diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/feature/relay/dns.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/feature/relay/dns.c | 53 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/dns.c b/src/feature/relay/dns.c index 9639193685..651563c556 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/dns.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/dns.c @@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ cached_resolve_hash(cached_resolve_t *a) } HT_PROTOTYPE(cache_map, cached_resolve_t, node, cached_resolve_hash, - cached_resolves_eq) + cached_resolves_eq); HT_GENERATE2(cache_map, cached_resolve_t, node, cached_resolve_hash, - cached_resolves_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_) + cached_resolves_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_); /** Initialize the DNS cache. */ static void @@ -268,22 +268,6 @@ has_dns_init_failed(void) return nameserver_config_failed; } -/** Helper: Given a TTL from a DNS response, determine what TTL to give the - * OP that asked us to resolve it, and how long to cache that record - * ourselves. */ -uint32_t -dns_clip_ttl(uint32_t ttl) -{ - /* This logic is a defense against "DefectTor" DNS-based traffic - * confirmation attacks, as in https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf . - * We only give two values: a "low" value and a "high" value. - */ - if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT) - return MIN_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT; - else - return MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT; -} - /** Helper: free storage held by an entry in the DNS cache. */ static void free_cached_resolve_(cached_resolve_t *r) @@ -521,7 +505,7 @@ send_resolved_cell,(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t answer_type, uint32_t ttl; buf[0] = answer_type; - ttl = dns_clip_ttl(conn->address_ttl); + ttl = clip_dns_ttl(conn->address_ttl); switch (answer_type) { @@ -593,7 +577,7 @@ send_resolved_hostname_cell,(edge_connection_t *conn, size_t namelen = strlen(hostname); tor_assert(namelen < 256); - ttl = dns_clip_ttl(conn->address_ttl); + ttl = clip_dns_ttl(conn->address_ttl); buf[0] = RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME; buf[1] = (uint8_t)namelen; @@ -987,25 +971,6 @@ assert_connection_edge_not_dns_pending(edge_connection_t *conn) #endif /* 1 */ } -/** Log an error and abort if any connection waiting for a DNS resolve is - * corrupted. */ -void -assert_all_pending_dns_resolves_ok(void) -{ - pending_connection_t *pend; - cached_resolve_t **resolve; - - HT_FOREACH(resolve, cache_map, &cache_root) { - for (pend = (*resolve)->pending_connections; - pend; - pend = pend->next) { - assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(pend->conn), 0); - tor_assert(!SOCKET_OK(pend->conn->base_.s)); - tor_assert(!connection_in_array(TO_CONN(pend->conn))); - } - } -} - /** Remove <b>conn</b> from the list of connections waiting for conn-\>address. */ void @@ -1063,7 +1028,7 @@ connection_dns_remove(edge_connection_t *conn) * the resolve for <b>address</b> itself, and remove any cached results for * <b>address</b> from the cache. */ -MOCK_IMPL(void, +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void, dns_cancel_pending_resolve,(const char *address)) { pending_connection_t *pend; @@ -1338,7 +1303,7 @@ make_pending_resolve_cached(cached_resolve_t *resolve) resolve->ttl_hostname < ttl) ttl = resolve->ttl_hostname; - set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + dns_clip_ttl(ttl)); + set_expiry(new_resolve, time(NULL) + clip_dns_ttl(ttl)); } assert_cache_ok(); @@ -2051,12 +2016,12 @@ dns_launch_correctness_checks(void) /* Wait a while before launching requests for test addresses, so we can * get the results from checking for wildcarding. */ - if (! launch_event) + if (!launch_event) launch_event = tor_evtimer_new(tor_libevent_get_base(), launch_test_addresses, NULL); timeout.tv_sec = 30; timeout.tv_usec = 0; - if (evtimer_add(launch_event, &timeout)<0) { + if (evtimer_add(launch_event, &timeout) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't add timer for checking for dns hijacking"); } } @@ -2188,7 +2153,7 @@ dns_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes) total_bytes_removed += bytes_removed; /* Increase time_inc by a reasonable fraction. */ - time_inc += (MAX_DNS_TTL_AT_EXIT / 4); + time_inc += (MAX_DNS_TTL / 4); } while (total_bytes_removed < min_remove_bytes); return total_bytes_removed; |