup_ip(router->addr);
+ if (!address)
+ goto err;
+
chunks = smartlist_new();
/* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
@@ -2722,8 +2908,7 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
signing_keypair) < 0)
goto err;
- if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig) < 0)
- goto err;
+ ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
}
@@ -2862,34 +3047,26 @@ load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now,
return r;
}
-/** Write the contents of <b>extrainfo</b> and aggregated statistics to
- * *<b>s_out</b>, signing them with <b>ident_key</b>. Return 0 on
- * success, negative on failure. */
-int
-extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
- crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
- const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
+/** Add header strings to chunks, based on the extrainfo object extrainfo,
+ * and ed25519 keypair signing_keypair, if emit_ed_sigs is true.
+ * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */
+static int
+extrainfo_dump_to_string_header_helper(
+ smartlist_t *chunks,
+ const extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair,
+ int emit_ed_sigs)
{
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
- char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
- char *bandwidth_usage;
- int result;
- static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
- char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
- char *s = NULL, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
- extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
- const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
- extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
+ char *pre = NULL;
+ int rv = -1;
base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
- bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
if (emit_ed_sigs) {
if (!extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
!ed25519_pubkey_eq(&extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
@@ -2915,21 +3092,64 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
ed_cert_line = tor_strdup("");
}
- tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n%s",
+ /* This is the first chunk in the file. If the file is too big, other chunks
+ * are removed. So we must only add one chunk here. */
+ tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n",
extrainfo->nickname, identity,
ed_cert_line,
- published, bandwidth_usage);
+ published);
smartlist_add(chunks, pre);
- if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET))
- smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip-db-digest %s\n",
- geoip_db_digest(AF_INET));
- if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6))
- smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip6-db-digest %s\n",
- geoip_db_digest(AF_INET6));
+ rv = 0;
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ rv = -1;
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(ed_cert_line);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/** Add pluggable transport and statistics strings to chunks, skipping
+ * statistics if write_stats_to_extrainfo is false.
+ * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
+ * Can not fail. */
+static void
+extrainfo_dump_to_string_stats_helper(smartlist_t *chunks,
+ int write_stats_to_extrainfo)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ char *contents = NULL;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ /* If the file is too big, these chunks are removed, starting with the last
+ * chunk. So each chunk must be a complete line, and the file must be valid
+ * after each chunk. */
+
+ /* Add information about the pluggable transports we support, even if we
+ * are not publishing statistics. This information is needed by BridgeDB
+ * to distribute bridges. */
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
+ char *pluggable_transports = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string();
+ if (pluggable_transports)
+ smartlist_add(chunks, pluggable_transports);
+ }
if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor.");
+ /* Bandwidth usage stats don't have their own option */
+ {
+ contents = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ /* geoip hashes aren't useful unless we are publishing other stats */
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip-db-digest %s\n",
+ geoip_db_digest(AF_INET));
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip6-db-digest %s\n",
+ geoip_db_digest(AF_INET6));
if (options->DirReqStatistics &&
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats",
"dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
@@ -2965,50 +3185,140 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
if (contents)
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
+ /* bridge statistics */
+ if (should_record_bridge_info(options)) {
+ const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now);
+ if (bridge_stats) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, bridge_stats);
+ }
+ }
}
+}
- /* Add information about the pluggable transports we support. */
- if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
- char *pluggable_transports = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string();
- if (pluggable_transports)
- smartlist_add(chunks, pluggable_transports);
- }
+/** Add an ed25519 signature of chunks to chunks, using the ed25519 keypair
+ * signing_keypair.
+ * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */
+static int
+extrainfo_dump_to_string_ed_sig_helper(
+ smartlist_t *chunks,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
+{
+ char sha256_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ ed25519_signature_t ed_sig;
+ char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ /* These are two of the three final chunks in the file. If the file is too
+ * big, other chunks are removed. So we must only add two chunks here. */
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
+ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+ chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
+ if (ed25519_sign(&ed_sig, (const uint8_t*)sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ signing_keypair) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &ed_sig);
- if (should_record_bridge_info(options) && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
- const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now);
- if (bridge_stats) {
- smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, bridge_stats);
- }
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
+
+ rv = 0;
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ rv = -1;
+
+ done:
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/** Add an RSA signature of extrainfo_string to chunks, using the RSA key
+ * ident_key.
+ * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */
+static int
+extrainfo_dump_to_string_rsa_sig_helper(smartlist_t *chunks,
+ crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+ const char *extrainfo_string)
+{
+ char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
+ char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
+ if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(extrainfo_string, strlen(extrainfo_string),
+ digest) < 0 ||
+ router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN,
+ ident_key) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info "
+ "descriptor.");
+ goto err;
}
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, sig);
+
+ rv = 0;
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ rv = -1;
+
+ done:
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/** Write the contents of <b>extrainfo</b>, to * *<b>s_out</b>, signing them
+ * with <b>ident_key</b>.
+ *
+ * If ExtraInfoStatistics is 1, also write aggregated statistics and related
+ * configuration data before signing. Most statistics also have an option that
+ * enables or disables that particular statistic.
+ *
+ * Always write pluggable transport lines.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, negative on failure. */
+int
+extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
+ crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
+{
+ int result;
+ static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
+ char *s = NULL, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
+ smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
+ extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
+ const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_header_helper(chunks, extrainfo,
+ signing_keypair,
+ emit_ed_sigs);
+ if (rv < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ extrainfo_dump_to_string_stats_helper(chunks, write_stats_to_extrainfo);
if (emit_ed_sigs) {
- char sha256_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
- smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
- crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
- ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
- chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
- ed25519_signature_t ed_sig;
- char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
- if (ed25519_sign(&ed_sig, (const uint8_t*)sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
- signing_keypair) < 0)
- goto err;
- if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &ed_sig) < 0)
+ rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_ed_sig_helper(chunks, signing_keypair);
+ if (rv < 0)
goto err;
-
- smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
}
+ /* This is one of the three final chunks in the file. If the file is too big,
+ * other chunks are removed. So we must only add one chunk here. */
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) {
/* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial
* extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing
- * things. */
- if (smartlist_len(chunks) > 2) {
- /* We remove the next-to-last element (remember, len-1 is the last
- element), since we need to keep the router-signature element. */
- int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - 2;
+ * things. If emit_ed_sigs is true, we also keep 2 additional chunks at the
+ * end for the ed25519 signature. */
+ const int required_chunks = emit_ed_sigs ? 4 : 2;
+ if (smartlist_len(chunks) > required_chunks) {
+ /* We remove the next-to-last or 4th-last element (remember, len-1 is the
+ * last element), since we need to keep the router-signature elements. */
+ int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - required_chunks;
char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx);
smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx);
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
@@ -3025,15 +3335,10 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
}
}
- memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
- if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, strlen(s), digest) < 0 ||
- router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN,
- ident_key) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info "
- "descriptor.");
+ rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_rsa_sig_helper(chunks, ident_key, s);
+ if (rv < 0)
goto err;
- }
- smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, sig);
+
tor_free(s);
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
@@ -3069,9 +3374,7 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, chunk, tor_free(chunk));
smartlist_free(chunks);
tor_free(s_dup);
- tor_free(ed_cert_line);
extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
- tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
return result;
}
@@ -3081,9 +3384,9 @@ extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
void
router_reset_warnings(void)
{
- if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_clear(warned_nonexistent_family);
+ if (warned_family) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_clear(warned_family);
}
}
@@ -3096,6 +3399,10 @@ router_free_all(void)
crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
+ /* Destroying a locked mutex is undefined behaviour. This mutex may be
+ * locked, because multiple threads can access it. But we need to destroy
+ * it, otherwise re-initialisation will trigger undefined behaviour.
+ * See #31735 for details. */
tor_mutex_free(key_lock);
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
@@ -3107,11 +3414,12 @@ router_free_all(void)
memwipe(&curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(curve25519_onion_key));
memwipe(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
- if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(warned_nonexistent_family);
+ if (warned_family) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(warned_family);
}
}
+
/* From the given RSA key object, convert it to ASN-1 encoded format and set
* the newly allocated object in onion_pkey_out. The length of the key is set
* in onion_pkey_len_out. */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/router.h b/src/feature/relay/router.h
index ab1f771017..50790a73dd 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/router.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -23,11 +23,18 @@ struct ed25519_keypair_t;
#define TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED (-4)
#define TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE (-5)
#define TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING (-6)
+#define TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG (-7)
-crypto_pk_t *get_onion_key(void);
+MOCK_DECL(crypto_pk_t *,get_onion_key,(void));
time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void);
void set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k);
-crypto_pk_t *get_server_identity_key(void);
+/* Some compilers are clever enough to know that when relay mode is disabled,
+ * this function never returns. */
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+MOCK_DECL(crypto_pk_t *,get_server_identity_key,(void));
+#else
+#define get_server_identity_key() (tor_abort_(),NULL)
+#endif
int server_identity_key_is_set(void);
void set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k);
crypto_pk_t *get_tlsclient_identity_key(void);
@@ -61,6 +68,8 @@ uint16_t router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(int listener_type,
uint16_t router_get_advertised_or_port(const or_options_t *options);
void router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(const or_options_t *options,
tor_addr_port_t *ipv6_ap_out);
+bool router_has_advertised_ipv6_orport(const or_options_t *options);
+MOCK_DECL(bool, router_can_extend_over_ipv6,(const or_options_t *options));
uint16_t router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(const or_options_t *options,
sa_family_t family);
uint16_t router_get_advertised_dir_port(const or_options_t *options,
@@ -78,8 +87,6 @@ void mark_my_descriptor_dirty(const char *reason);
void check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now);
void check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now);
int router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options);
-void router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
- const dir_connection_t *d_conn);
int router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port);
MOCK_DECL(int, router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star,(void));
MOCK_DECL(const routerinfo_t *, router_get_my_routerinfo, (void));
@@ -91,9 +98,6 @@ int router_digest_is_me(const char *digest);
const uint8_t *router_get_my_id_digest(void);
int router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest);
int router_is_me(const routerinfo_t *router);
-MOCK_DECL(int,router_pick_published_address,(const or_options_t *options,
- uint32_t *addr,
- int cache_only));
int router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e);
int router_rebuild_descriptor(int force);
char *router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
@@ -111,14 +115,34 @@ int extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
const char *routerinfo_err_to_string(int err);
int routerinfo_err_is_transient(int err);
+void log_addr_has_changed(int severity, const tor_addr_t *prev,
+ const tor_addr_t *cur, const char *source);
+
void router_reset_warnings(void);
-void router_reset_reachability(void);
void router_free_all(void);
#ifdef ROUTER_PRIVATE
-/* Used only by router.c and test.c */
+/* Used only by router.c and the unit tests */
STATIC void get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len);
STATIC int router_write_fingerprint(int hashed);
-#endif
+STATIC smartlist_t *get_my_declared_family(const or_options_t *options);
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+extern time_t desc_clean_since;
+extern const char *desc_dirty_reason;
+void set_server_identity_key_digest_testing(const uint8_t *digest);
+MOCK_DECL(STATIC const struct curve25519_keypair_t *,
+ get_current_curve25519_keypair,(void));
+
+MOCK_DECL(STATIC int,
+ router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo,(routerinfo_t **ri_out));
+STATIC extrainfo_t *router_build_fresh_signed_extrainfo(
+ const routerinfo_t *ri);
+STATIC void router_update_routerinfo_from_extrainfo(routerinfo_t *ri,
+ const extrainfo_t *ei);
+STATIC int router_dump_and_sign_routerinfo_descriptor_body(routerinfo_t *ri);
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+#endif /* defined(ROUTER_PRIVATE) */
#endif /* !defined(TOR_ROUTER_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
index f639fc91e7..d3de83cb86 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2014-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* Copyright (c) 2014-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
tor_free(fname);
}
}
- if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
+ if (safe_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL;
else
sign_signing_key_with_id = id;
@@ -631,14 +631,14 @@ get_master_identity_keypair(void)
}
#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
-const ed25519_keypair_t *
-get_master_signing_keypair(void)
+MOCK_IMPL(const ed25519_keypair_t *,
+get_master_signing_keypair,(void))
{
return master_signing_key;
}
-const struct tor_cert_st *
-get_master_signing_key_cert(void)
+MOCK_IMPL(const struct tor_cert_st *,
+get_master_signing_key_cert,(void))
{
return signing_key_cert;
}
@@ -706,6 +706,8 @@ make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
*len_out = 0;
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(rsa_id_key, (char*)signed_data) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_OR, "crypto_pk_get_digest failed in "
+ "make_tap_onion_key_crosscert!");
return NULL;
}
memcpy(signed_data + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
@@ -713,8 +715,12 @@ make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
int r = crypto_pk_private_sign(onion_key,
(char*)signature, sizeof(signature),
(const char*)signed_data, sizeof(signed_data));
- if (r < 0)
+ if (r < 0) {
+ /* It's probably missing the private key */
+ log_info(LD_OR, "crypto_pk_private_sign failed in "
+ "make_tap_onion_key_crosscert!");
return NULL;
+ }
*len_out = r;
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
index 0badd34191..1fb5d724e9 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
@@ -1,14 +1,21 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2014-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* Copyright (c) 2014-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+/**
+ * @file routerkeys.h
+ * @brief Header for routerkeys.c
+ **/
+
#ifndef TOR_ROUTERKEYS_H
#define TOR_ROUTERKEYS_H
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
const ed25519_public_key_t *get_master_identity_key(void);
-const ed25519_keypair_t *get_master_signing_keypair(void);
-const struct tor_cert_st *get_master_signing_key_cert(void);
+MOCK_DECL(const ed25519_keypair_t *, get_master_signing_keypair,(void));
+MOCK_DECL(const struct tor_cert_st *, get_master_signing_key_cert,(void));
const ed25519_keypair_t *get_current_auth_keypair(void);
const struct tor_cert_st *get_current_link_cert_cert(void);
@@ -19,6 +26,7 @@ void get_master_rsa_crosscert(const uint8_t **cert_out,
int router_ed25519_id_is_me(const ed25519_public_key_t *id);
+/* These are only used by router.c */
struct tor_cert_st *make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(
const curve25519_keypair_t *onion_key,
const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
@@ -37,6 +45,85 @@ int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now, int force);
void routerkeys_free_all(void);
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#define router_ed25519_id_is_me(id) \
+ ((void)(id), 0)
+
+static inline void *
+relay_key_is_unavailable_(void)
+{
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return NULL;
+}
+#define relay_key_is_unavailable(type) \
+ ((type)(relay_key_is_unavailable_()))
+
+// Many of these can be removed once relay_handshake.c is relay-only.
+#define get_current_auth_keypair() \
+ relay_key_is_unavailable(const ed25519_keypair_t *)
+#define get_master_signing_keypair() \
+ relay_key_is_unavailable(const ed25519_keypair_t *)
+#define get_current_link_cert_cert() \
+ relay_key_is_unavailable(const struct tor_cert_st *)
+#define get_current_auth_key_cert() \
+ relay_key_is_unavailable(const struct tor_cert_st *)
+#define get_master_signing_key_cert() \
+ relay_key_is_unavailable(const struct tor_cert_st *)
+#define get_master_rsa_crosscert(cert_out, size_out) \
+ STMT_BEGIN \
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); \
+ *(cert_out) = NULL; \
+ *(size_out) = 0; \
+ STMT_END
+#define get_master_identity_key() \
+ relay_key_is_unavailable(const ed25519_public_key_t *)
+
+#define generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, force) \
+ ((void)(options), (void)(now), (void)(force), 0)
+#define should_make_new_ed_keys(options, now) \
+ ((void)(options), (void)(now), 0)
+
+// These can get removed once router.c becomes relay-only.
+static inline struct tor_cert_st *
+make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(const curve25519_keypair_t *onion_key,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
+ time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+ int *sign_out)
+{
+ (void)onion_key;
+ (void)master_id_key;
+ (void)now;
+ (void)lifetime;
+ *sign_out = 0;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return NULL;
+}
+static inline uint8_t *
+make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
+ const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
+ int *len_out)
+{
+ (void)onion_key;
+ (void)master_id_key;
+ (void)rsa_id_key;
+ *len_out = 0;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* This calls is used outside of relay mode, but only to implement
+ * CMD_KEY_EXPIRATION */
+#define log_cert_expiration() \
+ (puts("Not available: Tor has been compiled without relay support"), 0)
+/* This calls is used outside of relay mode, but only to implement
+ * CMD_KEYGEN. */
+#define load_ed_keys(x,y) \
+ (puts("Not available: Tor has been compiled without relay support"), 0)
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
const ed25519_keypair_t *get_master_identity_keypair(void);
void init_mock_ed_keys(const crypto_pk_t *rsa_identity_key);
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routermode.c b/src/feature/relay/routermode.c
index 2a9ddeac4d..c4d8792b5b 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routermode.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routermode.c
@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+/**
+ * @file routermode.c
+ * @brief Check if we're running as a relay/cache.
+ **/
+
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
-#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
-#include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
@@ -25,21 +28,6 @@ dir_server_mode(const or_options_t *options)
(server_mode(options) && router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(options));
}
-/** Return true iff we are trying to proxy client connections. */
-int
-proxy_mode(const or_options_t *options)
-{
- (void)options;
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_configured_ports(), const port_cfg_t *, p) {
- if (p->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER ||
- p->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER ||
- p->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER ||
- p->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER)
- return 1;
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(p);
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a server.
*/
MOCK_IMPL(int,
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routermode.h b/src/feature/relay/routermode.h
index be535af478..6d7404968d 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routermode.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routermode.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -12,13 +12,31 @@
#ifndef TOR_ROUTERMODE_H
#define TOR_ROUTERMODE_H
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
int dir_server_mode(const or_options_t *options);
MOCK_DECL(int, server_mode, (const or_options_t *options));
MOCK_DECL(int, public_server_mode, (const or_options_t *options));
MOCK_DECL(int, advertised_server_mode, (void));
-int proxy_mode(const or_options_t *options);
void set_server_advertised(int s);
+/** Is the relay module enabled? */
+#define have_module_relay() (1)
+
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#define dir_server_mode(options) (((void)(options)),0)
+#define server_mode(options) (((void)(options)),0)
+#define public_server_mode(options) (((void)(options)),0)
+#define advertised_server_mode() (0)
+
+/* We shouldn't be publishing descriptors when relay mode is disabled. */
+#define set_server_advertised(s) tor_assert_nonfatal(!(s))
+
+#define have_module_relay() (0)
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
#endif /* !defined(TOR_ROUTERMODE_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/selftest.c b/src/feature/relay/selftest.c
index 064eea6c46..18fe25b989 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/selftest.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/selftest.c
@@ -1,19 +1,17 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file selftest.c
* \brief Relay self-testing
*
- * Relays need to make sure that their own ports are reasonable, and estimate
+ * Relays need to make sure that their own ports are reachable, and estimate
* their own bandwidth, before publishing.
*/
-#define SELFTEST_PRIVATE
-
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
@@ -26,7 +24,7 @@
#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h"
#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
-#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
@@ -35,6 +33,7 @@
#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" // but...
#include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/relay/relay_periodic.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
@@ -214,6 +213,44 @@ router_do_reachability_checks(int test_or, int test_dir)
}
}
+/** We've decided to start our reachability testing. If all
+ * is set, log this to the user. Return 1 if we did, or 0 if
+ * we chose not to log anything. */
+int
+inform_testing_reachability(void)
+{
+ char dirbuf[128];
+ char *address;
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (!me)
+ return 0;
+
+ address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr);
+ if (!address)
+ return 0;
+
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "CHECKING_REACHABILITY ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
+ address, me->or_port);
+ if (me->dir_port) {
+ tor_snprintf(dirbuf, sizeof(dirbuf), " and DirPort %s:%d",
+ address, me->dir_port);
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "CHECKING_REACHABILITY DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
+ address, me->dir_port);
+ }
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... "
+ "(this may take up to %d minutes -- look for log "
+ "messages indicating success)",
+ address, me->or_port,
+ me->dir_port ? dirbuf : "",
+ me->dir_port ? "are" : "is",
+ TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT/60);
+
+ tor_free(address);
+ return 1;
+}
+
/** Annotate that we found our ORPort reachable. */
void
router_orport_found_reachable(void)
@@ -222,6 +259,10 @@ router_orport_found_reachable(void)
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (!can_reach_or_port && me) {
char *address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr);
+
+ if (!address)
+ return;
+
log_notice(LD_OR,"Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from "
"the outside. Excellent.%s",
options->PublishServerDescriptor_ != NO_DIRINFO
@@ -249,6 +290,10 @@ router_dirport_found_reachable(void)
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (!can_reach_dir_port && me) {
char *address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr);
+
+ if (!address)
+ return;
+
log_notice(LD_DIRSERV,"Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable "
"from the outside. Excellent.%s",
options->PublishServerDescriptor_ != NO_DIRINFO
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/selftest.h b/src/feature/relay/selftest.h
index a80ec8936e..f5babc95da 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/selftest.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/selftest.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -12,13 +12,57 @@
#ifndef TOR_SELFTEST_H
#define TOR_SELFTEST_H
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
struct or_options_t;
int check_whether_orport_reachable(const struct or_options_t *options);
int check_whether_dirport_reachable(const struct or_options_t *options);
void router_do_reachability_checks(int test_or, int test_dir);
+void router_perform_bandwidth_test(int num_circs, time_t now);
+int inform_testing_reachability(void);
+
void router_orport_found_reachable(void);
void router_dirport_found_reachable(void);
-void router_perform_bandwidth_test(int num_circs, time_t now);
-#endif
+void router_reset_reachability(void);
+
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#define check_whether_orport_reachable(opts) \
+ ((void)(opts), 0)
+#define check_whether_dirport_reachable(opts) \
+ ((void)(opts), 0)
+
+static inline void
+router_do_reachability_checks(int test_or, int test_dir)
+{
+ (void)test_or;
+ (void)test_dir;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+}
+static inline void
+router_perform_bandwidth_test(int num_circs, time_t now)
+{
+ (void)num_circs;
+ (void)now;
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+}
+static inline int
+inform_testing_reachability(void)
+{
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define router_orport_found_reachable() \
+ STMT_NIL
+#define router_dirport_found_reachable() \
+ STMT_NIL
+
+#define router_reset_reachability() \
+ STMT_NIL
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_SELFTEST_H) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/transport_config.c b/src/feature/relay/transport_config.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7dcce70e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/transport_config.c
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file transport_config.c
+ * @brief Code to interpret the user's configuration of Tor's server
+ * pluggable transports.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#define RELAY_TRANSPORT_CONFIG_PRIVATE
+#include "feature/relay/transport_config.h"
+
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/keyval.h"
+
+#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
+
+/* Required for dirinfo_type_t in or_options_t */
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+
+#include "feature/relay/ext_orport.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+
+/* Copied from config.c, we will refactor later in 29211. */
+#define REJECT(arg) \
+ STMT_BEGIN *msg = tor_strdup(arg); return -1; STMT_END
+
+/** Given a ServerTransportListenAddr <b>line</b>, return its
+ * <address:port> string. Return NULL if the line was not
+ * well-formed.
+ *
+ * If <b>transport</b> is set, return NULL if the line is not
+ * referring to <b>transport</b>.
+ *
+ * The returned string is allocated on the heap and it's the
+ * responsibility of the caller to free it. */
+static char *
+get_bindaddr_from_transport_listen_line(const char *line,
+ const char *transport)
+{
+ smartlist_t *items = NULL;
+ const char *parsed_transport = NULL;
+ char *addrport = NULL;
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ uint16_t port = 0;
+
+ items = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_split_string(items, line, NULL,
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, -1);
+
+ if (smartlist_len(items) < 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Too few arguments on ServerTransportListenAddr line.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ parsed_transport = smartlist_get(items, 0);
+ addrport = tor_strdup(smartlist_get(items, 1));
+
+ /* If 'transport' is given, check if it matches the one on the line */
+ if (transport && strcmp(transport, parsed_transport))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Validate addrport */
+ if (tor_addr_port_parse(LOG_WARN, addrport, &addr, &port, -1)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Error parsing ServerTransportListenAddr "
+ "address '%s'", addrport);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ tor_free(addrport);
+ addrport = NULL;
+
+ done:
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, char*, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(items);
+
+ return addrport;
+}
+
+/** Given the name of a pluggable transport in <b>transport</b>, check
+ * the configuration file to see if the user has explicitly asked for
+ * it to listen on a specific port. Return a <address:port> string if
+ * so, otherwise NULL. */
+char *
+pt_get_bindaddr_from_config(const char *transport)
+{
+ config_line_t *cl;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ for (cl = options->ServerTransportListenAddr; cl; cl = cl->next) {
+ char *bindaddr =
+ get_bindaddr_from_transport_listen_line(cl->value, transport);
+ if (bindaddr)
+ return bindaddr;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Given a ServerTransportOptions <b>line</b>, return a smartlist
+ * with the options. Return NULL if the line was not well-formed.
+ *
+ * If <b>transport</b> is set, return NULL if the line is not
+ * referring to <b>transport</b>.
+ *
+ * The returned smartlist and its strings are allocated on the heap
+ * and it's the responsibility of the caller to free it. */
+STATIC smartlist_t *
+get_options_from_transport_options_line(const char *line,
+ const char *transport)
+{
+ smartlist_t *items = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_t *pt_options = smartlist_new();
+ const char *parsed_transport = NULL;
+
+ smartlist_split_string(items, line, NULL,
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, -1);
+
+ if (smartlist_len(items) < 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Too few arguments on ServerTransportOptions line.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ parsed_transport = smartlist_get(items, 0);
+ /* If 'transport' is given, check if it matches the one on the line */
+ if (transport && strcmp(transport, parsed_transport))
+ goto err;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(items, const char *, option) {
+ if (option_sl_idx == 0) /* skip the transport field (first field)*/
+ continue;
+
+ /* validate that it's a k=v value */
+ if (!string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, option)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s is not a k=v value.", escaped(option));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* add it to the options smartlist */
+ smartlist_add_strdup(pt_options, option);
+ log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Added %s to the list of options", escaped(option));
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(option);
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(pt_options, char*, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(pt_options);
+ pt_options = NULL;
+
+ done:
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, char*, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(items);
+
+ return pt_options;
+}
+
+/** Given the name of a pluggable transport in <b>transport</b>, check
+ * the configuration file to see if the user has asked us to pass any
+ * parameters to the pluggable transport. Return a smartlist
+ * containing the parameters, otherwise NULL. */
+smartlist_t *
+pt_get_options_for_server_transport(const char *transport)
+{
+ config_line_t *cl;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ for (cl = options->ServerTransportOptions; cl; cl = cl->next) {
+ smartlist_t *options_sl =
+ get_options_from_transport_options_line(cl->value, transport);
+ if (options_sl)
+ return options_sl;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Legacy validation/normalization function for the server transport options.
+ * Uses old_options as the previous options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, returns -1 and sets *msg to a newly allocated string
+ * on error.
+ */
+int
+options_validate_server_transport(const or_options_t *old_options,
+ or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ if (BUG(!options))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (BUG(!msg))
+ return -1;
+
+ config_line_t *cl;
+
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin && !server_mode(options)) {
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Tor is not configured as a relay but you specified"
+ " a ServerTransportPlugin line (%s). The ServerTransportPlugin "
+ "line will be ignored.",
+ escaped(options->ServerTransportPlugin->value));
+ }
+
+ if (options->ServerTransportListenAddr && !options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "You need at least a single managed-proxy to "
+ "specify a transport listen address. The "
+ "ServerTransportListenAddr line will be ignored.");
+ }
+
+ for (cl = options->ServerTransportPlugin; cl; cl = cl->next) {
+ if (pt_parse_transport_line(options, cl->value, 1, 1) < 0)
+ REJECT("Invalid server transport line. See logs for details.");
+ }
+
+ for (cl = options->ServerTransportListenAddr; cl; cl = cl->next) {
+ /** If get_bindaddr_from_transport_listen_line() fails with
+ 'transport' being NULL, it means that something went wrong
+ while parsing the ServerTransportListenAddr line. */
+ char *bindaddr = get_bindaddr_from_transport_listen_line(cl->value, NULL);
+ if (!bindaddr)
+ REJECT("ServerTransportListenAddr did not parse. See logs for details.");
+ tor_free(bindaddr);
+ }
+
+ for (cl = options->ServerTransportOptions; cl; cl = cl->next) {
+ /** If get_options_from_transport_options_line() fails with
+ 'transport' being NULL, it means that something went wrong
+ while parsing the ServerTransportOptions line. */
+ smartlist_t *options_sl =
+ get_options_from_transport_options_line(cl->value, NULL);
+ if (!options_sl)
+ REJECT("ServerTransportOptions did not parse. See logs for details.");
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options_sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(options_sl);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Fetch the active option list, and take server pluggable transport actions
+ * based on it. All of the things we do should survive being done repeatedly.
+ * If present, <b>old_options</b> contains the previous value of the options.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if all goes well, return -1 if it's time to die.
+ *
+ * Note: We haven't moved all the "act on new configuration" logic
+ * into the options_act* functions yet. Some is still in do_hup() and other
+ * places.
+ */
+int
+options_act_server_transport(const or_options_t *old_options)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ config_line_t *cl;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int running_tor = options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR;
+
+ /* If we are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but no
+ Extended ORPort, inform the user that they are missing out. */
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin &&
+ !options->ExtORPort_lines) {
+ log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "We use pluggable transports but the Extended "
+ "ORPort is disabled. Tor and your pluggable transports proxy "
+ "communicate with each other via the Extended ORPort so it "
+ "is suggested you enable it: it will also allow your Bridge "
+ "to collect statistics about its clients that use pluggable "
+ "transports. Please enable it using the ExtORPort torrc option "
+ "(e.g. set 'ExtORPort auto').");
+ }
+
+ /* If we have an ExtORPort, initialize its auth cookie. */
+ if (running_tor &&
+ init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(!!options->ExtORPort_lines) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Error creating Extended ORPort cookie file.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!options->DisableNetwork) {
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
+ for (cl = options->ServerTransportPlugin; cl; cl = cl->next) {
+ if (pt_parse_transport_line(options, cl->value, 0, 1) < 0) {
+ // LCOV_EXCL_START
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Previously validated ServerTransportPlugin line "
+ "could not be added!");
+ return -1;
+ // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/transport_config.h b/src/feature/relay/transport_config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6d956d9af1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/transport_config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file transport_config.h
+ * @brief Header for feature/relay/transport_config.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_TRANSPORT_CONFIG_H
+#define TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_TRANSPORT_CONFIG_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
+
+#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
+
+struct or_options_t;
+struct smartlist_t;
+
+int options_validate_server_transport(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg);
+
+char *pt_get_bindaddr_from_config(const char *transport);
+struct smartlist_t *pt_get_options_for_server_transport(const char *transport);
+
+int options_act_server_transport(const struct or_options_t *old_options);
+
+#ifdef RELAY_TRANSPORT_CONFIG_PRIVATE
+
+STATIC struct smartlist_t *get_options_from_transport_options_line(
+ const char *line,
+ const char *transport);
+
+#endif /* defined(RELAY_TRANSPORT_CONFIG_PRIVATE) */
+
+#else /* !defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+/** When tor is compiled with the relay module disabled, it can't be
+ * configured with server pluggable transports.
+ *
+ * Returns -1 and sets msg to a newly allocated string, if ExtORPort,
+ * ServerTransportPlugin, ServerTransportListenAddr, or
+ * ServerTransportOptions are set in options. Otherwise returns 0. */
+static inline int
+options_validate_server_transport(const struct or_options_t *old_options,
+ struct or_options_t *options,
+ char **msg)
+{
+ (void)old_options;
+
+ /* These ExtORPort checks are too strict, and will reject valid configs
+ * that disable ports, like "ExtORPort 0". */
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin ||
+ options->ServerTransportListenAddr ||
+ options->ServerTransportOptions ||
+ options->ExtORPort_lines) {
+ /* REJECT() this configuration */
+ *msg = tor_strdup("This tor was built with relay mode disabled. "
+ "It can not be configured with an ExtORPort, "
+ "a ServerTransportPlugin, a ServerTransportListenAddr, "
+ "or ServerTransportOptions.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define pt_get_bindaddr_from_config(transport) \
+ (((void)(transport)),NULL)
+
+/* 31851: called from client/transports.c, but only from server code */
+#define pt_get_options_for_server_transport(transport) \
+ (((void)(transport)),NULL)
+
+#define options_validate_server_transport(old_options, options, msg) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),((void)(options)),((void)(msg)),0)
+#define options_act_server_transport(old_options) \
+ (((void)(old_options)),0)
+
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_FEATURE_RELAY_TRANSPORT_CONFIG_H) */