diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core')
147 files changed, 10890 insertions, 3889 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/core.md b/src/core/core.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8ecc43eaae --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/core.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +@dir /core +@brief core: main loop and onion routing functionality + +The "core" directory has the central protocols for Tor, which every +client and relay must implement in order to perform onion routing. + +It is divided into three lower-level pieces: + + - \refdir{core/crypto} -- Tor-specific cryptography. + + - \refdir{core/proto} -- Protocol encoding/decoding. + + - \refdir{core/mainloop} -- A connection-oriented asynchronous mainloop. + +and one high-level piece: + + - \refdir{core/or} -- Implements onion routing itself. + diff --git a/src/core/crypto/.may_include b/src/core/crypto/.may_include new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5782a36797 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/crypto/.may_include @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +!advisory + +orconfig.h + +lib/crypt_ops/*.h +lib/ctime/*.h +lib/cc/*.h +lib/log/*.h + +core/crypto/*.h diff --git a/src/core/crypto/core_crypto.md b/src/core/crypto/core_crypto.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26ade1f8f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/crypto/core_crypto.md @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +@dir /core/crypto +@brief core/crypto: Tor-specific cryptography + +This module implements Tor's circuit-construction crypto and Tor's +relay crypto. + diff --git a/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c b/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c index c34073690e..07bcdc566c 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** \file hs_ntor.c @@ -170,19 +170,18 @@ get_rendezvous1_key_material(const uint8_t *rend_secret_hs_input, * necessary key material, and return 0. */ static void get_introduce1_key_material(const uint8_t *secret_input, - const uint8_t *subcredential, + const hs_subcredential_t *subcredential, hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out) { uint8_t keystream[CIPHER256_KEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN]; uint8_t info_blob[INFO_BLOB_LEN]; uint8_t kdf_input[KDF_INPUT_LEN]; - crypto_xof_t *xof; uint8_t *ptr; /* Let's build info */ ptr = info_blob; APPEND(ptr, M_HSEXPAND, strlen(M_HSEXPAND)); - APPEND(ptr, subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN); + APPEND(ptr, subcredential->subcred, SUBCRED_LEN); tor_assert(ptr == info_blob + sizeof(info_blob)); /* Let's build the input to the KDF */ @@ -193,10 +192,8 @@ get_introduce1_key_material(const uint8_t *secret_input, tor_assert(ptr == kdf_input + sizeof(kdf_input)); /* Now we need to run kdf_input over SHAKE-256 */ - xof = crypto_xof_new(); - crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, kdf_input, sizeof(kdf_input)); - crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, keystream, sizeof(keystream)) ; - crypto_xof_free(xof); + crypto_xof(keystream, sizeof(keystream), + kdf_input, sizeof(kdf_input)); { /* Get the keys */ memcpy(&hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out->enc_key, keystream,CIPHER256_KEY_LEN); @@ -320,7 +317,7 @@ hs_ntor_client_get_introduce1_keys( const ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey, const curve25519_public_key_t *intro_enc_pubkey, const curve25519_keypair_t *client_ephemeral_enc_keypair, - const uint8_t *subcredential, + const hs_subcredential_t *subcredential, hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out) { int bad = 0; @@ -453,9 +450,31 @@ hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys( const ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey, const curve25519_keypair_t *intro_enc_keypair, const curve25519_public_key_t *client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey, - const uint8_t *subcredential, + const hs_subcredential_t *subcredential, hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out) { + return hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys_multi( + intro_auth_pubkey, + intro_enc_keypair, + client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey, + 1, + subcredential, + hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out); +} + +/** + * As hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys(), but take multiple subcredentials + * as input, and yield multiple sets of keys as output. + **/ +int +hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys_multi( + const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey, + const struct curve25519_keypair_t *intro_enc_keypair, + const struct curve25519_public_key_t *client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey, + size_t n_subcredentials, + const hs_subcredential_t *subcredentials, + hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out) +{ int bad = 0; uint8_t secret_input[INTRO_SECRET_HS_INPUT_LEN]; uint8_t dh_result[CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN]; @@ -463,7 +482,8 @@ hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys( tor_assert(intro_auth_pubkey); tor_assert(intro_enc_keypair); tor_assert(client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey); - tor_assert(subcredential); + tor_assert(n_subcredentials >= 1); + tor_assert(subcredentials); tor_assert(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out); /* Compute EXP(X, b) */ @@ -479,13 +499,16 @@ hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys( secret_input); bad |= safe_mem_is_zero(secret_input, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN); - /* Get ENC_KEY and MAC_KEY! */ - get_introduce1_key_material(secret_input, subcredential, - hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out); + for (unsigned i = 0; i < n_subcredentials; ++i) { + /* Get ENC_KEY and MAC_KEY! */ + get_introduce1_key_material(secret_input, &subcredentials[i], + &hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out[i]); + } memwipe(secret_input, 0, sizeof(secret_input)); if (bad) { - memwipe(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out, 0, sizeof(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t)); + memwipe(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out, 0, + sizeof(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t) * n_subcredentials); } return bad ? -1 : 0; @@ -594,7 +617,6 @@ hs_ntor_circuit_key_expansion(const uint8_t *ntor_key_seed, size_t seed_len, { uint8_t *ptr; uint8_t kdf_input[NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_INPUT_LEN]; - crypto_xof_t *xof; /* Sanity checks on lengths to make sure we are good */ if (BUG(seed_len != DIGEST256_LEN)) { @@ -611,10 +633,8 @@ hs_ntor_circuit_key_expansion(const uint8_t *ntor_key_seed, size_t seed_len, tor_assert(ptr == kdf_input + sizeof(kdf_input)); /* Generate the keys */ - xof = crypto_xof_new(); - crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, kdf_input, sizeof(kdf_input)); - crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, keys_out, HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN); - crypto_xof_free(xof); + crypto_xof(keys_out, HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN, + kdf_input, sizeof(kdf_input)); return 0; } diff --git a/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h b/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h index e5a5171915..9a975dd83f 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file hs_ntor.h + * @brief Header for hs_ntor.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_HS_NTOR_H #define TOR_HS_NTOR_H @@ -14,7 +19,7 @@ struct curve25519_keypair_t; (DIGEST256_LEN*2 + CIPHER256_KEY_LEN*2) /* Key material needed to encode/decode INTRODUCE1 cells */ -typedef struct { +typedef struct hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t { /* Key used for encryption of encrypted INTRODUCE1 blob */ uint8_t enc_key[CIPHER256_KEY_LEN]; /* MAC key used to protect encrypted INTRODUCE1 blob */ @@ -22,7 +27,7 @@ typedef struct { } hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t; /* Key material needed to encode/decode RENDEZVOUS1 cells */ -typedef struct { +typedef struct hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t { /* This is the MAC of the HANDSHAKE_INFO field */ uint8_t rend_cell_auth_mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; /* This is the key seed used to derive further rendezvous crypto keys as @@ -30,11 +35,20 @@ typedef struct { uint8_t ntor_key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN]; } hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t; +#define SUBCRED_LEN DIGEST256_LEN + +/** + * A 'subcredential' used to prove knowledge of a hidden service. + **/ +typedef struct hs_subcredential_t { + uint8_t subcred[SUBCRED_LEN]; +} hs_subcredential_t; + int hs_ntor_client_get_introduce1_keys( const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey, const struct curve25519_public_key_t *intro_enc_pubkey, const struct curve25519_keypair_t *client_ephemeral_enc_keypair, - const uint8_t *subcredential, + const hs_subcredential_t *subcredential, hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out); int hs_ntor_client_get_rendezvous1_keys( @@ -44,11 +58,19 @@ int hs_ntor_client_get_rendezvous1_keys( const struct curve25519_public_key_t *service_ephemeral_rend_pubkey, hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_out); +int hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys_multi( + const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey, + const struct curve25519_keypair_t *intro_enc_keypair, + const struct curve25519_public_key_t *client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey, + size_t n_subcredentials, + const hs_subcredential_t *subcredentials, + hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out); + int hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys( const struct ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_pubkey, const struct curve25519_keypair_t *intro_enc_keypair, const struct curve25519_public_key_t *client_ephemeral_enc_pubkey, - const uint8_t *subcredential, + const hs_subcredential_t *subcredential, hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_out); int hs_ntor_service_get_rendezvous1_keys( diff --git a/src/core/crypto/include.am b/src/core/crypto/include.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..28b7e22905 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/crypto/include.am @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT SOURCES HERE. +LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \ + src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c \ + src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c \ + src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c \ + src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c \ + src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c \ + src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT HEADERS HERE. +noinst_HEADERS += \ + src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h \ + src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h \ + src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h \ + src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h \ + src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h \ + src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c index 56b02e2996..69b4dc40aa 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h index 1cddde3610..2665d326a3 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -44,4 +44,4 @@ void server_onion_keys_free_(server_onion_keys_t *keys); #define server_onion_keys_free(keys) \ FREE_AND_NULL(server_onion_keys_t, server_onion_keys_free_, (keys)) -#endif +#endif /* !defined(TOR_ONION_CRYPTO_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c index 31bd20235f..d760549325 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h index 0ba8cbbc35..da983a56d9 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c index 7087fe1bd7..5a77230d02 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h index 51e72b4083..9473409e40 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file onion_ntor.h + * @brief Header for onion_ntor.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_ONION_NTOR_H #define TOR_ONION_NTOR_H diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c index 854889d88d..119f55f206 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h index 0e43b9c8ba..78174b1fab 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c b/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c index 0b83b2d0a5..3e6167e0e1 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c +++ b/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c @@ -1,17 +1,24 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file relay_crypto.h + * @brief Header for relay_crypto.c + **/ + #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" +#include "core/or/crypt_path.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "core/crypto/hs_ntor.h" // for HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN #include "core/or/relay.h" #include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h" +#include "core/or/sendme.h" #include "core/or/cell_st.h" #include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h" @@ -20,7 +27,7 @@ /** Update digest from the payload of cell. Assign integrity part to * cell. */ -static void +void relay_set_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell) { char integrity[4]; @@ -84,12 +91,39 @@ relay_digest_matches(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell) * * Note that we use the same operation for encrypting and for decrypting. */ -static void +void relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in) { crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, (char*) in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); } +/** Return the sendme_digest within the <b>crypto</b> object. */ +uint8_t * +relay_crypto_get_sendme_digest(relay_crypto_t *crypto) +{ + tor_assert(crypto); + return crypto->sendme_digest; +} + +/** Record the cell digest, indicated by is_foward_digest or not, as the + * SENDME cell digest. */ +void +relay_crypto_record_sendme_digest(relay_crypto_t *crypto, + bool is_foward_digest) +{ + struct crypto_digest_t *digest; + + tor_assert(crypto); + + digest = crypto->b_digest; + if (is_foward_digest) { + digest = crypto->f_digest; + } + + crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *) crypto->sendme_digest, + sizeof(crypto->sendme_digest)); +} + /** Do the appropriate en/decryptions for <b>cell</b> arriving on * <b>circ</b> in direction <b>cell_direction</b>. * @@ -134,12 +168,12 @@ relay_decrypt_cell(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, tor_assert(thishop); /* decrypt one layer */ - relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->crypto.b_crypto, cell->payload); + cpath_crypt_cell(thishop, cell->payload, true); relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); if (rh.recognized == 0) { /* it's possibly recognized. have to check digest to be sure. */ - if (relay_digest_matches(thishop->crypto.b_digest, cell)) { + if (relay_digest_matches(cpath_get_incoming_digest(thishop), cell)) { *recognized = 1; *layer_hint = thishop; return 0; @@ -187,14 +221,17 @@ relay_encrypt_cell_outbound(cell_t *cell, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) { crypt_path_t *thishop; /* counter for repeated crypts */ - relay_set_digest(layer_hint->crypto.f_digest, cell); + cpath_set_cell_forward_digest(layer_hint, cell); + + /* Record cell digest as the SENDME digest if need be. */ + sendme_record_sending_cell_digest(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), layer_hint); thishop = layer_hint; /* moving from farthest to nearest hop */ do { tor_assert(thishop); log_debug(LD_OR,"encrypting a layer of the relay cell."); - relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->crypto.f_crypto, cell->payload); + cpath_crypt_cell(thishop, cell->payload, false); thishop = thishop->prev; } while (thishop != circ->cpath->prev); @@ -212,6 +249,10 @@ relay_encrypt_cell_inbound(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *or_circ) { relay_set_digest(or_circ->crypto.b_digest, cell); + + /* Record cell digest as the SENDME digest if need be. */ + sendme_record_sending_cell_digest(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ), NULL); + /* encrypt one layer */ relay_crypt_one_payload(or_circ->crypto.b_crypto, cell->payload); } diff --git a/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h b/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h index 45a21d14ab..5e36c7678c 100644 --- a/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h +++ b/src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -27,5 +27,16 @@ void relay_crypto_clear(relay_crypto_t *crypto); void relay_crypto_assert_ok(const relay_crypto_t *crypto); +uint8_t *relay_crypto_get_sendme_digest(relay_crypto_t *crypto); + +void relay_crypto_record_sendme_digest(relay_crypto_t *crypto, + bool is_foward_digest); + +void +relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_t *cipher, uint8_t *in); + +void +relay_set_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, cell_t *cell); + #endif /* !defined(TOR_RELAY_CRYPTO_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/include.am b/src/core/include.am index 1b8ef2ac58..7752a7974b 100644 --- a/src/core/include.am +++ b/src/core/include.am @@ -1,174 +1,21 @@ -noinst_LIBRARIES += \ - src/core/libtor-app.a -if UNITTESTS_ENABLED -noinst_LIBRARIES += \ - src/core/libtor-app-testing.a -endif - -LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES = \ - src/app/config/config.c \ - src/app/config/confparse.c \ - src/app/config/statefile.c \ - src/app/main/main.c \ - src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c \ - src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c \ - src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c \ - src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c \ - src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c \ - src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c \ - src/core/mainloop/connection.c \ - src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c \ - src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c \ - src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c \ - src/core/mainloop/periodic.c \ - src/core/or/address_set.c \ - src/core/or/channel.c \ - src/core/or/channelpadding.c \ - src/core/or/channeltls.c \ - src/core/or/circuitbuild.c \ - src/core/or/circuitlist.c \ - src/core/or/circuitmux.c \ - src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.c \ - src/core/or/circuitstats.c \ - src/core/or/circuituse.c \ - src/core/or/command.c \ - src/core/or/connection_edge.c \ - src/core/or/connection_or.c \ - src/core/or/dos.c \ - src/core/or/onion.c \ - src/core/or/policies.c \ - src/core/or/protover.c \ - src/core/or/protover_rust.c \ - src/core/or/reasons.c \ - src/core/or/relay.c \ - src/core/or/scheduler.c \ - src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c \ - src/core/or/scheduler_vanilla.c \ - src/core/or/status.c \ - src/core/or/versions.c \ - src/core/proto/proto_cell.c \ - src/core/proto/proto_control0.c \ - src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.c \ - src/core/proto/proto_http.c \ - src/core/proto/proto_socks.c \ - src/feature/api/tor_api.c \ - src/feature/client/addressmap.c \ - src/feature/client/bridges.c \ - src/feature/client/circpathbias.c \ - src/feature/client/dnsserv.c \ - src/feature/client/entrynodes.c \ - src/feature/client/transports.c \ - src/feature/control/control.c \ - src/feature/control/fmt_serverstatus.c \ - src/feature/control/getinfo_geoip.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/keypin.c \ - src/feature/dircache/conscache.c \ - src/feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.c \ - src/feature/dircache/dircache.c \ - src/feature/dircache/dirserv.c \ - src/feature/dirclient/dirclient.c \ - src/feature/dirclient/dlstatus.c \ - src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.c \ - src/feature/dircommon/directory.c \ - src/feature/dircommon/fp_pair.c \ - src/feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/microdesc_parse.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/parsecommon.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/policy_parse.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/sigcommon.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/signing.c \ - src/feature/dirparse/unparseable.c \ - src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_cell.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_client.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_common.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_config.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_control.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_ident.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_service.c \ - src/feature/hs/hs_stats.c \ - src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.c \ - src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c \ - src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/keypin.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/describe.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/nickname.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/node_select.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerinfo.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerlist.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerset.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/fmt_routerstatus.c \ - src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c \ - src/feature/relay/dns.c \ - src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c \ - src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c \ - src/feature/relay/router.c \ - src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c \ - src/feature/relay/routermode.c \ - src/feature/relay/selftest.c \ - src/feature/rend/rendcache.c \ - src/feature/rend/rendclient.c \ - src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c \ - src/feature/rend/rendmid.c \ - src/feature/rend/rendparse.c \ - src/feature/rend/rendservice.c \ - src/feature/stats/geoip_stats.c \ - src/feature/stats/rephist.c \ - src/feature/stats/predict_ports.c - -# These should eventually move into module_dirauth_sources, but for now -# the separation is only in the code location. -LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \ - src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/dsigs_parse.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/reachability.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.c - -if BUILD_NT_SERVICES -LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += src/app/main/ntmain.c -endif - # -# Modules are conditionnally compiled in tor starting here. We add the C files +# Modules are conditionally compiled in tor starting here. We add the C files # only if the modules has been enabled at configure time. We always add the # source files of every module to libtor-testing.a so we can build the unit # tests for everything. See the UNITTESTS_ENABLED branch below. # LIBTOR_APP_TESTING_A_SOURCES = $(LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES) -# The Directory Authority module. -MODULE_DIRAUTH_SOURCES = \ - src/feature/dirauth/authmode.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/dircollate.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c \ - src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c - -if BUILD_MODULE_DIRAUTH -LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += $(MODULE_DIRAUTH_SOURCES) -endif +src_core_libtor_app_a_SOURCES = \ + $(LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES) \ + $(LIBTOR_APP_A_STUB_SOURCES) -src_core_libtor_app_a_SOURCES = $(LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES) if UNITTESTS_ENABLED # Add the sources of the modules that are needed for tests to work here. +LIBTOR_APP_TESTING_A_SOURCES += $(MODULE_RELAY_SOURCES) +LIBTOR_APP_TESTING_A_SOURCES += $(MODULE_DIRCACHE_SOURCES) LIBTOR_APP_TESTING_A_SOURCES += $(MODULE_DIRAUTH_SOURCES) src_core_libtor_app_testing_a_SOURCES = $(LIBTOR_APP_TESTING_A_SOURCES) @@ -183,204 +30,6 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS += -DSHARE_DATADIR="\"$(datadir)\"" \ src_core_libtor_app_testing_a_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(TEST_CPPFLAGS) src_core_libtor_app_testing_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) -noinst_HEADERS += \ - src/app/config/config.h \ - src/app/config/confparse.h \ - src/app/config/or_options_st.h \ - src/app/config/or_state_st.h \ - src/app/config/statefile.h \ - src/app/main/main.h \ - src/app/main/ntmain.h \ - src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h \ - src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h \ - src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h \ - src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h \ - src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h \ - src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h \ - src/core/mainloop/connection.h \ - src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h \ - src/core/mainloop/mainloop.h \ - src/core/mainloop/netstatus.h \ - src/core/mainloop/periodic.h \ - src/core/or/addr_policy_st.h \ - src/core/or/address_set.h \ - src/core/or/cell_queue_st.h \ - src/core/or/cell_st.h \ - src/core/or/channel.h \ - src/core/or/channelpadding.h \ - src/core/or/channeltls.h \ - src/core/or/circuit_st.h \ - src/core/or/circuitbuild.h \ - src/core/or/circuitlist.h \ - src/core/or/circuitmux.h \ - src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h \ - src/core/or/circuitstats.h \ - src/core/or/circuituse.h \ - src/core/or/command.h \ - src/core/or/connection_edge.h \ - src/core/or/connection_or.h \ - src/core/or/connection_st.h \ - src/core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h \ - src/core/or/crypt_path_reference_st.h \ - src/core/or/crypt_path_st.h \ - src/core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h \ - src/core/or/dos.h \ - src/core/or/edge_connection_st.h \ - src/core/or/half_edge_st.h \ - src/core/or/entry_connection_st.h \ - src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h \ - src/core/or/extend_info_st.h \ - src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h \ - src/core/or/onion.h \ - src/core/or/or.h \ - src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h \ - src/core/or/or_connection_st.h \ - src/core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h \ - src/core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h \ - src/core/or/origin_circuit_st.h \ - src/core/or/policies.h \ - src/core/or/port_cfg_st.h \ - src/core/or/protover.h \ - src/core/or/reasons.h \ - src/core/or/relay.h \ - src/core/or/relay_crypto_st.h \ - src/core/or/scheduler.h \ - src/core/or/server_port_cfg_st.h \ - src/core/or/socks_request_st.h \ - src/core/or/status.h \ - src/core/or/tor_version_st.h \ - src/core/or/var_cell_st.h \ - src/core/or/versions.h \ - src/core/proto/proto_cell.h \ - src/core/proto/proto_control0.h \ - src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.h \ - src/core/proto/proto_http.h \ - src/core/proto/proto_socks.h \ - src/feature/api/tor_api_internal.h \ - src/feature/client/addressmap.h \ - src/feature/client/bridges.h \ - src/feature/client/circpathbias.h \ - src/feature/client/dnsserv.h \ - src/feature/client/entrynodes.h \ - src/feature/client/transports.h \ - src/feature/control/control.h \ - src/feature/control/control_connection_st.h \ - src/feature/control/fmt_serverstatus.h \ - src/feature/control/getinfo_geoip.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/authmode.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/dircollate.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/dirvote.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/dsigs_parse.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/guardfraction.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/keypin.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/ns_detached_signatures_st.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/reachability.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/recommend_pkg.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/process_descs.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/vote_microdesc_hash_st.h \ - src/feature/dirauth/voteflags.h \ - src/feature/dircache/cached_dir_st.h \ - src/feature/dircache/conscache.h \ - src/feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.h \ - src/feature/dircache/dircache.h \ - src/feature/dircache/dirserv.h \ - src/feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h \ - src/feature/dirclient/dirclient.h \ - src/feature/dirclient/dlstatus.h \ - src/feature/dirclient/download_status_st.h \ - src/feature/dircommon/consdiff.h \ - src/feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h \ - src/feature/dircommon/directory.h \ - src/feature/dircommon/fp_pair.h \ - src/feature/dircommon/vote_timing_st.h \ - src/feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/authcert_members.i \ - src/feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/microdesc_parse.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/parsecommon.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/policy_parse.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/sigcommon.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/signing.h \ - src/feature/dirparse/unparseable.h \ - src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_cache.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_cell.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_client.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_common.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_config.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_control.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_ident.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_service.h \ - src/feature/hs/hs_stats.h \ - src/feature/hs/hsdir_index_st.h \ - src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.h \ - src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h \ - src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/describe.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/desc_store_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/document_signature_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/microdesc_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus_sr_info_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus_voter_info_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/nickname.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/node_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/node_select.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerinfo.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerlist.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerlist_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerset.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/fmt_routerstatus.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/signed_descriptor_st.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h \ - src/feature/nodelist/vote_routerstatus_st.h \ - src/feature/relay/dns.h \ - src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h \ - src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h \ - src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h \ - src/feature/relay/router.h \ - src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h \ - src/feature/relay/routermode.h \ - src/feature/relay/selftest.h \ - src/feature/rend/rend_authorized_client_st.h \ - src/feature/rend/rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_st.h \ - src/feature/rend/rend_intro_point_st.h \ - src/feature/rend/rend_service_descriptor_st.h \ - src/feature/rend/rendcache.h \ - src/feature/rend/rendclient.h \ - src/feature/rend/rendcommon.h \ - src/feature/rend/rendmid.h \ - src/feature/rend/rendparse.h \ - src/feature/rend/rendservice.h \ - src/feature/stats/geoip_stats.h \ - src/feature/stats/rephist.h \ - src/feature/stats/predict_ports.h - -noinst_HEADERS += \ - src/app/config/auth_dirs.inc \ - src/app/config/fallback_dirs.inc - -# This may someday want to be an installed file? -noinst_HEADERS += src/feature/api/tor_api.h - micro-revision.i: FORCE $(AM_V_at)rm -f micro-revision.tmp; \ if test -r "$(top_srcdir)/.git" && \ diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/.may_include b/src/core/mainloop/.may_include new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e01cf910e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/.may_include @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +!advisory + +orconfig.h + +lib/conf/*.h +lib/container/*.h +lib/dispatch/*.h +lib/evloop/*.h +lib/pubsub/*.h +lib/subsys/*.h +lib/buf/*.h +lib/crypt_ops/*.h +lib/err/*.h +lib/tls/*.h +lib/net/*.h +lib/evloop/*.h +lib/geoip/*.h +lib/sandbox/*.h +lib/smartlist_core/*.h +lib/compress/*.h +lib/log/*.h + +core/mainloop/*.h +core/mainloop/*.inc
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c index 21d4332758..36b2c6ef63 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ #define CONNECTION_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" #include "feature/client/bridges.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "lib/tls/buffers_tls.h" #include "lib/err/backtrace.h" @@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t). */ -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ -#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE #include "app/config/config.h" +#include "app/config/resolve_addr.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" #include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h" @@ -82,13 +82,17 @@ #include "core/or/policies.h" #include "core/or/reasons.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "core/or/crypt_path.h" +#include "core/proto/proto_haproxy.h" #include "core/proto/proto_http.h" #include "core/proto/proto_socks.h" #include "feature/client/dnsserv.h" #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" #include "feature/client/transports.h" #include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" +#include "feature/dirauth/dirauth_config.h" #include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" @@ -105,6 +109,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "lib/geoip/geoip.h" +#include "lib/cc/ctassert.h" #include "lib/sandbox/sandbox.h" #include "lib/net/buffers_net.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" @@ -641,7 +646,7 @@ connection_free_minimal(connection_t *conn) } } - tor_free(conn->address); + tor_str_wipe_and_free(conn->address); if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); @@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ connection_free_minimal(connection_t *conn) } or_handshake_state_free(or_conn->handshake_state); or_conn->handshake_state = NULL; - tor_free(or_conn->nickname); + tor_str_wipe_and_free(or_conn->nickname); if (or_conn->chan) { /* Owww, this shouldn't happen, but... */ channel_t *base_chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan); @@ -681,8 +686,8 @@ connection_free_minimal(connection_t *conn) } if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { entry_connection_t *entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn); - tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); - tor_free(entry_conn->original_dest_address); + tor_str_wipe_and_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); + tor_str_wipe_and_free(entry_conn->original_dest_address); if (entry_conn->socks_request) socks_request_free(entry_conn->socks_request); if (entry_conn->pending_optimistic_data) { @@ -700,6 +705,7 @@ connection_free_minimal(connection_t *conn) control_connection_t *control_conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn); tor_free(control_conn->safecookie_client_hash); tor_free(control_conn->incoming_cmd); + tor_free(control_conn->current_cmd); if (control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services, char *, cp, { memwipe(cp, 0, strlen(cp)); @@ -719,11 +725,7 @@ connection_free_minimal(connection_t *conn) tor_free(dir_conn->requested_resource); tor_compress_free(dir_conn->compress_state); - if (dir_conn->spool) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(dir_conn->spool, spooled_resource_t *, spooled, - spooled_resource_free(spooled)); - smartlist_free(dir_conn->spool); - } + dir_conn_clear_spool(dir_conn); rend_data_free(dir_conn->rend_data); hs_ident_dir_conn_free(dir_conn->hs_ident); @@ -1199,7 +1201,7 @@ make_win32_socket_exclusive(tor_socket_t sock) return -1; } return 0; -#else /* !(defined(SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE)) */ +#else /* !defined(SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE) */ (void) sock; return 0; #endif /* defined(SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE) */ @@ -1470,6 +1472,20 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); goto err; } + +#ifndef __APPLE__ + /* This code was introduced to help debug #28229. */ + int value; + socklen_t len = sizeof(value); + + if (!getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ACCEPTCONN, &value, &len)) { + if (value == 0) { + log_err(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s - " + "getsockopt(.,SO_ACCEPTCONN,.) yields 0.", address); + goto err; + } + } +#endif /* !defined(__APPLE__) */ #endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */ } else { log_err(LD_BUG, "Got unexpected address family %d.", @@ -1503,10 +1519,11 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } } + /* Force IPv4 and IPv6 traffic on for non-SOCKSPorts. + * Forcing options on isn't a good idea, see #32994 and #33607. */ if (type != CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER) { lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic = 1; lis_conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic = 1; - lis_conn->entry_cfg.prefer_ipv6 = 0; } if (connection_add(conn) < 0) { /* no space, forget it */ @@ -1648,7 +1665,7 @@ check_sockaddr(const struct sockaddr *sa, int len, int level) len,(int)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)); ok = 0; } - if (tor_mem_is_zero((void*)sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16) || + if (fast_mem_is_zero((void*)sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16) || sin6->sin6_port == 0) { log_fn(level, LD_NET, "Address for new connection has address/port equal to zero."); @@ -1871,7 +1888,7 @@ connection_init_accepted_conn(connection_t *conn, /* Initiate Extended ORPort authentication. */ return connection_ext_or_start_auth(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); case CONN_TYPE_OR: - control_event_or_conn_status(TO_OR_CONN(conn), OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0); + connection_or_event_status(TO_OR_CONN(conn), OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0); rv = connection_tls_start_handshake(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 1); if (rv < 0) { connection_or_close_for_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0); @@ -1884,11 +1901,16 @@ connection_init_accepted_conn(connection_t *conn, TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->nym_epoch = get_signewnym_epoch(); TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->listener_type = listener->base_.type; + /* Any incoming connection on an entry port counts as user activity. */ + note_user_activity(approx_time()); + switch (TO_CONN(listener)->type) { case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT; TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->socks_prefer_no_auth = listener->entry_cfg.socks_prefer_no_auth; + TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->socks_use_extended_errors = + listener->entry_cfg.extended_socks5_codes; break; case CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER: TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->is_transparent_ap = 1; @@ -2083,6 +2105,11 @@ connection_connect_log_client_use_ip_version(const connection_t *conn) return; } + if (fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options)) { + log_info(LD_NET, "Our outgoing connection is using IPv%d.", + tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET6 ? 6 : 4); + } + /* Check if we couldn't satisfy an address family preference */ if ((!pref_ipv6 && tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET6) || (pref_ipv6 && tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET)) { @@ -2261,9 +2288,12 @@ connection_proxy_state_to_string(int state) "PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929", "PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK", "PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK", + "PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH", "PROXY_CONNECTED", }; + CTASSERT(ARRAY_LENGTH(states) == PROXY_CONNECTED+1); + if (state < PROXY_NONE || state > PROXY_CONNECTED) return unknown; @@ -2296,7 +2326,11 @@ conn_get_proxy_type(const connection_t *conn) return PROXY_SOCKS4; else if (options->Socks5Proxy) return PROXY_SOCKS5; - else + else if (options->TCPProxy) { + /* The only supported protocol in TCPProxy is haproxy. */ + tor_assert(options->TCPProxyProtocol == TCP_PROXY_PROTOCOL_HAPROXY); + return PROXY_HAPROXY; + } else return PROXY_NONE; } @@ -2305,165 +2339,245 @@ conn_get_proxy_type(const connection_t *conn) username NUL: */ #define SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE (1 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 1) -/** Write a proxy request of <b>type</b> (socks4, socks5, https) to conn - * for conn->addr:conn->port, authenticating with the auth details given - * in the configuration (if available). SOCKS 5 and HTTP CONNECT proxies - * support authentication. +/** Write a proxy request of https to conn for conn->addr:conn->port, + * authenticating with the auth details given in the configuration + * (if available). * * Returns -1 if conn->addr is incompatible with the proxy protocol, and * 0 otherwise. - * - * Use connection_read_proxy_handshake() to complete the handshake. */ -int -connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) +static int +connection_https_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn) { - const or_options_t *options; + tor_assert(conn); + + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + char buf[1024]; + char *base64_authenticator = NULL; + const char *authenticator = options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; + + /* Send HTTP CONNECT and authentication (if available) in + * one request */ + + if (authenticator) { + base64_authenticator = alloc_http_authenticator(authenticator); + if (!base64_authenticator) + log_warn(LD_OR, "Encoding https authenticator failed"); + } + + if (base64_authenticator) { + const char *addrport = fmt_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "Host: %s\r\n" + "Proxy-Authorization: Basic %s\r\n\r\n", + addrport, + addrport, + base64_authenticator); + tor_free(base64_authenticator); + } else { + tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", + fmt_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)); + } + + connection_buf_add(buf, strlen(buf), conn); + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK; + + return 0; +} +/** Write a proxy request of socks4 to conn for conn->addr:conn->port. + * + * Returns -1 if conn->addr is incompatible with the proxy protocol, and + * 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +connection_socks4_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn) +{ tor_assert(conn); - options = get_options(); + unsigned char *buf; + uint16_t portn; + uint32_t ip4addr; + size_t buf_size = 0; + char *socks_args_string = NULL; - switch (type) { - case PROXY_CONNECT: { - char buf[1024]; - char *base64_authenticator=NULL; - const char *authenticator = options->HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; - - /* Send HTTP CONNECT and authentication (if available) in - * one request */ - - if (authenticator) { - base64_authenticator = alloc_http_authenticator(authenticator); - if (!base64_authenticator) - log_warn(LD_OR, "Encoding https authenticator failed"); - } + /* Send a SOCKS4 connect request */ - if (base64_authenticator) { - const char *addrport = fmt_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); - tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.1\r\n" - "Host: %s\r\n" - "Proxy-Authorization: Basic %s\r\n\r\n", - addrport, - addrport, - base64_authenticator); - tor_free(base64_authenticator); - } else { - tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", - fmt_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)); - } + if (tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) != AF_INET) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "SOCKS4 client is incompatible with IPv6"); + return -1; + } - connection_buf_add(buf, strlen(buf), conn); - conn->proxy_state = PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK; - break; + { /* If we are here because we are trying to connect to a + pluggable transport proxy, check if we have any SOCKS + arguments to transmit. If we do, compress all arguments to + a single string in 'socks_args_string': */ + + if (conn_get_proxy_type(conn) == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) { + socks_args_string = + pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); + if (socks_args_string) + log_debug(LD_NET, "Sending out '%s' as our SOCKS argument string.", + socks_args_string); } + } - case PROXY_SOCKS4: { - unsigned char *buf; - uint16_t portn; - uint32_t ip4addr; - size_t buf_size = 0; - char *socks_args_string = NULL; + { /* Figure out the buffer size we need for the SOCKS message: */ - /* Send a SOCKS4 connect request */ + buf_size = SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE; - if (tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) != AF_INET) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "SOCKS4 client is incompatible with IPv6"); - return -1; - } + /* If we have a SOCKS argument string, consider its size when + calculating the buffer size: */ + if (socks_args_string) + buf_size += strlen(socks_args_string); + } - { /* If we are here because we are trying to connect to a - pluggable transport proxy, check if we have any SOCKS - arguments to transmit. If we do, compress all arguments to - a single string in 'socks_args_string': */ + buf = tor_malloc_zero(buf_size); - if (conn_get_proxy_type(conn) == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) { - socks_args_string = - pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); - if (socks_args_string) - log_debug(LD_NET, "Sending out '%s' as our SOCKS argument string.", - socks_args_string); - } - } + ip4addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&conn->addr); + portn = htons(conn->port); - { /* Figure out the buffer size we need for the SOCKS message: */ + buf[0] = 4; /* version */ + buf[1] = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT; /* command */ + memcpy(buf + 2, &portn, 2); /* port */ + memcpy(buf + 4, &ip4addr, 4); /* addr */ + + /* Next packet field is the userid. If we have pluggable + transport SOCKS arguments, we have to embed them + there. Otherwise, we use an empty userid. */ + if (socks_args_string) { /* place the SOCKS args string: */ + tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) > 0); + tor_assert(buf_size >= + SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE + strlen(socks_args_string)); + strlcpy((char *)buf + 8, socks_args_string, buf_size - 8); + tor_free(socks_args_string); + } else { + buf[8] = 0; /* no userid */ + } - buf_size = SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE; + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, buf_size, conn); + tor_free(buf); - /* If we have a SOCKS argument string, consider its size when - calculating the buffer size: */ - if (socks_args_string) - buf_size += strlen(socks_args_string); - } + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK; + return 0; +} - buf = tor_malloc_zero(buf_size); - - ip4addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&conn->addr); - portn = htons(conn->port); - - buf[0] = 4; /* version */ - buf[1] = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT; /* command */ - memcpy(buf + 2, &portn, 2); /* port */ - memcpy(buf + 4, &ip4addr, 4); /* addr */ - - /* Next packet field is the userid. If we have pluggable - transport SOCKS arguments, we have to embed them - there. Otherwise, we use an empty userid. */ - if (socks_args_string) { /* place the SOCKS args string: */ - tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) > 0); - tor_assert(buf_size >= - SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE + strlen(socks_args_string)); - strlcpy((char *)buf + 8, socks_args_string, buf_size - 8); - tor_free(socks_args_string); - } else { - buf[8] = 0; /* no userid */ - } +/** Write a proxy request of socks5 to conn for conn->addr:conn->port, + * authenticating with the auth details given in the configuration + * (if available). + * + * Returns -1 if conn->addr is incompatible with the proxy protocol, and + * 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +connection_socks5_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); - connection_buf_add((char *)buf, buf_size, conn); - tor_free(buf); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + unsigned char buf[4]; /* fields: vers, num methods, method list */ - conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK; - break; - } + /* Send a SOCKS5 greeting (connect request must wait) */ - case PROXY_SOCKS5: { - unsigned char buf[4]; /* fields: vers, num methods, method list */ + buf[0] = 5; /* version */ - /* Send a SOCKS5 greeting (connect request must wait) */ + /* We have to use SOCKS5 authentication, if we have a + Socks5ProxyUsername or if we want to pass arguments to our + pluggable transport proxy: */ + if ((options->Socks5ProxyUsername) || + (conn_get_proxy_type(conn) == PROXY_PLUGGABLE && + (get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)))) { + /* number of auth methods */ + buf[1] = 2; + buf[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */ + buf[3] = 0x02; /* rfc1929 Username/Passwd auth */ + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929; + } else { + buf[1] = 1; + buf[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */ + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE; + } - buf[0] = 5; /* version */ + connection_buf_add((char *)buf, 2 + buf[1], conn); + return 0; +} - /* We have to use SOCKS5 authentication, if we have a - Socks5ProxyUsername or if we want to pass arguments to our - pluggable transport proxy: */ - if ((options->Socks5ProxyUsername) || - (conn_get_proxy_type(conn) == PROXY_PLUGGABLE && - (get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)))) { - /* number of auth methods */ - buf[1] = 2; - buf[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */ - buf[3] = 0x02; /* rfc1929 Username/Passwd auth */ - conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929; - } else { - buf[1] = 1; - buf[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */ - conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE; - } +/** Write a proxy request of haproxy to conn for conn->addr:conn->port. + * + * Returns -1 if conn->addr is incompatible with the proxy protocol, and + * 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +connection_haproxy_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn) +{ + int ret = 0; + tor_addr_port_t *addr_port = tor_addr_port_new(&conn->addr, conn->port); + char *buf = haproxy_format_proxy_header_line(addr_port); + + if (buf == NULL) { + ret = -1; + goto done; + } + + connection_buf_add(buf, strlen(buf), conn); + /* In haproxy, we don't have to wait for the response, but we wait for ack. + * So we can set the state to be PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH. */ + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH; + + ret = 0; + done: + tor_free(buf); + tor_free(addr_port); + return ret; +} + +/** Write a proxy request of <b>type</b> (socks4, socks5, https, haproxy) + * to conn for conn->addr:conn->port, authenticating with the auth details + * given in the configuration (if available). SOCKS 5 and HTTP CONNECT + * proxies support authentication. + * + * Returns -1 if conn->addr is incompatible with the proxy protocol, and + * 0 otherwise. + * + * Use connection_read_proxy_handshake() to complete the handshake. + */ +int +connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) +{ + int ret = 0; + + tor_assert(conn); + + switch (type) { + case PROXY_CONNECT: + ret = connection_https_proxy_connect(conn); + break; - connection_buf_add((char *)buf, 2 + buf[1], conn); + case PROXY_SOCKS4: + ret = connection_socks4_proxy_connect(conn); + break; + + case PROXY_SOCKS5: + ret = connection_socks5_proxy_connect(conn); + break; + + case PROXY_HAPROXY: + ret = connection_haproxy_proxy_connect(conn); break; - } default: log_err(LD_BUG, "Invalid proxy protocol, %d", type); tor_fragile_assert(); - return -1; + ret = -1; + break; } - log_debug(LD_NET, "set state %s", - connection_proxy_state_to_string(conn->proxy_state)); + if (ret == 0) { + log_debug(LD_NET, "set state %s", + connection_proxy_state_to_string(conn->proxy_state)); + } - return 0; + return ret; } /** Read conn's inbuf. If the http response from the proxy is all @@ -2841,7 +2955,7 @@ retry_listener_ports(smartlist_t *old_conns, SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(old_conns, conn); break; } -#endif +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_LISTENER_REBIND) */ } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(wanted); @@ -2905,6 +3019,10 @@ retry_all_listeners(smartlist_t *new_conns, int close_all_noncontrol) retval = -1; #ifdef ENABLE_LISTENER_REBIND + if (smartlist_len(replacements)) + log_debug(LD_NET, "%d replacements - starting rebinding loop.", + smartlist_len(replacements)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(replacements, listener_replacement_t *, r) { int addr_in_use = 0; int skip = 0; @@ -2916,8 +3034,11 @@ retry_all_listeners(smartlist_t *new_conns, int close_all_noncontrol) connection_listener_new_for_port(r->new_port, &skip, &addr_in_use); connection_t *old_conn = r->old_conn; - if (skip) + if (skip) { + log_debug(LD_NET, "Skipping creating new listener for %s:%d", + old_conn->address, old_conn->port); continue; + } connection_close_immediate(old_conn); connection_mark_for_close(old_conn); @@ -2943,7 +3064,7 @@ retry_all_listeners(smartlist_t *new_conns, int close_all_noncontrol) conn_type_to_string(old_conn->type), old_conn->address, old_conn->port, new_conn->address, new_conn->port); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(r); -#endif +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_LISTENER_REBIND) */ /* Any members that were still in 'listeners' don't correspond to * any configured port. Kill 'em. */ @@ -3030,7 +3151,7 @@ connection_mark_all_noncontrol_connections(void) * uses pluggable transports, since we should then limit it even if it * comes from an internal IP address. */ static int -connection_is_rate_limited(connection_t *conn) +connection_is_rate_limited(const connection_t *conn) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (conn->linked) @@ -3166,14 +3287,14 @@ connection_bucket_write_limit(connection_t *conn, time_t now) global_bucket_val, conn_bucket); } -/** Return 1 if the global write buckets are low enough that we +/** Return true iff the global write buckets are low enough that we * shouldn't send <b>attempt</b> bytes of low-priority directory stuff - * out to <b>conn</b>. Else return 0. - - * Priority was 1 for v1 requests (directories and running-routers), - * and 2 for v2 requests and later (statuses and descriptors). + * out to <b>conn</b>. + * + * If we are a directory authority, always answer dir requests thus true is + * always returned. * - * There are a lot of parameters we could use here: + * Note: There are a lot of parameters we could use here: * - global_relayed_write_bucket. Low is bad. * - global_write_bucket. Low is bad. * - bandwidthrate. Low is bad. @@ -3185,39 +3306,40 @@ connection_bucket_write_limit(connection_t *conn, time_t now) * mean is "total directory bytes added to outbufs recently", but * that's harder to quantify and harder to keep track of. */ -int -global_write_bucket_low(connection_t *conn, size_t attempt, int priority) +bool +connection_dir_is_global_write_low(const connection_t *conn, size_t attempt) { size_t smaller_bucket = MIN(token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_bucket), token_bucket_rw_get_write(&global_relayed_bucket)); - if (authdir_mode(get_options()) && priority>1) - return 0; /* there's always room to answer v2 if we're an auth dir */ + + /* Special case for authorities (directory only). */ + if (authdir_mode_v3(get_options())) { + /* Are we configured to possibly reject requests under load? */ + if (!dirauth_should_reject_requests_under_load()) { + /* Answer request no matter what. */ + return false; + } + /* Always answer requests from a known relay which includes the other + * authorities. The following looks up the addresses for relays that we + * have their descriptor _and_ any configured trusted directories. */ + if (nodelist_probably_contains_address(&conn->addr)) { + return false; + } + } if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) - return 0; /* local conns don't get limited */ + return false; /* local conns don't get limited */ if (smaller_bucket < attempt) - return 1; /* not enough space no matter the priority */ + return true; /* not enough space. */ { const time_t diff = approx_time() - write_buckets_last_empty_at; if (diff <= 1) - return 1; /* we're already hitting our limits, no more please */ + return true; /* we're already hitting our limits, no more please */ } - - if (priority == 1) { /* old-style v1 query */ - /* Could we handle *two* of these requests within the next two seconds? */ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - size_t can_write = (size_t) (smaller_bucket - + 2*(options->RelayBandwidthRate ? options->RelayBandwidthRate : - options->BandwidthRate)); - if (can_write < 2*attempt) - return 1; - } else { /* v2 query */ - /* no further constraints yet */ - } - return 0; + return false; } /** When did we last tell the accounting subsystem about transmitted @@ -3239,8 +3361,17 @@ record_num_bytes_transferred_impl(connection_t *conn, rep_hist_note_dir_bytes_written(num_written, now); } + /* Linked connections and internal IPs aren't counted for statistics or + * accounting: + * - counting linked connections would double-count BEGINDIR bytes, because + * they are sent as Dir bytes on the linked connection, and OR bytes on + * the OR connection; + * - relays and clients don't connect to internal IPs, unless specifically + * configured to do so. If they are configured that way, we don't count + * internal bytes. + */ if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) - return; /* local IPs are free */ + return; if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) rep_hist_note_or_conn_bytes(conn->global_identifier, num_read, @@ -3696,6 +3827,12 @@ connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, at_most = connection_bucket_read_limit(conn, approx_time()); } + /* Do not allow inbuf to grow past BUF_MAX_LEN. */ + const ssize_t maximum = BUF_MAX_LEN - buf_datalen(conn->inbuf); + if (at_most > maximum) { + at_most = maximum; + } + slack_in_buf = buf_slack(conn->inbuf); again: if ((size_t)at_most > slack_in_buf && slack_in_buf >= 1024) { @@ -3943,9 +4080,9 @@ update_send_buffer_size(tor_socket_t sock) &isb, sizeof(isb), &bytesReturned, NULL, NULL)) { setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, (const char*)&isb, sizeof(isb)); } -#else +#else /* !defined(_WIN32) */ (void) sock; -#endif +#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */ } /** Try to flush more bytes onto <b>conn</b>-\>s. @@ -4080,6 +4217,7 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) switch (result) { CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY: case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: + or_conn->tls_error = result; log_info(LD_NET, result != TOR_TLS_CLOSE ? "tls error. breaking.":"TLS connection closed on flush"); /* Don't flush; connection is dead. */ @@ -4343,6 +4481,23 @@ connection_write_to_buf_impl_,(const char *string, size_t len, connection_write_to_buf_commit(conn, written); } +/** + * Write a <b>string</b> (of size <b>len</b> to directory connection + * <b>dir_conn</b>. Apply compression if connection is configured to use + * it and finalize it if <b>done</b> is true. + */ +void +connection_dir_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, + dir_connection_t *dir_conn, int done) +{ + if (dir_conn->compress_state != NULL) { + connection_buf_add_compress(string, len, dir_conn, done); + return; + } + + connection_buf_add(string, len, TO_CONN(dir_conn)); +} + void connection_buf_add_compress(const char *string, size_t len, dir_connection_t *conn, int done) @@ -4457,6 +4612,16 @@ connection_get_by_type_state(int type, int state) CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, conn->type == type && conn->state == state); } +/** + * Return a connection of type <b>type</b> that is not an internally linked + * connection, and is not marked for close. + **/ +MOCK_IMPL(connection_t *, +connection_get_by_type_nonlinked,(int type)) +{ + CONN_GET_TEMPLATE(conn, conn->type == type && !conn->linked); +} + /** Return a connection of type <b>type</b> that has rendquery equal * to <b>rendquery</b>, and that is not marked for close. If state * is non-zero, conn must be of that state too. @@ -4837,10 +5002,10 @@ connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn) } } -/** Called when our attempt to connect() to another server has just - * succeeded. +/** Called when our attempt to connect() to a server has just succeeded. * - * This function just passes conn to the connection-specific + * This function checks if the interface address has changed (clients only), + * and then passes conn to the connection-specific * connection_*_finished_connecting() function. */ static int @@ -5299,7 +5464,7 @@ assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now) tor_assert(entry_conn->socks_request->has_finished); if (!conn->marked_for_close) { tor_assert(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn)->cpath_layer); - assert_cpath_layer_ok(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn)->cpath_layer); + cpath_assert_layer_ok(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn)->cpath_layer); } } } @@ -5353,17 +5518,20 @@ assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now) } /** Fills <b>addr</b> and <b>port</b> with the details of the global - * proxy server we are using. - * <b>conn</b> contains the connection we are using the proxy for. + * proxy server we are using. Store a 1 to the int pointed to by + * <b>is_put_out</b> if the connection is using a pluggable + * transport; store 0 otherwise. <b>conn</b> contains the connection + * we are using the proxy for. * * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, - const connection_t *conn) + int *is_pt_out, const connection_t *conn) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + *is_pt_out = 0; /* Client Transport Plugins can use another proxy, but that should be hidden * from the rest of tor (as the plugin is responsible for dealing with the * proxy), check it first, then check the rest of the proxy types to allow @@ -5379,6 +5547,7 @@ get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, tor_addr_copy(addr, &transport->addr); *port = transport->port; *proxy_type = transport->socks_version; + *is_pt_out = 1; return 0; } @@ -5400,6 +5569,13 @@ get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, *port = options->Socks5ProxyPort; *proxy_type = PROXY_SOCKS5; return 0; + } else if (options->TCPProxy) { + tor_addr_copy(addr, &options->TCPProxyAddr); + *port = options->TCPProxyPort; + /* The only supported protocol in TCPProxy is haproxy. */ + tor_assert(options->TCPProxyProtocol == TCP_PROXY_PROTOCOL_HAPROXY); + *proxy_type = PROXY_HAPROXY; + return 0; } tor_addr_make_unspec(addr); @@ -5415,11 +5591,13 @@ log_failed_proxy_connection(connection_t *conn) { tor_addr_t proxy_addr; uint16_t proxy_port; - int proxy_type; + int proxy_type, is_pt; - if (get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, conn) != 0) + if (get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, &is_pt, + conn) != 0) return; /* if we have no proxy set up, leave this function. */ + (void)is_pt; log_warn(LD_NET, "The connection to the %s proxy server at %s just failed. " "Make sure that the proxy server is up and running.", @@ -5435,6 +5613,7 @@ proxy_type_to_string(int proxy_type) case PROXY_CONNECT: return "HTTP"; case PROXY_SOCKS4: return "SOCKS4"; case PROXY_SOCKS5: return "SOCKS5"; + case PROXY_HAPROXY: return "HAPROXY"; case PROXY_PLUGGABLE: return "pluggable transports SOCKS"; case PROXY_NONE: return "NULL"; default: tor_assert(0); diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/connection.h b/src/core/mainloop/connection.h index 8ecdd6f06f..bcd3d590a5 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.h +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -12,7 +12,25 @@ #ifndef TOR_CONNECTION_H #define TOR_CONNECTION_H -listener_connection_t *TO_LISTENER_CONN(connection_t *); +#include "lib/smartlist_core/smartlist_core.h" +#include "lib/log/log.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include <sys/socket.h> +#endif + +struct listener_connection_t; +struct connection_t; +struct dir_connection_t; +struct or_connection_t; +struct edge_connection_t; +struct entry_connection_t; +struct control_connection_t; +struct port_cfg_t; +struct tor_addr_t; +struct or_options_t; + +struct listener_connection_t *TO_LISTENER_CONN(struct connection_t *); struct buf_t; @@ -56,7 +74,7 @@ struct buf_t; #define CONN_TYPE_MAX_ 19 /* !!!! If _CONN_TYPE_MAX is ever over 31, we must grow the type field in - * connection_t. */ + * struct connection_t. */ /* Proxy client handshake states */ /* We use a proxy but we haven't even connected to it yet. */ @@ -75,8 +93,10 @@ struct buf_t; #define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK 6 /* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we just sent our CONNECT command. */ #define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK 7 +/* We use an HAPROXY proxy and we just sent the proxy header. */ +#define PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH 8 /* We use a proxy and we CONNECTed successfully!. */ -#define PROXY_CONNECTED 8 +#define PROXY_CONNECTED 9 /** State for any listener connection. */ #define LISTENER_STATE_READY 0 @@ -88,34 +108,36 @@ struct buf_t; */ typedef struct { - connection_t *old_conn; /* Old listener connection to be replaced */ - const port_cfg_t *new_port; /* New port configuration */ + struct connection_t *old_conn; /* Old listener connection to be replaced */ + const struct port_cfg_t *new_port; /* New port configuration */ } listener_replacement_t; const char *conn_type_to_string(int type); const char *conn_state_to_string(int type, int state); int conn_listener_type_supports_af_unix(int type); -dir_connection_t *dir_connection_new(int socket_family); -or_connection_t *or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); -edge_connection_t *edge_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); -entry_connection_t *entry_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); -control_connection_t *control_connection_new(int socket_family); -listener_connection_t *listener_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); -connection_t *connection_new(int type, int socket_family); -int connection_init_accepted_conn(connection_t *conn, - const listener_connection_t *listener); -void connection_link_connections(connection_t *conn_a, connection_t *conn_b); -MOCK_DECL(void,connection_free_,(connection_t *conn)); +struct dir_connection_t *dir_connection_new(int socket_family); +struct or_connection_t *or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); +struct edge_connection_t *edge_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); +struct entry_connection_t *entry_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); +struct control_connection_t *control_connection_new(int socket_family); +struct listener_connection_t *listener_connection_new(int type, + int socket_family); +struct connection_t *connection_new(int type, int socket_family); +int connection_init_accepted_conn(struct connection_t *conn, + const struct listener_connection_t *listener); +void connection_link_connections(struct connection_t *conn_a, + struct connection_t *conn_b); +MOCK_DECL(void,connection_free_,(struct connection_t *conn)); #define connection_free(conn) \ - FREE_AND_NULL(connection_t, connection_free_, (conn)) + FREE_AND_NULL(struct connection_t, connection_free_, (conn)) void connection_free_all(void); -void connection_about_to_close_connection(connection_t *conn); -void connection_close_immediate(connection_t *conn); -void connection_mark_for_close_(connection_t *conn, +void connection_about_to_close_connection(struct connection_t *conn); +void connection_close_immediate(struct connection_t *conn); +void connection_mark_for_close_(struct connection_t *conn, int line, const char *file); MOCK_DECL(void, connection_mark_for_close_internal_, - (connection_t *conn, int line, const char *file)); + (struct connection_t *conn, int line, const char *file)); #define connection_mark_for_close(c) \ connection_mark_for_close_((c), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__) @@ -130,11 +152,11 @@ MOCK_DECL(void, connection_mark_for_close_internal_, * connection_or_notify_error()), or you actually are the * connection_or_close_for_error() or connection_or_close_normally function. * For all other cases, use connection_mark_and_flush() instead, which - * checks for or_connection_t properly, instead. See below. + * checks for struct or_connection_t properly, instead. See below. */ #define connection_mark_and_flush_internal_(c,line,file) \ do { \ - connection_t *tmp_conn__ = (c); \ + struct connection_t *tmp_conn__ = (c); \ connection_mark_for_close_internal_(tmp_conn__, (line), (file)); \ tmp_conn__->hold_open_until_flushed = 1; \ } while (0) @@ -147,7 +169,7 @@ MOCK_DECL(void, connection_mark_for_close_internal_, */ #define connection_mark_and_flush_(c,line,file) \ do { \ - connection_t *tmp_conn_ = (c); \ + struct connection_t *tmp_conn_ = (c); \ if (tmp_conn_->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) { \ log_warn(LD_CHANNEL | LD_BUG, \ "Something tried to close (and flush) an or_connection_t" \ @@ -164,13 +186,13 @@ MOCK_DECL(void, connection_mark_for_close_internal_, void connection_expire_held_open(void); -int connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, - const tor_addr_t *addr, +int connection_connect(struct connection_t *conn, const char *address, + const struct tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, int *socket_error); #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H -int connection_connect_unix(connection_t *conn, const char *socket_path, +int connection_connect_unix(struct connection_t *conn, const char *socket_path, int *socket_error); #endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */ @@ -183,75 +205,86 @@ int connection_connect_unix(connection_t *conn, const char *socket_path, username and password fields. */ #define MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL 2*MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE -int connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type); -int connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn); -void log_failed_proxy_connection(connection_t *conn); -int get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, - const connection_t *conn); +int connection_proxy_connect(struct connection_t *conn, int type); +int connection_read_proxy_handshake(struct connection_t *conn); +void log_failed_proxy_connection(struct connection_t *conn); +int get_proxy_addrport(struct tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, + int *proxy_type, + int *is_pt_out, const struct connection_t *conn); -int retry_all_listeners(smartlist_t *new_conns, +int retry_all_listeners(struct smartlist_t *new_conns, int close_all_noncontrol); void connection_mark_all_noncontrol_listeners(void); void connection_mark_all_noncontrol_connections(void); -ssize_t connection_bucket_write_limit(connection_t *conn, time_t now); -int global_write_bucket_low(connection_t *conn, size_t attempt, int priority); +ssize_t connection_bucket_write_limit(struct connection_t *conn, time_t now); +bool connection_dir_is_global_write_low(const struct connection_t *conn, + size_t attempt); void connection_bucket_init(void); -void connection_bucket_adjust(const or_options_t *options); +void connection_bucket_adjust(const struct or_options_t *options); void connection_bucket_refill_all(time_t now, uint32_t now_ts); -void connection_read_bw_exhausted(connection_t *conn, bool is_global_bw); -void connection_write_bw_exhausted(connection_t *conn, bool is_global_bw); -void connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(connection_t *conn); -void connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(connection_t *conn); - -int connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn); - -int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn); -int connection_buf_get_line(connection_t *conn, char *data, - size_t *data_len); -int connection_fetch_from_buf_http(connection_t *conn, +void connection_read_bw_exhausted(struct connection_t *conn, + bool is_global_bw); +void connection_write_bw_exhausted(struct connection_t *conn, + bool is_global_bw); +void connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(struct connection_t *conn); +void connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(struct connection_t *conn); + +int connection_handle_read(struct connection_t *conn); + +int connection_buf_get_bytes(char *string, size_t len, + struct connection_t *conn); +int connection_buf_get_line(struct connection_t *conn, char *data, + size_t *data_len); +int connection_fetch_from_buf_http(struct connection_t *conn, char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen, char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen, int force_complete); -int connection_wants_to_flush(connection_t *conn); -int connection_outbuf_too_full(connection_t *conn); -int connection_handle_write(connection_t *conn, int force); -int connection_flush(connection_t *conn); +int connection_wants_to_flush(struct connection_t *conn); +int connection_outbuf_too_full(struct connection_t *conn); +int connection_handle_write(struct connection_t *conn, int force); +int connection_flush(struct connection_t *conn); MOCK_DECL(void, connection_write_to_buf_impl_, - (const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn, int zlib)); + (const char *string, size_t len, struct connection_t *conn, + int zlib)); /* DOCDOC connection_write_to_buf */ static void connection_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, - connection_t *conn); + struct connection_t *conn); +void connection_dir_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, + struct dir_connection_t *dir_conn, int done); static inline void -connection_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn) +connection_buf_add(const char *string, size_t len, struct connection_t *conn) { connection_write_to_buf_impl_(string, len, conn, 0); } void connection_buf_add_compress(const char *string, size_t len, - dir_connection_t *conn, int done); -void connection_buf_add_buf(connection_t *conn, struct buf_t *buf); - -size_t connection_get_inbuf_len(connection_t *conn); -size_t connection_get_outbuf_len(connection_t *conn); -connection_t *connection_get_by_global_id(uint64_t id); - -connection_t *connection_get_by_type(int type); -MOCK_DECL(connection_t *,connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose,(int type, - const tor_addr_t *addr, - uint16_t port, int purpose)); -connection_t *connection_get_by_type_state(int type, int state); -connection_t *connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(int type, int state, + struct dir_connection_t *conn, int done); +void connection_buf_add_buf(struct connection_t *conn, struct buf_t *buf); + +size_t connection_get_inbuf_len(struct connection_t *conn); +size_t connection_get_outbuf_len(struct connection_t *conn); +struct connection_t *connection_get_by_global_id(uint64_t id); + +struct connection_t *connection_get_by_type(int type); +MOCK_DECL(struct connection_t *,connection_get_by_type_nonlinked,(int type)); +MOCK_DECL(struct connection_t *,connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose, + (int type, + const struct tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, int purpose)); +struct connection_t *connection_get_by_type_state(int type, int state); +struct connection_t *connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery( + int type, int state, const char *rendquery); -smartlist_t *connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state); -smartlist_t *connection_list_by_type_purpose(int type, int purpose); -smartlist_t *connection_dir_list_by_purpose_and_resource( +struct smartlist_t *connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state); +struct smartlist_t *connection_list_by_type_purpose(int type, int purpose); +struct smartlist_t *connection_dir_list_by_purpose_and_resource( int purpose, const char *resource); -smartlist_t *connection_dir_list_by_purpose_resource_and_state( +struct smartlist_t *connection_dir_list_by_purpose_resource_and_state( int purpose, const char *resource, int state); @@ -270,7 +303,7 @@ connection_dir_count_by_purpose_and_resource( int purpose, const char *resource) { - smartlist_t *conns = connection_dir_list_by_purpose_and_resource( + struct smartlist_t *conns = connection_dir_list_by_purpose_and_resource( purpose, resource); CONN_LEN_AND_FREE_TEMPLATE(conns); @@ -284,7 +317,7 @@ connection_dir_count_by_purpose_resource_and_state( const char *resource, int state) { - smartlist_t *conns = + struct smartlist_t *conns = connection_dir_list_by_purpose_resource_and_state( purpose, resource, @@ -294,26 +327,26 @@ connection_dir_count_by_purpose_resource_and_state( #undef CONN_LEN_AND_FREE_TEMPLATE -int any_other_active_or_conns(const or_connection_t *this_conn); +int any_other_active_or_conns(const struct or_connection_t *this_conn); /* || 0 is for -Wparentheses-equality (-Wall?) appeasement under clang */ #define connection_speaks_cells(conn) (((conn)->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) || 0) -int connection_is_listener(connection_t *conn); -int connection_state_is_open(connection_t *conn); -int connection_state_is_connecting(connection_t *conn); +int connection_is_listener(struct connection_t *conn); +int connection_state_is_open(struct connection_t *conn); +int connection_state_is_connecting(struct connection_t *conn); char *alloc_http_authenticator(const char *authenticator); -void assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now); -int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn); +void assert_connection_ok(struct connection_t *conn, time_t now); +int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(struct or_connection_t *conn); void connection_dump_buffer_mem_stats(int severity); MOCK_DECL(void, clock_skew_warning, - (const connection_t *conn, long apparent_skew, int trusted, + (const struct connection_t *conn, long apparent_skew, int trusted, log_domain_mask_t domain, const char *received, const char *source)); -int connection_is_moribund(connection_t *conn); +int connection_is_moribund(struct connection_t *conn); void connection_check_oos(int n_socks, int failed); /** Execute the statement <b>stmt</b>, which may log events concerning the @@ -335,18 +368,18 @@ void connection_check_oos(int n_socks, int failed); STMT_END #ifdef CONNECTION_PRIVATE -STATIC void connection_free_minimal(connection_t *conn); +STATIC void connection_free_minimal(struct connection_t *conn); /* Used only by connection.c and test*.c */ MOCK_DECL(STATIC int,connection_connect_sockaddr, - (connection_t *conn, + (struct connection_t *conn, const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t sa_len, const struct sockaddr *bindaddr, socklen_t bindaddr_len, int *socket_error)); -MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, kill_conn_list_for_oos, (smartlist_t *conns)); -MOCK_DECL(STATIC smartlist_t *, pick_oos_victims, (int n)); +MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, kill_conn_list_for_oos, (struct smartlist_t *conns)); +MOCK_DECL(STATIC struct smartlist_t *, pick_oos_victims, (int n)); #endif /* defined(CONNECTION_PRIVATE) */ diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/core_mainloop.md b/src/core/mainloop/core_mainloop.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fee8a8179c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/core_mainloop.md @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +@dir /core/mainloop +@brief core/mainloop: Non-onion-routing mainloop functionality + +This module uses the event-loop code of \refdir{lib/evloop} to implement an +asynchronous connection-oriented protocol handler. + +The layering here is imperfect: the code here was split from \refdir{core/or} +without refactoring how the two modules call one another. Probably many +functions should be moved and refactored. + diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c index e704d55642..485ddb9741 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2003-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ **/ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" -#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" #include "app/config/config.h" @@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "core/or/onion.h" +#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h" #include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h" #include "feature/stats/rephist.h" #include "feature/relay/router.h" @@ -34,11 +34,10 @@ #include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h" #include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h" -#include "lib/intmath/weakrng.h" static void queue_pending_tasks(void); -typedef struct worker_state_s { +typedef struct worker_state_t { int generation; server_onion_keys_t *onion_keys; } worker_state_t; @@ -74,8 +73,6 @@ worker_state_free_void(void *arg) static replyqueue_t *replyqueue = NULL; static threadpool_t *threadpool = NULL; -static tor_weak_rng_t request_sample_rng = TOR_WEAK_RNG_INIT; - static int total_pending_tasks = 0; static int max_pending_tasks = 128; @@ -109,7 +106,6 @@ cpu_init(void) /* Total voodoo. Can we make this more sensible? */ max_pending_tasks = get_num_cpus(get_options()) * 64; - crypto_seed_weak_rng(&request_sample_rng); } /** Magic numbers to make sure our cpuworker_requests don't grow any @@ -164,7 +160,7 @@ typedef struct cpuworker_reply_t { uint8_t rend_auth_material[DIGEST_LEN]; } cpuworker_reply_t; -typedef struct cpuworker_job_u { +typedef struct cpuworker_job_u_t { or_circuit_t *circ; union { cpuworker_request_t request; @@ -235,9 +231,10 @@ should_time_request(uint16_t onionskin_type) * sample */ if (onionskins_n_processed[onionskin_type] < 4096) return 1; + /** Otherwise, measure with P=1/128. We avoid doing this for every * handshake, since the measurement itself can take a little time. */ - return tor_weak_random_one_in_n(&request_sample_rng, 128); + return crypto_fast_rng_one_in_n(get_thread_fast_rng(), 128); } /** Return an estimate of how many microseconds we will need for a single diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h index 77e2c42508..7e71961750 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h +++ b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ void cpu_init(void); void cpuworkers_rotate_keyinfo(void); -struct workqueue_entry_s; +struct workqueue_entry_t; enum workqueue_reply_t; enum workqueue_priority_t; -MOCK_DECL(struct workqueue_entry_s *, cpuworker_queue_work, ( +MOCK_DECL(struct workqueue_entry_t *, cpuworker_queue_work, ( enum workqueue_priority_t priority, enum workqueue_reply_t (*fn)(void *, void *), void (*reply_fn)(void *), diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/include.am b/src/core/mainloop/include.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63643127f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/include.am @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT SOURCES HERE. +LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \ + src/core/mainloop/connection.c \ + src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.c \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.c \ + src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c \ + src/core/mainloop/periodic.c + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT HEADERS HERE. +noinst_HEADERS += \ + src/core/mainloop/connection.h \ + src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.h \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop.h \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.h \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state.inc \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state_st.h \ + src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.h \ + src/core/mainloop/netstatus.h \ + src/core/mainloop/periodic.h diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c index e67e1299b2..b4dbedbfe4 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -71,12 +71,13 @@ #include "feature/client/bridges.h" #include "feature/client/dnsserv.h" #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" +#include "feature/client/proxymode.h" #include "feature/client/transports.h" #include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" -#include "feature/dirauth/reachability.h" #include "feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.h" -#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h" +#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient_modes.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h" @@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ #include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h" #include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h" #include "feature/stats/rephist.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/err/backtrace.h" #include "lib/tls/buffers_tls.h" @@ -105,9 +106,6 @@ #include <event2/event.h> -#include "feature/dirauth/dirvote.h" -#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" - #include "core/or/cell_st.h" #include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h" @@ -200,12 +198,10 @@ static int can_complete_circuits = 0; #define LAZY_DESCRIPTOR_RETRY_INTERVAL (60) static int conn_close_if_marked(int i); -static int run_main_loop_until_done(void); static void connection_start_reading_from_linked_conn(connection_t *conn); static int connection_should_read_from_linked_conn(connection_t *conn); static void conn_read_callback(evutil_socket_t fd, short event, void *_conn); static void conn_write_callback(evutil_socket_t fd, short event, void *_conn); -static void second_elapsed_callback(periodic_timer_t *timer, void *args); static void shutdown_did_not_work_callback(evutil_socket_t fd, short event, void *arg) ATTR_NORETURN; @@ -759,7 +755,7 @@ tor_shutdown_event_loop_for_restart_cb( tor_event_free(tor_shutdown_event_loop_for_restart_event); tor_shutdown_event_loop_and_exit(0); } -#endif +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_RESTART_DEBUGGING) */ /** * After finishing the current callback (if any), shut down the main loop, @@ -970,7 +966,6 @@ conn_close_if_marked(int i) return 0; /* nothing to see here, move along */ now = time(NULL); assert_connection_ok(conn, now); - /* assert_all_pending_dns_resolves_ok(); */ log_debug(LD_NET,"Cleaning up connection (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT").", conn->s); @@ -1137,14 +1132,14 @@ directory_info_has_arrived(time_t now, int from_cache, int suppress_logs) if (!router_have_minimum_dir_info()) { int quiet = suppress_logs || from_cache || - directory_too_idle_to_fetch_descriptors(options, now); + dirclient_too_idle_to_fetch_descriptors(options, now); tor_log(quiet ? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE, LD_DIR, "I learned some more directory information, but not enough to " "build a circuit: %s", get_dir_info_status_string()); update_all_descriptor_downloads(now); return; } else { - if (directory_fetches_from_authorities(options)) { + if (dirclient_fetches_from_authorities(options)) { update_all_descriptor_downloads(now); } @@ -1357,123 +1352,101 @@ get_signewnym_epoch(void) static int periodic_events_initialized = 0; /* Declare all the timer callback functions... */ +#ifndef COCCI #undef CALLBACK #define CALLBACK(name) \ static int name ## _callback(time_t, const or_options_t *) + CALLBACK(add_entropy); -CALLBACK(check_authority_cert); -CALLBACK(check_canonical_channels); -CALLBACK(check_descriptor); -CALLBACK(check_dns_honesty); -CALLBACK(check_ed_keys); CALLBACK(check_expired_networkstatus); -CALLBACK(check_for_reachability_bw); -CALLBACK(check_onion_keys_expiry_time); CALLBACK(clean_caches); CALLBACK(clean_consdiffmgr); -CALLBACK(dirvote); -CALLBACK(downrate_stability); -CALLBACK(expire_old_ciruits_serverside); CALLBACK(fetch_networkstatus); CALLBACK(heartbeat); CALLBACK(hs_service); CALLBACK(launch_descriptor_fetches); -CALLBACK(launch_reachability_tests); -CALLBACK(reachability_warnings); +CALLBACK(prune_old_routers); CALLBACK(record_bridge_stats); CALLBACK(rend_cache_failure_clean); CALLBACK(reset_padding_counts); -CALLBACK(retry_dns); CALLBACK(retry_listeners); -CALLBACK(rotate_onion_key); CALLBACK(rotate_x509_certificate); -CALLBACK(save_stability); CALLBACK(save_state); -CALLBACK(write_bridge_ns); CALLBACK(write_stats_file); +CALLBACK(control_per_second_events); +CALLBACK(second_elapsed); #undef CALLBACK /* Now we declare an array of periodic_event_item_t for each periodic event */ -#define CALLBACK(name, r, f) PERIODIC_EVENT(name, r, f) - -STATIC periodic_event_item_t periodic_events[] = { - /* Everyone needs to run those. */ - CALLBACK(add_entropy, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - CALLBACK(check_expired_networkstatus, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - CALLBACK(clean_caches, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - CALLBACK(fetch_networkstatus, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(heartbeat, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - CALLBACK(launch_descriptor_fetches, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(reset_padding_counts, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - CALLBACK(retry_listeners, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(save_state, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - CALLBACK(rotate_x509_certificate, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - CALLBACK(write_stats_file, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL, 0), - - /* Routers (bridge and relay) only. */ - CALLBACK(check_descriptor, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(check_ed_keys, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, 0), - CALLBACK(check_for_reachability_bw, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(check_onion_keys_expiry_time, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, 0), - CALLBACK(expire_old_ciruits_serverside, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(reachability_warnings, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(retry_dns, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, 0), - CALLBACK(rotate_onion_key, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER, 0), - - /* Authorities (bridge and directory) only. */ - CALLBACK(downrate_stability, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_AUTHORITIES, 0), - CALLBACK(launch_reachability_tests, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_AUTHORITIES, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(save_stability, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_AUTHORITIES, 0), - - /* Directory authority only. */ - CALLBACK(check_authority_cert, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRAUTH, 0), - CALLBACK(dirvote, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRAUTH, PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - - /* Relay only. */ - CALLBACK(check_canonical_channels, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_RELAY, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), - CALLBACK(check_dns_honesty, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_RELAY, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), +#define CALLBACK(name, r, f) \ + PERIODIC_EVENT(name, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ ## r, f) +#define FL(name) (PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_ ## name) +#endif /* !defined(COCCI) */ + +STATIC periodic_event_item_t mainloop_periodic_events[] = { + + /* Everyone needs to run these. They need to have very long timeouts for + * that to be safe. */ + CALLBACK(add_entropy, ALL, 0), + CALLBACK(heartbeat, ALL, 0), + CALLBACK(reset_padding_counts, ALL, 0), + + /* This is a legacy catch-all callback that runs once per second if + * we are online and active. */ + CALLBACK(second_elapsed, NET_PARTICIPANT, + FL(RUN_ON_DISABLE)), + + /* XXXX Do we have a reason to do this on a callback? Does it do any good at + * all? For now, if we're dormant, we can let our listeners decay. */ + CALLBACK(retry_listeners, NET_PARTICIPANT, FL(NEED_NET)), + + /* We need to do these if we're participating in the Tor network. */ + CALLBACK(check_expired_networkstatus, NET_PARTICIPANT, 0), + CALLBACK(fetch_networkstatus, NET_PARTICIPANT, 0), + CALLBACK(launch_descriptor_fetches, NET_PARTICIPANT, FL(NEED_NET)), + CALLBACK(rotate_x509_certificate, NET_PARTICIPANT, 0), + CALLBACK(check_network_participation, NET_PARTICIPANT, 0), + + /* We need to do these if we're participating in the Tor network, and + * immediately before we stop. */ + CALLBACK(clean_caches, NET_PARTICIPANT, FL(RUN_ON_DISABLE)), + CALLBACK(save_state, NET_PARTICIPANT, FL(RUN_ON_DISABLE)), + CALLBACK(write_stats_file, NET_PARTICIPANT, FL(RUN_ON_DISABLE)), + CALLBACK(prune_old_routers, NET_PARTICIPANT, FL(RUN_ON_DISABLE)), /* Hidden Service service only. */ - CALLBACK(hs_service, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_HS_SERVICE, - PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET), + CALLBACK(hs_service, HS_SERVICE, FL(NEED_NET)), // XXXX break this down more /* Bridge only. */ - CALLBACK(record_bridge_stats, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGE, 0), + CALLBACK(record_bridge_stats, BRIDGE, 0), /* Client only. */ - CALLBACK(rend_cache_failure_clean, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_CLIENT, 0), - - /* Bridge Authority only. */ - CALLBACK(write_bridge_ns, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGEAUTH, 0), + /* XXXX this could be restricted to CLIENT+NET_PARTICIPANT */ + CALLBACK(rend_cache_failure_clean, NET_PARTICIPANT, FL(RUN_ON_DISABLE)), /* Directory server only. */ - CALLBACK(clean_consdiffmgr, PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRSERVER, 0), + CALLBACK(clean_consdiffmgr, DIRSERVER, 0), + + /* Controller with per-second events only. */ + CALLBACK(control_per_second_events, CONTROLEV, 0), END_OF_PERIODIC_EVENTS }; +#ifndef COCCI #undef CALLBACK +#undef FL +#endif /* These are pointers to members of periodic_events[] that are used to * implement particular callbacks. We keep them separate here so that we * can access them by name. We also keep them inside periodic_events[] * so that we can implement "reset all timers" in a reasonable way. */ -static periodic_event_item_t *check_descriptor_event=NULL; -static periodic_event_item_t *dirvote_event=NULL; static periodic_event_item_t *fetch_networkstatus_event=NULL; static periodic_event_item_t *launch_descriptor_fetches_event=NULL; static periodic_event_item_t *check_dns_honesty_event=NULL; static periodic_event_item_t *save_state_event=NULL; +static periodic_event_item_t *prune_old_routers_event=NULL; /** Reset all the periodic events so we'll do all our actions again as if we * just started up. @@ -1483,24 +1456,7 @@ static periodic_event_item_t *save_state_event=NULL; void reset_all_main_loop_timers(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; periodic_events[i].name; ++i) { - periodic_event_reschedule(&periodic_events[i]); - } -} - -/** Return the member of periodic_events[] whose name is <b>name</b>. - * Return NULL if no such event is found. - */ -static periodic_event_item_t * -find_periodic_event(const char *name) -{ - int i; - for (i = 0; periodic_events[i].name; ++i) { - if (strcmp(name, periodic_events[i].name) == 0) - return &periodic_events[i]; - } - return NULL; + periodic_events_reset_all(); } /** Return a bitmask of the roles this tor instance is configured for using @@ -1510,7 +1466,7 @@ get_my_roles(const or_options_t *options) { tor_assert(options); - int roles = 0; + int roles = PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL; int is_bridge = options->BridgeRelay; int is_relay = server_mode(options); int is_dirauth = authdir_mode_v3(options); @@ -1518,6 +1474,8 @@ get_my_roles(const or_options_t *options) int is_hidden_service = !!hs_service_get_num_services() || !!rend_num_services(); int is_dirserver = dir_server_mode(options); + int sending_control_events = control_any_per_second_event_enabled(); + /* We also consider tor to have the role of a client if the ControlPort is * set because a lot of things can be done over the control port which * requires tor to have basic functionnalities. */ @@ -1525,6 +1483,9 @@ get_my_roles(const or_options_t *options) options->ControlPort_set || options->OwningControllerFD != UINT64_MAX; + int is_net_participant = is_participating_on_network() || + is_relay || is_hidden_service; + if (is_bridge) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGE; if (is_client) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_CLIENT; if (is_relay) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_RELAY; @@ -1532,6 +1493,8 @@ get_my_roles(const or_options_t *options) if (is_bridgeauth) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGEAUTH; if (is_hidden_service) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_HS_SERVICE; if (is_dirserver) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRSERVER; + if (is_net_participant) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_NET_PARTICIPANT; + if (sending_control_events) roles |= PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_CONTROLEV; return roles; } @@ -1556,9 +1519,9 @@ initialize_periodic_events_cb(evutil_socket_t fd, short events, void *data) rescan_periodic_events(get_options()); } -/** Set up all the members of periodic_events[], and configure them all to be - * launched from a callback. */ -STATIC void +/** Set up all the members of mainloop_periodic_events[], and configure them + * all to be launched from a callback. */ +void initialize_periodic_events(void) { if (periodic_events_initialized) @@ -1566,39 +1529,60 @@ initialize_periodic_events(void) periodic_events_initialized = 1; - /* Set up all periodic events. We'll launch them by roles. */ - int i; - for (i = 0; periodic_events[i].name; ++i) { - periodic_event_setup(&periodic_events[i]); + for (int i = 0; mainloop_periodic_events[i].name; ++i) { + periodic_events_register(&mainloop_periodic_events[i]); } + /* Set up all periodic events. We'll launch them by roles. */ + +#ifndef COCCI #define NAMED_CALLBACK(name) \ - STMT_BEGIN name ## _event = find_periodic_event( #name ); STMT_END + STMT_BEGIN name ## _event = periodic_events_find( #name ); STMT_END +#endif - NAMED_CALLBACK(check_descriptor); - NAMED_CALLBACK(dirvote); + NAMED_CALLBACK(prune_old_routers); NAMED_CALLBACK(fetch_networkstatus); NAMED_CALLBACK(launch_descriptor_fetches); NAMED_CALLBACK(check_dns_honesty); NAMED_CALLBACK(save_state); - - struct timeval one_second = { 1, 0 }; - initialize_periodic_events_event = tor_evtimer_new( - tor_libevent_get_base(), - initialize_periodic_events_cb, NULL); - event_add(initialize_periodic_events_event, &one_second); } STATIC void teardown_periodic_events(void) { - int i; - for (i = 0; periodic_events[i].name; ++i) { - periodic_event_destroy(&periodic_events[i]); - } + periodic_events_disconnect_all(); + fetch_networkstatus_event = NULL; + launch_descriptor_fetches_event = NULL; + check_dns_honesty_event = NULL; + save_state_event = NULL; + prune_old_routers_event = NULL; periodic_events_initialized = 0; } +static mainloop_event_t *rescan_periodic_events_ev = NULL; + +/** Callback: rescan the periodic event list. */ +static void +rescan_periodic_events_cb(mainloop_event_t *event, void *arg) +{ + (void)event; + (void)arg; + rescan_periodic_events(get_options()); +} + +/** + * Schedule an event that will rescan which periodic events should run. + **/ +MOCK_IMPL(void, +schedule_rescan_periodic_events,(void)) +{ + if (!rescan_periodic_events_ev) { + rescan_periodic_events_ev = + mainloop_event_new(rescan_periodic_events_cb, NULL); + } + mainloop_event_activate(rescan_periodic_events_ev); +} + /** Do a pass at all our periodic events, disable those we don't need anymore * and enable those we need now using the given options. */ void @@ -1606,36 +1590,7 @@ rescan_periodic_events(const or_options_t *options) { tor_assert(options); - /* Avoid scanning the event list if we haven't initialized it yet. This is - * particularly useful for unit tests in order to avoid initializing main - * loop events everytime. */ - if (!periodic_events_initialized) { - return; - } - - int roles = get_my_roles(options); - - for (int i = 0; periodic_events[i].name; ++i) { - periodic_event_item_t *item = &periodic_events[i]; - - int enable = !!(item->roles & roles); - - /* Handle the event flags. */ - if (net_is_disabled() && - (item->flags & PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET)) { - enable = 0; - } - - /* Enable the event if needed. It is safe to enable an event that was - * already enabled. Same goes for disabling it. */ - if (enable) { - log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Launching periodic event %s", item->name); - periodic_event_enable(item); - } else { - log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Disabling periodic event %s", item->name); - periodic_event_disable(item); - } - } + periodic_events_rescan_by_roles(get_my_roles(options), net_is_disabled()); } /* We just got new options globally set, see if we need to enabled or disable @@ -1643,26 +1598,7 @@ rescan_periodic_events(const or_options_t *options) void periodic_events_on_new_options(const or_options_t *options) { - /* Only if we've already initialized the events, rescan the list which will - * enable or disable events depending on our roles. This will be called at - * bootup and we don't want this function to initialize the events because - * they aren't set up at this stage. */ - if (periodic_events_initialized) { - rescan_periodic_events(options); - } -} - -/** - * Update our schedule so that we'll check whether we need to update our - * descriptor immediately, rather than after up to CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL - * seconds. - */ -void -reschedule_descriptor_update_check(void) -{ - if (check_descriptor_event) { - periodic_event_reschedule(check_descriptor_event); - } + rescan_periodic_events(options); } /** @@ -1708,40 +1644,41 @@ mainloop_schedule_postloop_cleanup(void) mainloop_event_activate(postloop_cleanup_ev); } -#define LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD (30 * 86400) -/** Helper: Return the number of seconds between <b>now</b> and <b>next</b>, - * clipped to the range [1 second, LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD]. */ -static inline int -safe_timer_diff(time_t now, time_t next) -{ - if (next > now) { - /* There were no computers at signed TIME_MIN (1902 on 32-bit systems), - * and nothing that could run Tor. It's a bug if 'next' is around then. - * On 64-bit systems with signed TIME_MIN, TIME_MIN is before the Big - * Bang. We cannot extrapolate past a singularity, but there was probably - * nothing that could run Tor then, either. - **/ - tor_assert(next > TIME_MIN + LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD); - - if (next - LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD > now) - return LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD; - return (int)(next - now); - } else { - return 1; +/** Event to run 'scheduled_shutdown_cb' */ +static mainloop_event_t *scheduled_shutdown_ev=NULL; + +/** Callback: run a scheduled shutdown */ +static void +scheduled_shutdown_cb(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *arg) +{ + (void)ev; + (void)arg; + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Clean shutdown finished. Exiting."); + tor_shutdown_event_loop_and_exit(0); +} + +/** Schedule the mainloop to exit after <b>delay_sec</b> seconds. */ +void +mainloop_schedule_shutdown(int delay_sec) +{ + const struct timeval delay_tv = { delay_sec, 0 }; + if (! scheduled_shutdown_ev) { + scheduled_shutdown_ev = mainloop_event_new(scheduled_shutdown_cb, NULL); } + mainloop_event_schedule(scheduled_shutdown_ev, &delay_tv); } /** Perform regular maintenance tasks. This function gets run once per - * second by second_elapsed_callback(). + * second. */ -static void -run_scheduled_events(time_t now) +static int +second_elapsed_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) { - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - - /* 0. See if we've been asked to shut down and our timeout has - * expired; or if our bandwidth limits are exhausted and we - * should hibernate; or if it's time to wake up from hibernation. + /* 0. See if our bandwidth limits are exhausted and we should hibernate + * + * Note: we have redundant mechanisms to handle the case where it's + * time to wake up from hibernation; or where we have a scheduled + * shutdown and it's time to run it, but this will also handle those. */ consider_hibernation(now); @@ -1751,10 +1688,13 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) if (options->UseBridges && !net_is_disabled()) { /* Note: this check uses net_is_disabled(), not should_delay_dir_fetches() * -- the latter is only for fetching consensus-derived directory info. */ + // TODO: client + // Also, schedule this rather than probing 1x / sec fetch_bridge_descriptors(options, now); } if (accounting_is_enabled(options)) { + // TODO: refactor or rewrite? accounting_run_housekeeping(now); } @@ -1765,6 +1705,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) */ /* (If our circuit build timeout can ever become lower than a second (which * it can't, currently), we should do this more often.) */ + // TODO: All expire stuff can become NET_PARTICIPANT, RUN_ON_DISABLE circuit_expire_building(); circuit_expire_waiting_for_better_guard(); @@ -1798,80 +1739,8 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) run_connection_housekeeping(i, now); } - /* 11b. check pending unconfigured managed proxies */ - if (!net_is_disabled() && pt_proxies_configuration_pending()) - pt_configure_remaining_proxies(); -} - -/* Periodic callback: rotate the onion keys after the period defined by the - * "onion-key-rotation-days" consensus parameter, shut down and restart all - * cpuworkers, and update our descriptor if necessary. - */ -static int -rotate_onion_key_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - if (server_mode(options)) { - int onion_key_lifetime = get_onion_key_lifetime(); - time_t rotation_time = get_onion_key_set_at()+onion_key_lifetime; - if (rotation_time > now) { - return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL; - } - - log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Rotating onion key."); - rotate_onion_key(); - cpuworkers_rotate_keyinfo(); - if (router_rebuild_descriptor(1)<0) { - log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Couldn't rebuild router descriptor"); - } - if (advertised_server_mode() && !net_is_disabled()) - router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(0); - return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL; - } - return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE; -} - -/* Period callback: Check if our old onion keys are still valid after the - * period of time defined by the consensus parameter - * "onion-key-grace-period-days", otherwise expire them by setting them to - * NULL. - */ -static int -check_onion_keys_expiry_time_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - if (server_mode(options)) { - int onion_key_grace_period = get_onion_key_grace_period(); - time_t expiry_time = get_onion_key_set_at()+onion_key_grace_period; - if (expiry_time > now) { - return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL; - } - - log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Expiring old onion keys."); - expire_old_onion_keys(); - cpuworkers_rotate_keyinfo(); - return ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL; - } - - return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE; -} - -/* Periodic callback: Every 30 seconds, check whether it's time to make new - * Ed25519 subkeys. - */ -static int -check_ed_keys_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - if (server_mode(options)) { - if (should_make_new_ed_keys(options, now)) { - int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options, now); - if (new_signing_key < 0 || - generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0)) { - log_err(LD_OR, "Unable to update Ed25519 keys! Exiting."); - tor_shutdown_event_loop_and_exit(1); - } - } - return 30; - } - return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE; + /* Run again in a second. */ + return 1; } /** @@ -1947,100 +1816,53 @@ add_entropy_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) return ENTROPY_INTERVAL; } -/** - * Periodic callback: if we're an authority, make sure we test - * the routers on the network for reachability. - */ -static int -launch_reachability_tests_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) +/** Periodic callback: if there has been no network usage in a while, + * enter a dormant state. */ +STATIC int +check_network_participation_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) { - if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options) && - !net_is_disabled()) { - /* try to determine reachability of the other Tor relays */ - dirserv_test_reachability(now); + /* If we're a server, we can't become dormant. */ + if (server_mode(options)) { + goto found_activity; } - return REACHABILITY_TEST_INTERVAL; -} -/** - * Periodic callback: if we're an authority, discount the stability - * information (and other rephist information) that's older. - */ -static int -downrate_stability_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - (void)options; - /* 1d. Periodically, we discount older stability information so that new - * stability info counts more, and save the stability information to disk as - * appropriate. */ - time_t next = rep_hist_downrate_old_runs(now); - return safe_timer_diff(now, next); -} + /* If we're running an onion service, we can't become dormant. */ + /* XXXX this would be nice to change, so that we can be dormant with a + * service. */ + if (hs_service_get_num_services() || rend_num_services()) { + goto found_activity; + } -/** - * Periodic callback: if we're an authority, record our measured stability - * information from rephist in an mtbf file. - */ -static int -save_stability_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) { - if (rep_hist_record_mtbf_data(now, 1)<0) { - log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't store mtbf data."); + /* If we have any currently open entry streams other than "linked" + * connections used for directory requests, those count as user activity. + */ + if (options->DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams) { + if (connection_get_by_type_nonlinked(CONN_TYPE_AP) != NULL) { + goto found_activity; } } -#define SAVE_STABILITY_INTERVAL (30*60) - return SAVE_STABILITY_INTERVAL; -} -/** - * Periodic callback: if we're an authority, check on our authority - * certificate (the one that authenticates our authority signing key). - */ -static int -check_authority_cert_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - (void)now; - (void)options; - /* 1e. Periodically, if we're a v3 authority, we check whether our cert is - * close to expiring and warn the admin if it is. */ - v3_authority_check_key_expiry(); -#define CHECK_V3_CERTIFICATE_INTERVAL (5*60) - return CHECK_V3_CERTIFICATE_INTERVAL; -} + /* XXXX Make this configurable? */ +/** How often do we check whether we have had network activity? */ +#define CHECK_PARTICIPATION_INTERVAL (5*60) -/** - * Scheduled callback: Run directory-authority voting functionality. - * - * The schedule is a bit complicated here, so dirvote_act() manages the - * schedule itself. - **/ -static int -dirvote_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - if (!authdir_mode_v3(options)) { - tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); - return 3600; + /* Become dormant if there has been no user activity in a long time. + * (The funny checks below are in order to prevent overflow.) */ + time_t time_since_last_activity = 0; + if (get_last_user_activity_time() < now) + time_since_last_activity = now - get_last_user_activity_time(); + if (time_since_last_activity >= options->DormantClientTimeout) { + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "No user activity in a long time: becoming" + " dormant."); + set_network_participation(false); + rescan_periodic_events(options); } - time_t next = dirvote_act(options, now); - if (BUG(next == TIME_MAX)) { - /* This shouldn't be returned unless we called dirvote_act() without - * being an authority. If it happens, maybe our configuration will - * fix itself in an hour or so? */ - return 3600; - } - return safe_timer_diff(now, next); -} + return CHECK_PARTICIPATION_INTERVAL; -/** Reschedule the directory-authority voting event. Run this whenever the - * schedule has changed. */ -void -reschedule_dirvote(const or_options_t *options) -{ - if (periodic_events_initialized && authdir_mode_v3(options)) { - periodic_event_reschedule(dirvote_event); - } + found_activity: + note_user_activity(now); + return CHECK_PARTICIPATION_INTERVAL; } /** @@ -2053,11 +1875,9 @@ check_expired_networkstatus_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) (void)options; /* Check whether our networkstatus has expired. */ networkstatus_t *ns = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus(); - /*XXXX RD: This value needs to be the same as REASONABLY_LIVE_TIME in - * networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(), but that value is way - * way too high. Arma: is the bridge issue there resolved yet? -NM */ -#define NS_EXPIRY_SLOP (24*60*60) - if (ns && ns->valid_until < (now - NS_EXPIRY_SLOP) && + /* Use reasonably live consensuses until they are no longer reasonably live. + */ + if (ns && !networkstatus_consensus_reasonably_live(ns, now) && router_have_minimum_dir_info()) { router_dir_info_changed(); } @@ -2143,17 +1963,6 @@ write_stats_file_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) return safe_timer_diff(now, next_time_to_write_stats_files); } -#define CHANNEL_CHECK_INTERVAL (60*60) -static int -check_canonical_channels_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - (void)now; - if (public_server_mode(options)) - channel_check_for_duplicates(); - - return CHANNEL_CHECK_INTERVAL; -} - static int reset_padding_counts_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) { @@ -2228,87 +2037,24 @@ rend_cache_failure_clean_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) } /** - * Periodic callback: If we're a server and initializing dns failed, retry. + * Periodic callback: prune routerlist of old information about Tor network. */ static int -retry_dns_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) +prune_old_routers_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) { +#define ROUTERLIST_PRUNING_INTERVAL (60*60) // 1 hour. (void)now; -#define RETRY_DNS_INTERVAL (10*60) - if (server_mode(options) && has_dns_init_failed()) - dns_init(); - return RETRY_DNS_INTERVAL; -} - -/** Periodic callback: consider rebuilding or and re-uploading our descriptor - * (if we've passed our internal checks). */ -static int -check_descriptor_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ -/** How often do we check whether part of our router info has changed in a - * way that would require an upload? That includes checking whether our IP - * address has changed. */ -#define CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (60) - (void)options; - /* 2b. Once per minute, regenerate and upload the descriptor if the old - * one is inaccurate. */ if (!net_is_disabled()) { - check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(now); - check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(now); - mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(now); - consider_publishable_server(0); /* If any networkstatus documents are no longer recent, we need to * update all the descriptors' running status. */ /* Remove dead routers. */ - /* XXXX This doesn't belong here, but it was here in the pre- - * XXXX refactoring code. */ + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Pruning routerlist..."); routerlist_remove_old_routers(); } - return CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL; -} - -/** - * Periodic callback: check whether we're reachable (as a relay), and - * whether our bandwidth has changed enough that we need to - * publish a new descriptor. - */ -static int -check_for_reachability_bw_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - /* XXXX This whole thing was stuck in the middle of what is now - * XXXX check_descriptor_callback. I'm not sure it's right. */ - - static int dirport_reachability_count = 0; - /* also, check religiously for reachability, if it's within the first - * 20 minutes of our uptime. */ - if (server_mode(options) && - (have_completed_a_circuit() || !any_predicted_circuits(now)) && - !net_is_disabled()) { - if (get_uptime() < TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT) { - router_do_reachability_checks(1, dirport_reachability_count==0); - if (++dirport_reachability_count > 5) - dirport_reachability_count = 0; - return 1; - } else { - /* If we haven't checked for 12 hours and our bandwidth estimate is - * low, do another bandwidth test. This is especially important for - * bridges, since they might go long periods without much use. */ - const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); - static int first_time = 1; - if (!first_time && me && - me->bandwidthcapacity < me->bandwidthrate && - me->bandwidthcapacity < 51200) { - reset_bandwidth_test(); - } - first_time = 0; -#define BANDWIDTH_RECHECK_INTERVAL (12*60*60) - return BANDWIDTH_RECHECK_INTERVAL; - } - } - return CHECK_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL; + return ROUTERLIST_PRUNING_INTERVAL; } /** @@ -2322,7 +2068,7 @@ fetch_networkstatus_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) * documents? */ const int we_are_bootstrapping = networkstatus_consensus_is_bootstrapping( now); - const int prefer_mirrors = !directory_fetches_from_authorities( + const int prefer_mirrors = !dirclient_fetches_from_authorities( get_options()); int networkstatus_dl_check_interval = 60; /* check more often when testing, or when bootstrapping from mirrors @@ -2353,109 +2099,6 @@ retry_listeners_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE; } -/** - * Periodic callback: as a server, see if we have any old unused circuits - * that should be expired */ -static int -expire_old_ciruits_serverside_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - (void)options; - /* every 11 seconds, so not usually the same second as other such events */ - circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside(now); - return 11; -} - -/** - * Callback: Send warnings if Tor doesn't find its ports reachable. - */ -static int -reachability_warnings_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - (void) now; - - if (get_uptime() < TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT) { - return (int)(TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT - get_uptime()); - } - - if (server_mode(options) && - !net_is_disabled() && - have_completed_a_circuit()) { - /* every 20 minutes, check and complain if necessary */ - const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); - if (me && !check_whether_orport_reachable(options)) { - char *address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr); - log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Your server (%s:%d) has not managed to confirm that " - "its ORPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors " - "until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check " - "your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.", - address, me->or_port); - control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN, - "REACHABILITY_FAILED ORADDRESS=%s:%d", - address, me->or_port); - tor_free(address); - } - - if (me && !check_whether_dirport_reachable(options)) { - char *address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr); - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, - "Your server (%s:%d) has not managed to confirm that its " - "DirPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors " - "until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check " - "your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.", - address, me->dir_port); - control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN, - "REACHABILITY_FAILED DIRADDRESS=%s:%d", - address, me->dir_port); - tor_free(address); - } - } - - return TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT; -} - -static int dns_honesty_first_time = 1; - -/** - * Periodic event: if we're an exit, see if our DNS server is telling us - * obvious lies. - */ -static int -check_dns_honesty_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - (void)now; - /* 9. and if we're an exit node, check whether our DNS is telling stories - * to us. */ - if (net_is_disabled() || - ! public_server_mode(options) || - router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star()) - return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE; - - if (dns_honesty_first_time) { - /* Don't launch right when we start */ - dns_honesty_first_time = 0; - return crypto_rand_int_range(60, 180); - } - - dns_launch_correctness_checks(); - return 12*3600 + crypto_rand_int(12*3600); -} - -/** - * Periodic callback: if we're the bridge authority, write a networkstatus - * file to disk. - */ -static int -write_bridge_ns_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) -{ - /* 10. write bridge networkstatus file to disk */ - if (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir) { - networkstatus_dump_bridge_status_to_file(now); -#define BRIDGE_STATUSFILE_INTERVAL (30*60) - return BRIDGE_STATUSFILE_INTERVAL; - } - return PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE; -} - static int heartbeat_callback_first_time = 1; /** @@ -2523,36 +2166,19 @@ hs_service_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) return 1; } -/** Timer: used to invoke second_elapsed_callback() once per second. */ -static periodic_timer_t *second_timer = NULL; - -/** - * Enable or disable the per-second timer as appropriate, creating it if - * necessary. +/* + * Periodic callback: Send once-per-second events to the controller(s). + * This is called every second. */ -void -reschedule_per_second_timer(void) +static int +control_per_second_events_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) { - struct timeval one_second; - one_second.tv_sec = 1; - one_second.tv_usec = 0; - - if (! second_timer) { - second_timer = periodic_timer_new(tor_libevent_get_base(), - &one_second, - second_elapsed_callback, - NULL); - tor_assert(second_timer); - } + (void) options; + (void) now; - const bool run_per_second_events = - control_any_per_second_event_enabled() || ! net_is_completely_disabled(); + control_per_second_events(); - if (run_per_second_events) { - periodic_timer_launch(second_timer, &one_second); - } else { - periodic_timer_disable(second_timer); - } + return 1; } /** Last time that update_current_time was called. */ @@ -2582,6 +2208,17 @@ update_current_time(time_t now) memcpy(&last_updated, ¤t_second_last_changed, sizeof(last_updated)); monotime_coarse_get(¤t_second_last_changed); + /** How much clock jumping means that we should adjust our idea of when + * to go dormant? */ +#define NUM_JUMPED_SECONDS_BEFORE_NETSTATUS_UPDATE 20 + + /* Don't go dormant early or late just because we jumped in time. */ + if (ABS(seconds_elapsed) >= NUM_JUMPED_SECONDS_BEFORE_NETSTATUS_UPDATE) { + if (is_participating_on_network()) { + netstatus_note_clock_jumped(seconds_elapsed); + } + } + /** How much clock jumping do we tolerate? */ #define NUM_JUMPED_SECONDS_BEFORE_WARN 100 @@ -2591,6 +2228,7 @@ update_current_time(time_t now) if (seconds_elapsed < -NUM_JUMPED_SECONDS_BEFORE_WARN) { // moving back in time is always a bad sign. circuit_note_clock_jumped(seconds_elapsed, false); + } else if (seconds_elapsed >= NUM_JUMPED_SECONDS_BEFORE_WARN) { /* Compare the monotonic clock to the result of time(). */ const int32_t monotime_msec_passed = @@ -2620,31 +2258,6 @@ update_current_time(time_t now) current_second = now; } -/** Libevent callback: invoked once every second. */ -static void -second_elapsed_callback(periodic_timer_t *timer, void *arg) -{ - /* XXXX This could be sensibly refactored into multiple callbacks, and we - * could use Libevent's timers for this rather than checking the current - * time against a bunch of timeouts every second. */ - time_t now; - (void)timer; - (void)arg; - - now = time(NULL); - - /* We don't need to do this once-per-second any more: time-updating is - * only in this callback _because it is a callback_. It should be fine - * to disable this callback, and the time will still get updated. - */ - update_current_time(now); - - /* Maybe some controller events are ready to fire */ - control_per_second_events(); - - run_scheduled_events(now); -} - #ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_209 static periodic_timer_t *systemd_watchdog_timer = NULL; @@ -2660,18 +2273,23 @@ systemd_watchdog_callback(periodic_timer_t *timer, void *arg) #define UPTIME_CUTOFF_FOR_NEW_BANDWIDTH_TEST (6*60*60) -/** Called when our IP address seems to have changed. <b>at_interface</b> - * should be true if we detected a change in our interface, and false if we - * detected a change in our published address. */ +/** Called when our IP address seems to have changed. <b>on_client_conn</b> + * should be true if: + * - we detected a change in our interface address, using an outbound + * connection, and therefore + * - our client TLS keys need to be rotated. + * Otherwise, it should be false, and: + * - we detected a change in our published address + * (using some other method), and therefore + * - the published addresses in our descriptor need to change. + */ void -ip_address_changed(int at_interface) +ip_address_changed(int on_client_conn) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int server = server_mode(options); - int exit_reject_interfaces = (server && options->ExitRelay - && options->ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces); - if (at_interface) { + if (on_client_conn) { if (! server) { /* Okay, change our keys. */ if (init_keys_client() < 0) @@ -2683,15 +2301,14 @@ ip_address_changed(int at_interface) reset_bandwidth_test(); reset_uptime(); router_reset_reachability(); + /* All relays include their IP addresses as their ORPort addresses in + * their descriptor. + * Exit relays also incorporate interface addresses in their exit + * policies, when ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces is set. */ + mark_my_descriptor_dirty("IP address changed"); } } - /* Exit relays incorporate interface addresses in their exit policies when - * ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces is set */ - if (exit_reject_interfaces || (server && !at_interface)) { - mark_my_descriptor_dirty("IP address changed"); - } - dns_servers_relaunch_checks(); } @@ -2702,8 +2319,7 @@ dns_servers_relaunch_checks(void) { if (server_mode(get_options())) { dns_reset_correctness_checks(); - if (periodic_events_initialized) { - tor_assert(check_dns_honesty_event); + if (check_dns_honesty_event) { periodic_event_reschedule(check_dns_honesty_event); } } @@ -2713,8 +2329,6 @@ dns_servers_relaunch_checks(void) void initialize_mainloop_events(void) { - initialize_periodic_events(); - if (!schedule_active_linked_connections_event) { schedule_active_linked_connections_event = mainloop_event_postloop_new(schedule_active_linked_connections_cb, NULL); @@ -2732,11 +2346,16 @@ do_main_loop(void) /* initialize the periodic events first, so that code that depends on the * events being present does not assert. */ - initialize_periodic_events(); + tor_assert(periodic_events_initialized); initialize_mainloop_events(); - /* set up once-a-second callback. */ - reschedule_per_second_timer(); + periodic_events_connect_all(); + + struct timeval one_second = { 1, 0 }; + initialize_periodic_events_event = tor_evtimer_new( + tor_libevent_get_base(), + initialize_periodic_events_cb, NULL); + event_add(initialize_periodic_events_event, &one_second); #ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_209 uint64_t watchdog_delay; @@ -2759,10 +2378,6 @@ do_main_loop(void) } } #endif /* defined(HAVE_SYSTEMD_209) */ - - main_loop_should_exit = 0; - main_loop_exit_value = 0; - #ifdef ENABLE_RESTART_DEBUGGING { static int first_time = 1; @@ -2786,7 +2401,7 @@ do_main_loop(void) event_add(tor_shutdown_event_loop_for_restart_event, &restart_after); } } -#endif +#endif /* defined(ENABLE_RESTART_DEBUGGING) */ return run_main_loop_until_done(); } @@ -2888,10 +2503,14 @@ run_main_loop_once(void) * * Shadow won't invoke this function, so don't fill it up with things. */ -static int +STATIC int run_main_loop_until_done(void) { int loop_result = 1; + + main_loop_should_exit = 0; + main_loop_exit_value = 0; + do { loop_result = run_main_loop_once(); } while (loop_result == 1); @@ -2922,7 +2541,6 @@ tor_mainloop_free_all(void) smartlist_free(connection_array); smartlist_free(closeable_connection_lst); smartlist_free(active_linked_connection_lst); - periodic_timer_free(second_timer); teardown_periodic_events(); tor_event_free(shutdown_did_not_work_event); tor_event_free(initialize_periodic_events_event); @@ -2930,6 +2548,8 @@ tor_mainloop_free_all(void) mainloop_event_free(schedule_active_linked_connections_event); mainloop_event_free(postloop_cleanup_ev); mainloop_event_free(handle_deferred_signewnym_ev); + mainloop_event_free(scheduled_shutdown_ev); + mainloop_event_free(rescan_periodic_events_ev); #ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_209 periodic_timer_free(systemd_watchdog_timer); @@ -2949,7 +2569,6 @@ tor_mainloop_free_all(void) can_complete_circuits = 0; quiet_level = 0; should_init_bridge_stats = 1; - dns_honesty_first_time = 1; heartbeat_callback_first_time = 1; current_second = 0; memset(¤t_second_last_changed, 0, diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.h b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.h index c5669fc4e0..1ddfec2162 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.h +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -56,15 +56,14 @@ MOCK_DECL(int, connection_count_moribund, (void)); void directory_all_unreachable(time_t now); void directory_info_has_arrived(time_t now, int from_cache, int suppress_logs); -void ip_address_changed(int at_interface); +void ip_address_changed(int on_client_conn); void dns_servers_relaunch_checks(void); void reset_all_main_loop_timers(void); -void reschedule_descriptor_update_check(void); void reschedule_directory_downloads(void); void reschedule_or_state_save(void); -void reschedule_dirvote(const or_options_t *options); void mainloop_schedule_postloop_cleanup(void); void rescan_periodic_events(const or_options_t *options); +MOCK_DECL(void, schedule_rescan_periodic_events,(void)); void update_current_time(time_t now); @@ -81,34 +80,38 @@ uint64_t get_main_loop_error_count(void); uint64_t get_main_loop_idle_count(void); void periodic_events_on_new_options(const or_options_t *options); -void reschedule_per_second_timer(void); void do_signewnym(time_t); time_t get_last_signewnym_time(void); +void mainloop_schedule_shutdown(int delay_sec); + void tor_init_connection_lists(void); void initialize_mainloop_events(void); +void initialize_periodic_events(void); void tor_mainloop_free_all(void); struct token_bucket_rw_t; extern time_t time_of_process_start; -extern int quiet_level; extern struct token_bucket_rw_t global_bucket; extern struct token_bucket_rw_t global_relayed_bucket; #ifdef MAINLOOP_PRIVATE +STATIC int run_main_loop_until_done(void); STATIC void close_closeable_connections(void); -STATIC void initialize_periodic_events(void); STATIC void teardown_periodic_events(void); STATIC int get_my_roles(const or_options_t *); +STATIC int check_network_participation_callback(time_t now, + const or_options_t *options); + #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS extern smartlist_t *connection_array; /* We need the periodic_event_item_t definition. */ #include "core/mainloop/periodic.h" -extern periodic_event_item_t periodic_events[]; -#endif -#endif /* defined(MAIN_PRIVATE) */ +extern periodic_event_item_t mainloop_periodic_events[]; +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ +#endif /* defined(MAINLOOP_PRIVATE) */ -#endif +#endif /* !defined(TOR_MAINLOOP_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.c b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e982d4c40 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file mainloop_pubsub.c + * @brief Connect the publish-subscribe code to the main-loop. + * + * This module is responsible for instantiating all the channels used by the + * publish-subscribe code, and making sure that each one's messages are + * processed when appropriate. + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.h" + +#include "lib/container/smartlist.h" +#include "lib/dispatch/dispatch.h" +#include "lib/dispatch/dispatch_naming.h" +#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" +#include "lib/pubsub/pubsub.h" +#include "lib/pubsub/pubsub_build.h" + +/** + * Dispatcher to use for delivering messages. + **/ +static dispatch_t *the_dispatcher = NULL; +static pubsub_items_t *the_pubsub_items = NULL; +/** + * A list of mainloop_event_t, indexed by channel ID, to flush the messages + * on a channel. + **/ +static smartlist_t *alert_events = NULL; + +/** + * Mainloop event callback: flush all the messages in a channel. + * + * The channel is encoded as a pointer, and passed via arg. + **/ +static void +flush_channel_event(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *arg) +{ + (void)ev; + if (!the_dispatcher) + return; + + channel_id_t chan = (channel_id_t)(uintptr_t)(arg); + dispatch_flush(the_dispatcher, chan, INT_MAX); +} + +/** + * Construct our global pubsub object from <b>builder</b>. Return 0 on + * success, -1 on failure. */ +int +tor_mainloop_connect_pubsub(struct pubsub_builder_t *builder) +{ + int rv = -1; + tor_mainloop_disconnect_pubsub(); + + the_dispatcher = pubsub_builder_finalize(builder, &the_pubsub_items); + if (! the_dispatcher) + goto err; + + rv = 0; + goto done; + err: + tor_mainloop_disconnect_pubsub(); + done: + return rv; +} + +/** + * Install libevent events for all of the pubsub channels. + * + * Invoke this after tor_mainloop_connect_pubsub, and after libevent has been + * initialized. + */ +void +tor_mainloop_connect_pubsub_events(void) +{ + tor_assert(the_dispatcher); + tor_assert(! alert_events); + + const size_t num_channels = get_num_channel_ids(); + alert_events = smartlist_new(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < num_channels; ++i) { + smartlist_add(alert_events, + mainloop_event_postloop_new(flush_channel_event, + (void*)(uintptr_t)(i))); + } +} + +/** + * Dispatch alertfn callback: do nothing. Implements DELIV_NEVER. + **/ +static void +alertfn_never(dispatch_t *d, channel_id_t chan, void *arg) +{ + (void)d; + (void)chan; + (void)arg; +} + +/** + * Dispatch alertfn callback: activate a mainloop event. Implements + * DELIV_PROMPT. + **/ +static void +alertfn_prompt(dispatch_t *d, channel_id_t chan, void *arg) +{ + (void)d; + (void)chan; + mainloop_event_t *event = arg; + mainloop_event_activate(event); +} + +/** + * Dispatch alertfn callback: flush all messages right now. Implements + * DELIV_IMMEDIATE. + **/ +static void +alertfn_immediate(dispatch_t *d, channel_id_t chan, void *arg) +{ + (void) arg; + dispatch_flush(d, chan, INT_MAX); +} + +/** + * Set the strategy to be used for delivering messages on the named channel. + * + * This function needs to be called once globally for each channel, to + * set up how messages are delivered. + **/ +int +tor_mainloop_set_delivery_strategy(const char *msg_channel_name, + deliv_strategy_t strategy) +{ + channel_id_t chan = get_channel_id(msg_channel_name); + if (BUG(chan == ERROR_ID) || + BUG(chan >= smartlist_len(alert_events))) + return -1; + + switch (strategy) { + case DELIV_NEVER: + dispatch_set_alert_fn(the_dispatcher, chan, alertfn_never, NULL); + break; + case DELIV_PROMPT: + dispatch_set_alert_fn(the_dispatcher, chan, alertfn_prompt, + smartlist_get(alert_events, chan)); + break; + case DELIV_IMMEDIATE: + dispatch_set_alert_fn(the_dispatcher, chan, alertfn_immediate, NULL); + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * Remove all pubsub dispatchers and events from the mainloop. + **/ +void +tor_mainloop_disconnect_pubsub(void) +{ + if (the_pubsub_items) { + pubsub_items_clear_bindings(the_pubsub_items); + pubsub_items_free(the_pubsub_items); + } + if (alert_events) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(alert_events, mainloop_event_t *, ev, + mainloop_event_free(ev)); + smartlist_free(alert_events); + } + dispatch_free(the_dispatcher); +} diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.h b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3698fd8d03 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_pubsub.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file mainloop_pubsub.h + * @brief Header for mainloop_pubsub.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_MAINLOOP_PUBSUB_H +#define TOR_MAINLOOP_PUBSUB_H + +struct pubsub_builder_t; + +/** + * Describe when and how messages are delivered on message channel. + * + * Every message channel must be associated with one of these strategies. + **/ +typedef enum { + /** + * Never deliver messages automatically. + * + * If a message channel uses this strategy, then no matter now many + * messages are published on it, they are not delivered until something + * manually calls dispatch_flush() for that channel + **/ + DELIV_NEVER=0, + /** + * Deliver messages promptly, via the event loop. + * + * If a message channel uses this strategy, then publishing a messages + * that channel activates an event that causes messages to be handled + * later in the mainloop. The messages will be processed at some point + * very soon, delaying only for pending IO events and the like. + * + * Generally this is the best choice for a delivery strategy, since + * it avoids stack explosion. + **/ + DELIV_PROMPT, + /** + * Deliver messages immediately, skipping the event loop. + * + * Every event on this channel is flushed immediately after it is queued, + * using the stack. + * + * This delivery type should be used with caution, since it can cause + * unexpected call chains, resource starvation, and the like. + **/ + DELIV_IMMEDIATE, +} deliv_strategy_t; + +int tor_mainloop_connect_pubsub(struct pubsub_builder_t *builder); +void tor_mainloop_connect_pubsub_events(void); +int tor_mainloop_set_delivery_strategy(const char *msg_channel_name, + deliv_strategy_t strategy); +void tor_mainloop_disconnect_pubsub(void); + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_MAINLOOP_PUBSUB_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state.inc b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state.inc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34a37caaa2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state.inc @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ + +/** + * @file mainloop_state.inc + * @brief Declare configuration options for the crypto_ops module. + **/ + +/** Holds state for the mainloop, corresponding to part of the state + * file in Tor's DataDirectory. */ +BEGIN_CONF_STRUCT(mainloop_state_t) + +/** Number of minutes since the last user-initiated request (as defined by + * the dormant net-status system.) Set to zero if we are dormant. */ +CONF_VAR(MinutesSinceUserActivity, POSINT, 0, NULL) + +/** True if we were dormant when we last wrote the file; false if we + * weren't. "auto" on initial startup. */ +CONF_VAR(Dormant, AUTOBOOL, 0, "auto") + +END_CONF_STRUCT(mainloop_state_t) diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state_st.h b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state_st.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5649b536f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_state_st.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file mainloop_state_st.h + * @brief Declare a state structure for mainloop-relevant fields + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CORE_MAINLOOP_MAINLOOP_STATE_ST_H +#define TOR_CORE_MAINLOOP_MAINLOOP_STATE_ST_H + +#include "lib/conf/confdecl.h" + +#define CONF_CONTEXT STRUCT +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop_state.inc" +#undef CONF_CONTEXT + +typedef struct mainloop_state_t mainloop_state_t; + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CORE_MAINLOOP_MAINLOOP_STATE_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.c b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..884bae1c59 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file mainloop_sys.c + * @brief Declare the "mainloop" subsystem. + **/ + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop_state_st.h" +#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h" +#include "lib/conf/conftypes.h" +#include "lib/conf/confdecl.h" + +#include "lib/subsys/subsys.h" + +static int +subsys_mainloop_initialize(void) +{ + initialize_periodic_events(); + return 0; +} + +static void +subsys_mainloop_shutdown(void) +{ + tor_mainloop_free_all(); +} + +/** Declare a list of state variables for mainloop state. */ +#define CONF_CONTEXT TABLE +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop_state.inc" +#undef CONF_CONTEXT + +/** Magic number for mainloop state objects */ +#define MAINLOOP_STATE_MAGIC 0x59455449 + +/** + * Format object for mainloop state. + **/ +static config_format_t mainloop_state_fmt = { + .size = sizeof(mainloop_state_t), + .magic = { "mainloop_state", + MAINLOOP_STATE_MAGIC, + offsetof(mainloop_state_t, magic) + }, + .vars = mainloop_state_t_vars, +}; + +/** + */ +static int +mainloop_set_state(void *arg) +{ + const mainloop_state_t *state = arg; + tor_assert(state->magic == MAINLOOP_STATE_MAGIC); + + netstatus_load_from_state(state, approx_time()); + + return 0; +} + +static int +mainloop_flush_state(void *arg) +{ + mainloop_state_t *state = arg; + tor_assert(state->magic == MAINLOOP_STATE_MAGIC); + + netstatus_flush_to_state(state, approx_time()); + + return 0; +} + +const struct subsys_fns_t sys_mainloop = { + .name = "mainloop", + SUBSYS_DECLARE_LOCATION(), + .supported = true, + .level = 5, + .initialize = subsys_mainloop_initialize, + .shutdown = subsys_mainloop_shutdown, + + .state_format = &mainloop_state_fmt, + .set_state = mainloop_set_state, + .flush_state = mainloop_flush_state, +}; diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.h b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b3ade33cd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/mainloop/mainloop_sys.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file mainloop_sys.h + * @brief Header for mainloop_sys.c + **/ + +#ifndef MAINLOOP_SYS_H +#define MAINLOOP_SYS_H + +extern const struct subsys_fns_t sys_mainloop; + +#endif /* !defined(MAINLOOP_SYS_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c b/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c index 1444ca5db2..61a3469eaa 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.c @@ -1,14 +1,23 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file netstatus.c + * @brief Track whether the network is disabled, dormant, etc. + **/ + #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" +#include "core/mainloop/mainloop_state_st.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" +#include "app/config/or_state_st.h" + /** Return true iff our network is in some sense disabled or shutting down: * either we're hibernating, entering hibernation, or the network is turned * off with DisableNetwork. */ @@ -26,3 +35,136 @@ net_is_completely_disabled(void) { return get_options()->DisableNetwork || we_are_fully_hibernating(); } + +/** + * The time at which we've last seen "user activity" -- that is, any activity + * that should keep us as a participant on the network. + * + * This is not actually the true time. We will adjust this forward if + * our clock jumps, or if Tor is shut down for a while, so that the time + * since our last activity remains as it was before the jump or shutdown. + */ +static time_t last_user_activity_seen = 0; + +/** + * True iff we are currently a "network participant" -- that is, we + * are building circuits, fetching directory information, and so on. + **/ +static bool participating_on_network = false; + +/** + * Record the fact that we have seen "user activity" at the time now. Move + * "last activity seen" time forwards, but never backwards. + * + * If we were previously not participating on the network, set our + * participation status to true, and launch periodic events as appropriate. + **/ +void +note_user_activity(time_t now) +{ + last_user_activity_seen = MAX(now, last_user_activity_seen); + + if (! participating_on_network) { + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Tor is no longer dormant."); + set_network_participation(true); + schedule_rescan_periodic_events(); + } +} + +/** + * Change the time at which "user activitiy" was last seen to <b>now</b>. + * + * Unlike note_user_actity, this function sets the time without checking + * whether it is in the past, and without causing any rescan of periodic events + * or change in participation status. + */ +void +reset_user_activity(time_t now) +{ + last_user_activity_seen = now; +} + +/** + * Return the most recent time at which we recorded "user activity". + **/ +time_t +get_last_user_activity_time(void) +{ + return last_user_activity_seen; +} + +/** + * Set the field that remembers whether we are currently participating on the + * network. Does not schedule or un-schedule periodic events. + **/ +void +set_network_participation(bool participation) +{ + participating_on_network = participation; +} + +/** + * Return true iff we are currently participating on the network. + **/ +bool +is_participating_on_network(void) +{ + return participating_on_network; +} + +/** + * Update 'state' with the last time at which we were active on the network. + **/ +void +netstatus_flush_to_state(mainloop_state_t *state, time_t now) +{ + state->Dormant = ! participating_on_network; + if (participating_on_network) { + time_t sec_since_activity = MAX(0, now - last_user_activity_seen); + state->MinutesSinceUserActivity = (int)(sec_since_activity / 60); + } else { + state->MinutesSinceUserActivity = 0; + } +} + +/** + * Update our current view of network participation from an or_state_t object. + **/ +void +netstatus_load_from_state(const mainloop_state_t *state, time_t now) +{ + time_t last_activity; + if (state->Dormant == -1) { // Initial setup. + if (get_options()->DormantOnFirstStartup) { + last_activity = 0; + participating_on_network = false; + } else { + // Start up as active, treat activity as happening now. + last_activity = now; + participating_on_network = true; + } + } else if (state->Dormant) { + last_activity = 0; + participating_on_network = false; + } else { + last_activity = now - 60 * state->MinutesSinceUserActivity; + participating_on_network = true; + } + if (get_options()->DormantCanceledByStartup) { + last_activity = now; + participating_on_network = true; + } + reset_user_activity(last_activity); +} + +/** + * Adjust the time at which the user was last active by <b>seconds_diff</b> + * in response to a clock jump. + */ +void +netstatus_note_clock_jumped(time_t seconds_diff) +{ + time_t last_active = get_last_user_activity_time(); + if (last_active) + reset_user_activity(last_active + seconds_diff); +} diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.h b/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.h index ae8547b30d..5f54e54553 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.h +++ b/src/core/mainloop/netstatus.h @@ -1,13 +1,32 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file netstatus.h + * @brief Header for netstatus.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_NETSTATUS_H #define TOR_NETSTATUS_H int net_is_disabled(void); int net_is_completely_disabled(void); -#endif +void note_user_activity(time_t now); +void reset_user_activity(time_t now); +time_t get_last_user_activity_time(void); + +void set_network_participation(bool participation); +bool is_participating_on_network(void); + +struct mainloop_state_t; + +void netstatus_flush_to_state(struct mainloop_state_t *state, time_t now); +void netstatus_load_from_state(const struct mainloop_state_t *state, + time_t now); +void netstatus_note_clock_jumped(time_t seconds_diff); + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_NETSTATUS_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/periodic.c b/src/core/mainloop/periodic.c index 2651bbbc89..b5fd8fab61 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/periodic.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/periodic.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2015-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2015-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -6,9 +6,22 @@ * * \brief Generic backend for handling periodic events. * - * The events in this module are used by main.c to track items that need + * The events in this module are used to track items that need * to fire once every N seconds, possibly picking a new interval each time - * that they fire. See periodic_events[] in main.c for examples. + * that they fire. See periodic_events[] in mainloop.c for examples. + * + * This module manages a global list of periodic_event_item_t objects, + * each corresponding to a single event. To register an event, pass it to + * periodic_events_register() when initializing your subsystem. + * + * Registering an event makes the periodic event subsystem know about it, but + * doesn't cause the event to get created immediately. Before the event can + * be started, periodic_event_connect_all() must be called by mainloop.c to + * connect all the events to Libevent. + * + * We expect that periodic_event_item_t objects will be statically allocated; + * we set them up and tear them down here, but we don't take ownership of + * them. */ #include "core/or/or.h" @@ -16,7 +29,6 @@ #include "app/config/config.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" #include "core/mainloop/periodic.h" -#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" /** We disable any interval greater than this number of seconds, on the * grounds that it is probably an absolute time mistakenly passed in as a @@ -24,6 +36,12 @@ */ static const int MAX_INTERVAL = 10 * 365 * 86400; +/** + * Global list of periodic events that have been registered with + * <b>periodic_event_register</b>. + **/ +static smartlist_t *the_periodic_events = NULL; + /** Set the event <b>event</b> to run in <b>next_interval</b> seconds from * now. */ static void @@ -45,10 +63,6 @@ periodic_event_dispatch(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *data) periodic_event_item_t *event = data; tor_assert(ev == event->ev); - if (BUG(!periodic_event_is_enabled(event))) { - return; - } - time_t now = time(NULL); update_current_time(now); const or_options_t *options = get_options(); @@ -57,7 +71,7 @@ periodic_event_dispatch(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *data) int next_interval = 0; if (!periodic_event_is_enabled(event)) { - /* The event got disabled from inside its callback; no need to + /* The event got disabled from inside its callback, or before: no need to * reschedule. */ return; } @@ -91,15 +105,16 @@ periodic_event_dispatch(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *data) void periodic_event_reschedule(periodic_event_item_t *event) { - /* Don't reschedule a disabled event. */ - if (periodic_event_is_enabled(event)) { + /* Don't reschedule a disabled or uninitialized event. */ + if (event->ev && periodic_event_is_enabled(event)) { periodic_event_set_interval(event, 1); } } -/** Initializes the libevent backend for a periodic event. */ +/** Connects a periodic event to the Libevent backend. Does not launch the + * event immediately. */ void -periodic_event_setup(periodic_event_item_t *event) +periodic_event_connect(periodic_event_item_t *event) { if (event->ev) { /* Already setup? This is a bug */ log_err(LD_BUG, "Initial dispatch should only be done once."); @@ -117,7 +132,7 @@ void periodic_event_launch(periodic_event_item_t *event) { if (! event->ev) { /* Not setup? This is a bug */ - log_err(LD_BUG, "periodic_event_launch without periodic_event_setup"); + log_err(LD_BUG, "periodic_event_launch without periodic_event_connect"); tor_assert(0); } /* Event already enabled? This is a bug */ @@ -131,9 +146,9 @@ periodic_event_launch(periodic_event_item_t *event) periodic_event_dispatch(event->ev, event); } -/** Release all storage associated with <b>event</b> */ -void -periodic_event_destroy(periodic_event_item_t *event) +/** Disconnect and unregister the periodic event in <b>event</b> */ +static void +periodic_event_disconnect(periodic_event_item_t *event) { if (!event) return; @@ -177,3 +192,177 @@ periodic_event_disable(periodic_event_item_t *event) mainloop_event_cancel(event->ev); event->enabled = 0; } + +/** + * Disable an event, then schedule it to run once. + * Do nothing if the event was already disabled. + */ +void +periodic_event_schedule_and_disable(periodic_event_item_t *event) +{ + tor_assert(event); + if (!periodic_event_is_enabled(event)) + return; + + periodic_event_disable(event); + + mainloop_event_activate(event->ev); +} + +/** + * Add <b>item</b> to the list of periodic events. + * + * Note that <b>item</b> should be statically allocated: we do not + * take ownership of it. + **/ +void +periodic_events_register(periodic_event_item_t *item) +{ + if (!the_periodic_events) + the_periodic_events = smartlist_new(); + + if (BUG(smartlist_contains(the_periodic_events, item))) + return; + + smartlist_add(the_periodic_events, item); +} + +/** + * Make all registered periodic events connect to the libevent backend. + */ +void +periodic_events_connect_all(void) +{ + if (! the_periodic_events) + return; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_periodic_events, periodic_event_item_t *, item) { + if (item->ev) + continue; + periodic_event_connect(item); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(item); +} + +/** + * Reset all the registered periodic events so we'll do all our actions again + * as if we just started up. + * + * Useful if our clock just moved back a long time from the future, + * so we don't wait until that future arrives again before acting. + */ +void +periodic_events_reset_all(void) +{ + if (! the_periodic_events) + return; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_periodic_events, periodic_event_item_t *, item) { + if (!item->ev) + continue; + + periodic_event_reschedule(item); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(item); +} + +/** + * Return the registered periodic event whose name is <b>name</b>. + * Return NULL if no such event is found. + */ +periodic_event_item_t * +periodic_events_find(const char *name) +{ + if (! the_periodic_events) + return NULL; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_periodic_events, periodic_event_item_t *, item) { + if (strcmp(name, item->name) == 0) + return item; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(item); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * Start or stop registered periodic events, depending on our current set of + * roles. + * + * Invoked when our list of roles, or the net_disabled flag has changed. + **/ +void +periodic_events_rescan_by_roles(int roles, bool net_disabled) +{ + if (! the_periodic_events) + return; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_periodic_events, periodic_event_item_t *, item) { + if (!item->ev) + continue; + + int enable = !!(item->roles & roles); + + /* Handle the event flags. */ + if (net_disabled && + (item->flags & PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET)) { + enable = 0; + } + + /* Enable the event if needed. It is safe to enable an event that was + * already enabled. Same goes for disabling it. */ + if (enable) { + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Launching periodic event %s", item->name); + periodic_event_enable(item); + } else { + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Disabling periodic event %s", item->name); + if (item->flags & PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_RUN_ON_DISABLE) { + periodic_event_schedule_and_disable(item); + } else { + periodic_event_disable(item); + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(item); +} + +/** + * Invoked at shutdown: disconnect and unregister all periodic events. + * + * Does not free the periodic_event_item_t object themselves, because we do + * not own them. + */ +void +periodic_events_disconnect_all(void) +{ + if (! the_periodic_events) + return; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_periodic_events, periodic_event_item_t *, item) { + periodic_event_disconnect(item); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(item); + + smartlist_free(the_periodic_events); +} + +#define LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD (30 * 86400) +/** Helper: Return the number of seconds between <b>now</b> and <b>next</b>, + * clipped to the range [1 second, LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD]. + * + * We use this to answer the question, "how many seconds is it from now until + * next" in periodic timer callbacks. Don't use it for other purposes + **/ +int +safe_timer_diff(time_t now, time_t next) +{ + if (next > now) { + /* There were no computers at signed TIME_MIN (1902 on 32-bit systems), + * and nothing that could run Tor. It's a bug if 'next' is around then. + * On 64-bit systems with signed TIME_MIN, TIME_MIN is before the Big + * Bang. We cannot extrapolate past a singularity, but there was probably + * nothing that could run Tor then, either. + **/ + tor_assert(next > TIME_MIN + LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD); + + if (next - LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD > now) + return LONGEST_TIMER_PERIOD; + return (int)(next - now); + } else { + return 1; + } +} diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/periodic.h b/src/core/mainloop/periodic.h index e49fafd174..de556a6bdb 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/periodic.h +++ b/src/core/mainloop/periodic.h @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2015-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2015-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file periodic.h + * @brief Header for periodic.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_PERIODIC_H #define TOR_PERIODIC_H @@ -15,6 +20,10 @@ #define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGEAUTH (1U << 4) #define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_HS_SERVICE (1U << 5) #define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRSERVER (1U << 6) +#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_CONTROLEV (1U << 7) + +#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_NET_PARTICIPANT (1U << 8) +#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL (1U << 9) /* Helper macro to make it a bit less annoying to defined groups of roles that * are often used. */ @@ -25,10 +34,6 @@ /* Authorities that is both bridge and directory. */ #define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_AUTHORITIES \ (PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_BRIDGEAUTH | PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_DIRAUTH) -/* All roles. */ -#define PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ALL \ - (PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_AUTHORITIES | PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_CLIENT | \ - PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_HS_SERVICE | PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_ROUTER) /* * Event flags which can change the behavior of an event. @@ -39,6 +44,11 @@ * the net_is_disabled() check. */ #define PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_NEED_NET (1U << 0) +/* Indicate that if the event is enabled, it needs to be run once before + * it becomes disabled. + */ +#define PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_RUN_ON_DISABLE (1U << 1) + /** Callback function for a periodic event to take action. The return value * influences the next time the function will get called. Return * PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE to not update <b>last_action_time</b> and be polled @@ -66,8 +76,10 @@ typedef struct periodic_event_item_t { } periodic_event_item_t; /** events will get their interval from first execution */ +#ifndef COCCI #define PERIODIC_EVENT(fn, r, f) { fn##_callback, 0, NULL, #fn, r, f, 0 } #define END_OF_PERIODIC_EVENTS { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0 } +#endif /* Return true iff the given event was setup before thus is enabled to be * scheduled. */ @@ -78,11 +90,20 @@ periodic_event_is_enabled(const periodic_event_item_t *item) } void periodic_event_launch(periodic_event_item_t *event); -void periodic_event_setup(periodic_event_item_t *event); -void periodic_event_destroy(periodic_event_item_t *event); +void periodic_event_connect(periodic_event_item_t *event); +//void periodic_event_disconnect(periodic_event_item_t *event); void periodic_event_reschedule(periodic_event_item_t *event); void periodic_event_enable(periodic_event_item_t *event); void periodic_event_disable(periodic_event_item_t *event); +void periodic_event_schedule_and_disable(periodic_event_item_t *event); -#endif /* !defined(TOR_PERIODIC_H) */ +void periodic_events_register(periodic_event_item_t *item); +void periodic_events_connect_all(void); +void periodic_events_reset_all(void); +periodic_event_item_t *periodic_events_find(const char *name); +void periodic_events_rescan_by_roles(int roles, bool net_disabled); +void periodic_events_disconnect_all(void); + +int safe_timer_diff(time_t now, time_t next); +#endif /* !defined(TOR_PERIODIC_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/.may_include b/src/core/or/.may_include new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..beb12f155d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/.may_include @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +!advisory + +orconfig.h + +lib/arch/*.h +lib/buf/*.h +lib/cc/*.h +lib/compress/*.h +lib/container/*.h +lib/crypt_ops/*.h +lib/ctime/*.h +lib/defs/*.h +lib/encoding/*.h +lib/err/*.h +lib/evloop/*.h +lib/fs/*.h +lib/geoip/*.h +lib/intmath/*.h +lib/log/*.h +lib/malloc/*.h +lib/math/*.h +lib/net/*.h +lib/pubsub/*.h +lib/string/*.h +lib/subsys/*.h +lib/test/*.h +lib/testsupport/*.h +lib/thread/*.h +lib/time/*.h +lib/tls/*.h +lib/wallclock/*.h + +trunnel/*.h + +core/mainloop/*.h +core/proto/*.h +core/crypto/*.h +core/or/*.h + +ext/*.h diff --git a/src/core/or/addr_policy_st.h b/src/core/or/addr_policy_st.h index a75f1a731d..08d16ee616 100644 --- a/src/core/or/addr_policy_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/addr_policy_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file addr_policy_st.h + * @brief Address policy structures. + **/ + #ifndef TOR_ADDR_POLICY_ST_H #define TOR_ADDR_POLICY_ST_H @@ -33,7 +38,7 @@ struct addr_policy_t { /** Base address to accept or reject. * * Note that wildcards are treated - * differntly depending on address family. An AF_UNSPEC address means + * differently depending on address family. An AF_UNSPEC address means * "All addresses, IPv4 or IPv6." An AF_INET address with maskbits==0 means * "All IPv4 addresses" and an AF_INET6 address with maskbits == 0 means * "All IPv6 addresses". @@ -43,4 +48,4 @@ struct addr_policy_t { uint16_t prt_max; /**< Highest port number to accept/reject. */ }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(TOR_ADDR_POLICY_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/address_set.c b/src/core/or/address_set.c index 7ada4446c4..9bd3cc0f2d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/address_set.c +++ b/src/core/or/address_set.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2018-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include "lib/container/bloomfilt.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" -/* Wrap our hash function to have the signature that the bloom filter +/** Wrap our hash function to have the signature that the bloom filter * needs. */ static uint64_t bloomfilt_addr_hash(const struct sipkey *key, diff --git a/src/core/or/address_set.h b/src/core/or/address_set.h index a505d31628..b4d94b65a9 100644 --- a/src/core/or/address_set.h +++ b/src/core/or/address_set.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2018-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/or/cell_queue_st.h b/src/core/or/cell_queue_st.h index 130b95a011..0681dba1b8 100644 --- a/src/core/or/cell_queue_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/cell_queue_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file cell_queue_st.h + * @brief Cell queue structures + **/ + #ifndef PACKED_CELL_ST_H #define PACKED_CELL_ST_H @@ -22,8 +27,8 @@ struct packed_cell_t { * or_connection_t's outbuf. */ struct cell_queue_t { /** Linked list of packed_cell_t*/ - TOR_SIMPLEQ_HEAD(cell_simpleq, packed_cell_t) head; + TOR_SIMPLEQ_HEAD(cell_simpleq_t, packed_cell_t) head; int n; /**< The number of cells in the queue. */ }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(PACKED_CELL_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/cell_st.h b/src/core/or/cell_st.h index 7ab7eceb50..a640d6a456 100644 --- a/src/core/or/cell_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/cell_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file cell_st.h + * @brief Fixed-size cell structure. + **/ + #ifndef CELL_ST_H #define CELL_ST_H @@ -16,5 +21,4 @@ struct cell_t { uint8_t payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; /**< Cell body. */ }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(CELL_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.c b/src/core/or/channel.c index 9649bdf278..50c03de846 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channel.c +++ b/src/core/or/channel.c @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ - -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -52,10 +51,10 @@ * Define this so channel.h gives us things only channel_t subclasses * should touch. */ -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE /* This one's for stuff only channel.c and the test suite should see */ -#define CHANNEL_PRIVATE_ +#define CHANNEL_FILE_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" #include "app/config/config.h" @@ -85,6 +84,13 @@ #include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" +/* Static function prototypes */ + +static bool channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend( + channel_t *chan, + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv4_addr, + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv6_addr); + /* Global lists of channels */ /* All channel_t instances */ @@ -107,7 +113,7 @@ static smartlist_t *finished_listeners = NULL; /** Map from channel->global_identifier to channel. Contains the same * elements as all_channels. */ -static HT_HEAD(channel_gid_map, channel_s) channel_gid_map = HT_INITIALIZER(); +static HT_HEAD(channel_gid_map, channel_t) channel_gid_map = HT_INITIALIZER(); static unsigned channel_id_hash(const channel_t *chan) @@ -119,13 +125,13 @@ channel_id_eq(const channel_t *a, const channel_t *b) { return a->global_identifier == b->global_identifier; } -HT_PROTOTYPE(channel_gid_map, channel_s, gidmap_node, - channel_id_hash, channel_id_eq) -HT_GENERATE2(channel_gid_map, channel_s, gidmap_node, +HT_PROTOTYPE(channel_gid_map, channel_t, gidmap_node, + channel_id_hash, channel_id_eq); +HT_GENERATE2(channel_gid_map, channel_t, gidmap_node, channel_id_hash, channel_id_eq, - 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_) + 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_); -HANDLE_IMPL(channel, channel_s,) +HANDLE_IMPL(channel, channel_t,) /* Counter for ID numbers */ static uint64_t n_channels_allocated = 0; @@ -138,13 +144,13 @@ static uint64_t n_channels_allocated = 0; * If more than one channel exists, follow the next_with_same_id pointer * as a linked list. */ -static HT_HEAD(channel_idmap, channel_idmap_entry_s) channel_identity_map = +static HT_HEAD(channel_idmap, channel_idmap_entry_t) channel_identity_map = HT_INITIALIZER(); -typedef struct channel_idmap_entry_s { - HT_ENTRY(channel_idmap_entry_s) node; +typedef struct channel_idmap_entry_t { + HT_ENTRY(channel_idmap_entry_t) node; uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - TOR_LIST_HEAD(channel_list_s, channel_s) channel_list; + TOR_LIST_HEAD(channel_list_t, channel_t) channel_list; } channel_idmap_entry_t; static inline unsigned @@ -160,10 +166,10 @@ channel_idmap_eq(const channel_idmap_entry_t *a, return tor_memeq(a->digest, b->digest, DIGEST_LEN); } -HT_PROTOTYPE(channel_idmap, channel_idmap_entry_s, node, channel_idmap_hash, - channel_idmap_eq) -HT_GENERATE2(channel_idmap, channel_idmap_entry_s, node, channel_idmap_hash, - channel_idmap_eq, 0.5, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_) +HT_PROTOTYPE(channel_idmap, channel_idmap_entry_t, node, channel_idmap_hash, + channel_idmap_eq); +HT_GENERATE2(channel_idmap, channel_idmap_entry_t, node, channel_idmap_hash, + channel_idmap_eq, 0.5, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_); /* Functions to maintain the digest map */ static void channel_remove_from_digest_map(channel_t *chan); @@ -1092,23 +1098,6 @@ channel_get_cell_handler(channel_t *chan) } /** - * Return the variable-length cell handler for a channel. - * - * This function gets the handler for incoming variable-length cells - * installed on a channel. - */ -channel_var_cell_handler_fn_ptr -channel_get_var_cell_handler(channel_t *chan) -{ - tor_assert(chan); - - if (CHANNEL_CAN_HANDLE_CELLS(chan)) - return chan->var_cell_handler; - - return NULL; -} - -/** * Set both cell handlers for a channel. * * This function sets both the fixed-length and variable length cell handlers @@ -1116,9 +1105,7 @@ channel_get_var_cell_handler(channel_t *chan) */ void channel_set_cell_handlers(channel_t *chan, - channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr cell_handler, - channel_var_cell_handler_fn_ptr - var_cell_handler) + channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr cell_handler) { tor_assert(chan); tor_assert(CHANNEL_CAN_HANDLE_CELLS(chan)); @@ -1126,13 +1113,9 @@ channel_set_cell_handlers(channel_t *chan, log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, "Setting cell_handler callback for channel %p to %p", chan, cell_handler); - log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, - "Setting var_cell_handler callback for channel %p to %p", - chan, var_cell_handler); /* Change them */ chan->cell_handler = cell_handler; - chan->var_cell_handler = var_cell_handler; } /* @@ -1443,6 +1426,7 @@ write_packed_cell(channel_t *chan, packed_cell_t *cell) { int ret = -1; size_t cell_bytes; + uint8_t command = packed_cell_get_command(cell, chan->wide_circ_ids); tor_assert(chan); tor_assert(cell); @@ -1477,6 +1461,16 @@ write_packed_cell(channel_t *chan, packed_cell_t *cell) /* Successfully sent the cell. */ ret = 0; + /* Update padding statistics for the packed codepath.. */ + rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL); + if (command == CELL_PADDING) + rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_CELL); + if (chan->padding_enabled) { + rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL); + if (command == CELL_PADDING) + rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL); + } + done: return ret; } @@ -1893,11 +1887,11 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &remote_addr, transport_name, now); - tor_free(transport_name); /* Notify the DoS subsystem of a new client. */ if (tlschan && tlschan->conn) { dos_new_client_conn(tlschan->conn, transport_name); } + tor_free(transport_name); } /* Otherwise the underlying transport can't tell us this, so skip it */ } @@ -2372,7 +2366,7 @@ channel_is_better(channel_t *a, channel_t *b) if (!a->is_canonical_to_peer && b->is_canonical_to_peer) return 0; /* - * Okay, if we're here they tied on canonicity, the prefer the older + * Okay, if we're here they tied on canonicity. Prefer the older * connection, so that the adversary can't create a new connection * and try to switch us over to it (which will leak information * about long-lived circuits). Additionally, switching connections @@ -2397,19 +2391,23 @@ channel_is_better(channel_t *a, channel_t *b) /** * Get a channel to extend a circuit. * - * Pick a suitable channel to extend a circuit to given the desired digest - * the address we believe is correct for that digest; this tries to see - * if we already have one for the requested endpoint, but if there is no good - * channel, set *msg_out to a message describing the channel's state - * and our next action, and set *launch_out to a boolean indicated whether - * the caller should try to launch a new channel with channel_connect(). + * Given the desired relay identity, pick a suitable channel to extend a + * circuit to the target IPv4 or IPv6 address requsted by the client. Search + * for an existing channel for the requested endpoint. Make sure the channel + * is usable for new circuits, and matches one of the target addresses. + * + * Try to return the best channel. But if there is no good channel, set + * *msg_out to a message describing the channel's state and our next action, + * and set *launch_out to a boolean indicated whether the caller should try to + * launch a new channel with channel_connect(). */ -channel_t * -channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, - const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, - const tor_addr_t *target_addr, - const char **msg_out, - int *launch_out) +MOCK_IMPL(channel_t *, +channel_get_for_extend,(const char *rsa_id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv4_addr, + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv6_addr, + const char **msg_out, + int *launch_out)) { channel_t *chan, *best = NULL; int n_inprogress_goodaddr = 0, n_old = 0; @@ -2420,9 +2418,7 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, chan = channel_find_by_remote_identity(rsa_id_digest, ed_id); - /* Walk the list, unrefing the old one and refing the new at each - * iteration. - */ + /* Walk the list of channels */ for (; chan; chan = channel_next_with_rsa_identity(chan)) { tor_assert(tor_memeq(chan->identity_digest, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); @@ -2441,11 +2437,15 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, continue; } + const bool matches_target = + channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, + target_ipv4_addr, + target_ipv6_addr); /* Never return a non-open connection. */ if (!CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(chan)) { /* If the address matches, don't launch a new connection for this * circuit. */ - if (channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, target_addr)) + if (matches_target) ++n_inprogress_goodaddr; continue; } @@ -2458,8 +2458,7 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, /* Only return canonical connections or connections where the address * is the address we wanted. */ - if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) && - !channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, target_addr)) { + if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) && !matches_target) { ++n_noncanonical; continue; } @@ -2841,8 +2840,8 @@ channel_get_actual_remote_address(channel_t *chan) * Subsequent calls to channel_get_{actual,canonical}_remote_{address,descr} * may invalidate the return value from this function. */ -const char * -channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(channel_t *chan) +MOCK_IMPL(const char *, +channel_get_canonical_remote_descr,(channel_t *chan)) { tor_assert(chan); tor_assert(chan->get_remote_descr); @@ -3303,20 +3302,33 @@ channel_matches_extend_info(channel_t *chan, extend_info_t *extend_info) } /** - * Check if a channel matches a given target address; return true iff we do. + * Check if a channel matches the given target IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. + * If either address matches, return true. If neither address matches, + * return false. + * + * Both addresses can't be NULL. * * This function calls into the lower layer and asks if this channel thinks - * it matches a given target address for circuit extension purposes. + * it matches the target addresses for circuit extension purposes. */ -int +static bool channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(channel_t *chan, - const tor_addr_t *target) + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv4_addr, + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv6_addr) { tor_assert(chan); tor_assert(chan->matches_target); - tor_assert(target); - return chan->matches_target(chan, target); + IF_BUG_ONCE(!target_ipv4_addr && !target_ipv6_addr) + return false; + + if (target_ipv4_addr && chan->matches_target(chan, target_ipv4_addr)) + return true; + + if (target_ipv6_addr && chan->matches_target(chan, target_ipv6_addr)) + return true; + + return false; } /** @@ -3389,7 +3401,7 @@ channel_sort_by_ed25519_identity(const void **a_, const void **b_) * all of which MUST have the same RSA ID. (They MAY have different * Ed25519 IDs.) */ static void -channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness(struct channel_list_s *lst, int force) +channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness(struct channel_list_t *lst, int force) { /*XXXX This function should really be about channels. 15056 */ channel_t *chan = TOR_LIST_FIRST(lst); diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.h b/src/core/or/channel.h index d41f0d70bb..fa4ce4f703 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channel.h +++ b/src/core/or/channel.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "lib/container/handles.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h" +#include "ext/ht.h" #include "tor_queue.h" #define tor_timer_t timeout @@ -22,7 +23,6 @@ struct tor_timer_t; /* Channel handler function pointer typedefs */ typedef void (*channel_listener_fn_ptr)(channel_listener_t *, channel_t *); typedef void (*channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr)(channel_t *, cell_t *); -typedef void (*channel_var_cell_handler_fn_ptr)(channel_t *, var_cell_t *); /** * This enum is used by channelpadding to decide when to pad channels. @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ typedef enum { /* channel states for channel_t */ typedef enum { - /* + /** * Closed state - channel is inactive * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING */ CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED = 0, - /* + /** * Opening state - channel is trying to connect * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN */ CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING, - /* + /** * Open state - channel is active and ready for use * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT */ CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN, - /* + /** * Maintenance state - channel is temporarily offline for subclass specific * maintenance activities such as TLS renegotiation. * @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN */ CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT, - /* + /** * Closing state - channel is shutting down * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR */ CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING, - /* + /** * Error state - channel has experienced a permanent error * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ typedef enum { * - None */ CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR, - /* + /** * Placeholder for maximum state value */ CHANNEL_STATE_LAST @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ typedef enum { /* channel listener states for channel_listener_t */ typedef enum { - /* + /** * Closed state - channel listener is inactive * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING */ CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED = 0, - /* + /** * Listening state - channel listener is listening for incoming * connections * @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR */ CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING, - /* + /** * Closing state - channel listener is shutting down * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ typedef enum { * - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR */ CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING, - /* + /** * Error state - channel listener has experienced a permanent error * * Permitted transitions from: @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ typedef enum { * - None */ CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR, - /* + /** * Placeholder for maximum state value */ CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LAST @@ -178,15 +178,15 @@ typedef enum { * to a particular node, and once constructed support the abstract operations * defined below. */ -struct channel_s { +struct channel_t { /** Magic number for type-checking cast macros */ uint32_t magic; /** List entry for hashtable for global-identifier lookup. */ - HT_ENTRY(channel_s) gidmap_node; + HT_ENTRY(channel_t) gidmap_node; /** Handle entry for handle-based lookup */ - HANDLE_ENTRY(channel, channel_s); + HANDLE_ENTRY(channel, channel_t); /** Current channel state */ channel_state_t state; @@ -267,21 +267,21 @@ struct channel_s { /** State variable for use by the scheduler */ enum { - /* + /** * The channel is not open, or it has a full output buffer but no queued * cells. */ SCHED_CHAN_IDLE = 0, - /* + /** * The channel has space on its output buffer to write, but no queued * cells. */ SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS, - /* + /** * The scheduler has queued cells but no output buffer space to write. */ SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE, - /* + /** * The scheduler has both queued cells and output buffer space, and is * eligible for the scheduler loop. */ @@ -320,7 +320,6 @@ struct channel_s { /** Registered handlers for incoming cells */ channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr cell_handler; - channel_var_cell_handler_fn_ptr var_cell_handler; /* Methods implemented by the lower layer */ @@ -395,7 +394,7 @@ struct channel_s { * Linked list of channels with the same RSA identity digest, for use with * the digest->channel map */ - TOR_LIST_ENTRY(channel_s) next_with_same_id; + TOR_LIST_ENTRY(channel_t) next_with_same_id; /** Circuit mux for circuits sending on this channel */ circuitmux_t *cmux; @@ -442,9 +441,9 @@ struct channel_s { ratelim_t last_warned_circ_ids_exhausted; /** Channel timestamps for cell channels */ - time_t timestamp_client; /* Client used this, according to relay.c */ - time_t timestamp_recv; /* Cell received from lower layer */ - time_t timestamp_xmit; /* Cell sent to lower layer */ + time_t timestamp_client; /*(< Client used this, according to relay.c */ + time_t timestamp_recv; /**< Cell received from lower layer */ + time_t timestamp_xmit; /**< Cell sent to lower layer */ /** Timestamp for run_connection_housekeeping(). We update this once a * second when we run housekeeping and find a circuit on this channel, and @@ -456,16 +455,17 @@ struct channel_s { * distinct namespace. */ uint64_t dirreq_id; - /** Channel counters for cell channels */ + /** Channel counters for cells and bytes we have received. */ uint64_t n_cells_recved, n_bytes_recved; + /** Channel counters for cells and bytes we have sent. */ uint64_t n_cells_xmitted, n_bytes_xmitted; }; -struct channel_listener_s { - /* Current channel listener state */ +struct channel_listener_t { + /** Current channel listener state */ channel_listener_state_t state; - /* Globally unique ID number for a channel over the lifetime of a Tor + /** Globally unique ID number for a channel over the lifetime of a Tor * process. */ uint64_t global_identifier; @@ -539,13 +539,8 @@ void channel_listener_set_listener_fn(channel_listener_t *chan, /* Incoming cell callbacks */ channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr channel_get_cell_handler(channel_t *chan); -channel_var_cell_handler_fn_ptr -channel_get_var_cell_handler(channel_t *chan); - void channel_set_cell_handlers(channel_t *chan, - channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr cell_handler, - channel_var_cell_handler_fn_ptr - var_cell_handler); + channel_cell_handler_fn_ptr cell_handler); /* Clean up closed channels and channel listeners periodically; these are * called from run_scheduled_events() in main.c. @@ -560,13 +555,13 @@ void channel_free_all(void); void channel_dumpstats(int severity); void channel_listener_dumpstats(int severity); -#ifdef TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#ifdef CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE -#ifdef CHANNEL_PRIVATE_ +#ifdef CHANNEL_FILE_PRIVATE STATIC void channel_add_to_digest_map(channel_t *chan); -#endif /* defined(CHANNEL_PRIVATE_) */ +#endif /* defined(CHANNEL_FILE_PRIVATE) */ /* Channel operations for subclasses and internal use only */ @@ -645,7 +640,7 @@ void channel_notify_flushed(channel_t *chan); /* Handle stuff we need to do on open like notifying circuits */ void channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan); -#endif /* defined(TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_) */ +#endif /* defined(CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE) */ /* Helper functions to perform operations on channels */ @@ -661,11 +656,13 @@ channel_t * channel_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *rsa_id_digest, const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); -channel_t * channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, +MOCK_DECL(channel_t *, channel_get_for_extend,( + const char *rsa_id_digest, const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, - const tor_addr_t *target_addr, + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv4_addr, + const tor_addr_t *target_ipv6_addr, const char **msg_out, - int *launch_out); + int *launch_out)); /* Ask which of two channels is better for circuit-extension purposes */ int channel_is_better(channel_t *a, channel_t *b); @@ -726,7 +723,7 @@ const char * channel_get_actual_remote_descr(channel_t *chan); const char * channel_get_actual_remote_address(channel_t *chan); MOCK_DECL(int, channel_get_addr_if_possible, (channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out)); -const char * channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(channel_t *chan); +MOCK_DECL(const char *, channel_get_canonical_remote_descr,(channel_t *chan)); int channel_has_queued_writes(channel_t *chan); int channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan); void channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan); @@ -741,8 +738,6 @@ int channel_matches_extend_info(channel_t *chan, extend_info_t *extend_info); int channel_remote_identity_matches(const channel_t *chan, const char *rsa_id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); -int channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(channel_t *chan, - const tor_addr_t *target); unsigned int channel_num_circuits(channel_t *chan); MOCK_DECL(void,channel_set_circid_type,(channel_t *chan, crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd, @@ -772,7 +767,7 @@ int packed_cell_is_destroy(channel_t *chan, circid_t *circid_out); /* Declare the handle helpers */ -HANDLE_DECL(channel, channel_s,) +HANDLE_DECL(channel, channel_t,) #define channel_handle_free(h) \ FREE_AND_NULL(channel_handle_t, channel_handle_free_, (h)) #undef tor_timer_t diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c index 4a0f0e00da..be2ce78a17 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c +++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c @@ -1,12 +1,17 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -/* TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ define needed for an O(1) implementation of +/** + * @file channelpadding.c + * @brief Link-level padding code. + **/ + +/* CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE define needed for an O(1) implementation of * channelpadding_channel_to_channelinfo() */ -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h index 48002eedb7..d1c7192ffd 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h +++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/or/channeltls.c b/src/core/or/channeltls.c index 18025ff73a..f9eb67c399 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ * Define this so channel.h gives us things only channel_t subclasses * should touch. */ -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE #define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE @@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ #include "core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h" #include "core/or/command.h" #include "app/config/config.h" +#include "app/config/resolve_addr.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" +#include "feature/relay/relay_handshake.h" #include "feature/control/control.h" #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" #include "trunnel/link_handshake.h" @@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ #include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h" +#include "trunnel/netinfo.h" #include "core/or/channelpadding.h" #include "core/or/cell_st.h" @@ -562,9 +565,7 @@ channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out) static const char * channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags) { -#define MAX_DESCR_LEN 32 - - static char buf[MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1]; + static char buf[TOR_ADDRPORT_BUF_LEN]; channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); connection_t *conn; const char *answer = NULL; @@ -577,15 +578,14 @@ channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags) switch (flags) { case 0: /* Canonical address with port*/ - tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, + tor_snprintf(buf, TOR_ADDRPORT_BUF_LEN, "%s:%u", conn->address, conn->port); answer = buf; break; case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL: /* Actual address with port */ addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); - tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, - "%s:%u", addr_str, conn->port); + tor_snprintf(buf, TOR_ADDRPORT_BUF_LEN, "%s:%u", addr_str, conn->port); tor_free(addr_str); answer = buf; break; @@ -724,10 +724,13 @@ channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan, * base_.addr is updated by connection_or_init_conn_from_address() * to be the address in the descriptor. It may be tempting to * allow either address to be allowed, but if we did so, it would - * enable someone who steals a relay's keys to impersonate/MITM it + * enable someone who steals a relay's keys to covertly impersonate/MITM it * from anywhere on the Internet! (Because they could make long-lived * TLS connections from anywhere to all relays, and wait for them to * be used for extends). + * + * An adversary who has stolen a relay's keys could also post a fake relay + * descriptor, but that attack is easier to detect. */ return tor_addr_eq(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr), target); } @@ -937,7 +940,6 @@ channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l) void channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, or_connection_t *conn, - uint8_t old_state, uint8_t state) { channel_t *base_chan; @@ -946,8 +948,6 @@ channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, tor_assert(conn); tor_assert(conn->chan == chan); tor_assert(chan->conn == conn); - /* Shut the compiler up without triggering -Wtautological-compare */ - (void)old_state; base_chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan); @@ -1017,6 +1017,16 @@ channel_tls_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan, int *time, } #endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) STMT_BEGIN { \ + ++num ## tp; \ + channel_tls_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \ + channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \ + } STMT_END +#else /* !defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn) +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + /** * Handle an incoming cell on a channel_tls_t. * @@ -1036,16 +1046,6 @@ channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) channel_tls_t *chan; int handshaking; -#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS -#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) STMT_BEGIN { \ - ++num ## tp; \ - channel_tls_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \ - channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \ - } STMT_END -#else /* !(defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS)) */ -#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn) -#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ - tor_assert(cell); tor_assert(conn); @@ -1063,7 +1063,8 @@ channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) return; /* Reject all but VERSIONS and NETINFO when handshaking. */ - /* (VERSIONS should actually be impossible; it's variable-length.) */ + /* (VERSIONS actually indicates a protocol warning: it's variable-length, + * so if it reaches this function, we're on a v1 connection.) */ if (handshaking && cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS && cell->command != CELL_NETINFO) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, @@ -1084,13 +1085,13 @@ channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info()); rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL); - if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->currently_padding) + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL); switch (cell->command) { case CELL_PADDING: rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_CELL); - if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->currently_padding) + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL); ++stats_n_padding_cells_processed; /* do nothing */ @@ -1317,6 +1318,8 @@ channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn) } } +#undef PROCESS_CELL + /** * Update channel marks after connection_or.c has changed an address. * @@ -1632,6 +1635,35 @@ channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) } /** + * Convert <b>netinfo_addr</b> into corresponding <b>tor_addr</b>. + * Return 0 on success; on failure, return -1 and log a warning. + */ +static int +tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(tor_addr_t *tor_addr, + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr) { + tor_assert(tor_addr); + tor_assert(netinfo_addr); + + uint8_t type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(netinfo_addr); + uint8_t len = netinfo_addr_get_len(netinfo_addr); + + if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && len == 4) { + uint32_t ipv4 = netinfo_addr_get_addr_ipv4(netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(tor_addr, ipv4); + } else if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && len == 16) { + const uint8_t *ipv6_bytes = netinfo_addr_getconstarray_addr_ipv6( + netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(tor_addr, ipv6_bytes); + } else { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Cannot read address from NETINFO " + "- wrong type/length."); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** * Helper: compute the absolute value of a time_t. * * (we need this because labs() doesn't always work for time_t, since @@ -1655,8 +1687,6 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) time_t timestamp; uint8_t my_addr_type; uint8_t my_addr_len; - const uint8_t *my_addr_ptr; - const uint8_t *cp, *end; uint8_t n_other_addrs; time_t now = time(NULL); const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); @@ -1704,7 +1734,7 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero( (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> authenticated_rsa_peer_id))); - tor_assert(tor_mem_is_zero( + tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero( (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32)); /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge @@ -1727,38 +1757,48 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) } /* Decode the cell. */ - timestamp = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload)); - const time_t sent_versions_at = - chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at; - if (now > sent_versions_at && (now - sent_versions_at) < 180) { - /* If we have gotten the NETINFO cell reasonably soon after having - * sent our VERSIONS cell, maybe we can learn skew information from it. */ - apparent_skew = now - timestamp; + netinfo_cell_t *netinfo_cell = NULL; + + ssize_t parsed = netinfo_cell_parse(&netinfo_cell, cell->payload, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + + if (parsed < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Failed to parse NETINFO cell - closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; } - my_addr_type = (uint8_t) cell->payload[4]; - my_addr_len = (uint8_t) cell->payload[5]; - my_addr_ptr = (uint8_t*) cell->payload + 6; - end = cell->payload + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE; - cp = cell->payload + 6 + my_addr_len; + timestamp = netinfo_cell_get_timestamp(netinfo_cell); + const netinfo_addr_t *my_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_other_addr(netinfo_cell); + + my_addr_type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(my_addr); + my_addr_len = netinfo_addr_get_len(my_addr); + + if ((now - chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at) < 180) { + apparent_skew = now - timestamp; + } /* We used to check: * if (my_addr_len >= CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 6) { * * This is actually never going to happen, since my_addr_len is at most 255, * and CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN - 6 is 503. So we know that cp is < end. */ - if (my_addr_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) { - tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&my_apparent_addr, get_uint32(my_addr_ptr)); + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&my_apparent_addr, my_addr) == -1) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + return; + } + if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) { if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && - get_uint32(my_addr_ptr) == htonl(me->addr)) { + tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&my_apparent_addr, me->addr)) { TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1; } - - } else if (my_addr_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && my_addr_len == 16) { - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&my_apparent_addr, (const char *) my_addr_ptr); - + } else if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && + my_addr_len == 16) { if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr) && tor_addr_eq(&my_apparent_addr, &me->ipv6_addr)) { @@ -1766,18 +1806,20 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) } } - n_other_addrs = (uint8_t) *cp++; - while (n_other_addrs && cp < end-2) { + n_other_addrs = netinfo_cell_get_n_my_addrs(netinfo_cell); + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < n_other_addrs; i++) { /* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is * "canonical." */ + + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, i); + tor_addr_t addr; - const uint8_t *next = - decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp)); - if (next == NULL) { + + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&addr, netinfo_addr) == -1) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, - "Bad address in netinfo cell; closing connection."); - connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); - return; + "Bad address in netinfo cell; Skipping."); + continue; } /* A relay can connect from anywhere and be canonical, so * long as it tells you from where it came. This may sound a bit @@ -1790,10 +1832,10 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) connection_or_set_canonical(chan->conn, 1); break; } - cp = next; - --n_other_addrs; } + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + if (me && !TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer && channel_is_canonical(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan))) { const char *descr = diff --git a/src/core/or/channeltls.h b/src/core/or/channeltls.h index a2648ff537..f04ce0fa9c 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channeltls.h +++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -22,16 +22,16 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t; #define TLS_CHAN_MAGIC 0x8a192427U -#ifdef TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#ifdef CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE -struct channel_tls_s { +struct channel_tls_t { /* Base channel_t struct */ channel_t base_; /* or_connection_t pointer */ or_connection_t *conn; }; -#endif /* defined(TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_) */ +#endif /* defined(CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE) */ channel_t * channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest, @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ channel_tls_t * channel_tls_from_base(channel_t *chan); void channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn); void channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, or_connection_t *conn, - uint8_t old_state, uint8_t state); void channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn); diff --git a/src/core/or/circuit_st.h b/src/core/or/circuit_st.h index d4339ff50d..4baafb1848 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuit_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuit_st.h @@ -1,17 +1,30 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file circuit_st.h + * @brief Base circuit structure. + **/ + #ifndef CIRCUIT_ST_H #define CIRCUIT_ST_H #include "core/or/or.h" +#include "lib/container/handles.h" + #include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" +#include "ext/ht.h" struct hs_token_t; +struct circpad_machine_spec_t; +struct circpad_machine_runtime_t; + +/** Number of padding state machines on a circuit. */ +#define CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES (2) /** "magic" value for an origin_circuit_t */ #define ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0x35315243u @@ -49,6 +62,9 @@ struct circuit_t { uint32_t magic; /**< For memory and type debugging: must equal * ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC or OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC. */ + /** Handle entry for handle-based lookup */ + HANDLE_ENTRY(circuit, circuit_t); + /** The channel that is next in this circuit. */ channel_t *n_chan; @@ -61,12 +77,6 @@ struct circuit_t { */ circid_t n_circ_id; - /** - * Circuit mux associated with n_chan to which this circuit is attached; - * NULL if we have no n_chan. - */ - circuitmux_t *n_mux; - /** Queue of cells waiting to be transmitted on n_chan */ cell_queue_t n_chan_cells; @@ -93,6 +103,10 @@ struct circuit_t { /** True iff this circuit has received a DESTROY cell in either direction */ unsigned int received_destroy : 1; + /** True iff we have sent a sufficiently random data cell since last + * we reset send_randomness_after_n_cells. */ + unsigned int have_sent_sufficiently_random_cell : 1; + uint8_t state; /**< Current status of this circuit. */ uint8_t purpose; /**< Why are we creating this circuit? */ @@ -105,6 +119,32 @@ struct circuit_t { * circuit-level sendme cells to indicate that we're willing to accept * more. */ int deliver_window; + /** + * How many cells do we have until we need to send one that contains + * sufficient randomness? Used to ensure that authenticated SENDME cells + * will reflect some unpredictable information. + **/ + uint16_t send_randomness_after_n_cells; + + /** FIFO containing the digest of the cells that are just before a SENDME is + * sent by the client. It is done at the last cell before our package_window + * goes down to 0 which is when we expect a SENDME. + * + * Our current circuit package window is capped to 1000 + * (CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) which is also the start value. The increment is + * set to 100 (CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT) which means we don't allow more than + * 1000/100 = 10 outstanding SENDME cells worth of data. Meaning that this + * list can not contain more than 10 digests of DIGEST_LEN bytes (20). + * + * At position i in the list, the digest corresponds to the + * (CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT * i)-nth cell received since we expect a SENDME to + * be received containing that cell digest. + * + * For example, position 2 (starting at 0) means that we've received 300 + * cells so the 300th cell digest is kept at index 2. + * + * At maximum, this list contains 200 bytes plus the smartlist overhead. */ + smartlist_t *sendme_last_digests; /** Temporary field used during circuits_handle_oom. */ uint32_t age_tmp; @@ -177,6 +217,27 @@ struct circuit_t { /** Hashtable node: used to look up the circuit by its HS token using the HS circuitmap. */ HT_ENTRY(circuit_t) hs_circuitmap_node; + + /** Adaptive Padding state machines: these are immutable. The state machines + * that come from the consensus are saved to a global structure, to avoid + * per-circuit allocations. This merely points to the global copy in + * origin_padding_machines or relay_padding_machines that should never + * change or get deallocated. + * + * Each element of this array corresponds to a different padding machine, + * and we can have up to CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES such machines. */ + const struct circpad_machine_spec_t *padding_machine[CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES]; + + /** Adaptive Padding machine runtime info for above machines. This is + * the per-circuit mutable information, such as the current state and + * histogram token counts. Some of it is optional (aka NULL). + * If a machine is being shut down, these indexes can be NULL + * without the corresponding padding_machine being NULL, while we + * wait for the other end to respond to our shutdown request. + * + * Each element of this array corresponds to a different padding machine, + * and we can have up to CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES such machines. */ + struct circpad_machine_runtime_t *padding_info[CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES]; }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(CIRCUIT_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index 70b5d8215a..ec61b4a455 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -21,20 +21,19 @@ * cells arrive, the client will invoke circuit_send_next_onion_skin() to send * CREATE or RELAY_EXTEND cells. * - * On the server side, this module also handles the logic of responding to - * RELAY_EXTEND requests, using circuit_extend(). + * The server side is handled in feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c. **/ #define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE +#define OCIRC_EVENT_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" #include "app/config/config.h" -#include "app/config/confparse.h" +#include "lib/confmgt/confmgt.h" #include "core/crypto/hs_ntor.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h" #include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h" -#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" @@ -42,17 +41,20 @@ #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuitstats.h" #include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding.h" #include "core/or/command.h" #include "core/or/connection_edge.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" #include "core/or/onion.h" +#include "core/or/ocirc_event.h" #include "core/or/policies.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "core/or/crypt_path.h" #include "feature/client/bridges.h" #include "feature/client/circpathbias.h" #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" #include "feature/client/transports.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/nodelist/describe.h" #include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h" @@ -80,15 +82,6 @@ #include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h" -static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, - uint16_t port, - const char *id_digest, - const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id); -static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, - const create_cell_t *create_cell, - int relayed); -static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); -STATIC int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); static int circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ, @@ -102,10 +95,10 @@ static const node_t *choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, * and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right * callbacks. */ -static channel_t * -channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *id_digest, - const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) +MOCK_IMPL(channel_t *, +channel_connect_for_circuit,(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *id_digest, + const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)) { channel_t *chan; @@ -492,7 +485,7 @@ circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int flags) return NULL; } - control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0); + circuit_event_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0); if ((err_reason = circuit_handle_first_hop(circ)) < 0) { circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason); @@ -508,6 +501,27 @@ origin_circuit_get_guard_state(origin_circuit_t *circ) return circ->guard_state; } +/** + * Helper function to publish a channel association message + * + * circuit_handle_first_hop() calls this to notify subscribers about a + * channel launch event, which associates a circuit with a channel. + * This doesn't always correspond to an assignment of the circuit's + * n_chan field, because that seems to be only for fully-open + * channels. + **/ +static void +circuit_chan_publish(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const channel_t *chan) +{ + ocirc_chan_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg)); + + msg->gid = circ->global_identifier; + msg->chan = chan->global_identifier; + msg->onehop = circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel; + + ocirc_chan_publish(msg); +} + /** Start establishing the first hop of our circuit. Figure out what * OR we should connect to, and if necessary start the connection to * it. If we're already connected, then send the 'create' cell. @@ -522,7 +536,7 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) int should_launch = 0; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - firsthop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath); + firsthop = cpath_get_next_non_open_hop(circ->cpath); tor_assert(firsthop); tor_assert(firsthop->extend_info); @@ -545,11 +559,17 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) fmt_addrport(&firsthop->extend_info->addr, firsthop->extend_info->port)); - n_chan = channel_get_for_extend(firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest, - &firsthop->extend_info->ed_identity, - &firsthop->extend_info->addr, - &msg, - &should_launch); + /* We'll cleanup this code in #33220, when we add an IPv6 address to + * extend_info_t. */ + const bool addr_is_ipv4 = + (tor_addr_family(&firsthop->extend_info->addr) == AF_INET); + n_chan = channel_get_for_extend( + firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest, + &firsthop->extend_info->ed_identity, + addr_is_ipv4 ? &firsthop->extend_info->addr : NULL, + addr_is_ipv4 ? NULL : &firsthop->extend_info->addr, + &msg, + &should_launch); if (!n_chan) { /* not currently connected in a useful way. */ @@ -559,8 +579,6 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) circ->base_.n_hop = extend_info_dup(firsthop->extend_info); if (should_launch) { - if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) - control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_DIR, 0); n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit( &firsthop->extend_info->addr, firsthop->extend_info->port, @@ -570,6 +588,7 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) log_info(LD_CIRC,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED; } + circuit_chan_publish(circ, n_chan); } log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good."); @@ -581,6 +600,7 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) } else { /* it's already open. use it. */ tor_assert(!circ->base_.n_hop); circ->base_.n_chan = n_chan; + circuit_chan_publish(circ, n_chan); log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin."); if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)) < 0) { log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed."); @@ -700,9 +720,10 @@ circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status, int close_origin_circuits) * gave us via an EXTEND cell, so we shouldn't worry if we don't understand * it. Return -1 if we failed to find a suitable circid, else return 0. */ -static int -circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, - int relayed) +MOCK_IMPL(int, +circuit_deliver_create_cell,(circuit_t *circ, + const struct create_cell_t *create_cell, + int relayed)) { cell_t cell; circid_t id; @@ -762,40 +783,6 @@ circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, return -1; } -/** We've decided to start our reachability testing. If all - * is set, log this to the user. Return 1 if we did, or 0 if - * we chose not to log anything. */ -int -inform_testing_reachability(void) -{ - char dirbuf[128]; - char *address; - const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); - if (!me) - return 0; - address = tor_dup_ip(me->addr); - control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE, - "CHECKING_REACHABILITY ORADDRESS=%s:%d", - address, me->or_port); - if (me->dir_port) { - tor_snprintf(dirbuf, sizeof(dirbuf), " and DirPort %s:%d", - address, me->dir_port); - control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE, - "CHECKING_REACHABILITY DIRADDRESS=%s:%d", - address, me->dir_port); - } - log_notice(LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... " - "(this may take up to %d minutes -- look for log " - "messages indicating success)", - address, me->or_port, - me->dir_port ? dirbuf : "", - me->dir_port ? "are" : "is", - TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT/60); - - tor_free(address); - return 1; -} - /** Return true iff we should send a create_fast cell to start building a given * circuit */ static inline int @@ -941,15 +928,18 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); tor_assert(circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); - crypt_path_t *hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath); + crypt_path_t *hop = cpath_get_next_non_open_hop(circ->cpath); circuit_build_times_handle_completed_hop(circ); + circpad_machine_event_circ_added_hop(circ); + if (hop) { /* Case two: we're on a hop after the first. */ return circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(circ, hop); } /* Case three: the circuit is finished. Do housekeeping tasks on it. */ + circpad_machine_event_circ_built(circ); return circuit_build_no_more_hops(circ); } @@ -1192,192 +1182,6 @@ circuit_note_clock_jumped(int64_t seconds_elapsed, bool was_idle) } } -/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion - * skin and identity digest for the next hop. If we're already connected, - * pass the onion skin to the next hop using a create cell; otherwise - * launch a new OR connection, and <b>circ</b> will notice when the - * connection succeeds or fails. - * - * Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit, else return 0. - */ -int -circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) -{ - channel_t *n_chan; - relay_header_t rh; - extend_cell_t ec; - const char *msg = NULL; - int should_launch = 0; - - if (circ->n_chan) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing."); - return -1; - } - if (circ->n_hop) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing."); - return -1; - } - - if (!server_mode(get_options())) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing."); - return -1; - } - - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); - - if (extend_cell_parse(&ec, rh.command, - cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, - rh.length) < 0) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Can't parse extend cell. Closing circuit."); - return -1; - } - - if (!ec.orport_ipv4.port || tor_addr_is_null(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend to zero destination port or addr."); - return -1; - } - - if (tor_addr_is_internal(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, 0) && - !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend to a private address"); - return -1; - } - - /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using - * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay), - * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty - * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack, - * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a - * new TLS connection for each extend request. */ - if (tor_digest_is_zero((const char*)ec.node_id)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend without specifying an id_digest."); - return -1; - } - - /* Fill in ed_pubkey if it was not provided and we can infer it from - * our networkstatus */ - if (ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey)) { - const node_t *node = node_get_by_id((const char*)ec.node_id); - const ed25519_public_key_t *node_ed_id = NULL; - if (node && - node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 1) && - (node_ed_id = node_get_ed25519_id(node))) { - ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ec.ed_pubkey, node_ed_id); - } - } - - /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the - * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can - * assist circular-path attacks. */ - if (tor_memeq(ec.node_id, - TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop."); - return -1; - } - - /* Check the previous hop Ed25519 ID too */ - if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&ec.ed_pubkey) && - ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ec.ed_pubkey, - &TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->ed25519_identity)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop " - "(by Ed25519 ID)."); - return -1; - } - - n_chan = channel_get_for_extend((const char*)ec.node_id, - &ec.ed_pubkey, - &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, - &msg, - &should_launch); - - if (!n_chan) { - log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s): %s", - fmt_addrport(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr,ec.orport_ipv4.port), - msg?msg:"????"); - - circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/, - (const char*)ec.node_id, - &ec.ed_pubkey, - NULL, /*onion_key*/ - NULL, /*curve25519_key*/ - &ec.orport_ipv4.addr, - ec.orport_ipv4.port); - - circ->n_chan_create_cell = tor_memdup(&ec.create_cell, - sizeof(ec.create_cell)); - - circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT); - - if (should_launch) { - /* we should try to open a connection */ - n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, - ec.orport_ipv4.port, - (const char*)ec.node_id, - &ec.ed_pubkey); - if (!n_chan) { - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit."); - circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED); - return 0; - } - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good."); - } - /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of - * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches - * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN. - */ - return 0; - } - - tor_assert(!circ->n_hop); /* Connection is already established. */ - circ->n_chan = n_chan; - log_debug(LD_CIRC, - "n_chan is %s", - channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan)); - - if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, &ec.create_cell, 1) < 0) - return -1; - - return 0; -} - -/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in key_data. - * - * If <b>is_hs_v3</b> is set, this cpath will be used for next gen hidden - * service circuits and <b>key_data</b> must be at least - * HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN bytes in length. - * - * If <b>is_hs_v3</b> is not set, key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN - * bytes, which are used as follows: - * - 20 to initialize f_digest - * - 20 to initialize b_digest - * - 16 to key f_crypto - * - 16 to key b_crypto - * - * (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.) - * - * Return 0 if init was successful, else -1 if it failed. - */ -int -circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, - const char *key_data, size_t key_data_len, - int reverse, int is_hs_v3) -{ - - tor_assert(cpath); - return relay_crypto_init(&cpath->crypto, key_data, key_data_len, reverse, - is_hs_v3); -} - /** A "created" cell <b>reply</b> came back to us on circuit <b>circ</b>. * (The body of <b>reply</b> varies depending on what sort of handshake * this is.) @@ -1403,7 +1207,7 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) { hop = circ->cpath; } else { - hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath); + hop = cpath_get_next_non_open_hop(circ->cpath); if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"got extended when circ already built? Closing."); return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; @@ -1427,14 +1231,14 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, onion_handshake_state_release(&hop->handshake_state); - if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, sizeof(keys), 0, 0)<0) { + if (cpath_init_circuit_crypto(hop, keys, sizeof(keys), 0, 0)<0) { return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN; log_info(LD_CIRC,"Finished building circuit hop:"); circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,circ); - control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED, 0); + circuit_event_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED, 0); return 0; } @@ -1479,7 +1283,7 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason) } layer->next = victim->next; - circuit_free_cpath_node(victim); + cpath_free(victim); } log_info(LD_CIRC, "finished"); @@ -1487,61 +1291,6 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason) #endif /* 0 */ } -/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created - * cell back. - */ -int -onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, - const created_cell_t *created_cell, - const char *keys, size_t keys_len, - const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce) -{ - cell_t cell; - - tor_assert(keys_len == CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN); - - if (created_cell_format(&cell, created_cell) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"couldn't format created cell (type=%d, len=%d)", - (int)created_cell->cell_type, (int)created_cell->handshake_len); - return -1; - } - cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id; - - circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); - - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.", - (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys), - (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20)); - if (relay_crypto_init(&circ->crypto, keys, keys_len, 0, 0)<0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed"); - return -1; - } - - memcpy(circ->rend_circ_nonce, rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN); - - int used_create_fast = (created_cell->cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST); - - append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), - circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0); - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.", - used_create_fast ? "created_fast" : "created"); - - /* Ignore the local bit when ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set: - * it violates the assumption that private addresses are local. - * Also, many test networks run on local addresses, and - * TestingTorNetwork sets ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses. */ - if ((!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) - || get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) - && !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) { - /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn - * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells - * can reach us too. */ - router_orport_found_reachable(); - } - - return 0; -} - /** Helper for new_route_len(). Choose a circuit length for purpose * <b>purpose</b>: DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN (+ 1 if someone else chose the * exit). If someone else chose the exit, they could be colluding @@ -1673,24 +1422,28 @@ route_len_for_purpose(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei) * to handle the desired path length, return -1. */ STATIC int -new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, smartlist_t *nodes) +new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, + const smartlist_t *nodes) { - int num_acceptable_routers; int routelen; tor_assert(nodes); routelen = route_len_for_purpose(purpose, exit_ei); - num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_nodes(nodes); + int num_acceptable_direct = count_acceptable_nodes(nodes, 1); + int num_acceptable_indirect = count_acceptable_nodes(nodes, 0); - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen route length %d (%d/%d routers suitable).", - routelen, num_acceptable_routers, smartlist_len(nodes)); + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen route length %d (%d direct and %d indirect " + "routers suitable).", routelen, num_acceptable_direct, + num_acceptable_indirect); - if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) { + if (num_acceptable_direct < 1 || num_acceptable_indirect < routelen - 1) { log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Not enough acceptable routers (%d/%d). Discarding this circuit.", - num_acceptable_routers, routelen); + "Not enough acceptable routers (%d/%d direct and %d/%d " + "indirect routers suitable). Discarding this circuit.", + num_acceptable_direct, routelen, + num_acceptable_indirect, routelen); return -1; } @@ -2294,7 +2047,7 @@ circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit_ei); ++circ->build_state->desired_path_len; - onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit_ei); + cpath_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit_ei); return 0; } @@ -2332,7 +2085,7 @@ circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) * particular router. See bug #25885.) */ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC int, -count_acceptable_nodes, (smartlist_t *nodes)) +count_acceptable_nodes, (const smartlist_t *nodes, int direct)) { int num=0; @@ -2346,7 +2099,7 @@ count_acceptable_nodes, (smartlist_t *nodes)) if (! node->is_valid) // log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i); continue; - if (! node_has_any_descriptor(node)) + if (! node_has_preferred_descriptor(node, direct)) continue; /* The node has a descriptor, so we can just check the ntor key directly */ if (!node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) @@ -2359,47 +2112,6 @@ count_acceptable_nodes, (smartlist_t *nodes)) return num; } -/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>. - * This function is used to extend cpath by another hop. - */ -void -onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop) -{ - if (*head_ptr) { - new_hop->next = (*head_ptr); - new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev; - (*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop; - (*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop; - } else { - *head_ptr = new_hop; - new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop; - } -} - -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS - -/** Unittest helper function: Count number of hops in cpath linked list. */ -unsigned int -cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr) -{ - unsigned int n_hops = 0; - crypt_path_t *tmp; - - if (!*head_ptr) { - return 0; - } - - tmp = *head_ptr; - do { - n_hops++; - tmp = tmp->next; - } while (tmp != *head_ptr); - - return n_hops; -} - -#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ - /** * Build the exclude list for vanguard circuits. * @@ -2597,7 +2309,24 @@ choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, return choice; } - choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); + if (options->MiddleNodes) { + smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new(); + routerset_get_all_nodes(sl, options->MiddleNodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, 1); + + smartlist_subtract(sl, excluded); + + choice = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, WEIGHT_FOR_MID); + smartlist_free(sl); + if (choice) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, "Chose fixed middle node: %s", + hex_str(choice->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } else { + log_fn(LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC, "Restricted middle not available"); + } + } else { + choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); + } smartlist_free(excluded); return choice; } @@ -2657,20 +2386,6 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state, return choice; } -/** Return the first non-open hop in cpath, or return NULL if all - * hops are open. */ -static crypt_path_t * -onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath) -{ - crypt_path_t *hop = cpath; - do { - if (hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) - return hop; - hop = hop->next; - } while (hop != cpath); - return NULL; -} - /** Choose a suitable next hop for the circuit <b>circ</b>. * Append the hop info to circ->cpath. * @@ -2727,33 +2442,11 @@ onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) extend_info_describe(info), cur_len+1, build_state_get_exit_nickname(state)); - onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, info); + cpath_append_hop(&circ->cpath, info); extend_info_free(info); return 0; } -/** Create a new hop, annotate it with information about its - * corresponding router <b>choice</b>, and append it to the - * end of the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>. */ -STATIC int -onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice) -{ - crypt_path_t *hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t)); - - /* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */ - onion_append_to_cpath(head_ptr, hop); - - hop->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC; - hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED; - - hop->extend_info = extend_info_dup(choice); - - hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); - hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; - - return 0; -} - /** Allocate a new extend_info object based on the various arguments. */ extend_info_t * extend_info_new(const char *nickname, @@ -2895,8 +2588,8 @@ extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info) * If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the node_t for * the chosen exit, return NULL. */ -const node_t * -build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state) +MOCK_IMPL(const node_t *, +build_state_get_exit_node,(cpath_build_state_t *state)) { if (!state || !state->chosen_exit) return NULL; @@ -2958,7 +2651,7 @@ extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei) { tor_assert(ei); /* Valid ntor keys have at least one non-zero byte */ - return !tor_mem_is_zero( + return !fast_mem_is_zero( (const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); } diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h index 969f5b5cc3..e62bb41de9 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -29,29 +29,19 @@ struct circuit_guard_state_t *origin_circuit_get_guard_state( int circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ); void circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status, int close_origin_circuits); -int inform_testing_reachability(void); int circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(const origin_circuit_t *circ); int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ); void circuit_note_clock_jumped(int64_t seconds_elapsed, bool was_idle); -int circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ); -int circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, - const char *key_data, size_t key_data_len, - int reverse, int is_hs_v3); struct created_cell_t; int circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, const struct created_cell_t *created_cell); int circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); -int onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, - const struct created_cell_t *created_cell, - const char *keys, size_t keys_len, - const uint8_t *rend_circ_nonce); MOCK_DECL(int, circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled, (time_t now, int *need_uptime, int *need_capacity)); int circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info); int circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info); -void onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop); extend_info_t *extend_info_new(const char *nickname, const char *rsa_id_digest, const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, @@ -70,7 +60,8 @@ int circuit_can_use_tap(const origin_circuit_t *circ); int circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ); int extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei); const uint8_t *build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(cpath_build_state_t *state); -const node_t *build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state); +MOCK_DECL(const node_t *, + build_state_get_exit_node,(cpath_build_state_t *state)); const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state); struct circuit_guard_state_t; @@ -80,11 +71,26 @@ const node_t *choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, struct circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out); void circuit_upgrade_circuits_from_guard_wait(void); +struct ed25519_public_key_t; + +MOCK_DECL(channel_t *, +channel_connect_for_circuit,(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *id_digest, + const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)); + +struct create_cell_t; +MOCK_DECL(int, +circuit_deliver_create_cell,(circuit_t *circ, + const struct create_cell_t *create_cell, + int relayed)); + #ifdef CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE STATIC circid_t get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan); STATIC int new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, - smartlist_t *nodes); -MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, count_acceptable_nodes, (smartlist_t *nodes)); + const smartlist_t *nodes); +MOCK_DECL(STATIC int, count_acceptable_nodes, (const smartlist_t *nodes, + int direct)); STATIC int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); @@ -92,11 +98,6 @@ STATIC int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit); -#if defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) -unsigned int cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr); - -#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ - #endif /* defined(CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE) */ #endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitlist.c b/src/core/or/circuitlist.c index ccf3041bb4..384835667d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ * logic, which was originally circuit-focused. **/ #define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +#define OCIRC_EVENT_PRIVATE #include "lib/cc/torint.h" /* TOR_PRIuSZ */ #include "core/or/or.h" @@ -61,11 +62,13 @@ #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuituse.h" #include "core/or/circuitstats.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding.h" +#include "core/or/crypt_path.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "core/or/connection_edge.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" @@ -94,7 +97,9 @@ #include "lib/compress/compress_lzma.h" #include "lib/compress/compress_zlib.h" #include "lib/compress/compress_zstd.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" + +#include "core/or/ocirc_event.h" #include "ht.h" @@ -127,7 +132,6 @@ static smartlist_t *circuits_pending_other_guards = NULL; * circuit_mark_for_close and which are waiting for circuit_about_to_free. */ static smartlist_t *circuits_pending_close = NULL; -static void circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim); static void cpath_ref_decref(crypt_path_reference_t *cpath_ref); static void circuit_about_to_free_atexit(circuit_t *circ); static void circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ); @@ -142,6 +146,9 @@ static int any_opened_circs_cached_val = 0; /********* END VARIABLES ************/ +/* Implement circuit handle helpers. */ +HANDLE_IMPL(circuit, circuit_t,) + or_circuit_t * TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *x) { @@ -208,10 +215,10 @@ chan_circid_entry_hash_(chan_circid_circuit_map_t *a) static HT_HEAD(chan_circid_map, chan_circid_circuit_map_t) chan_circid_map = HT_INITIALIZER(); HT_PROTOTYPE(chan_circid_map, chan_circid_circuit_map_t, node, - chan_circid_entry_hash_, chan_circid_entries_eq_) + chan_circid_entry_hash_, chan_circid_entries_eq_); HT_GENERATE2(chan_circid_map, chan_circid_circuit_map_t, node, chan_circid_entry_hash_, chan_circid_entries_eq_, 0.6, - tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_) + tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_); /** The most recently returned entry from circuit_get_by_circid_chan; * used to improve performance when many cells arrive in a row from the @@ -481,6 +488,54 @@ circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, } } +/** + * Helper function to publish a message about events on an origin circuit + * + * Publishes a message to subscribers of origin circuit events, and + * sends the control event. + **/ +int +circuit_event_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp, + int reason_code) +{ + ocirc_cevent_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg)); + + tor_assert(circ); + + msg->gid = circ->global_identifier; + msg->evtype = tp; + msg->reason = reason_code; + msg->onehop = circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel; + + ocirc_cevent_publish(msg); + return control_event_circuit_status(circ, tp, reason_code); +} + +/** + * Helper function to publish a state change message + * + * circuit_set_state() calls this to notify subscribers about a change + * of the state of an origin circuit. @a circ must be an origin + * circuit. + **/ +static void +circuit_state_publish(const circuit_t *circ) +{ + ocirc_state_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg)); + const origin_circuit_t *ocirc; + + tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)); + ocirc = CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + /* Only inbound OR circuits can be in this state, not origin circuits. */ + tor_assert(circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING); + + msg->gid = ocirc->global_identifier; + msg->state = circ->state; + msg->onehop = ocirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel; + + ocirc_state_publish(msg); +} + /** Change the state of <b>circ</b> to <b>state</b>, adding it to or removing * it from lists as appropriate. */ void @@ -510,6 +565,8 @@ circuit_set_state(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t state) if (state == CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT || state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) tor_assert(!circ->n_chan_create_cell); circ->state = state; + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) + circuit_state_publish(circ); } /** Append to <b>out</b> all circuits in state CHAN_WAIT waiting for @@ -767,6 +824,8 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose) return "PATH_BIAS_TESTING"; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS: return "HS_VANGUARDS"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING: + return "CIRCUIT_PADDING"; default: tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose); @@ -796,6 +855,7 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_hs_state_string(uint8_t purpose) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS: + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING: return NULL; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT: @@ -896,6 +956,9 @@ circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose) case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS: return "Hidden service: Pre-built vanguard circuit"; + case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING: + return "Circuit kept open for padding"; + default: tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose); return buf; @@ -931,6 +994,7 @@ init_circuit_base(circuit_t *circ) circ->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); circ->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + circuit_reset_sendme_randomness(circ); cell_queue_init(&circ->n_chan_cells); smartlist_add(circuit_get_global_list(), circ); @@ -1072,7 +1136,7 @@ circuit_free_(circuit_t *circ) * circuit is closed. This is to avoid any code path that free registered * circuits without closing them before. This needs to be done before the * hs identifier is freed. */ - hs_circ_cleanup(circ); + hs_circ_cleanup_on_free(circ); if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); @@ -1092,7 +1156,7 @@ circuit_free_(circuit_t *circ) if (ocirc->build_state) { extend_info_free(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit); - circuit_free_cpath_node(ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath); + cpath_free(ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath); cpath_ref_decref(ocirc->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref); } tor_free(ocirc->build_state); @@ -1171,11 +1235,23 @@ circuit_free_(circuit_t *circ) * "active" checks will be violated. */ cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_chan_cells); + /* Cleanup possible SENDME state. */ + if (circ->sendme_last_digests) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(circ->sendme_last_digests, uint8_t *, d, tor_free(d)); + smartlist_free(circ->sendme_last_digests); + } + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") has been freed.", n_circ_id, CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier : 0); + /* Free any circuit padding structures */ + circpad_circuit_free_all_machineinfos(circ); + + /* Clear all dangling handle references. */ + circuit_handles_clear(circ); + if (should_free) { memwipe(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */ tor_free(mem); @@ -1207,10 +1283,10 @@ circuit_clear_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) while (cpath->next && cpath->next != head) { victim = cpath; cpath = victim->next; - circuit_free_cpath_node(victim); + cpath_free(victim); } - circuit_free_cpath_node(cpath); + cpath_free(cpath); circ->cpath = NULL; } @@ -1267,29 +1343,13 @@ circuit_free_all(void) HT_CLEAR(chan_circid_map, &chan_circid_map); } -/** Deallocate space associated with the cpath node <b>victim</b>. */ -static void -circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim) -{ - if (!victim) - return; - - relay_crypto_clear(&victim->crypto); - onion_handshake_state_release(&victim->handshake_state); - crypto_dh_free(victim->rend_dh_handshake_state); - extend_info_free(victim->extend_info); - - memwipe(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */ - tor_free(victim); -} - /** Release a crypt_path_reference_t*, which may be NULL. */ static void cpath_ref_decref(crypt_path_reference_t *cpath_ref) { if (cpath_ref != NULL) { if (--(cpath_ref->refcount) == 0) { - circuit_free_cpath_node(cpath_ref->cpath); + cpath_free(cpath_ref->cpath); tor_free(cpath_ref); } } @@ -2140,6 +2200,11 @@ circuit_mark_for_close_, (circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line, tor_assert(line); tor_assert(file); + /* Check whether the circuitpadding subsystem wants to block this close */ + if (circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(circ, reason)) { + return; + } + if (circ->marked_for_close) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close at %s:%d" @@ -2195,7 +2260,7 @@ circuit_mark_for_close_, (circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line, } /* Notify the HS subsystem that this circuit is closing. */ - hs_circ_cleanup(circ); + hs_circ_cleanup_on_close(circ); if (circuits_pending_close == NULL) circuits_pending_close = smartlist_new(); @@ -2270,50 +2335,13 @@ circuit_about_to_free(circuit_t *circ) smartlist_remove(circuits_pending_other_guards, circ); } if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - control_event_circuit_status(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), + circuit_event_status(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN || circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT) ? CIRC_EVENT_CLOSED:CIRC_EVENT_FAILED, orig_reason); } - if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) { - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - int timed_out = (reason == END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT); - tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); - tor_assert(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit); - if (orig_reason != END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT && - ocirc->rend_data) { - /* treat this like getting a nack from it */ - log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). %s", - safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(ocirc->rend_data)), - safe_str_client(build_state_get_exit_nickname(ocirc->build_state)), - timed_out ? "Recording timeout." : "Removing from descriptor."); - rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit, - ocirc->rend_data, - timed_out ? - INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT : - INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC); - } - } else if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && - reason != END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT) { - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - if (ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit && ocirc->rend_data) { - if (orig_reason != END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT && - ocirc->rend_data) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s " - "(building circuit to intro point). " - "Marking intro point as possibly unreachable.", - safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(ocirc->rend_data)), - safe_str_client(build_state_get_exit_nickname( - ocirc->build_state))); - rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit, - ocirc->rend_data, - INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_UNREACHABLE); - } - } - } - if (circ->n_chan) { circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, circ->n_chan); /* Only send destroy if the channel isn't closing anyway */ @@ -2374,13 +2402,9 @@ marked_circuit_free_cells(circuit_t *circ) return; } cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_chan_cells); - if (circ->n_mux) - circuitmux_clear_num_cells(circ->n_mux, circ); if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { or_circuit_t *orcirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); cell_queue_clear(&orcirc->p_chan_cells); - if (orcirc->p_mux) - circuitmux_clear_num_cells(orcirc->p_mux, circ); } } @@ -2724,59 +2748,6 @@ circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation) n_dirconns_killed); } -/** Verify that cpath layer <b>cp</b> has all of its invariants - * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid. - */ -void -assert_cpath_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp) -{ -// tor_assert(cp->addr); /* these are zero for rendezvous extra-hops */ -// tor_assert(cp->port); - tor_assert(cp); - tor_assert(cp->magic == CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC); - switch (cp->state) - { - case CPATH_STATE_OPEN: - relay_crypto_assert_ok(&cp->crypto); - FALLTHROUGH; - case CPATH_STATE_CLOSED: - /*XXXX Assert that there's no handshake_state either. */ - tor_assert(!cp->rend_dh_handshake_state); - break; - case CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS: - /* tor_assert(cp->dh_handshake_state); */ - break; - default: - log_fn(LOG_ERR, LD_BUG, "Unexpected state %d", cp->state); - tor_assert(0); - } - tor_assert(cp->package_window >= 0); - tor_assert(cp->deliver_window >= 0); -} - -/** Verify that cpath <b>cp</b> has all of its invariants - * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid. - */ -static void -assert_cpath_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp) -{ - const crypt_path_t *start = cp; - - do { - assert_cpath_layer_ok(cp); - /* layers must be in sequence of: "open* awaiting? closed*" */ - if (cp != start) { - if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) { - tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); - } else if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { - tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); - } - } - cp = cp->next; - tor_assert(cp); - } while (cp != start); -} - /** Verify that circuit <b>c</b> has all of its invariants * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid. */ @@ -2838,7 +2809,7 @@ assert_circuit_ok,(const circuit_t *c)) !smartlist_contains(circuits_pending_chans, c)); } if (origin_circ && origin_circ->cpath) { - assert_cpath_ok(origin_circ->cpath); + cpath_assert_ok(origin_circ->cpath); } if (c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED) { tor_assert(or_circ); diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitlist.h b/src/core/or/circuitlist.h index b87c6a3667..fd7e22e4c0 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitlist.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ #ifndef TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H #define TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H +#include "lib/container/handles.h" #include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h" +#include "core/or/ocirc_event.h" /** Circuit state: I'm the origin, still haven't done all my handshakes. */ #define CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING 0 @@ -91,31 +93,33 @@ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MAX_ 13 /** This circuit is used for build time measurement only */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT 14 -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 14 +/** This circuit is being held open by circuit padding */ +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING 15 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 15 -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ 15 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ 16 /** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, waiting for * introductions. */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 15 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 16 /** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, successfully * established intro. */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 16 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 17 /** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, connecting to rend * point. */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 17 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 18 /** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, rendezvous * established. */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 18 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 19 /** This circuit is used for uploading hsdirs */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST 19 -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_ 19 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST 20 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_ 20 /** A testing circuit; not meant to be used for actual traffic. */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 20 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 21 /** A controller made this circuit and Tor should not use it. */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 21 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 22 /** This circuit is used for path bias probing only */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING 22 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING 23 /** This circuit is used for vanguards/restricted paths. * @@ -123,9 +127,9 @@ * on-demand. When an HS operation needs to take place (e.g. connect to an * intro point), these circuits are then cannibalized and repurposed to the * actual needed HS purpose. */ -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS 23 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS 24 -#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 23 +#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 24 /** A catch-all for unrecognized purposes. Currently we don't expect * to make or see any circuits with this purpose. */ #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255 @@ -184,6 +188,8 @@ void channel_mark_circid_unusable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id); void channel_mark_circid_usable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id); time_t circuit_id_when_marked_unusable_on_channel(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan); +int circuit_event_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp, + int reason_code); void circuit_set_state(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t state); void circuit_close_all_marked(void); int32_t circuit_initial_package_window(void); @@ -213,7 +219,7 @@ void circuit_mark_all_dirty_circs_as_unusable(void); void circuit_synchronize_written_or_bandwidth(const circuit_t *c, circuit_channel_direction_t dir); MOCK_DECL(void, circuit_mark_for_close_, (circuit_t *circ, int reason, - int line, const char *file)); + int line, const char *cfile)); int circuit_get_cpath_len(origin_circuit_t *circ); int circuit_get_cpath_opened_len(const origin_circuit_t *); void circuit_clear_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); @@ -225,7 +231,6 @@ int circuit_count_pending_on_channel(channel_t *chan); #define circuit_mark_for_close(c, reason) \ circuit_mark_for_close_((c), (reason), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__) -void assert_cpath_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp); MOCK_DECL(void, assert_circuit_ok,(const circuit_t *c)); void circuit_free_all(void); void circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation); @@ -238,6 +243,11 @@ MOCK_DECL(void, channel_note_destroy_not_pending, smartlist_t *circuit_find_circuits_to_upgrade_from_guard_wait(void); +/* Declare the handle helpers */ +HANDLE_DECL(circuit, circuit_t, ) +#define circuit_handle_free(h) \ + FREE_AND_NULL(circuit_handle_t, circuit_handle_free_, (h)) + #ifdef CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE STATIC void circuit_free_(circuit_t *circ); #define circuit_free(circ) FREE_AND_NULL(circuit_t, circuit_free_, (circ)) diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitmux.c b/src/core/or/circuitmux.c index e7309553c4..be54ae6ec6 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitmux.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitmux.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -69,25 +69,21 @@ * made to attach all existing circuits to the new policy. **/ +#define CIRCUITMUX_PRIVATE + #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuitmux.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" -#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" -#include "core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h" #include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h" -/* - * Private typedefs for circuitmux.c - */ +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" /* - * Map of muxinfos for circuitmux_t to use; struct is defined below (name - * of struct must match HT_HEAD line). + * Private typedefs for circuitmux.c */ -typedef struct chanid_circid_muxinfo_map chanid_circid_muxinfo_map_t; /* * Hash table entry (yeah, calling it chanid_circid_muxinfo_s seems to @@ -100,57 +96,14 @@ typedef struct chanid_circid_muxinfo_t chanid_circid_muxinfo_t; * a count of queued cells. */ -typedef struct circuit_muxinfo_s circuit_muxinfo_t; - -/* - * Structures for circuitmux.c - */ - -struct circuitmux_s { - /* Keep count of attached, active circuits */ - unsigned int n_circuits, n_active_circuits; - - /* Total number of queued cells on all circuits */ - unsigned int n_cells; - - /* - * Map from (channel ID, circuit ID) pairs to circuit_muxinfo_t - */ - chanid_circid_muxinfo_map_t *chanid_circid_map; - - /** List of queued destroy cells */ - destroy_cell_queue_t destroy_cell_queue; - /** Boolean: True iff the last cell to circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit - * returned the destroy queue. Used to force alternation between - * destroy/non-destroy cells. - * - * XXXX There is no reason to think that alternating is a particularly good - * approach -- it's just designed to prevent destroys from starving other - * cells completely. - */ - unsigned int last_cell_was_destroy : 1; - /** Destroy counter: increment this when a destroy gets queued, decrement - * when we unqueue it, so we can test to make sure they don't starve. - */ - int64_t destroy_ctr; - - /* - * Circuitmux policy; if this is non-NULL, it can override the built- - * in round-robin active circuits behavior. This is how EWMA works in - * the new circuitmux_t world. - */ - const circuitmux_policy_t *policy; - - /* Policy-specific data */ - circuitmux_policy_data_t *policy_data; -}; +typedef struct circuit_muxinfo_t circuit_muxinfo_t; /* * This struct holds whatever we want to store per attached circuit on a * circuitmux_t; right now, just the count of queued cells and the direction. */ -struct circuit_muxinfo_s { +struct circuit_muxinfo_t { /* Count of cells on this circuit at last update */ unsigned int cell_count; /* Direction of flow */ @@ -222,15 +175,12 @@ chanid_circid_entry_hash(chanid_circid_muxinfo_t *a) return (unsigned) siphash24g(data, sizeof(data)); } -/* Declare the struct chanid_circid_muxinfo_map type */ -HT_HEAD(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, chanid_circid_muxinfo_t); - /* Emit a bunch of hash table stuff */ HT_PROTOTYPE(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, chanid_circid_muxinfo_t, node, - chanid_circid_entry_hash, chanid_circid_entries_eq) + chanid_circid_entry_hash, chanid_circid_entries_eq); HT_GENERATE2(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, chanid_circid_muxinfo_t, node, chanid_circid_entry_hash, chanid_circid_entries_eq, 0.6, - tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_) + tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_); /* * Circuitmux alloc/free functions @@ -295,9 +245,6 @@ circuitmux_detach_all_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux, smartlist_t *detached_out) circuitmux_make_circuit_inactive(cmux, circ); } - /* Clear n_mux */ - circ->n_mux = NULL; - if (detached_out) smartlist_add(detached_out, circ); } else if (circ->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC) { @@ -310,12 +257,6 @@ circuitmux_detach_all_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux, smartlist_t *detached_out) circuitmux_make_circuit_inactive(cmux, circ); } - /* - * It has a sensible p_chan and direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN, - * so clear p_mux. - */ - TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_mux = NULL; - if (detached_out) smartlist_add(detached_out, circ); } else { @@ -837,18 +778,14 @@ circuitmux_attach_circuit,(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, */ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit %u on channel %"PRIu64 " was already attached to " - "cmux %p (trying to attach to %p)", + "(trying to attach to %p)", (unsigned)circ_id, (channel_id), - ((direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? - circ->n_mux : TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_mux), cmux); /* * The mux pointer on this circuit and the direction in result should * match; otherwise assert. */ - if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) tor_assert(circ->n_mux == cmux); - else tor_assert(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_mux == cmux); tor_assert(hashent->muxinfo.direction == direction); /* @@ -873,13 +810,6 @@ circuitmux_attach_circuit,(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, "Attaching circuit %u on channel %"PRIu64 " to cmux %p", (unsigned)circ_id, (channel_id), cmux); - /* - * Assert that the circuit doesn't already have a mux for this - * direction. - */ - if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) tor_assert(circ->n_mux == NULL); - else tor_assert(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_mux == NULL); - /* Insert it in the map */ hashent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*hashent)); hashent->chan_id = channel_id; @@ -903,10 +833,6 @@ circuitmux_attach_circuit,(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, HT_INSERT(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, cmux->chanid_circid_map, hashent); - /* Set the circuit's mux for this direction */ - if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) circ->n_mux = cmux; - else TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_mux = cmux; - /* Update counters */ ++(cmux->n_circuits); if (cell_count > 0) { @@ -994,14 +920,14 @@ circuitmux_detach_circuit,(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ)) /* Consistency check: the direction must match the direction searched */ tor_assert(last_searched_direction == hashent->muxinfo.direction); - /* Clear the circuit's mux for this direction */ - if (last_searched_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) circ->n_mux = NULL; - else TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_mux = NULL; /* Now remove it from the map */ HT_REMOVE(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, cmux->chanid_circid_map, hashent); - /* Free the hash entry */ + /* Wipe and free the hash entry */ + // This isn't sensitive, but we want to be sure to know if we're accessing + // this accidentally. + memwipe(hashent, 0xef, sizeof(*hashent)); tor_free(hashent); } } diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitmux.h b/src/core/or/circuitmux.h index 67cd9bcdd8..191ca12e30 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitmux.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitmux.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h" -typedef struct circuitmux_policy_s circuitmux_policy_t; -typedef struct circuitmux_policy_data_s circuitmux_policy_data_t; -typedef struct circuitmux_policy_circ_data_s circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t; +typedef struct circuitmux_policy_t circuitmux_policy_t; +typedef struct circuitmux_policy_data_t circuitmux_policy_data_t; +typedef struct circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t; -struct circuitmux_policy_s { +struct circuitmux_policy_t { /* Allocate cmux-wide policy-specific data */ circuitmux_policy_data_t * (*alloc_cmux_data)(circuitmux_t *cmux); /* Free cmux-wide policy-specific data */ @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct circuitmux_policy_s { * wide data; it just has the magic number in the base struct. */ -struct circuitmux_policy_data_s { +struct circuitmux_policy_data_t { uint32_t magic; }; @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ struct circuitmux_policy_data_s { * specific data; it just has the magic number in the base struct. */ -struct circuitmux_policy_circ_data_s { +struct circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t { uint32_t magic; }; @@ -158,5 +158,61 @@ void circuitmux_mark_destroyed_circids_usable(circuitmux_t *cmux, MOCK_DECL(int, circuitmux_compare_muxes, (circuitmux_t *cmux_1, circuitmux_t *cmux_2)); +#ifdef CIRCUITMUX_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h" + +/* + * Map of muxinfos for circuitmux_t to use; struct is defined below (name + * of struct must match HT_HEAD line). + */ +typedef HT_HEAD(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, chanid_circid_muxinfo_t) + chanid_circid_muxinfo_map_t; + +/* + * Structures for circuitmux.c + */ + +struct circuitmux_t { + /* Keep count of attached, active circuits */ + unsigned int n_circuits, n_active_circuits; + + /* Total number of queued cells on all circuits */ + unsigned int n_cells; + + /* + * Map from (channel ID, circuit ID) pairs to circuit_muxinfo_t + */ + chanid_circid_muxinfo_map_t *chanid_circid_map; + + /** List of queued destroy cells */ + destroy_cell_queue_t destroy_cell_queue; + /** Boolean: True iff the last cell to circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit + * returned the destroy queue. Used to force alternation between + * destroy/non-destroy cells. + * + * XXXX There is no reason to think that alternating is a particularly good + * approach -- it's just designed to prevent destroys from starving other + * cells completely. + */ + unsigned int last_cell_was_destroy : 1; + /** Destroy counter: increment this when a destroy gets queued, decrement + * when we unqueue it, so we can test to make sure they don't starve. + */ + int64_t destroy_ctr; + + /* + * Circuitmux policy; if this is non-NULL, it can override the built- + * in round-robin active circuits behavior. This is how EWMA works in + * the new circuitmux_t world. + */ + const circuitmux_policy_t *policy; + + /* Policy-specific data */ + circuitmux_policy_data_t *policy_data; +}; + +#endif /* defined(CIRCUITMUX_PRIVATE) */ + #endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.c b/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.c index 3f83c3fd5a..0dcd22e8a7 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "core/or/circuitmux.h" #include "core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "app/config/or_options_st.h" @@ -58,115 +59,6 @@ /** The natural logarithm of 0.5. */ #define LOG_ONEHALF -0.69314718055994529 -/*** EWMA structures ***/ - -typedef struct cell_ewma_s cell_ewma_t; -typedef struct ewma_policy_data_s ewma_policy_data_t; -typedef struct ewma_policy_circ_data_s ewma_policy_circ_data_t; - -/** - * The cell_ewma_t structure keeps track of how many cells a circuit has - * transferred recently. It keeps an EWMA (exponentially weighted moving - * average) of the number of cells flushed from the circuit queue onto a - * connection in channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(). - */ - -struct cell_ewma_s { - /** The last 'tick' at which we recalibrated cell_count. - * - * A cell sent at exactly the start of this tick has weight 1.0. Cells sent - * since the start of this tick have weight greater than 1.0; ones sent - * earlier have less weight. */ - unsigned int last_adjusted_tick; - /** The EWMA of the cell count. */ - double cell_count; - /** True iff this is the cell count for a circuit's previous - * channel. */ - unsigned int is_for_p_chan : 1; - /** The position of the circuit within the OR connection's priority - * queue. */ - int heap_index; -}; - -struct ewma_policy_data_s { - circuitmux_policy_data_t base_; - - /** - * Priority queue of cell_ewma_t for circuits with queued cells waiting - * for room to free up on the channel that owns this circuitmux. Kept - * in heap order according to EWMA. This was formerly in channel_t, and - * in or_connection_t before that. - */ - smartlist_t *active_circuit_pqueue; - - /** - * The tick on which the cell_ewma_ts in active_circuit_pqueue last had - * their ewma values rescaled. This was formerly in channel_t, and in - * or_connection_t before that. - */ - unsigned int active_circuit_pqueue_last_recalibrated; -}; - -struct ewma_policy_circ_data_s { - circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t base_; - - /** - * The EWMA count for the number of cells flushed from this circuit - * onto this circuitmux. Used to determine which circuit to flush - * from next. This was formerly in circuit_t and or_circuit_t. - */ - cell_ewma_t cell_ewma; - - /** - * Pointer back to the circuit_t this is for; since we're separating - * out circuit selection policy like this, we can't attach cell_ewma_t - * to the circuit_t any more, so we can't use SUBTYPE_P directly to a - * circuit_t like before; instead get it here. - */ - circuit_t *circ; -}; - -#define EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC 0x2fd8b16aU -#define EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC 0x761e7747U - -/*** Downcasts for the above types ***/ - -static ewma_policy_data_t * -TO_EWMA_POL_DATA(circuitmux_policy_data_t *); - -static ewma_policy_circ_data_t * -TO_EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA(circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *); - -/** - * Downcast a circuitmux_policy_data_t to an ewma_policy_data_t and assert - * if the cast is impossible. - */ - -static inline ewma_policy_data_t * -TO_EWMA_POL_DATA(circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol) -{ - if (!pol) return NULL; - else { - tor_assert(pol->magic == EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC); - return DOWNCAST(ewma_policy_data_t, pol); - } -} - -/** - * Downcast a circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t to an ewma_policy_circ_data_t - * and assert if the cast is impossible. - */ - -static inline ewma_policy_circ_data_t * -TO_EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA(circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol) -{ - if (!pol) return NULL; - else { - tor_assert(pol->magic == EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC); - return DOWNCAST(ewma_policy_circ_data_t, pol); - } -} - /*** Static declarations for circuitmux_ewma.c ***/ static void add_cell_ewma(ewma_policy_data_t *pol, cell_ewma_t *ewma); @@ -295,6 +187,7 @@ ewma_free_cmux_data(circuitmux_t *cmux, pol = TO_EWMA_POL_DATA(pol_data); smartlist_free(pol->active_circuit_pqueue); + memwipe(pol, 0xda, sizeof(ewma_policy_data_t)); tor_free(pol); } @@ -361,7 +254,7 @@ ewma_free_circ_data(circuitmux_t *cmux, if (!pol_circ_data) return; cdata = TO_EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA(pol_circ_data); - + memwipe(cdata, 0xdc, sizeof(ewma_policy_circ_data_t)); tor_free(cdata); } @@ -530,7 +423,7 @@ ewma_cmp_cmux(circuitmux_t *cmux_1, circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol_data_1, /* Pick whichever one has the better best circuit */ return compare_cell_ewma_counts(ce1, ce2); } else { - if (ce1 != NULL ) { + if (ce1 != NULL) { /* We only have a circuit on cmux_1, so prefer it */ return -1; } else if (ce2 != NULL) { @@ -716,7 +609,7 @@ cmux_ewma_set_options(const or_options_t *options, /* convert halflife into halflife-per-tick. */ halflife /= EWMA_TICK_LEN; /* compute per-tick scale factor. */ - ewma_scale_factor = exp( LOG_ONEHALF / halflife ); + ewma_scale_factor = exp(LOG_ONEHALF / halflife); log_info(LD_OR, "Enabled cell_ewma algorithm because of value in %s; " "scale factor is %f per %d seconds", diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h b/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h index b45ce1f916..e41cf9e0f0 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -22,9 +22,117 @@ void cmux_ewma_set_options(const or_options_t *options, void circuitmux_ewma_free_all(void); #ifdef CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_PRIVATE + +/*** EWMA structures ***/ + +typedef struct cell_ewma_t cell_ewma_t; +typedef struct ewma_policy_data_t ewma_policy_data_t; +typedef struct ewma_policy_circ_data_t ewma_policy_circ_data_t; + +/** + * The cell_ewma_t structure keeps track of how many cells a circuit has + * transferred recently. It keeps an EWMA (exponentially weighted moving + * average) of the number of cells flushed from the circuit queue onto a + * connection in channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(). + */ + +struct cell_ewma_t { + /** The last 'tick' at which we recalibrated cell_count. + * + * A cell sent at exactly the start of this tick has weight 1.0. Cells sent + * since the start of this tick have weight greater than 1.0; ones sent + * earlier have less weight. */ + unsigned int last_adjusted_tick; + /** The EWMA of the cell count. */ + double cell_count; + /** True iff this is the cell count for a circuit's previous + * channel. */ + unsigned int is_for_p_chan : 1; + /** The position of the circuit within the OR connection's priority + * queue. */ + int heap_index; +}; + +struct ewma_policy_data_t { + circuitmux_policy_data_t base_; + + /** + * Priority queue of cell_ewma_t for circuits with queued cells waiting + * for room to free up on the channel that owns this circuitmux. Kept + * in heap order according to EWMA. This was formerly in channel_t, and + * in or_connection_t before that. + */ + smartlist_t *active_circuit_pqueue; + + /** + * The tick on which the cell_ewma_ts in active_circuit_pqueue last had + * their ewma values rescaled. This was formerly in channel_t, and in + * or_connection_t before that. + */ + unsigned int active_circuit_pqueue_last_recalibrated; +}; + +struct ewma_policy_circ_data_t { + circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t base_; + + /** + * The EWMA count for the number of cells flushed from this circuit + * onto this circuitmux. Used to determine which circuit to flush + * from next. This was formerly in circuit_t and or_circuit_t. + */ + cell_ewma_t cell_ewma; + + /** + * Pointer back to the circuit_t this is for; since we're separating + * out circuit selection policy like this, we can't attach cell_ewma_t + * to the circuit_t any more, so we can't use SUBTYPE_P directly to a + * circuit_t like before; instead get it here. + */ + circuit_t *circ; +}; + +#define EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC 0x2fd8b16aU +#define EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC 0x761e7747U + +/*** Downcasts for the above types ***/ + +/** + * Downcast a circuitmux_policy_data_t to an ewma_policy_data_t and assert + * if the cast is impossible. + */ + +static inline ewma_policy_data_t * +TO_EWMA_POL_DATA(circuitmux_policy_data_t *pol) +{ + if (!pol) return NULL; + else { + tor_assertf(pol->magic == EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC, + "Mismatch: %"PRIu32" != %"PRIu32, + pol->magic, EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC); + return DOWNCAST(ewma_policy_data_t, pol); + } +} + +/** + * Downcast a circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t to an ewma_policy_circ_data_t + * and assert if the cast is impossible. + */ + +static inline ewma_policy_circ_data_t * +TO_EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA(circuitmux_policy_circ_data_t *pol) +{ + if (!pol) return NULL; + else { + tor_assertf(pol->magic == EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC, + "Mismatch: %"PRIu32" != %"PRIu32, + pol->magic, EWMA_POL_CIRC_DATA_MAGIC); + return DOWNCAST(ewma_policy_circ_data_t, pol); + } +} + STATIC unsigned cell_ewma_get_current_tick_and_fraction(double *remainder_out); STATIC void cell_ewma_initialize_ticks(void); -#endif -#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H) */ +#endif /* defined(CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_PRIVATE) */ +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitpadding.c b/src/core/or/circuitpadding.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..43f4a31624 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/circuitpadding.c @@ -0,0 +1,3101 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2017 The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file circuitpadding.c + * \brief Circuit-level padding implementation + * + * \details + * + * This file implements Tor proposal 254 "Padding Negotiation" which is heavily + * inspired by the paper "Toward an Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense" + * by M. Juarez, M. Imani, M. Perry, C. Diaz, M. Wright. + * + * In particular the code in this file describes mechanisms for clients to + * negotiate various types of circuit-level padding from relays. + * + * Each padding type is described by a state machine (circpad_machine_spec_t), + * which is also referred as a "padding machine" in this file. Currently, + * these state machines are hardcoded in the source code (e.g. see + * circpad_machines_init()), but in the future we will be able to + * serialize them in the torrc or the consensus. + * + * As specified by prop#254, clients can negotiate padding with relays by using + * PADDING_NEGOTIATE cells. After successful padding negotiation, padding + * machines are assigned to the circuit in their mutable form as a + * circpad_machine_runtime_t. + * + * Each state of a padding state machine can be either: + * - A histogram that specifies inter-arrival padding delays. + * - Or a parametrized probability distribution that specifies inter-arrival + * delays (see circpad_distribution_type_t). + * + * Padding machines start from the START state and finish with the END + * state. They can transition between states using the events in + * circpad_event_t. + * + * When a padding machine reaches the END state, it gets wiped from the circuit + * so that other padding machines can take over if needed (see + * circpad_machine_spec_transitioned_to_end()). + * + **************************** + * General notes: + * + * All used machines should be heap allocated and placed into + * origin_padding_machines/relay_padding_machines so that they get correctly + * cleaned up by the circpad_free_all() function. + **/ + +#define CIRCUITPADDING_PRIVATE + +#include <math.h> +#include "lib/math/fp.h" +#include "lib/math/prob_distr.h" +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding_machines.h" +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h" +#include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h" +#include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" + +#include "core/or/channel.h" + +#include "lib/time/compat_time.h" +#include "lib/defs/time.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" + +#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h" +#include "core/or/circuit_st.h" +#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h" +#include "core/or/cell_st.h" +#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" +#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" + +#include "app/config/config.h" + +static inline circpad_circuit_state_t circpad_circuit_state( + origin_circuit_t *circ); +static void circpad_setup_machine_on_circ(circuit_t *on_circ, + const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine); +static double circpad_distribution_sample(circpad_distribution_t dist); + +static inline void circpad_machine_update_state_length_for_nonpadding( + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); + +/** Cached consensus params */ +static uint8_t circpad_padding_disabled; +static uint8_t circpad_padding_reduced; +static uint8_t circpad_global_max_padding_percent; +static uint16_t circpad_global_allowed_cells; +static uint16_t circpad_max_circ_queued_cells; + +/** Global cell counts, for rate limiting */ +static uint64_t circpad_global_padding_sent; +static uint64_t circpad_global_nonpadding_sent; + +/** This is the list of circpad_machine_spec_t's parsed from consensus and + * torrc that have origin_side == 1 (ie: are for client side). + * + * The machines in this smartlist are considered immutable and they are used + * as-is by circuits so they should not change or get deallocated in Tor's + * runtime and as long as circuits are alive. */ +STATIC smartlist_t *origin_padding_machines = NULL; + +/** This is the list of circpad_machine_spec_t's parsed from consensus and + * torrc that have origin_side == 0 (ie: are for relay side). + * + * The machines in this smartlist are considered immutable and they are used + * as-is by circuits so they should not change or get deallocated in Tor's + * runtime and as long as circuits are alive. */ +STATIC smartlist_t *relay_padding_machines = NULL; + +#ifndef COCCI +/** Loop over the current padding state machines using <b>loop_var</b> as the + * loop variable. */ +#define FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(loop_var) \ + STMT_BEGIN \ + for (int loop_var = 0; loop_var < CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES; loop_var++) { +#define FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END } STMT_END ; + +/** Loop over the current active padding state machines using <b>loop_var</b> + * as the loop variable. If a machine is not active, skip it. */ +#define FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(loop_var, circ) \ + FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(loop_var) \ + if (!(circ)->padding_info[loop_var]) \ + continue; +#define FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END } STMT_END ; +#endif /* !defined(COCCI) */ + +/** + * Free the machineinfo at an index + */ +static void +circpad_circuit_machineinfo_free_idx(circuit_t *circ, int idx) +{ + if (circ->padding_info[idx]) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC, "Freeing padding info idx %d on circuit %u (%d)", + idx, CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier : 0, + circ->purpose); + + tor_free(circ->padding_info[idx]->histogram); + timer_free(circ->padding_info[idx]->padding_timer); + tor_free(circ->padding_info[idx]); + } +} + +/** + * Return true if circpad has decided to hold the circuit open for additional + * padding. This function is used to take and retain ownership of certain + * types of circuits that have padding machines on them, that have been passed + * to circuit_mark_for_close(). + * + * circuit_mark_for_close() calls this function to ask circpad if any padding + * machines want to keep the circuit open longer to pad. + * + * Any non-measurement circuit that was closed for a normal, non-error reason + * code may be held open for up to CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE microseconds between + * network-driven cell events. + * + * After CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE microseconds of silence on a circuit, this + * function will no longer hold it open (it will return 0 regardless of + * what the machines ask for, and thus circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside() + * will close the circuit after roughly 1.25hr of idle time, maximum, + * regardless of the padding machine state. + */ +int +circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(circuit_t *circ, int reason) +{ + /* If the circuit purpose is measurement or path bias, don't + * hold it open */ + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING || + circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + return 0; + } + + /* If the circuit is closed for any reason other than these three valid, + * client-side close reasons, do not try to keep it open. It is probably + * damaged or unusable. Note this is OK with vanguards because + * controller-closed circuits have REASON=REQUESTED, so vanguards-closed + * circuits will not be held open (we want them to close ASAP). */ + if (!(reason == END_CIRC_REASON_NONE || + reason == END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED || + reason == END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT)) { + return 0; + } + + FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i, circ) { + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi = circ->padding_info[i]; + if (!mi) { + continue; // No padding runtime info; check next machine + } + + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + + /* If we're in END state (NULL here), then check next machine */ + if (!state) { + continue; // check next machine + } + + /* If the machine does not want to control the circuit close itself, then + * check the next machine */ + if (!circ->padding_machine[i]->manage_circ_lifetime) { + continue; // check next machine + } + + /* If the machine has reached the END state, we can close. Check next + * machine. */ + if (mi->current_state == CIRCPAD_STATE_END) { + continue; // check next machine + } + + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit %d is not marked for close because of a " + "pending padding machine in index %d.", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier : 0, i); + + /* If the machine has had no network events at all within the + * last circpad_delay_t timespan, it's in some deadlock state. + * Tell circuit_mark_for_close() that we don't own it anymore. + * This will allow circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside() to + * close it. + */ + if (circ->padding_info[i]->last_cell_time_sec + + (time_t)CIRCPAD_DELAY_MAX_SECS < approx_time()) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d was not marked for close because of a " + "pending padding machine in index %d for over an hour. " + "Circuit is a %s", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier : 0, + i, circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose)); + + return 0; // abort timer reached; mark the circuit for close now + } + + /* If we weren't marked dirty yet, let's pretend we're dirty now. + * ("Dirty" means that a circuit has been used for application traffic + * by Tor.. Dirty circuits have different expiry times, and are not + * considered in counts of built circuits, etc. By claiming that we're + * dirty, the rest of Tor will make decisions as if we were actually + * used by application data. + * + * This is most important for circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(), + * where we want that function to expire us after the padding machine + * has shut down, but using the MaxCircuitDirtiness timer instead of + * the idle circuit timer (again, we want this because we're not + * supposed to look idle to Guard nodes that can see our lifespan). */ + if (!circ->timestamp_dirty) + circ->timestamp_dirty = approx_time(); + + /* Take ownership of the circuit */ + circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING); + + return 1; + } FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; + + return 0; // No machine wanted to keep the circuit open; mark for close +} + +/** + * Free all the machineinfos in <b>circ</b> that match <b>machine_num</b>. + * + * Returns true if any machineinfos with that number were freed. + * False otherwise. */ +static int +free_circ_machineinfos_with_machine_num(circuit_t *circ, int machine_num) +{ + int found = 0; + FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i) { + if (circ->padding_machine[i] && + circ->padding_machine[i]->machine_num == machine_num) { + circpad_circuit_machineinfo_free_idx(circ, i); + circ->padding_machine[i] = NULL; + found = 1; + } + } FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; + + return found; +} + +/** + * Free all padding machines and mutable info associated with circuit + */ +void +circpad_circuit_free_all_machineinfos(circuit_t *circ) +{ + FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i) { + circpad_circuit_machineinfo_free_idx(circ, i); + } FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; +} + +/** + * Allocate a new mutable machineinfo structure. + */ +STATIC circpad_machine_runtime_t * +circpad_circuit_machineinfo_new(circuit_t *on_circ, int machine_index) +{ + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_machine_runtime_t)); + mi->machine_index = machine_index; + mi->on_circ = on_circ; + mi->last_cell_time_sec = approx_time(); + + return mi; +} + +/** + * Return the circpad_state_t for the current state based on the + * mutable info. + * + * This function returns NULL when the machine is in the end state or in an + * invalid state. + */ +STATIC const circpad_state_t * +circpad_machine_current_state(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine = CIRCPAD_GET_MACHINE(mi); + + if (mi->current_state == CIRCPAD_STATE_END) { + return NULL; + } else if (BUG(mi->current_state >= machine->num_states)) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,LD_CIRC, + "Invalid circuit padding state %d", + mi->current_state); + + return NULL; + } + + return &machine->states[mi->current_state]; +} + +/** + * Get the lower bound of a histogram bin. + * + * You can obtain the upper bound using histogram_get_bin_upper_bound(). + * + * This function can also be called with 'bin' set to a value equal or greater + * than histogram_len in which case the infinity bin is chosen and + * CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE is returned. + */ +STATIC circpad_delay_t +circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_hist_index_t bin) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + circpad_delay_t rtt_add_usec = 0; + + /* Our state should have been checked to be non-null by the caller + * (circpad_machine_remove_token()) */ + if (BUG(state == NULL)) { + return CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE; + } + + /* The infinity bin has an upper bound of infinity, so make sure we return + * that if they ask for it. */ + if (bin > CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(state)) { + return CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE; + } + + /* If we are using an RTT estimate, consider it as well. */ + if (state->use_rtt_estimate) { + rtt_add_usec = mi->rtt_estimate_usec; + } + + return state->histogram_edges[bin] + rtt_add_usec; +} + +/** + * Like circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec() but return the upper bound of bin. + * (The upper bound is included in the bin.) + */ +STATIC circpad_delay_t +histogram_get_bin_upper_bound(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_hist_index_t bin) +{ + return circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec(mi, bin+1) - 1; +} + +/** Return the midpoint of the histogram bin <b>bin_index</b>. */ +static circpad_delay_t +circpad_get_histogram_bin_midpoint(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + int bin_index) +{ + circpad_delay_t left_bound = circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec(mi, bin_index); + circpad_delay_t right_bound = histogram_get_bin_upper_bound(mi, bin_index); + + return left_bound + (right_bound - left_bound)/2; +} + +/** + * Return the bin that contains the usec argument. + * "Contains" is defined as us in [lower, upper). + * + * This function will never return the infinity bin (histogram_len-1), in order + * to simplify the rest of the code, so if a usec is provided that falls above + * the highest non-infinity bin, that bin index will be returned. + */ +STATIC circpad_hist_index_t +circpad_histogram_usec_to_bin(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t usec) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + circpad_delay_t rtt_add_usec = 0; + circpad_hist_index_t bin; + + /* Our state should have been checked to be non-null by the caller + * (circpad_machine_remove_token()) */ + if (BUG(state == NULL)) { + return 0; + } + + /* If we are using an RTT estimate, consider it as well. */ + if (state->use_rtt_estimate) { + rtt_add_usec = mi->rtt_estimate_usec; + } + + /* Walk through the bins and check the upper bound of each bin, if 'usec' is + * less-or-equal to that, return that bin. If rtt_estimate is enabled then + * add that to the upper bound of each bin. + * + * We don't want to return the infinity bin here, so don't go there. */ + for (bin = 0 ; bin < CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(state) ; bin++) { + if (usec <= histogram_get_bin_upper_bound(mi, bin) + rtt_add_usec) { + return bin; + } + } + + /* We don't want to return the infinity bin here, so if we still didn't find + * the right bin, return the highest non-infinity bin */ + return CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(state)-1; +} + +/** + * Return true if the machine supports token removal. + * + * Token removal is equivalent to having a mutable histogram in the + * circpad_machine_runtime_t mutable info. So while we're at it, + * let's assert that everything is consistent between the mutable + * runtime and the readonly machine spec. + */ +static inline int +circpad_is_token_removal_supported(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + /* No runtime histogram == no token removal */ + if (mi->histogram == NULL) { + /* Machines that don't want token removal are trying to avoid + * potentially expensive mallocs, extra memory accesses, and/or + * potentially expensive monotime calls. Let's minimize checks + * and keep this path fast. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(mi->histogram_len == 0); + return 0; + } else { + /* Machines that do want token removal are less sensitive to performance. + * Let's spend some time to check that our state is consistent and sane */ + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + if (BUG(!state)) { + return 1; + } + tor_assert_nonfatal(state->token_removal != CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE); + tor_assert_nonfatal(state->histogram_len == mi->histogram_len); + tor_assert_nonfatal(mi->histogram_len != 0); + return 1; + } + + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + return 0; +} + +/** + * This function frees any token bins allocated from a previous state + * + * Called after a state transition, or if the bins are empty. + */ +STATIC void +circpad_machine_setup_tokens(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + + /* If this state doesn't exist, or doesn't have token removal, + * free any previous state's runtime histogram, and bail. + * + * If we don't have a token removal strategy, we also don't need a runtime + * histogram and we rely on the immutable one in machine_spec_t. */ + if (!state || state->token_removal == CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE) { + if (mi->histogram) { + tor_free(mi->histogram); + mi->histogram = NULL; + mi->histogram_len = 0; + } + return; + } + + /* Try to avoid re-mallocing if we don't really need to */ + if (!mi->histogram || (mi->histogram + && mi->histogram_len != state->histogram_len)) { + tor_free(mi->histogram); // null ok + mi->histogram = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_hist_token_t) + *state->histogram_len); + } + mi->histogram_len = state->histogram_len; + + memcpy(mi->histogram, state->histogram, + sizeof(circpad_hist_token_t)*state->histogram_len); +} + +/** + * Choose a length for this state (in cells), if specified. + */ +static void +circpad_choose_state_length(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + double length; + + if (!state || state->length_dist.type == CIRCPAD_DIST_NONE) { + mi->state_length = CIRCPAD_STATE_LENGTH_INFINITE; + return; + } + + length = circpad_distribution_sample(state->length_dist); + length = MAX(0, length); + length += state->start_length; + + if (state->max_length) { + length = MIN(length, state->max_length); + } + + mi->state_length = clamp_double_to_int64(length); + + log_info(LD_CIRC, "State length sampled to %"PRIu64" for circuit %u", + mi->state_length, CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier : 0); +} + +/** + * Sample a value from our iat_dist, and clamp it safely + * to circpad_delay_t. + * + * Before returning, add <b>delay_shift</b> (can be zero) to the sampled value. + */ +static circpad_delay_t +circpad_distribution_sample_iat_delay(const circpad_state_t *state, + circpad_delay_t delay_shift) +{ + double val = circpad_distribution_sample(state->iat_dist); + /* These comparisons are safe, because the output is in the range + * [0, 2**32), and double has a precision of 53 bits. */ + /* We want a positive sample value */ + val = MAX(0, val); + /* Respect the maximum sample setting */ + val = MIN(val, state->dist_max_sample_usec); + + /* Now apply the shift: + * This addition is exact: val is at most 2**32-1, delay_shift is at most + * 2**32-1, and doubles have a precision of 53 bits. */ + val += delay_shift; + + /* Clamp the distribution at infinite delay val */ + return (circpad_delay_t)MIN(tor_llround(val), CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE); +} + +/** + * Sample an expected time-until-next-packet delay from the histogram or + * probability distribution. + * + * A bin of the histogram is chosen with probability proportional to the number + * of tokens in each bin, and then a time value is chosen uniformly from that + * bin's [start,end) time range. + */ +STATIC circpad_delay_t +circpad_machine_sample_delay(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + const circpad_hist_token_t *histogram = NULL; + circpad_hist_index_t curr_bin = 0; + circpad_delay_t bin_start, bin_end; + /* These three must all be larger than circpad_hist_token_t, because + * we sum several circpad_hist_token_t values across the histogram */ + uint64_t curr_weight = 0; + uint64_t histogram_total_tokens = 0; + uint64_t bin_choice; + + tor_assert(state); + + if (state->iat_dist.type != CIRCPAD_DIST_NONE) { + /* Sample from a fixed IAT distribution and return */ + circpad_delay_t iat_delay_shift = state->use_rtt_estimate ? + mi->rtt_estimate_usec + state->dist_added_shift_usec : + state->dist_added_shift_usec; + return circpad_distribution_sample_iat_delay(state, iat_delay_shift); + } else if (circpad_is_token_removal_supported(mi)) { + histogram = mi->histogram; + for (circpad_hist_index_t b = 0; b < state->histogram_len; b++) + histogram_total_tokens += histogram[b]; + } else { + /* We have a histogram, but it's immutable */ + histogram = state->histogram; + histogram_total_tokens = state->histogram_total_tokens; + } + + /* If we are out of tokens, don't schedule padding. */ + if (!histogram_total_tokens) { + return CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE; + } + + bin_choice = crypto_fast_rng_get_uint64(get_thread_fast_rng(), + histogram_total_tokens); + + /* Skip all the initial zero bins */ + while (!histogram[curr_bin]) { + curr_bin++; + } + curr_weight = histogram[curr_bin]; + + // TODO: This is not constant-time. Pretty sure we don't + // really need it to be, though. + while (curr_weight < bin_choice) { + curr_bin++; + /* It should be impossible to run past the end of the histogram */ + if (BUG(curr_bin >= state->histogram_len)) { + return CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE; + } + curr_weight += histogram[curr_bin]; + } + + /* Do some basic checking of the current bin we are in */ + if (BUG(curr_bin >= state->histogram_len) || + BUG(histogram[curr_bin] == 0)) { + return CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE; + } + + // Store this index to remove the token upon callback. + if (state->token_removal != CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE) { + mi->chosen_bin = curr_bin; + } + + if (curr_bin >= CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(state)) { + if (state->token_removal != CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE && + mi->histogram[curr_bin] > 0) { + mi->histogram[curr_bin]--; + } + + // Infinity: Don't send a padding packet. Wait for a real packet + // and then see if our bins are empty or what else we should do. + return CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE; + } + + tor_assert(curr_bin < CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(state)); + + bin_start = circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec(mi, curr_bin); + /* We don't need to reduct 1 from the upper bound because the random range + * function below samples from [bin_start, bin_end) */ + bin_end = circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec(mi, curr_bin+1); + + /* Bin edges are monotonically increasing so this is a bug. Handle it. */ + if (BUG(bin_start >= bin_end)) { + return bin_start; + } + + return (circpad_delay_t)crypto_fast_rng_uint64_range(get_thread_fast_rng(), + bin_start, bin_end); +} + +/** + * Sample a value from the specified probability distribution. + * + * Uses functions from src/lib/math/prob_distr.c . + */ +static double +circpad_distribution_sample(circpad_distribution_t dist) +{ + log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,LD_CIRC, "Sampling delay with distribution %d", + dist.type); + + switch (dist.type) { + case CIRCPAD_DIST_NONE: + { + /* We should not get in here like this */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + return 0; + } + case CIRCPAD_DIST_UNIFORM: + { + // param2 is upper bound, param1 is lower + const struct uniform_t my_uniform = { + .base = UNIFORM(my_uniform), + .a = dist.param1, + .b = dist.param2, + }; + return dist_sample(&my_uniform.base); + } + case CIRCPAD_DIST_LOGISTIC: + { + /* param1 is Mu, param2 is sigma. */ + const struct logistic_t my_logistic = { + .base = LOGISTIC(my_logistic), + .mu = dist.param1, + .sigma = dist.param2, + }; + return dist_sample(&my_logistic.base); + } + case CIRCPAD_DIST_LOG_LOGISTIC: + { + /* param1 is Alpha, param2 is 1.0/Beta */ + const struct log_logistic_t my_log_logistic = { + .base = LOG_LOGISTIC(my_log_logistic), + .alpha = dist.param1, + .beta = dist.param2, + }; + return dist_sample(&my_log_logistic.base); + } + case CIRCPAD_DIST_GEOMETRIC: + { + /* param1 is 'p' (success probability) */ + const struct geometric_t my_geometric = { + .base = GEOMETRIC(my_geometric), + .p = dist.param1, + }; + return dist_sample(&my_geometric.base); + } + case CIRCPAD_DIST_WEIBULL: + { + /* param1 is k, param2 is Lambda */ + const struct weibull_t my_weibull = { + .base = WEIBULL(my_weibull), + .k = dist.param1, + .lambda = dist.param2, + }; + return dist_sample(&my_weibull.base); + } + case CIRCPAD_DIST_PARETO: + { + /* param1 is sigma, param2 is xi, no more params for mu so we use 0 */ + const struct genpareto_t my_genpareto = { + .base = GENPARETO(my_genpareto), + .mu = 0, + .sigma = dist.param1, + .xi = dist.param2, + }; + return dist_sample(&my_genpareto.base); + } + } + + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Find the index of the first bin whose upper bound is + * greater than the target, and that has tokens remaining. + * + * Used for histograms with token removal. + */ +static circpad_hist_index_t +circpad_machine_first_higher_index(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_usec) +{ + circpad_hist_index_t bin = circpad_histogram_usec_to_bin(mi, + target_bin_usec); + + /* Don't remove from the infinity bin */ + for (; bin < CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(mi); bin++) { + if (mi->histogram[bin] && + histogram_get_bin_upper_bound(mi, bin) >= target_bin_usec) { + return bin; + } + } + + return mi->histogram_len; +} + +/** + * Find the index of the first bin whose lower bound is lower or equal to + * <b>target_bin_usec</b>, and that still has tokens remaining. + * + * Used for histograms with token removal. + */ +static circpad_hist_index_t +circpad_machine_first_lower_index(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_usec) +{ + circpad_hist_index_t bin = circpad_histogram_usec_to_bin(mi, + target_bin_usec); + + for (; bin >= 0; bin--) { + if (mi->histogram[bin] && + circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec(mi, bin) <= target_bin_usec) { + return bin; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +/** + * Remove a token from the first non-empty bin whose upper bound is + * greater than the target. + * + * Used for histograms with token removal. + */ +STATIC void +circpad_machine_remove_higher_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_usec) +{ + /* We need to remove the token from the first bin + * whose upper bound is greater than the target, and that + * has tokens remaining. */ + circpad_hist_index_t bin = circpad_machine_first_higher_index(mi, + target_bin_usec); + + if (bin >= 0 && bin < CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(mi)) { + if (!BUG(mi->histogram[bin] == 0)) { + mi->histogram[bin]--; + } + } +} + +/** + * Remove a token from the first non-empty bin whose upper bound is + * lower than the target. + * + * Used for histograms with token removal. + */ +STATIC void +circpad_machine_remove_lower_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_usec) +{ + circpad_hist_index_t bin = circpad_machine_first_lower_index(mi, + target_bin_usec); + + if (bin >= 0 && bin < CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(mi)) { + if (!BUG(mi->histogram[bin] == 0)) { + mi->histogram[bin]--; + } + } +} + +/* Helper macro: Ensure that the bin has tokens available, and BUG out of the + * function if it's not the case. */ +#define ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(bin_index) \ + if (BUG(mi->histogram[bin_index] == 0)) { \ + return; \ + } + +/** + * Remove a token from the closest non-empty bin to the target. + * + * If use_usec is true, measure "closest" in terms of the next closest bin + * midpoint. + * + * If it is false, use bin index distance only. + * + * Used for histograms with token removal. + */ +STATIC void +circpad_machine_remove_closest_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_usec, + bool use_usec) +{ + circpad_hist_index_t lower, higher, current; + circpad_hist_index_t bin_to_remove = -1; + + lower = circpad_machine_first_lower_index(mi, target_bin_usec); + higher = circpad_machine_first_higher_index(mi, target_bin_usec); + current = circpad_histogram_usec_to_bin(mi, target_bin_usec); + + /* Sanity check the results */ + if (BUG(lower > current) || BUG(higher < current)) { + return; + } + + /* Take care of edge cases first */ + if (higher == mi->histogram_len && lower == -1) { + /* All bins are empty */ + return; + } else if (higher == mi->histogram_len) { + /* All higher bins are empty */ + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(lower); + mi->histogram[lower]--; + return; + } else if (lower == -1) { + /* All lower bins are empty */ + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(higher); + mi->histogram[higher]--; + return; + } + + /* Now handle the intermediate cases */ + if (use_usec) { + /* Find the closest bin midpoint to the target */ + circpad_delay_t lower_usec = circpad_get_histogram_bin_midpoint(mi, lower); + circpad_delay_t higher_usec = + circpad_get_histogram_bin_midpoint(mi, higher); + + if (target_bin_usec < lower_usec) { + // Lower bin is closer + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(lower); + bin_to_remove = lower; + } else if (target_bin_usec > higher_usec) { + // Higher bin is closer + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(higher); + bin_to_remove = higher; + } else if (target_bin_usec-lower_usec > higher_usec-target_bin_usec) { + // Higher bin is closer + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(higher); + bin_to_remove = higher; + } else { + // Lower bin is closer + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(lower); + bin_to_remove = lower; + } + mi->histogram[bin_to_remove]--; + log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Removing token from bin %d", bin_to_remove); + return; + } else { + if (current - lower > higher - current) { + // Higher bin is closer + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(higher); + mi->histogram[higher]--; + return; + } else { + // Lower bin is closer + ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY(lower); + mi->histogram[lower]--; + return; + } + } +} + +#undef ENSURE_BIN_CAPACITY + +/** + * Remove a token from the exact bin corresponding to the target. + * + * If it is empty, do nothing. + * + * Used for histograms with token removal. + */ +static void +circpad_machine_remove_exact(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_usec) +{ + circpad_hist_index_t bin = circpad_histogram_usec_to_bin(mi, + target_bin_usec); + + if (mi->histogram[bin] > 0) + mi->histogram[bin]--; +} + +/** + * Check our state's cell limit count and tokens. + * + * Returns 1 if either limits are hit and we decide to change states, + * otherwise returns 0. + */ +static circpad_decision_t +check_machine_token_supply(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + uint32_t histogram_total_tokens = 0; + + /* Check if bins empty. This requires summing up the current mutable + * machineinfo histogram token total and checking if it is zero. + * Machineinfo does not keep a running token count. We're assuming the + * extra space is not worth this short loop iteration. + * + * We also do not count infinity bin in histogram totals. + */ + if (circpad_is_token_removal_supported(mi)) { + for (circpad_hist_index_t b = 0; b < CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(mi); b++) + histogram_total_tokens += mi->histogram[b]; + + /* If we change state, we're done */ + if (histogram_total_tokens == 0) { + if (circpad_internal_event_bins_empty(mi) == CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED) + return CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED; + } + } + + if (mi->state_length == 0) { + return circpad_internal_event_state_length_up(mi); + } + + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; +} + +/** + * Count that a padding packet was sent. + * + * This updates our state length count, our machine rate limit counts, + * and if token removal is used, decrements the histogram. + */ +static inline void +circpad_machine_count_padding_sent(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + /* If we have a valid state length bound, consider it */ + if (mi->state_length != CIRCPAD_STATE_LENGTH_INFINITE && + !BUG(mi->state_length <= 0)) { + mi->state_length--; + } + + /* + * Update non-padding counts for rate limiting: We scale at UINT16_MAX + * because we only use this for a percentile limit of 2 sig figs, and + * space is scare in the machineinfo struct. + */ + mi->padding_sent++; + if (mi->padding_sent == UINT16_MAX) { + mi->padding_sent /= 2; + mi->nonpadding_sent /= 2; + } + + circpad_global_padding_sent++; + + /* If we have a mutable histogram, reduce the token count from + * the chosen padding bin (this assumes we always send padding + * when we intended to). */ + if (circpad_is_token_removal_supported(mi)) { + /* Check array bounds and token count before removing */ + if (!BUG(mi->chosen_bin >= mi->histogram_len) && + !BUG(mi->histogram[mi->chosen_bin] == 0)) { + mi->histogram[mi->chosen_bin]--; + } + } +} + +/** + * Count a nonpadding packet as being sent. + * + * This function updates our overhead accounting variables, as well + * as decrements the state limit packet counter, if the latter was + * flagged as applying to non-padding as well. + */ +static inline void +circpad_machine_count_nonpadding_sent(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + /* Update non-padding counts for rate limiting: We scale at UINT16_MAX + * because we only use this for a percentile limit of 2 sig figs, and + * space is scare in the machineinfo struct. */ + mi->nonpadding_sent++; + if (mi->nonpadding_sent == UINT16_MAX) { + mi->padding_sent /= 2; + mi->nonpadding_sent /= 2; + } + + /* Update any state packet length limits that apply */ + circpad_machine_update_state_length_for_nonpadding(mi); + + /* Remove a token from the histogram, if applicable */ + circpad_machine_remove_token(mi); +} + +/** + * Decrement the state length counter for a non-padding packet. + * + * Only updates the state length if we're using that feature, we + * have a state, and the machine wants to count non-padding packets + * towards the state length. + */ +static inline void +circpad_machine_update_state_length_for_nonpadding( + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = NULL; + + if (mi->state_length == CIRCPAD_STATE_LENGTH_INFINITE) + return; + + state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + + /* If we are not in a padding state (like start or end), we're done */ + if (!state) + return; + + /* If we're enforcing a state length on non-padding packets, + * decrement it */ + if (state->length_includes_nonpadding && + mi->state_length > 0) { + mi->state_length--; + } +} + +/** + * When a non-padding packet arrives, remove a token from the bin + * corresponding to the delta since last sent packet. If that bin + * is empty, choose a token based on the specified removal strategy + * in the state machine. + */ +STATIC void +circpad_machine_remove_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = NULL; + circpad_time_t current_time; + circpad_delay_t target_bin_usec; + + /* Dont remove any tokens if there was no padding scheduled */ + if (!mi->padding_scheduled_at_usec) { + return; + } + + state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + + /* If we are not in a padding state (like start or end), we're done */ + if (!state) + return; + /* Don't remove any tokens if we're not doing token removal */ + if (state->token_removal == CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE) + return; + + current_time = monotime_absolute_usec(); + + /* If we have scheduled padding some time in the future, we want to see what + bin we are in at the current time */ + target_bin_usec = (circpad_delay_t) + MIN((current_time - mi->padding_scheduled_at_usec), + CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE-1); + + /* We are treating this non-padding cell as a padding cell, so we cancel + padding timer, if present. */ + mi->padding_scheduled_at_usec = 0; + if (mi->is_padding_timer_scheduled) { + mi->is_padding_timer_scheduled = 0; + timer_disable(mi->padding_timer); + } + + /* Perform the specified token removal strategy */ + switch (state->token_removal) { + case CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_CLOSEST_USEC: + circpad_machine_remove_closest_token(mi, target_bin_usec, 1); + break; + case CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_CLOSEST: + circpad_machine_remove_closest_token(mi, target_bin_usec, 0); + break; + case CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_LOWER: + circpad_machine_remove_lower_token(mi, target_bin_usec); + break; + case CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_HIGHER: + circpad_machine_remove_higher_token(mi, target_bin_usec); + break; + case CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_EXACT: + circpad_machine_remove_exact(mi, target_bin_usec); + break; + case CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE: + default: + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circpad: Unknown token removal strategy %d", + state->token_removal); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Send a relay command with a relay cell payload on a circuit to + * the particular hopnum. + * + * Hopnum starts at 1 (1=guard, 2=middle, 3=exit, etc). + * + * Payload may be null. + * + * Returns negative on error, 0 on success. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC signed_error_t, +circpad_send_command_to_hop,(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t hopnum, + uint8_t relay_command, const uint8_t *payload, + ssize_t payload_len)) +{ + crypt_path_t *target_hop = circuit_get_cpath_hop(circ, hopnum); + signed_error_t ret; + + /* Check that the cpath has the target hop */ + if (!target_hop) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_BUG, "Padding circuit %u has %d hops, not %d", + circ->global_identifier, circuit_get_cpath_len(circ), hopnum); + return -1; + } + + /* Check that the target hop is opened */ + if (target_hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,LD_CIRC, + "Padding circuit %u has %d hops, not %d", + circ->global_identifier, + circuit_get_cpath_opened_len(circ), hopnum); + return -1; + } + + /* Send the drop command to the second hop */ + ret = relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), relay_command, + (const char*)payload, payload_len, + target_hop); + return ret; +} + +/** + * Callback helper to send a padding cell. + * + * This helper is called after our histogram-sampled delay period passes + * without another packet being sent first. If a packet is sent before this + * callback happens, it is canceled. So when we're called here, send padding + * right away. + * + * If sending this padding cell forced us to transition states return + * CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED. Otherwise return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED. + */ +circpad_decision_t +circpad_send_padding_cell_for_callback(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + circuit_t *circ = mi->on_circ; + int machine_idx = mi->machine_index; + mi->padding_scheduled_at_usec = 0; + circpad_statenum_t state = mi->current_state; + + /* Make sure circuit didn't close on us */ + if (mi->on_circ->marked_for_close) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC, + "Padding callback on circuit marked for close (%u). Ignoring.", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier : 0); + return CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED; + } + + circpad_machine_count_padding_sent(mi); + + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ)) { + circpad_send_command_to_hop(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ), + CIRCPAD_GET_MACHINE(mi)->target_hopnum, + RELAY_COMMAND_DROP, NULL, 0); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Callback: Sending padding to origin circuit %u" + " (%d) [length: %"PRIu64"]", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier, + mi->on_circ->purpose, mi->state_length); + } else { + // If we're a non-origin circ, we can just send from here as if we're the + // edge. + if (TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan_cells.n <= circpad_max_circ_queued_cells) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Callback: Sending padding to circuit (%d)" + " [length: %"PRIu64"]", mi->on_circ->purpose, mi->state_length); + relay_send_command_from_edge(0, mi->on_circ, RELAY_COMMAND_DROP, NULL, + 0, NULL); + rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_DROP); + } else { + static ratelim_t cell_lim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&cell_lim,LOG_NOTICE,LD_CIRC, + "Too many cells (%d) in circ queue to send padding.", + TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan_cells.n); + } + } + + /* This is a padding cell sent from the client or from the middle node, + * (because it's invoked from circuitpadding.c) */ + circpad_cell_event_padding_sent(circ); + + /* The circpad_cell_event_padding_sent() could cause us to transition. + * Check that we still have a padding machineinfo, and then check our token + * supply. */ + if (circ->padding_info[machine_idx] != NULL) { + if (state != circ->padding_info[machine_idx]->current_state) + return CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED; + else + return check_machine_token_supply(circ->padding_info[machine_idx]); + } else { + return CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED; + } +} + +/** + * Tor-timer compatible callback that tells us to send a padding cell. + * + * Timers are associated with circpad_machine_runtime_t's. When the machineinfo + * is freed on a circuit, the timers are cancelled. Since the lifetime + * of machineinfo is always longer than the timers, handles are not + * needed. + */ +static void +circpad_send_padding_callback(tor_timer_t *timer, void *args, + const struct monotime_t *time) +{ + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi = ((circpad_machine_runtime_t*)args); + (void)timer; (void)time; + + if (mi && mi->on_circ) { + assert_circuit_ok(mi->on_circ); + circpad_send_padding_cell_for_callback(mi); + } else { + // This shouldn't happen (represents a timer leak) + log_fn(LOG_WARN,LD_CIRC, + "Circuit closed while waiting for padding timer."); + tor_fragile_assert(); + } + + // TODO-MP-AP: Unify this counter with channelpadding for rephist stats + //total_timers_pending--; +} + +/** + * Cache our consensus parameters upon consensus update. + */ +void +circpad_new_consensus_params(const networkstatus_t *ns) +{ + circpad_padding_disabled = + networkstatus_get_param(ns, "circpad_padding_disabled", + 0, 0, 1); + + circpad_padding_reduced = + networkstatus_get_param(ns, "circpad_padding_reduced", + 0, 0, 1); + + circpad_global_allowed_cells = + networkstatus_get_param(ns, "circpad_global_allowed_cells", + 0, 0, UINT16_MAX-1); + + circpad_global_max_padding_percent = + networkstatus_get_param(ns, "circpad_global_max_padding_pct", + 0, 0, 100); + + circpad_max_circ_queued_cells = + networkstatus_get_param(ns, "circpad_max_circ_queued_cells", + CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX, 0, 50*CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX); +} + +/** + * Return true if padding is allowed by torrc and consensus. + */ +static bool +circpad_is_padding_allowed(void) +{ + /* If padding has been disabled in the consensus, don't send any more + * padding. Technically the machine should be shut down when the next + * machine condition check happens, but machine checks only happen on + * certain circuit events, and if padding is disabled due to some + * network overload or DoS condition, we really want to stop ASAP. */ + if (circpad_padding_disabled || !get_options()->CircuitPadding) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Check this machine against its padding limits, as well as global + * consensus limits. + * + * We have two limits: a percent and a cell count. The cell count + * limit must be reached before the percent is enforced (this is to + * optionally allow very light padding of things like circuit setup + * while there is no other traffic on the circuit). + * + * TODO: Don't apply limits to machines form torrc. + * + * Returns 1 if limits are set and we've hit them. Otherwise returns 0. + */ +STATIC bool +circpad_machine_reached_padding_limit(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine = CIRCPAD_GET_MACHINE(mi); + + /* If machine_padding_pct is non-zero, and we've sent more + * than the allowed count of padding cells, then check our + * percent limits for this machine. */ + if (machine->max_padding_percent && + mi->padding_sent >= machine->allowed_padding_count) { + uint32_t total_cells = mi->padding_sent + mi->nonpadding_sent; + + /* Check the percent */ + if ((100*(uint32_t)mi->padding_sent) / total_cells > + machine->max_padding_percent) { + return 1; // limit is reached. Stop. + } + } + + /* If circpad_max_global_padding_pct is non-zero, and we've + * sent more than the global padding cell limit, then check our + * global tor process percentage limit on padding. */ + if (circpad_global_max_padding_percent && + circpad_global_padding_sent >= circpad_global_allowed_cells) { + uint64_t total_cells = circpad_global_padding_sent + + circpad_global_nonpadding_sent; + + /* Check the percent */ + if ((100*circpad_global_padding_sent) / total_cells > + circpad_global_max_padding_percent) { + return 1; // global limit reached. Stop. + } + } + + return 0; // All good! +} + +/** + * Schedule the next padding time according to the machineinfo on a + * circuit. + * + * The histograms represent inter-packet-delay. Whenever you get an packet + * event you should be scheduling your next timer (after cancelling any old + * ones and updating tokens accordingly). + * + * Returns 1 if we decide to transition states (due to infinity bin), + * 0 otherwise. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(circpad_decision_t, +circpad_machine_schedule_padding,(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi)) +{ + circpad_delay_t in_usec = 0; + struct timeval timeout; + tor_assert(mi); + + /* Don't schedule padding if it is disabled */ + if (!circpad_is_padding_allowed()) { + static ratelim_t padding_lim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&padding_lim,LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC, + "Padding has been disabled, but machine still on circuit %"PRIu64 + ", %d", + mi->on_circ->n_chan ? mi->on_circ->n_chan->global_identifier : 0, + mi->on_circ->n_circ_id); + + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } + + /* Don't schedule padding if we are currently in dormant mode. */ + if (!is_participating_on_network()) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Not scheduling padding because we are dormant."); + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } + + // Don't pad in end (but also don't cancel any previously + // scheduled padding either). + if (mi->current_state == CIRCPAD_STATE_END) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, "Padding end state on circuit %u", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier : 0); + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } + + /* Check our padding limits */ + if (circpad_machine_reached_padding_limit(mi)) { + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ)) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, + "Padding machine has reached padding limit on circuit %u", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier); + } else { + static ratelim_t padding_lim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&padding_lim,LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC, + "Padding machine has reached padding limit on circuit %"PRIu64 + ", %d", + mi->on_circ->n_chan ? mi->on_circ->n_chan->global_identifier : 0, + mi->on_circ->n_circ_id); + } + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } + + if (mi->is_padding_timer_scheduled) { + /* Cancel current timer (if any) */ + timer_disable(mi->padding_timer); + mi->is_padding_timer_scheduled = 0; + } + + /* in_usec = in microseconds */ + in_usec = circpad_machine_sample_delay(mi); + /* If we're using token removal, we need to know when the padding + * was scheduled at, so we can remove the appropriate token if + * a non-padding cell is sent before the padding timer expires. + * + * However, since monotime is unpredictably expensive, let's avoid + * using it for machines that don't need token removal. */ + if (circpad_is_token_removal_supported(mi)) { + mi->padding_scheduled_at_usec = monotime_absolute_usec(); + } else { + mi->padding_scheduled_at_usec = 1; + } + log_fn(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,"\tPadding in %u usec on circuit %u", in_usec, + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier : 0); + + // Don't schedule if we have infinite delay. + if (in_usec == CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE) { + return circpad_internal_event_infinity(mi); + } + + if (mi->state_length == 0) { + /* If we're at length 0, that means we hit 0 after sending + * a cell earlier, and emitted an event for it, but + * for whatever reason we did not decide to change states then. + * So maybe the machine is waiting for bins empty, or for an + * infinity event later? That would be a strange machine, + * but there's no reason to make it impossible. */ + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } + + if (in_usec <= 0) { + return circpad_send_padding_cell_for_callback(mi); + } + + timeout.tv_sec = in_usec/TOR_USEC_PER_SEC; + timeout.tv_usec = (in_usec%TOR_USEC_PER_SEC); + + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, "\tPadding circuit %u in %u sec, %u usec", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier : 0, + (unsigned)timeout.tv_sec, (unsigned)timeout.tv_usec); + + if (mi->padding_timer) { + timer_set_cb(mi->padding_timer, circpad_send_padding_callback, mi); + } else { + mi->padding_timer = + timer_new(circpad_send_padding_callback, mi); + } + timer_schedule(mi->padding_timer, &timeout); + mi->is_padding_timer_scheduled = 1; + + // TODO-MP-AP: Unify with channelpadding counter + //rep_hist_padding_count_timers(++total_timers_pending); + + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; +} + +/** + * If the machine transitioned to the END state, we need + * to check to see if it wants us to shut it down immediately. + * If it does, then we need to send the appropiate negotiation commands + * depending on which side it is. + * + * After this function is called, mi may point to freed memory. Do + * not access it. + */ +static void +circpad_machine_spec_transitioned_to_end(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine = CIRCPAD_GET_MACHINE(mi); + circuit_t *on_circ = mi->on_circ; + + log_fn(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC, "Padding machine in end state on circuit %u (%d)", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(on_circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(on_circ)->global_identifier : 0, + on_circ->purpose); + + /* + * We allow machines to shut down and delete themselves as opposed + * to just going back to START or waiting forever in END so that + * we can handle the case where this machine started while it was + * the only machine that matched conditions, but *since* then more + * "higher ranking" machines now match the conditions, and would + * be given a chance to take precedence over this one in + * circpad_add_matching_machines(). + * + * Returning to START or waiting forever in END would not give those + * other machines a chance to be launched, where as shutting down + * here does. + */ + if (machine->should_negotiate_end) { + if (machine->is_origin_side) { + /* We free the machine info here so that we can be replaced + * by a different machine. But we must leave the padding_machine + * in place to wait for the negotiated response */ + circpad_circuit_machineinfo_free_idx(on_circ, + machine->machine_index); + circpad_negotiate_padding(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(on_circ), + machine->machine_num, + machine->target_hopnum, + CIRCPAD_COMMAND_STOP); + } else { + circpad_circuit_machineinfo_free_idx(on_circ, + machine->machine_index); + circpad_padding_negotiated(on_circ, + machine->machine_num, + CIRCPAD_COMMAND_STOP, + CIRCPAD_RESPONSE_OK); + on_circ->padding_machine[machine->machine_index] = NULL; + } + } +} + +/** + * Generic state transition function for padding state machines. + * + * Given an event and our mutable machine info, decide if/how to + * transition to a different state, and perform actions accordingly. + * + * Returns 1 if we transition states, 0 otherwise. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(circpad_decision_t, +circpad_machine_spec_transition,(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_event_t event)) +{ + const circpad_state_t *state = + circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + + /* If state is null we are in the end state. */ + if (!state) { + /* If we in end state we don't pad no matter what. */ + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } + + /* Check if this event is ignored or causes a cancel */ + if (state->next_state[event] == CIRCPAD_STATE_IGNORE) { + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } else if (state->next_state[event] == CIRCPAD_STATE_CANCEL) { + /* Check cancel events and cancel any pending padding */ + mi->padding_scheduled_at_usec = 0; + if (mi->is_padding_timer_scheduled) { + mi->is_padding_timer_scheduled = 0; + /* Cancel current timer (if any) */ + timer_disable(mi->padding_timer); + } + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } else { + circpad_statenum_t s = state->next_state[event]; + /* See if we need to transition to any other states based on this event. + * Whenever a transition happens, even to our own state, we schedule + * padding. + * + * So if a state only wants to schedule padding for an event, it specifies + * a transition to itself. All non-specified events are ignored. + */ + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, + "Circuit %u circpad machine %d transitioning from %u to %u", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(mi->on_circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(mi->on_circ)->global_identifier : 0, + mi->machine_index, mi->current_state, s); + + /* If this is not the same state, switch and init tokens, + * otherwise just reschedule padding. */ + if (mi->current_state != s) { + mi->current_state = s; + circpad_machine_setup_tokens(mi); + circpad_choose_state_length(mi); + + /* If we transition to the end state, check to see + * if this machine wants to be shut down at end */ + if (s == CIRCPAD_STATE_END) { + circpad_machine_spec_transitioned_to_end(mi); + /* We transitioned but we don't pad in end. Also, mi + * may be freed. Returning STATE_CHANGED prevents us + * from accessing it in any callers of this function. */ + return CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED; + } + + /* We transitioned to a new state, schedule padding */ + circpad_machine_schedule_padding(mi); + return CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED; + } + + /* We transitioned back to the same state. Schedule padding, + * and inform if that causes a state transition. */ + return circpad_machine_schedule_padding(mi); + } + + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; +} + +/** + * Estimate the circuit RTT from the current middle hop out to the + * end of the circuit. + * + * We estimate RTT by calculating the time between "receive" and + * "send" at a middle hop. This is because we "receive" a cell + * from the origin, and then relay it towards the exit before a + * response comes back. It is that response time from the exit side + * that we want to measure, so that we can make use of it for synthetic + * response delays. + */ +static void +circpad_estimate_circ_rtt_on_received(circuit_t *circ, + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + /* Origin circuits don't estimate RTT. They could do it easily enough, + * but they have no reason to use it in any delay calculations. */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || mi->stop_rtt_update) + return; + + /* If we already have a last received packet time, that means we + * did not get a response before this packet. The RTT estimate + * only makes sense if we do not have multiple packets on the + * wire, so stop estimating if this is the second packet + * back to back. However, for the first set of back-to-back + * packets, we can wait until the very first response comes back + * to us, to measure that RTT (for the response to optimistic + * data, for example). Hence stop_rtt_update is only checked + * in this received side function, and not in send side below. + */ + if (mi->last_received_time_usec) { + /* We also allow multiple back-to-back packets if the circuit is not + * opened, to handle var cells. + * XXX: Will this work with out var cell plans? Maybe not, + * since we're opened at the middle hop as soon as we process + * one var extend2 :/ */ + if (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, + "Stopping padding RTT estimation on circuit (%"PRIu64 + ", %d) after two back to back packets. Current RTT: %d", + circ->n_chan ? circ->n_chan->global_identifier : 0, + circ->n_circ_id, mi->rtt_estimate_usec); + mi->stop_rtt_update = 1; + + if (!mi->rtt_estimate_usec) { + static ratelim_t rtt_lim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&rtt_lim,LOG_NOTICE,LD_BUG, + "Circuit got two cells back to back before estimating RTT."); + } + } + } else { + const circpad_state_t *state = circpad_machine_current_state(mi); + if (BUG(!state)) { + return; + } + + /* Since monotime is unpredictably expensive, only update this field + * if rtt estimates are needed. Otherwise, stop the rtt update. */ + if (state->use_rtt_estimate) { + mi->last_received_time_usec = monotime_absolute_usec(); + } else { + /* Let's fast-path future decisions not to update rtt if the + * feature is not in use. */ + mi->stop_rtt_update = 1; + } + } +} + +/** + * Handles the "send" side of RTT calculation at middle nodes. + * + * This function calculates the RTT from the middle to the end + * of the circuit by subtracting the last received cell timestamp + * from the current time. It allows back-to-back cells until + * the circuit is opened, to allow for var cell handshakes. + * XXX: Check our var cell plans to make sure this will work. + */ +static void +circpad_estimate_circ_rtt_on_send(circuit_t *circ, + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + /* Origin circuits don't estimate RTT. They could do it easily enough, + * but they have no reason to use it in any delay calculations. */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) + return; + + /* If last_received_time_usec is non-zero, we are waiting for a response + * from the exit side. Calculate the time delta and use it as RTT. */ + if (mi->last_received_time_usec) { + circpad_time_t rtt_time = monotime_absolute_usec() - + mi->last_received_time_usec; + + /* Reset the last RTT packet time, so we can tell if two cells + * arrive back to back */ + mi->last_received_time_usec = 0; + + /* Use INT32_MAX to ensure the addition doesn't overflow */ + if (rtt_time >= INT32_MAX) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN,LD_CIRC, + "Circuit padding RTT estimate overflowed: %"PRIu64 + " vs %"PRIu64, monotime_absolute_usec(), + mi->last_received_time_usec); + return; + } + + /* If the old RTT estimate is lower than this one, use this one, because + * the circuit is getting longer. If this estimate is somehow + * faster than the previous, then maybe that was network jitter, or a + * bad monotonic clock source (so our ratchet returned a zero delta). + * In that case, average them. */ + if (mi->rtt_estimate_usec < (circpad_delay_t)rtt_time) { + mi->rtt_estimate_usec = (circpad_delay_t)rtt_time; + } else { + mi->rtt_estimate_usec += (circpad_delay_t)rtt_time; + mi->rtt_estimate_usec /= 2; + } + } else if (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) { + /* If last_received_time_usec is zero, then we have gotten two cells back + * to back. Stop estimating RTT in this case. Note that we only + * stop RTT update if the circuit is opened, to allow for RTT estimates + * of var cells during circ setup. */ + if (!mi->rtt_estimate_usec && !mi->stop_rtt_update) { + static ratelim_t rtt_lim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&rtt_lim,LOG_NOTICE,LD_BUG, + "Circuit sent two cells back to back before estimating RTT."); + } + mi->stop_rtt_update = 1; + } +} + +/** + * A "non-padding" cell has been sent from this endpoint. React + * according to any padding state machines on the circuit. + * + * For origin circuits, this means we sent a cell into the network. + * For middle relay circuits, this means we sent a cell towards the + * origin. + */ +void +circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_sent(circuit_t *on_circ) +{ + /* Update global cell count */ + circpad_global_nonpadding_sent++; + + /* If there are no machines then this loop should not iterate */ + FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i, on_circ) { + /* First, update any timestamps */ + on_circ->padding_info[i]->last_cell_time_sec = approx_time(); + circpad_estimate_circ_rtt_on_send(on_circ, on_circ->padding_info[i]); + + /* Then, do accounting */ + circpad_machine_count_nonpadding_sent(on_circ->padding_info[i]); + + /* Check to see if we've run out of tokens for this state already, + * and if not, check for other state transitions */ + if (check_machine_token_supply(on_circ->padding_info[i]) + == CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED) { + /* If removing a token did not cause a transition, check if + * non-padding sent event should */ + circpad_machine_spec_transition(on_circ->padding_info[i], + CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT); + } + } FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; +} + +/** Check if this cell or circuit are related to circuit padding and handle + * them if so. Return 0 if the cell was handled in this subsystem and does + * not need any other consideration, otherwise return 1. + */ +int +circpad_check_received_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint, + const relay_header_t *rh) +{ + /* First handle the padding commands, since we want to ignore any other + * commands if this circuit is padding-specific. */ + switch (rh->command) { + case RELAY_COMMAND_DROP: + /* Already examined in circpad_deliver_recognized_relay_cell_events */ + return 0; + case RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATE: + circpad_handle_padding_negotiate(circ, cell); + return 0; + case RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATED: + if (circpad_handle_padding_negotiated(circ, cell, layer_hint) == 0) + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh->length); + return 0; + } + + /* If this is a padding circuit we don't need to parse any other commands + * than the padding ones. Just drop them to the floor. + * + * Note: we deliberately do not call circuit_read_valid_data() here. The + * vanguards addon (specifically the 'bandguards' component's dropped cell + * detection) will thus close this circuit, as it would for any other + * unexpected cell. However, default tor will *not* close the circuit. + * + * This is intentional. We are not yet certain that is it optimal to keep + * padding circuits open in cases like these, rather than closing them. + * We suspect that continuing to pad is optimal against a passive classifier, + * but as soon as the adversary is active (even as a client adversary) this + * might change. + * + * So as a way forward, we log the cell command and circuit number, to + * help us enumerate the most common instances of this in testing with + * vanguards, to see which are common enough to verify and handle + * properly. + * - Mike + */ + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Ignored cell (%d) that arrived in padding circuit " + " %u.", rh->command, CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier : 0); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * A "non-padding" cell has been received by this endpoint. React + * according to any padding state machines on the circuit. + * + * For origin circuits, this means we read a cell from the network. + * For middle relay circuits, this means we received a cell from the + * origin. + */ +void +circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_received(circuit_t *on_circ) +{ + FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i, on_circ) { + /* First, update any timestamps */ + on_circ->padding_info[i]->last_cell_time_sec = approx_time(); + circpad_estimate_circ_rtt_on_received(on_circ, on_circ->padding_info[i]); + + circpad_machine_spec_transition(on_circ->padding_info[i], + CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_RECV); + } FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; +} + +/** + * A padding cell has been sent from this endpoint. React + * according to any padding state machines on the circuit. + * + * For origin circuits, this means we sent a cell into the network. + * For middle relay circuits, this means we sent a cell towards the + * origin. + */ +void +circpad_cell_event_padding_sent(circuit_t *on_circ) +{ + FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i, on_circ) { + /* Check to see if we've run out of tokens for this state already, + * and if not, check for other state transitions */ + if (check_machine_token_supply(on_circ->padding_info[i]) + == CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED) { + /* If removing a token did not cause a transition, check if + * non-padding sent event should */ + + on_circ->padding_info[i]->last_cell_time_sec = approx_time(); + circpad_machine_spec_transition(on_circ->padding_info[i], + CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_SENT); + } + } FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; +} + +/** + * A padding cell has been received by this endpoint. React + * according to any padding state machines on the circuit. + * + * For origin circuits, this means we read a cell from the network. + * For middle relay circuits, this means we received a cell from the + * origin. + */ +void +circpad_cell_event_padding_received(circuit_t *on_circ) +{ + /* identical to padding sent */ + FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i, on_circ) { + on_circ->padding_info[i]->last_cell_time_sec = approx_time(); + circpad_machine_spec_transition(on_circ->padding_info[i], + CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_RECV); + } FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; +} + +/** + * An "infinite" delay has ben chosen from one of our histograms. + * + * "Infinite" delays mean don't send padding -- but they can also + * mean transition to another state depending on the state machine + * definitions. Check the rules and react accordingly. + * + * Return 1 if we decide to transition, 0 otherwise. + */ +circpad_decision_t +circpad_internal_event_infinity(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + return circpad_machine_spec_transition(mi, CIRCPAD_EVENT_INFINITY); +} + +/** + * All of the bins of our current state's histogram's are empty. + * + * Check to see if this means transition to another state, and if + * not, refill the tokens. + * + * Return 1 if we decide to transition, 0 otherwise. + */ +circpad_decision_t +circpad_internal_event_bins_empty(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + if (circpad_machine_spec_transition(mi, CIRCPAD_EVENT_BINS_EMPTY) + == CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED) { + return CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED; + } else { + /* If we dont transition, then we refill the tokens */ + circpad_machine_setup_tokens(mi); + return CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED; + } +} + +/** + * This state has used up its cell count. Emit the event and + * see if we transition. + * + * Return 1 if we decide to transition, 0 otherwise. + */ +circpad_decision_t +circpad_internal_event_state_length_up(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi) +{ + return circpad_machine_spec_transition(mi, CIRCPAD_EVENT_LENGTH_COUNT); +} + +/** + * Returns true if the circuit matches the conditions. + */ +static inline bool +circpad_machine_conditions_met(origin_circuit_t *circ, + const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine) +{ + /* If padding is disabled, no machines should match/apply. This has + * the effect of shutting down all machines, and not adding any more. */ + if (circpad_padding_disabled || !get_options()->CircuitPadding) + return 0; + + /* If the consensus or our torrc has selected reduced connection padding, + * then only allow this machine if it is flagged as acceptable under + * reduced padding conditions */ + if (circpad_padding_reduced || get_options()->ReducedCircuitPadding) { + if (!machine->conditions.reduced_padding_ok) + return 0; + } + + if (!(circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) + & machine->conditions.purpose_mask)) + return 0; + + if (machine->conditions.requires_vanguards) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + /* Pinned middles are effectively vanguards */ + if (!(options->HSLayer2Nodes || options->HSLayer3Nodes)) + return 0; + } + + /* We check for any bits set in the circuit state mask so that machines + * can say any of the following through their state bitmask: + * "I want to apply to circuits with either streams or no streams"; OR + * "I only want to apply to circuits with streams"; OR + * "I only want to apply to circuits without streams". */ + if (!(circpad_circuit_state(circ) & machine->conditions.state_mask)) + return 0; + + if (circuit_get_cpath_opened_len(circ) < machine->conditions.min_hops) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Returns a minimized representation of the circuit state. + * + * The padding code only cares if the circuit is building, + * opened, used for streams, and/or still has relay early cells. + * This returns a bitmask of all state properities that apply to + * this circuit. + */ +static inline +circpad_circuit_state_t +circpad_circuit_state(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + circpad_circuit_state_t retmask = 0; + + if (circ->p_streams) + retmask |= CIRCPAD_CIRC_STREAMS; + else + retmask |= CIRCPAD_CIRC_NO_STREAMS; + + /* We use has_opened to prevent cannibialized circs from flapping. */ + if (circ->has_opened) + retmask |= CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED; + else + retmask |= CIRCPAD_CIRC_BUILDING; + + if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells > 0) + retmask |= CIRCPAD_CIRC_HAS_RELAY_EARLY; + else + retmask |= CIRCPAD_CIRC_HAS_NO_RELAY_EARLY; + + return retmask; +} + +/** + * Convert a normal circuit purpose into a bitmask that we can + * use for determining matching circuits. + */ +circpad_purpose_mask_t +circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(uint8_t circ_purpose) +{ + /* Treat OR circ purposes as ignored. They should not be passed here*/ + if (BUG(circ_purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Treat new client circuit purposes as "OMG ITS EVERYTHING". + * This also should not happen */ + if (BUG(circ_purpose - CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ - 1 > 32)) { + return CIRCPAD_PURPOSE_ALL; + } + + /* Convert the purpose to a bit position */ + return 1 << (circ_purpose - CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ - 1); +} + +/** + * Shut down any machines whose conditions no longer match + * the current circuit. + */ +static void +circpad_shutdown_old_machines(origin_circuit_t *on_circ) +{ + circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(on_circ); + + FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i, circ) { + if (!circpad_machine_conditions_met(on_circ, + circ->padding_machine[i])) { + // Clear machineinfo (frees timers) + circpad_circuit_machineinfo_free_idx(circ, i); + // Send padding negotiate stop + circpad_negotiate_padding(on_circ, + circ->padding_machine[i]->machine_num, + circ->padding_machine[i]->target_hopnum, + CIRCPAD_COMMAND_STOP); + } + } FOR_EACH_ACTIVE_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; +} + +/** + * Negotiate new machines that would apply to this circuit, given the machines + * inside <b>machines_sl</b>. + * + * This function checks to see if we have any free machine indexes, + * and for each free machine index, it initializes the most recently + * added origin-side padding machine that matches the target machine + * index and circuit conditions, and negotiates it with the appropriate + * middle relay. + */ +STATIC void +circpad_add_matching_machines(origin_circuit_t *on_circ, + smartlist_t *machines_sl) +{ + circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(on_circ); + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS + /* Tests don't have to init our padding machines */ + if (!machines_sl) + return; +#endif + + /* If padding negotiation failed before, do not try again */ + if (on_circ->padding_negotiation_failed) + return; + + FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i) { + /* If there is a padding machine info, this index is occupied. + * No need to check conditions for this index. */ + if (circ->padding_info[i]) + continue; + + /* We have a free machine index. Check the origin padding + * machines in reverse order, so that more recently added + * machines take priority over older ones. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_REVERSE_BEGIN(machines_sl, + circpad_machine_spec_t *, + machine) { + /* Machine definitions have a specific target machine index. + * This is so event ordering is deterministic with respect + * to which machine gets events first when there are two + * machines installed on a circuit. Make sure we only + * add this machine if its target machine index is free. */ + if (machine->machine_index == i && + circpad_machine_conditions_met(on_circ, machine)) { + + // We can only replace this machine if the target hopnum + // is the same, otherwise we'll get invalid data + if (circ->padding_machine[i]) { + if (circ->padding_machine[i]->target_hopnum != + machine->target_hopnum) + continue; + /* Replace it. (Don't free - is global). */ + circ->padding_machine[i] = NULL; + } + + /* Set up the machine immediately so that the slot is occupied. + * We will tear it down on error return, or if there is an error + * response from the relay. */ + circpad_setup_machine_on_circ(circ, machine); + if (circpad_negotiate_padding(on_circ, machine->machine_num, + machine->target_hopnum, + CIRCPAD_COMMAND_START) < 0) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Padding not negotiated. Cleaning machine from circuit %u", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier : 0); + circpad_circuit_machineinfo_free_idx(circ, i); + circ->padding_machine[i] = NULL; + on_circ->padding_negotiation_failed = 1; + } else { + /* Success. Don't try any more machines on this index */ + break; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(machine); + } FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; +} + +/** + * Event that tells us we added a hop to an origin circuit. + * + * This event is used to decide if we should create a padding machine + * on a circuit. + */ +void +circpad_machine_event_circ_added_hop(origin_circuit_t *on_circ) +{ + /* Since our padding conditions do not specify a max_hops, + * all we can do is add machines here */ + circpad_add_matching_machines(on_circ, origin_padding_machines); +} + +/** + * Event that tells us that an origin circuit is now built. + * + * Shut down any machines that only applied to un-built circuits. + * Activate any new ones. + */ +void +circpad_machine_event_circ_built(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + circpad_shutdown_old_machines(circ); + circpad_add_matching_machines(circ, origin_padding_machines); +} + +/** + * Circpad purpose changed event. + * + * Shut down any machines that don't apply to our circ purpose. + * Activate any new ones that do. + */ +void +circpad_machine_event_circ_purpose_changed(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + circpad_shutdown_old_machines(circ); + circpad_add_matching_machines(circ, origin_padding_machines); +} + +/** + * Event that tells us that an origin circuit is out of RELAY_EARLY + * cells. + * + * Shut down any machines that only applied to RELAY_EARLY circuits. + * Activate any new ones. + */ +void +circpad_machine_event_circ_has_no_relay_early(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + circpad_shutdown_old_machines(circ); + circpad_add_matching_machines(circ, origin_padding_machines); +} + +/** + * Streams attached event. + * + * Called from link_apconn_to_circ() and handle_hs_exit_conn() + * + * Shut down any machines that only applied to machines without + * streams. Activate any new ones. + */ +void +circpad_machine_event_circ_has_streams(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + circpad_shutdown_old_machines(circ); + circpad_add_matching_machines(circ, origin_padding_machines); +} + +/** + * Streams detached event. + * + * Called from circuit_detach_stream() + * + * Shut down any machines that only applied to machines without + * streams. Activate any new ones. + */ +void +circpad_machine_event_circ_has_no_streams(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + circpad_shutdown_old_machines(circ); + circpad_add_matching_machines(circ, origin_padding_machines); +} + +/** + * Verify that padding is coming from the expected hop. + * + * Returns true if from_hop matches the target hop from + * one of our padding machines. + * + * Returns false if we're not an origin circuit, or if from_hop + * does not match one of the padding machines. + */ +bool +circpad_padding_is_from_expected_hop(circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *from_hop) +{ + crypt_path_t *target_hop = NULL; + if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) + return 0; + + FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_BEGIN(i) { + /* We have to check padding_machine and not padding_info/active + * machines here because padding may arrive after we shut down a + * machine. The info is gone, but the padding_machine waits + * for the padding_negotiated response to come back. */ + if (!circ->padding_machine[i]) + continue; + + target_hop = circuit_get_cpath_hop(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), + circ->padding_machine[i]->target_hopnum); + + if (target_hop == from_hop) + return 1; + } FOR_EACH_CIRCUIT_MACHINE_END; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Deliver circpad events for an "unrecognized cell". + * + * Unrecognized cells are sent to relays and are forwarded + * onto the next hop of their circuits. Unrecognized cells + * are by definition not padding. We need to tell relay-side + * state machines that a non-padding cell was sent or received, + * depending on the direction, so they can update their histograms + * and decide to pad or not. + */ +void +circpad_deliver_unrecognized_cell_events(circuit_t *circ, + cell_direction_t dir) +{ + // We should never see unrecognized cells at origin. + // Our caller emits a warn when this happens. + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + return; + } + + if (dir == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { + /* When direction is out (away from origin), then we received non-padding + cell coming from the origin to us. */ + circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_received(circ); + } else if (dir == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) { + /* It's in and not origin, so the cell is going away from us. + * So we are relaying a non-padding cell towards the origin. */ + circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_sent(circ); + } +} + +/** + * Deliver circpad events for "recognized" relay cells. + * + * Recognized cells are destined for this hop, either client or middle. + * Check if this is a padding cell or not, and send the appropiate + * received event. + */ +void +circpad_deliver_recognized_relay_cell_events(circuit_t *circ, + uint8_t relay_command, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint) +{ + if (relay_command == RELAY_COMMAND_DROP) { + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_DROP); + + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + if (circpad_padding_is_from_expected_hop(circ, layer_hint)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), 0); + } else { + /* This is unexpected padding. Ignore it for now. */ + return; + } + } + + /* The cell should be recognized by now, which means that we are on the + destination, which means that we received a padding cell. We might be + the client or the Middle node, still, because leaky-pipe. */ + circpad_cell_event_padding_received(circ); + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, "Got padding cell on %s circuit %u.", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? "origin" : "non-origin", + CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier : 0); + } else { + /* We received a non-padding cell on the edge */ + circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_received(circ); + } +} + +/** + * Deliver circpad events for relay cells sent from us. + * + * If this is a padding cell, update our padding stats + * and deliver the event. Otherwise just deliver the event. + */ +void +circpad_deliver_sent_relay_cell_events(circuit_t *circ, + uint8_t relay_command) +{ + /* RELAY_COMMAND_DROP is the multi-hop (aka circuit-level) padding cell in + * tor. (CELL_PADDING is a channel-level padding cell, which is not relayed + * or processed here). + * + * We do generate events for PADDING_NEGOTIATE and PADDING_NEGOTIATED cells. + */ + if (relay_command == RELAY_COMMAND_DROP) { + /* Optimization: The event for RELAY_COMMAND_DROP is sent directly + * from circpad_send_padding_cell_for_callback(). This is to avoid + * putting a cell_t and a relay_header_t on the stack repeatedly + * if we decide to send a long train of padding cells back-to-back + * with 0 delay. So we do nothing here. */ + return; + } else { + /* This is a non-padding cell sent from the client or from + * this node. */ + circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_sent(circ); + } +} + +/** + * Initialize the states array for a circpad machine. + */ +void +circpad_machine_states_init(circpad_machine_spec_t *machine, + circpad_statenum_t num_states) +{ + if (BUG(num_states > CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINE_STATES)) { + num_states = CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINE_STATES; + } + + machine->num_states = num_states; + machine->states = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_state_t)*num_states); + + /* Initialize the default next state for all events to + * "ignore" -- if events aren't specified, they are ignored. */ + for (circpad_statenum_t s = 0; s < num_states; s++) { + for (int e = 0; e < CIRCPAD_NUM_EVENTS; e++) { + machine->states[s].next_state[e] = CIRCPAD_STATE_IGNORE; + } + } +} + +static void +circpad_setup_machine_on_circ(circuit_t *on_circ, + const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine) +{ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(on_circ) && !machine->is_origin_side) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_BUG, + "Can't set up non-origin machine on origin circuit!"); + return; + } + + if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(on_circ) && machine->is_origin_side) { + log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_BUG, + "Can't set up origin machine on non-origin circuit!"); + return; + } + + IF_BUG_ONCE(on_circ->padding_machine[machine->machine_index] != NULL) { + return; + } + IF_BUG_ONCE(on_circ->padding_info[machine->machine_index] != NULL) { + return; + } + + /* Log message */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(on_circ)) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Registering machine %s to origin circ %u (%d)", + machine->name, + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(on_circ)->global_identifier, on_circ->purpose); + } else { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Registering machine %s to non-origin circ (%d)", + machine->name, on_circ->purpose); + } + + on_circ->padding_info[machine->machine_index] = + circpad_circuit_machineinfo_new(on_circ, machine->machine_index); + on_circ->padding_machine[machine->machine_index] = machine; +} + +/** Validate a single state of a padding machine */ +static bool +padding_machine_state_is_valid(const circpad_state_t *state) +{ + int b; + uint32_t tokens_count = 0; + circpad_delay_t prev_bin_edge = 0; + + /* We only validate histograms */ + if (!state->histogram_len) { + return true; + } + + /* We need at least two bins in a histogram */ + if (state->histogram_len < 2) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "You can't have a histogram with less than 2 bins"); + return false; + } + + /* For each machine state, if it's a histogram, make sure all the + * histogram edges are well defined (i.e. are strictly monotonic). */ + for (b = 0 ; b < state->histogram_len ; b++) { + /* Check that histogram edges are strictly increasing. Ignore the first + * edge since it can be zero. */ + if (prev_bin_edge >= state->histogram_edges[b] && b > 0) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Histogram edges are not increasing [%u/%u]", + prev_bin_edge, state->histogram_edges[b]); + return false; + } + + prev_bin_edge = state->histogram_edges[b]; + + /* Also count the number of tokens as we go through the histogram states */ + tokens_count += state->histogram[b]; + } + /* Verify that the total number of tokens is correct */ + if (tokens_count != state->histogram_total_tokens) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Histogram token count is wrong [%u/%u]", + tokens_count, state->histogram_total_tokens); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/** Basic validation of padding machine */ +static bool +padding_machine_is_valid(const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine) +{ + int i; + + /* Validate the histograms of the padding machine */ + for (i = 0 ; i < machine->num_states ; i++) { + if (!padding_machine_state_is_valid(&machine->states[i])) { + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + +/* Validate and register <b>machine</b> into <b>machine_list</b>. If + * <b>machine_list</b> is NULL, then just validate. */ +void +circpad_register_padding_machine(circpad_machine_spec_t *machine, + smartlist_t *machine_list) +{ + if (!padding_machine_is_valid(machine)) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Machine #%u is invalid. Ignoring.", + machine->machine_num); + return; + } + + if (machine_list) { + smartlist_add(machine_list, machine); + } +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* These padding machines are only used for tests pending #28634. */ +static void +circpad_circ_client_machine_init(void) +{ + circpad_machine_spec_t *circ_client_machine + = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_machine_spec_t)); + + circ_client_machine->conditions.min_hops = 2; + circ_client_machine->conditions.state_mask = + CIRCPAD_CIRC_BUILDING|CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED|CIRCPAD_CIRC_HAS_RELAY_EARLY; + circ_client_machine->conditions.purpose_mask = CIRCPAD_PURPOSE_ALL; + circ_client_machine->conditions.reduced_padding_ok = 1; + + circ_client_machine->target_hopnum = 2; + circ_client_machine->is_origin_side = 1; + + /* Start, gap, burst */ + circpad_machine_states_init(circ_client_machine, 3); + + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_START]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST; + + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST; + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST; + + /* If we are in burst state, and we send a non-padding cell, then we cancel + the timer for the next padding cell: + We dont want to send fake extends when actual extends are going on */ + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = CIRCPAD_STATE_CANCEL; + + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_BINS_EMPTY] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].token_removal = + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_CLOSEST; + + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram_len = 2; + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram_edges[0]= 500; + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram_edges[1]= 1000000; + + /* We have 5 tokens in the histogram, which means that all circuits will look + * like they have 7 hops (since we start this machine after the second hop, + * and tokens are decremented for any valid hops, and fake extends are + * used after that -- 2+5==7). */ + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram[0] = 5; + + circ_client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram_total_tokens = 5; + + circ_client_machine->machine_num = smartlist_len(origin_padding_machines); + circpad_register_padding_machine(circ_client_machine, + origin_padding_machines); +} + +static void +circpad_circ_responder_machine_init(void) +{ + circpad_machine_spec_t *circ_responder_machine + = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_machine_spec_t)); + + /* Shut down the machine after we've sent enough packets */ + circ_responder_machine->should_negotiate_end = 1; + + /* The relay-side doesn't care what hopnum it is, but for consistency, + * let's match the client */ + circ_responder_machine->target_hopnum = 2; + circ_responder_machine->is_origin_side = 0; + + /* Start, gap, burst */ + circpad_machine_states_init(circ_responder_machine, 3); + + /* This is the settings of the state machine. In the future we are gonna + serialize this into the consensus or the torrc */ + + /* We transition to the burst state on padding receive and on non-padding + * recieve */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_START]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_START]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST; + + /* Inside the burst state we _stay_ in the burst state when a non-padding + * is sent */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST; + + /* Inside the burst state we transition to the gap state when we receive a + * padding cell */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP; + + /* These describe the padding charasteristics when in burst state */ + + /* use_rtt_estimate tries to estimate how long padding cells take to go from + C->M, and uses that as what as the base of the histogram */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].use_rtt_estimate = 1; + /* The histogram is 2 bins: an empty one, and infinity */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram_len = 2; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram_edges[0]= 500; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram_edges[1] = + 1000000; + /* During burst state we wait forever for padding to arrive. + + We are waiting for a padding cell from the client to come in, so that we + respond, and we immitate how extend looks like */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram[0] = 0; + // Only infinity bin: + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST].histogram[1] = 1; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST]. + histogram_total_tokens = 1; + + /* From the gap state, we _stay_ in the gap state, when we receive padding + * or non padding */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP; + + /* And from the gap state, we go to the end, when the bins are empty or a + * non-padding cell is sent */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_BINS_EMPTY] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + + // FIXME: Tune this histogram + + /* The gap state is the delay you wait after you receive a padding cell + before you send a padding response */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].use_rtt_estimate = 1; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_len = 6; + /* Specify histogram bins */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_edges[0]= 500; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_edges[1]= 1000; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_edges[2]= 2000; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_edges[3]= 4000; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_edges[4]= 8000; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_edges[5]= 16000; + /* Specify histogram tokens */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram[0] = 0; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram[1] = 1; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram[2] = 2; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram[3] = 2; + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram[4] = 1; + /* Total number of tokens */ + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].histogram_total_tokens = 6; + + circ_responder_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP].token_removal = + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_CLOSEST_USEC; + + circ_responder_machine->machine_num = smartlist_len(relay_padding_machines); + circpad_register_padding_machine(circ_responder_machine, + relay_padding_machines); +} +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +/** + * Initialize all of our padding machines. + * + * This is called at startup. It sets up some global machines, and then + * loads some from torrc, and from the tor consensus. + */ +void +circpad_machines_init(void) +{ + tor_assert_nonfatal(origin_padding_machines == NULL); + tor_assert_nonfatal(relay_padding_machines == NULL); + + origin_padding_machines = smartlist_new(); + relay_padding_machines = smartlist_new(); + + /* Register machines for hiding client-side intro circuits */ + circpad_machine_client_hide_intro_circuits(origin_padding_machines); + circpad_machine_relay_hide_intro_circuits(relay_padding_machines); + + /* Register machines for hiding client-side rendezvous circuits */ + circpad_machine_client_hide_rend_circuits(origin_padding_machines); + circpad_machine_relay_hide_rend_circuits(relay_padding_machines); + + // TODO: Parse machines from consensus and torrc +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS + circpad_circ_client_machine_init(); + circpad_circ_responder_machine_init(); +#endif +} + +/** + * Free our padding machines + */ +void +circpad_machines_free(void) +{ + if (origin_padding_machines) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(origin_padding_machines, + circpad_machine_spec_t *, + m, tor_free(m->states); tor_free(m)); + smartlist_free(origin_padding_machines); + } + + if (relay_padding_machines) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(relay_padding_machines, + circpad_machine_spec_t *, + m, tor_free(m->states); tor_free(m)); + smartlist_free(relay_padding_machines); + } +} + +/** + * Check the Protover info to see if a node supports padding. + */ +static bool +circpad_node_supports_padding(const node_t *node) +{ + if (node->rs) { + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, "Checking padding: %s", + node->rs->pv.supports_hs_setup_padding ? + "supported" : "unsupported"); + return node->rs->pv.supports_hs_setup_padding; + } + + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, "Empty routerstatus in padding check"); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Get a node_t for the nth hop in our circuit, starting from 1. + * + * Returns node_t from the consensus for that hop, if it is opened. + * Otherwise returns NULL. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC const node_t *, +circuit_get_nth_node,(origin_circuit_t *circ, int hop)) +{ + crypt_path_t *iter = circuit_get_cpath_hop(circ, hop); + + if (!iter || iter->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) + return NULL; + + return node_get_by_id(iter->extend_info->identity_digest); +} + +/** + * Return true if a particular circuit supports padding + * at the desired hop. + */ +static bool +circpad_circuit_supports_padding(origin_circuit_t *circ, + int target_hopnum) +{ + const node_t *hop; + + if (!(hop = circuit_get_nth_node(circ, target_hopnum))) { + return 0; + } + + return circpad_node_supports_padding(hop); +} + +/** + * Try to negotiate padding. + * + * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success. + */ +signed_error_t +circpad_negotiate_padding(origin_circuit_t *circ, + circpad_machine_num_t machine, + uint8_t target_hopnum, + uint8_t command) +{ + circpad_negotiate_t type; + cell_t cell; + ssize_t len; + + /* Check that the target hop lists support for padding in + * its ProtoVer fields */ + if (!circpad_circuit_supports_padding(circ, target_hopnum)) { + return -1; + } + + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); + memset(&type, 0, sizeof(circpad_negotiate_t)); + // This gets reset to RELAY_EARLY appropriately by + // relay_send_command_from_edge_. At least, it looks that way. + // QQQ-MP-AP: Verify that. + cell.command = CELL_RELAY; + + circpad_negotiate_set_command(&type, command); + circpad_negotiate_set_version(&type, 0); + circpad_negotiate_set_machine_type(&type, machine); + + if ((len = circpad_negotiate_encode(cell.payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE, + &type)) < 0) + return -1; + + log_fn(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC, + "Negotiating padding on circuit %u (%d), command %d", + circ->global_identifier, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose, command); + + return circpad_send_command_to_hop(circ, target_hopnum, + RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATE, + cell.payload, len); +} + +/** + * Try to negotiate padding. + * + * Returns 1 if successful (or already set up), 0 otherwise. + */ +bool +circpad_padding_negotiated(circuit_t *circ, + circpad_machine_num_t machine, + uint8_t command, + uint8_t response) +{ + circpad_negotiated_t type; + cell_t cell; + ssize_t len; + + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); + memset(&type, 0, sizeof(circpad_negotiated_t)); + // This gets reset to RELAY_EARLY appropriately by + // relay_send_command_from_edge_. At least, it looks that way. + // QQQ-MP-AP: Verify that. + cell.command = CELL_RELAY; + + circpad_negotiated_set_command(&type, command); + circpad_negotiated_set_response(&type, response); + circpad_negotiated_set_version(&type, 0); + circpad_negotiated_set_machine_type(&type, machine); + + if ((len = circpad_negotiated_encode(cell.payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE, + &type)) < 0) + return 0; + + /* Use relay_send because we're from the middle to the origin. We don't + * need to specify a target hop or layer_hint. */ + return relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, + RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATED, + (void*)cell.payload, + (size_t)len, NULL) == 0; +} + +/** + * Parse and react to a padding_negotiate cell. + * + * This is called at the middle node upon receipt of the client's choice of + * state machine, so that it can use the requested state machine index, if + * it is available. + * + * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success. + */ +signed_error_t +circpad_handle_padding_negotiate(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell) +{ + int retval = 0; + circpad_negotiate_t *negotiate; + + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Padding negotiate cell unsupported at origin (circuit %u)", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + if (circpad_negotiate_parse(&negotiate, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE-RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Received malformed PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell; dropping."); + return -1; + } + + if (negotiate->command == CIRCPAD_COMMAND_STOP) { + /* Free the machine corresponding to this machine type */ + if (free_circ_machineinfos_with_machine_num(circ, + negotiate->machine_type)) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Received STOP command for machine %u", + negotiate->machine_type); + goto done; + } + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine."); + goto err; + } else if (negotiate->command == CIRCPAD_COMMAND_START) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(relay_padding_machines, + const circpad_machine_spec_t *, m) { + if (m->machine_num == negotiate->machine_type) { + circpad_setup_machine_on_circ(circ, m); + circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_received(circ); + goto done; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(m); + } + + err: + retval = -1; + + done: + circpad_padding_negotiated(circ, negotiate->machine_type, + negotiate->command, + (retval == 0) ? CIRCPAD_RESPONSE_OK : CIRCPAD_RESPONSE_ERR); + circpad_negotiate_free(negotiate); + + return retval; +} + +/** + * Parse and react to a padding_negotiated cell. + * + * This is called at the origin upon receipt of the middle's response + * to our choice of state machine. + * + * Returns -1 on error, 0 on success. + */ +signed_error_t +circpad_handle_padding_negotiated(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint) +{ + circpad_negotiated_t *negotiated; + + if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Padding negotiated cell unsupported at non-origin."); + return -1; + } + + /* Verify this came from the expected hop */ + if (!circpad_padding_is_from_expected_hop(circ, layer_hint)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Padding negotiated cell from wrong hop on circuit %u", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + if (circpad_negotiated_parse(&negotiated, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE-RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Received malformed PADDING_NEGOTIATED cell on circuit %u; " + "dropping.", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + if (negotiated->command == CIRCPAD_COMMAND_STOP) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Received STOP command on PADDING_NEGOTIATED for circuit %u", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier); + /* There may not be a padding_info here if we shut down the + * machine in circpad_shutdown_old_machines(). Or, if + * circpad_add_matching_matchines() added a new machine, + * there may be a padding_machine for a different machine num + * than this response. */ + free_circ_machineinfos_with_machine_num(circ, negotiated->machine_type); + } else if (negotiated->command == CIRCPAD_COMMAND_START && + negotiated->response == CIRCPAD_RESPONSE_ERR) { + // This can happen due to consensus drift.. free the machines + // and be sad + free_circ_machineinfos_with_machine_num(circ, negotiated->machine_type); + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->padding_negotiation_failed = 1; + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, + "Middle node did not accept our padding request on circuit %u (%d)", + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier, + circ->purpose); + } + + circpad_negotiated_free(negotiated); + return 0; +} + +/** Free memory allocated by this machine spec. */ +STATIC void +machine_spec_free_(circpad_machine_spec_t *m) +{ + if (!m) return; + + tor_free(m->states); + tor_free(m); +} + +/** Free all memory allocated by the circuitpadding subsystem. */ +void +circpad_free_all(void) +{ + if (origin_padding_machines) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(origin_padding_machines, + circpad_machine_spec_t *, m) { + machine_spec_free(m); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(m); + smartlist_free(origin_padding_machines); + } + if (relay_padding_machines) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(relay_padding_machines, + circpad_machine_spec_t *, m) { + machine_spec_free(m); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(m); + smartlist_free(relay_padding_machines); + } +} + +/* Serialization */ +// TODO: Should we use keyword=value here? Are there helpers for that? +#if 0 +static void +circpad_state_serialize(const circpad_state_t *state, + smartlist_t *chunks) +{ + smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, " %u", state->histogram[0]); + for (int i = 1; i < state->histogram_len; i++) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, ",%u", + state->histogram[i]); + } + + smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, " 0x%x", + state->transition_cancel_events); + + for (int i = 0; i < CIRCPAD_NUM_STATES; i++) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, ",0x%x", + state->transition_events[i]); + } + + smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, " %u %u", + state->use_rtt_estimate, + state->token_removal); +} + +char * +circpad_machine_spec_to_string(const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine) +{ + smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new(); + char *out; + (void)machine; + + circpad_state_serialize(&machine->start, chunks); + circpad_state_serialize(&machine->gap, chunks); + circpad_state_serialize(&machine->burst, chunks); + + out = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(chunks); + return out; +} + +// XXX: Writeme +const circpad_machine_spec_t * +circpad_string_to_machine(const char *str) +{ + (void)str; + return NULL; +} + +#endif /* 0 */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitpadding.h b/src/core/or/circuitpadding.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..74b69a1c7a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/circuitpadding.h @@ -0,0 +1,813 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file circuitpadding.h + * \brief Header file for circuitpadding.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CIRCUITPADDING_H +#define TOR_CIRCUITPADDING_H + +#include "trunnel/circpad_negotiation.h" +#include "lib/evloop/timers.h" + +struct circuit_t; +struct origin_circuit_t; +struct cell_t; + +/** + * Signed error return with the specific property that negative + * values mean error codes of various semantics, 0 means success, + * and positive values are unused. + * + * XXX: Tor uses this concept a lot but just calls it int. Should we move + * this somewhere centralized? Where? + */ +typedef int signed_error_t; + +/** + * These constants specify the types of events that can cause + * transitions between state machine states. + * + * Note that SENT and RECV are relative to this endpoint. For + * relays, SENT means packets destined towards the client and + * RECV means packets destined towards the relay. On the client, + * SENT means packets destined towards the relay, where as RECV + * means packets destined towards the client. + */ +typedef enum { + /* A non-padding cell was received. */ + CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_RECV = 0, + /* A non-padding cell was sent. */ + CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT = 1, + /* A padding cell (RELAY_COMMAND_DROP) was sent. */ + CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_SENT = 2, + /* A padding cell was received. */ + CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_RECV = 3, + /* We tried to schedule padding but we ended up picking the infinity bin + * which means that padding was delayed infinitely */ + CIRCPAD_EVENT_INFINITY = 4, + /* All histogram bins are empty (we are out of tokens) */ + CIRCPAD_EVENT_BINS_EMPTY = 5, + /* This state has used up its cell count */ + CIRCPAD_EVENT_LENGTH_COUNT = 6 +} circpad_event_t; +#define CIRCPAD_NUM_EVENTS ((int)CIRCPAD_EVENT_LENGTH_COUNT+1) + +/** Boolean type that says if we decided to transition states or not */ +typedef enum { + CIRCPAD_STATE_UNCHANGED = 0, + CIRCPAD_STATE_CHANGED = 1 +} circpad_decision_t; + +/** The type for the things in histogram bins (aka tokens) */ +typedef uint32_t circpad_hist_token_t; + +/** The type for histogram indexes (needs to be negative for errors) */ +typedef int8_t circpad_hist_index_t; + +/** The type for absolute time, from monotime_absolute_usec() */ +typedef uint64_t circpad_time_t; + +/** The type for timer delays, in microseconds */ +typedef uint32_t circpad_delay_t; +#define CIRCPAD_DELAY_UNITS_PER_SECOND (1000*1000) + +/** + * An infinite padding cell delay means don't schedule any padding -- + * simply wait until a different event triggers a transition. + * + * This means that the maximum delay we can schedule is UINT32_MAX-1 + * microseconds, or about 4300 seconds (1.25 hours). + * XXX: Is this enough if we want to simulate light, intermittent + * activity on an onion service? + */ +#define CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE (UINT32_MAX) + +/** + * This is the maximum delay that the circuit padding system can have, in + * seconds. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_DELAY_MAX_SECS \ + ((CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE/CIRCPAD_DELAY_UNITS_PER_SECOND)+1) + +/** + * Macro to clarify when we're checking the infinity bin. + * + * Works with either circpad_state_t or circpad_machine_runtime_t + */ +#define CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN(mi) ((mi)->histogram_len-1) + +/** + * These constants form a bitfield that specifies when a state machine + * should be applied to a circuit. + * + * If any of these elements is set, then the circuit will be tested against + * that specific condition. If an element is unset, then we don't test it. + * (E.g., if neither NO_STREAMS or STREAMS are set, then we will not care + * whether a circuit has streams attached when we apply a state machine.) + * + * The helper function circpad_circuit_state() converts circuit state + * flags into this more compact representation. + */ +typedef enum { + /* Only apply machine if the circuit is still building */ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_BUILDING = 1<<0, + /* Only apply machine if the circuit is open */ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED = 1<<1, + /* Only apply machine if the circuit has no attached streams */ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_NO_STREAMS = 1<<2, + /* Only apply machine if the circuit has attached streams */ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_STREAMS = 1<<3, + /* Only apply machine if the circuit still allows RELAY_EARLY cells */ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_HAS_RELAY_EARLY = 1<<4, + /* Only apply machine if the circuit has depleted its RELAY_EARLY cells + * allowance. */ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_HAS_NO_RELAY_EARLY = 1<<5 +} circpad_circuit_state_t; + +/** Bitmask that says "apply this machine to all states" */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_ALL \ + (CIRCPAD_CIRC_BUILDING|CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED| \ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_STREAMS|CIRCPAD_CIRC_NO_STREAMS| \ + CIRCPAD_CIRC_HAS_RELAY_EARLY|CIRCPAD_CIRC_HAS_NO_RELAY_EARLY) + +/** + * A compact circuit purpose bitfield mask that allows us to compactly + * specify which circuit purposes a machine should apply to. + * + * The helper function circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask() converts circuit + * purposes into bit positions in this bitmask. + */ +typedef uint32_t circpad_purpose_mask_t; + +/** Bitmask that says "apply this machine to all purposes". */ +#define CIRCPAD_PURPOSE_ALL (0xFFFFFFFF) + +/** + * This type specifies all of the conditions that must be met before + * a client decides to initiate padding on a circuit. + * + * A circuit must satisfy every sub-field in this type in order + * to be considered to match the conditions. + */ +typedef struct circpad_machine_conditions_t { + /** Only apply the machine *if* the circuit has at least this many hops */ + unsigned min_hops : 3; + + /** Only apply the machine *if* vanguards are enabled */ + unsigned requires_vanguards : 1; + + /** + * This machine is ok to use if reduced padding is set in consensus + * or torrc. This machine will still be applied even if reduced padding + * is not set; this flag only acts to exclude machines that don't have + * it set when reduced padding is requested. Therefore, reduced padding + * machines should appear at the lowest priority in the padding machine + * lists (aka first in the list), so that non-reduced padding machines + * for the same purpose are given a chance to apply when reduced padding + * is not requested. */ + unsigned reduced_padding_ok : 1; + + /** Only apply the machine *if* the circuit's state matches any of + * the bits set in this bitmask. */ + circpad_circuit_state_t state_mask; + + /** Only apply a machine *if* the circuit's purpose matches one + * of the bits set in this bitmask */ + circpad_purpose_mask_t purpose_mask; + +} circpad_machine_conditions_t; + +/** + * Token removal strategy options. + * + * The WTF-PAD histograms are meant to specify a target distribution to shape + * traffic towards. This is accomplished by removing tokens from the histogram + * when either padding or non-padding cells are sent. + * + * When we see a non-padding cell at a particular time since the last cell, you + * remove a token from the corresponding delay bin. These flags specify + * which bin to choose if that bin is already empty. + */ +typedef enum { + /** Don't remove any tokens */ + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE = 0, + /** + * Remove from the first non-zero higher bin index when current is zero. + * This is the recommended strategy from the Adaptive Padding paper. */ + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_HIGHER = 1, + /** Remove from the first non-zero lower bin index when current is empty. */ + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_LOWER = 2, + /** Remove from the closest non-zero bin index when current is empty. */ + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_CLOSEST = 3, + /** Remove from the closest bin by time value (since bins are + * exponentially spaced). */ + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_CLOSEST_USEC = 4, + /** Only remove from the exact bin corresponding to this delay. If + * the bin is 0, simply do nothing. Don't pick another bin. */ + CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_EXACT = 5 +} circpad_removal_t; + +/** + * Distribution types supported by circpad_distribution_sample(). + * + * These can be used instead of histograms for the inter-packet + * timing distribution, or to specify a distribution on the number + * of cells that can be sent while in a specific state of the state + * machine. + * + * Each distribution takes up to two parameters which are described below. */ +typedef enum { + /* No probability distribution is used */ + CIRCPAD_DIST_NONE = 0, + /* Uniform distribution: param1 is lower bound and param2 is upper bound */ + CIRCPAD_DIST_UNIFORM = 1, + /* Logistic distribution: param1 is Mu, param2 is sigma. */ + CIRCPAD_DIST_LOGISTIC = 2, + /* Log-logistic distribution: param1 is Alpha, param2 is 1.0/Beta */ + CIRCPAD_DIST_LOG_LOGISTIC = 3, + /* Geometric distribution: param1 is 'p' (success probability) */ + CIRCPAD_DIST_GEOMETRIC = 4, + /* Weibull distribution: param1 is k, param2 is Lambda */ + CIRCPAD_DIST_WEIBULL = 5, + /* Generalized Pareto distribution: param1 is sigma, param2 is xi */ + CIRCPAD_DIST_PARETO = 6 +} circpad_distribution_type_t; + +/** + * Distribution information. + * + * This type specifies a specific distribution above, as well as + * up to two parameters for that distribution. The specific + * per-distribution meaning of these parameters is specified + * in circpad_distribution_sample(). + */ +typedef struct circpad_distribution_t { + circpad_distribution_type_t type; + double param1; + double param2; +} circpad_distribution_t; + +/** State number type. Represents current state of state machine. */ +typedef uint16_t circpad_statenum_t; +#define CIRCPAD_STATENUM_MAX (UINT16_MAX) + +/** A histogram can be used to sample padding delays given a machine state. + * This constant defines the maximum histogram width (i.e. the max number of + * bins). + * + * The current limit is arbitrary and could be raised if there is a need, + * however too many bins will be hard to serialize in the future. + * + * Memory concerns are not so great here since the corresponding histogram and + * histogram_edges arrays are global and not per-circuit. + * + * If we ever upgrade this to a value that can't be represented by 8-bits we + * also need to upgrade circpad_hist_index_t. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_MAX_HISTOGRAM_LEN (100) + +/** + * A state of a padding state machine. The information here are immutable and + * represent the initial form of the state; it does not get updated as things + * happen. The mutable information that gets updated in runtime are carried in + * a circpad_machine_runtime_t. + * + * This struct describes the histograms and/or probability distributions, as + * well as parameters of a single state in the adaptive padding machine. + * Instances of this struct exist in global circpad machine definitions that + * come from torrc or the consensus. + */ +typedef struct circpad_state_t { + /** + * If a histogram is used for this state, this specifies the number of bins + * of this histogram. Histograms must have at least 2 bins. + * + * In particular, the following histogram: + * + * Tokens + * + + * 10 | +----+ + * 9 | | | +---------+ + * 8 | | | | | + * 7 | | | +-----+ | + * 6 +----+ Bin+-----+ | +---------------+ + * 5 | | #1 | | | | | + * | Bin| | Bin | Bin | Bin #4 | Bin #5 | + * | #0 | | #2 | #3 | | (infinity bin)| + * | | | | | | | + * | | | | | | | + * 0 +----+----+-----+-----+---------+---------------+ + * 0 100 200 350 500 1000 inf microseconds + * + * would be specified the following way: + * histogram_len = 6; + * histogram[] = { 6, 10, 6, 7, 9, 6 } + * histogram_edges[] = { 0, 100, 200, 350, 500, 1000 } + * + * The final bin is called the "infinity bin" and if it's chosen we don't + * schedule any padding. The infinity bin is strange because its lower edge + * is the max value of possible non-infinite delay allowed by this histogram, + * and its upper edge is CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE. You can tell if the infinity + * bin is chosen by inspecting its bin index or inspecting its upper edge. + * + * If a delay probability distribution is used for this state, this is set + * to 0. */ + circpad_hist_index_t histogram_len; + /** The histogram itself: an array of uint16s of tokens, whose + * widths are exponentially spaced, in microseconds. + * + * This array must have histogram_len elements that are strictly + * monotonically increasing. */ + circpad_hist_token_t histogram[CIRCPAD_MAX_HISTOGRAM_LEN]; + /* The histogram bin edges in usec. + * + * Each element of this array specifies the left edge of the corresponding + * bin. The rightmost edge is always infinity and is not specified in this + * array. + * + * This array must have histogram_len elements. */ + circpad_delay_t histogram_edges[CIRCPAD_MAX_HISTOGRAM_LEN+1]; + /** Total number of tokens in this histogram. This is a constant and is *not* + * decremented every time we spend a token. It's used for initializing and + * refilling the histogram. */ + uint32_t histogram_total_tokens; + + /** + * Represents a delay probability distribution (aka IAT distribution). It's a + * parametrized way of encoding inter-packet delay information in + * microseconds. It can be used instead of histograms. + * + * If it is used, token_removal below must be set to + * CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE. + * + * Start_usec, range_sec, and rtt_estimates are still applied to the + * results of sampling from this distribution (range_sec is used as a max). + */ + circpad_distribution_t iat_dist; + /* If a delay probability distribution is used, this is used as the max + * value we can sample from the distribution. However, RTT measurements and + * dist_added_shift gets applied on top of this value to derive the final + * padding delay. */ + circpad_delay_t dist_max_sample_usec; + /* If a delay probability distribution is used and this is set, we will add + * this value on top of the value sampled from the IAT distribution to + * derive the final padding delay (We also add the RTT measurement if it's + * enabled.). */ + circpad_delay_t dist_added_shift_usec; + + /** + * The length dist is a parameterized way of encoding how long this + * state machine runs in terms of sent padding cells or all + * sent cells. Values are sampled from this distribution, clamped + * to max_len, and then start_len is added to that value. + * + * It may be specified instead of or in addition to + * the infinity bins and bins empty conditions. */ + circpad_distribution_t length_dist; + /** A minimum length value, added to the output of length_dist */ + uint16_t start_length; + /** A cap on the length value that can be sampled from the length_dist */ + uint64_t max_length; + + /** Should we decrement length when we see a nonpadding packet? + * XXX: Are there any machines that actually want to set this to 0? There may + * not be. OTOH, it's only a bit.. */ + unsigned length_includes_nonpadding : 1; + + /** + * This is an array that specifies the next state to transition to upon + * receipt an event matching the indicated array index. + * + * This aborts our scheduled packet and switches to the state + * corresponding to the index of the array. Tokens are filled upon + * this transition. + * + * States are allowed to transition to themselves, which means re-schedule + * a new padding timer. They are also allowed to temporarily "transition" + * to the "IGNORE" and "CANCEL" pseudo-states. See defines below + * for details on state behavior and meaning. + */ + circpad_statenum_t next_state[CIRCPAD_NUM_EVENTS]; + + /** + * If true, estimate the RTT from this relay to the exit/website and add that + * to start_usec for use as the histogram bin 0 start delay. + * + * Right now this is only supported for relay-side state machines. + */ + unsigned use_rtt_estimate : 1; + + /** This specifies the token removal strategy to use upon padding and + * non-padding activity. */ + circpad_removal_t token_removal; +} circpad_state_t; + +/** + * The start state for this machine. + * + * In the original WTF-PAD, this is only used for transition to/from + * the burst state. All other fields are not used. But to simplify the + * code we've made it a first-class state. This has no performance + * consequences, but may make naive serialization of the state machine + * large, if we're not careful about how we represent empty fields. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_START 0 + +/** + * The burst state for this machine. + * + * In the original Adaptive Padding algorithm and in WTF-PAD + * (https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf and + * https://www.cs.kau.se/pulls/hot/thebasketcase-wtfpad/), the burst + * state serves to detect bursts in traffic. This is done by using longer + * delays in its histogram, which represent the expected delays between + * bursts of packets in the target stream. If this delay expires without a + * real packet being sent, the burst state sends a padding packet and then + * immediately transitions to the gap state, which is used to generate + * a synthetic padding packet train. In this implementation, this transition + * needs to be explicitly specified in the burst state's transition events. + * + * Because of this flexibility, other padding mechanisms can transition + * between these two states arbitrarily, to encode other dynamics of + * target traffic. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST 1 + +/** + * The gap state for this machine. + * + * In the original Adaptive Padding algorithm and in WTF-PAD, the gap + * state serves to simulate an artificial packet train composed of padding + * packets. It does this by specifying much lower inter-packet delays than + * the burst state, and transitioning back to itself after padding is sent + * if these timers expire before real traffic is sent. If real traffic is + * sent, it transitions back to the burst state. + * + * Again, in this implementation, these transitions must be specified + * explicitly, and other transitions are also permitted. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_GAP 2 + +/** + * End is a pseudo-state that causes the machine to go completely + * idle, and optionally get torn down (depending on the + * value of circpad_machine_spec_t.should_negotiate_end) + * + * End MUST NOT occupy a slot in the machine state array. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_END CIRCPAD_STATENUM_MAX + +/** + * "Ignore" is a pseudo-state that means "do not react to this + * event". + * + * "Ignore" MUST NOT occupy a slot in the machine state array. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_IGNORE (CIRCPAD_STATENUM_MAX-1) + +/** + * "Cancel" is a pseudo-state that means "cancel pending timers, + * but remain in your current state". + * + * Cancel MUST NOT occupy a slot in the machine state array. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_CANCEL (CIRCPAD_STATENUM_MAX-2) + +/** + * Since we have 3 pseudo-states, the max state array length is + * up to one less than cancel's statenum. + */ +#define CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINE_STATES (CIRCPAD_STATE_CANCEL-1) + +/** + * Mutable padding machine info. + * + * This structure contains mutable information about a padding + * machine. The mutable information must be kept separate because + * it exists per-circuit, where as the machines themselves are global. + * This separation is done to conserve space in the circuit structure. + * + * This is the per-circuit state that changes regarding the global state + * machine. Some parts of it are optional (ie NULL). + * + * XXX: Play with layout to minimize space on x64 Linux (most common relay). + */ +typedef struct circpad_machine_runtime_t { + /** The callback pointer for the padding callbacks. + * + * These timers stick around the machineinfo until the machineinfo's circuit + * is closed, at which point the timer is cancelled. For this reason it's + * safe to assume that the machineinfo exists if this timer gets + * triggered. */ + tor_timer_t *padding_timer; + + /** The circuit for this machine */ + struct circuit_t *on_circ; + + /** A mutable copy of the histogram for the current state. + * NULL if remove_tokens is false for that state */ + circpad_hist_token_t *histogram; + /** Length of the above histogram. + * XXX: This field *could* be removed at the expense of added + * complexity+overhead for reaching back into the immutable machine + * state every time we need to inspect the histogram. It's only a byte, + * though, so it seemed worth it. + */ + circpad_hist_index_t histogram_len; + /** Remove token from this index upon sending padding */ + circpad_hist_index_t chosen_bin; + + /** Stop padding/transition if this many cells sent */ + uint64_t state_length; +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_LENGTH_INFINITE UINT64_MAX + + /** A scaled count of padding packets sent, used to limit padding overhead. + * When this reaches UINT16_MAX, we cut it and nonpadding_sent in half. */ + uint16_t padding_sent; + /** A scaled count of non-padding packets sent, used to limit padding + * overhead. When this reaches UINT16_MAX, we cut it and padding_sent in + * half. */ + uint16_t nonpadding_sent; + + /** + * Timestamp of the most recent cell event (sent, received, padding, + * non-padding), in seconds from approx_time(). + * + * Used as an emergency break to stop holding padding circuits open. + */ + time_t last_cell_time_sec; + + /** + * EWMA estimate of the RTT of the circuit from this hop + * to the exit end, in microseconds. */ + circpad_delay_t rtt_estimate_usec; + + /** + * The last time we got an event relevant to estimating + * the RTT. Monotonic time in microseconds since system + * start. + */ + circpad_time_t last_received_time_usec; + + /** + * The time at which we scheduled a non-padding packet, + * or selected an infinite delay. + * + * Monotonic time in microseconds since system start. + * This is 0 if we haven't chosen a padding delay. + */ + circpad_time_t padding_scheduled_at_usec; + + /** What state is this machine in? */ + circpad_statenum_t current_state; + + /** + * True if we have scheduled a timer for padding. + * + * This is 1 if a timer is pending. It is 0 if + * no timer is scheduled. (It can be 0 even when + * padding_was_scheduled_at_usec is non-zero). + */ + unsigned is_padding_timer_scheduled : 1; + + /** + * If this is true, we have seen full duplex behavior. + * Stop updating the RTT. + */ + unsigned stop_rtt_update : 1; + +/** Max number of padding machines on each circuit. If changed, + * also ensure the machine_index bitwith supports the new size. */ +#define CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES (2) + /** Which padding machine index was this for. + * (make sure changes to the bitwidth can support the + * CIRCPAD_MAX_MACHINES define). */ + unsigned machine_index : 1; + +} circpad_machine_runtime_t; + +/** Helper macro to get an actual state machine from a machineinfo */ +#define CIRCPAD_GET_MACHINE(machineinfo) \ + ((machineinfo)->on_circ->padding_machine[(machineinfo)->machine_index]) + +/** + * This specifies a particular padding machine to use after negotiation. + * + * The constants for machine_num_t are in trunnel. + * We want to be able to define extra numbers in the consensus/torrc, though. + */ +typedef uint8_t circpad_machine_num_t; + +/** Global state machine structure from the consensus */ +typedef struct circpad_machine_spec_t { + /* Just a user-friendly machine name for logs */ + const char *name; + + /** Global machine number */ + circpad_machine_num_t machine_num; + + /** Which machine index slot should this machine go into in + * the array on the circuit_t */ + unsigned machine_index : 1; + + /** Send a padding negotiate to shut down machine at end state? */ + unsigned should_negotiate_end : 1; + + // These next three fields are origin machine-only... + /** Origin side or relay side */ + unsigned is_origin_side : 1; + + /** Which hop in the circuit should we send padding to/from? + * 1-indexed (ie: hop #1 is guard, #2 middle, #3 exit). */ + unsigned target_hopnum : 3; + + /** If this flag is enabled, don't close circuits that use this machine even + * if another part of Tor wants to close this circuit. + * + * If this flag is set, the circuitpadding subsystem will close circuits the + * moment the machine transitions to the END state, and only if the circuit + * has already been asked to be closed by another part of Tor. + * + * Circuits that should have been closed but were kept open by a padding + * machine are re-purposed to CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING, hence + * machines should take that purpose into account if they are filtering + * circuits by purpose. */ + unsigned manage_circ_lifetime : 1; + + /** This machine only kills fascists if the following conditions are met. */ + circpad_machine_conditions_t conditions; + + /** How many padding cells can be sent before we apply overhead limits? + * XXX: Note that we can only allow up to 64k of padding cells on an + * otherwise quiet circuit. Is this enough? It's 33MB. */ + uint16_t allowed_padding_count; + + /** Padding percent cap: Stop padding if we exceed this percent overhead. + * 0 means no limit. Overhead is defined as percent of total traffic, so + * that we can use 0..100 here. This is the same definition as used in + * Prop#265. */ + uint8_t max_padding_percent; + + /** State array: indexed by circpad_statenum_t */ + circpad_state_t *states; + + /** + * Number of states this machine has (ie: length of the states array). + * XXX: This field is not needed other than for safety. */ + circpad_statenum_t num_states; +} circpad_machine_spec_t; + +void circpad_new_consensus_params(const networkstatus_t *ns); + +int circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(circuit_t *circ, int reason); + +/** + * The following are event call-in points that are of interest to + * the state machines. They are called during cell processing. */ +void circpad_deliver_unrecognized_cell_events(struct circuit_t *circ, + cell_direction_t dir); +void circpad_deliver_sent_relay_cell_events(struct circuit_t *circ, + uint8_t relay_command); +void circpad_deliver_recognized_relay_cell_events(struct circuit_t *circ, + uint8_t relay_command, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint); + +/** Cell events are delivered by the above delivery functions */ +void circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_sent(struct circuit_t *on_circ); +void circpad_cell_event_nonpadding_received(struct circuit_t *on_circ); +void circpad_cell_event_padding_sent(struct circuit_t *on_circ); +void circpad_cell_event_padding_received(struct circuit_t *on_circ); + +/** Internal events are events the machines send to themselves */ +circpad_decision_t +circpad_internal_event_infinity(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); +circpad_decision_t +circpad_internal_event_bins_empty(circpad_machine_runtime_t *); +circpad_decision_t circpad_internal_event_state_length_up( + circpad_machine_runtime_t *); + +/** Machine creation events are events that cause us to set up or + * tear down padding state machines. */ +void circpad_machine_event_circ_added_hop(struct origin_circuit_t *on_circ); +void circpad_machine_event_circ_built(struct origin_circuit_t *circ); +void circpad_machine_event_circ_purpose_changed(struct origin_circuit_t *circ); +void circpad_machine_event_circ_has_streams(struct origin_circuit_t *circ); +void circpad_machine_event_circ_has_no_streams(struct origin_circuit_t *circ); +void +circpad_machine_event_circ_has_no_relay_early(struct origin_circuit_t *circ); + +void circpad_machines_init(void); +void circpad_machines_free(void); +void circpad_register_padding_machine(circpad_machine_spec_t *machine, + smartlist_t *machine_list); + +void circpad_machine_states_init(circpad_machine_spec_t *machine, + circpad_statenum_t num_states); + +void circpad_circuit_free_all_machineinfos(struct circuit_t *circ); + +bool circpad_padding_is_from_expected_hop(struct circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *from_hop); + +/** Serializaton functions for writing to/from torrc and consensus */ +char *circpad_machine_spec_to_string(const circpad_machine_spec_t *machine); +const circpad_machine_spec_t *circpad_string_to_machine(const char *str); + +/* Padding negotiation between client and middle */ +signed_error_t circpad_handle_padding_negotiate(struct circuit_t *circ, + struct cell_t *cell); +signed_error_t circpad_handle_padding_negotiated(struct circuit_t *circ, + struct cell_t *cell, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint); +signed_error_t circpad_negotiate_padding(struct origin_circuit_t *circ, + circpad_machine_num_t machine, + uint8_t target_hopnum, + uint8_t command); +bool circpad_padding_negotiated(struct circuit_t *circ, + circpad_machine_num_t machine, + uint8_t command, + uint8_t response); + +circpad_purpose_mask_t circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(uint8_t circ_purpose); + +int circpad_check_received_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint, + const relay_header_t *rh); + +MOCK_DECL(circpad_decision_t, +circpad_machine_schedule_padding,(circpad_machine_runtime_t *)); + +MOCK_DECL(circpad_decision_t, +circpad_machine_spec_transition, (circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_event_t event)); + +circpad_decision_t circpad_send_padding_cell_for_callback( + circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); + +void circpad_free_all(void); + +#ifdef CIRCUITPADDING_PRIVATE +STATIC void machine_spec_free_(circpad_machine_spec_t *m); +#define machine_spec_free(chan) \ + FREE_AND_NULL(circpad_machine_spec_t,machine_spec_free_, (m)) + +STATIC circpad_delay_t +circpad_machine_sample_delay(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); + +STATIC bool +circpad_machine_reached_padding_limit(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); + +STATIC circpad_delay_t +circpad_histogram_bin_to_usec(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_hist_index_t bin); + +STATIC const circpad_state_t * +circpad_machine_current_state(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); + +STATIC void circpad_machine_remove_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); + +STATIC circpad_hist_index_t circpad_histogram_usec_to_bin( + const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t us); + +STATIC circpad_machine_runtime_t *circpad_circuit_machineinfo_new( + struct circuit_t *on_circ, + int machine_index); +STATIC void circpad_machine_remove_higher_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_us); +STATIC void circpad_machine_remove_lower_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_us); +STATIC void circpad_machine_remove_closest_token(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_delay_t target_bin_us, + bool use_usec); +STATIC void circpad_machine_setup_tokens(circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi); + +MOCK_DECL(STATIC signed_error_t, +circpad_send_command_to_hop,(struct origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t hopnum, + uint8_t relay_command, const uint8_t *payload, + ssize_t payload_len)); + +MOCK_DECL(STATIC const node_t *, +circuit_get_nth_node,(origin_circuit_t *circ, int hop)); + +STATIC circpad_delay_t +histogram_get_bin_upper_bound(const circpad_machine_runtime_t *mi, + circpad_hist_index_t bin); + +STATIC void +circpad_add_matching_machines(origin_circuit_t *on_circ, + smartlist_t *machines_sl); + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +extern smartlist_t *origin_padding_machines; +extern smartlist_t *relay_padding_machines; + +#endif + +#endif /* defined(CIRCUITPADDING_PRIVATE) */ + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITPADDING_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.c b/src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98767f9e8f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.c @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2019 The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file circuitpadding_machines.c + * \brief Circuit padding state machines + * + * Introduce circuit padding machines that will be used by Tor circuits, as + * specified by proposal 302 "Hiding onion service clients using padding". + * + * Right now this file introduces two machines that aim to hide the client-side + * of onion service circuits against naive classifiers like the ones from the + * "Circuit Fingerprinting Attacks: Passive Deanonymization of Tor Hidden + * Services" paper from USENIX. By naive classifiers we mean classifiers that + * use basic features like "circuit construction circuits" and "incoming and + * outgoing cell counts" and "duration of activity". + * + * In particular, these machines aim to be lightweight and protect against + * these basic classifiers. They don't aim to protect against more advanced + * attacks that use deep learning or even correlate various circuit + * construction events together. Machines that fool such advanced classifiers + * are also possible, but they can't be so lightweight and might require more + * WTF-PAD features. So for now we opt for the following two machines: + * + * Client-side introduction circuit hiding machine: + * + * This machine hides client-side introduction circuits by making their + * circuit consruction sequence look like normal general circuits that + * download directory information. Furthermore, the circuits are kept open + * until all the padding has been sent, since intro circuits are usually + * very short lived and this act as a distinguisher. For more info see + * circpad_machine_client_hide_intro_circuits() and the sec. + * + * Client-side rendezvous circuit hiding machine: + * + * This machine hides client-side rendezvous circuits by making their + * circuit construction sequence look like normal general circuits. For more + * details see circpad_machine_client_hide_rend_circuits() and the spec. + * + * TODO: These are simple machines that carefully manipulate the cells of the + * initial circuit setup procedure to make them look like general + * circuits. In the future, more states can be baked into their state machine + * to do more advanced obfuscation. + **/ + +#define CIRCUITPADDING_MACHINES_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" + +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" + +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h" + +#include "core/or/circuitpadding_machines.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding.h" + +/** Create a client-side padding machine that aims to hide IP circuits. In + * particular, it keeps intro circuits alive until a bunch of fake traffic has + * been pushed through. + */ +void +circpad_machine_client_hide_intro_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl) +{ + circpad_machine_spec_t *client_machine + = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_machine_spec_t)); + + client_machine->name = "client_ip_circ"; + + client_machine->conditions.state_mask = CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED; + client_machine->target_hopnum = 2; + + /* This is a client machine */ + client_machine->is_origin_side = 1; + + /* We only want to pad introduction circuits, and we want to start padding + * only after the INTRODUCE1 cell has been sent, so set the purposes + * appropriately. + * + * In particular we want introduction circuits to blend as much as possible + * with general circuits. Most general circuits have the following initial + * relay cell sequence (outgoing cells marked in [brackets]): + * + * [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [BEGIN] -> CONNECTED + * -> [DATA] -> [DATA] -> DATA -> DATA...(inbound data cells continue) + * + * Whereas normal introduction circuits usually look like: + * + * [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 + * -> [INTRO1] -> INTRODUCE_ACK + * + * This means that up to the sixth cell (first line of each sequence above), + * both general and intro circuits have identical cell sequences. After that + * we want to mimic the second line sequence of + * -> [DATA] -> [DATA] -> DATA -> DATA...(inbound data cells continue) + * + * We achieve this by starting padding INTRODUCE1 has been sent. With padding + * negotiation cells, in the common case of the second line looks like: + * -> [INTRO1] -> [PADDING_NEGOTIATE] -> PADDING_NEGOTIATED -> INTRO_ACK + * + * Then, the middle node will send between INTRO_MACHINE_MINIMUM_PADDING and + * INTRO_MACHINE_MAXIMUM_PADDING cells, to match the "...(inbound data cells + * continue)" portion of the trace (aka the rest of an HTTPS response body). + */ + client_machine->conditions.purpose_mask = + circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)| + circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)| + circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING); + + /* Keep the circuit alive even after the introduction has been finished, + * otherwise the short-term lifetime of the circuit will blow our cover */ + client_machine->manage_circ_lifetime = 1; + + /* Set padding machine limits to help guard against excessive padding */ + client_machine->allowed_padding_count = INTRO_MACHINE_MAXIMUM_PADDING; + client_machine->max_padding_percent = 1; + + /* Two states: START, OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP (and END) */ + circpad_machine_states_init(client_machine, 2); + + /* For the origin-side machine, we transition to OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP after + * sending PADDING_NEGOTIATE, and we stay there (without sending any padding) + * until we receive a STOP from the other side. */ + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_START]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = + CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP; + + /* origin-side machine has no event reactions while in + * CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP, so no more state transitions here. */ + + /* The client side should never send padding, so it does not need + * to specify token removal, or a histogram definition or state lengths. + * That is all controlled by the middle node. */ + + /* Register the machine */ + client_machine->machine_num = smartlist_len(machines_sl); + circpad_register_padding_machine(client_machine, machines_sl); + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Registered client intro point hiding padding machine (%u)", + client_machine->machine_num); +} + +/** Create a relay-side padding machine that aims to hide IP circuits. See + * comments on the function above for more details on the workings of the + * machine. */ +void +circpad_machine_relay_hide_intro_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl) +{ + circpad_machine_spec_t *relay_machine + = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_machine_spec_t)); + + relay_machine->name = "relay_ip_circ"; + + relay_machine->conditions.state_mask = CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED; + + /* This is a relay-side machine */ + relay_machine->is_origin_side = 0; + + /* We want to negotiate END from this side after all our padding is done, so + * that the origin-side machine goes into END state, and eventually closes + * the circuit. */ + relay_machine->should_negotiate_end = 1; + + /* Set padding machine limits to help guard against excessive padding */ + relay_machine->allowed_padding_count = INTRO_MACHINE_MAXIMUM_PADDING; + relay_machine->max_padding_percent = 1; + + /* Two states: START, OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP (and END) */ + circpad_machine_states_init(relay_machine, 2); + + /* For the relay-side machine, we want to transition + * START -> OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP upon first non-padding + * cell sent (PADDING_NEGOTIATED in this case). */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_START]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = + CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP; + + /* For the relay-side, we want to transition from OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP to END + * state when the length finishes. */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_LENGTH_COUNT] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + + /* Now let's define the OBF -> OBF transitions that maintain our padding + * flow: + * + * For the relay-side machine, we want to keep on sending padding bytes even + * when nothing else happens on this circuit. */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_SENT] = + CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP; + /* For the relay-side machine, we need this transition so that we re-enter + the state, after PADDING_NEGOTIATED is sent. Otherwise, the remove token + function will disable the timer, and nothing will restart it since there + is no other motion on an intro circuit. */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = + CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP; + + /* Token removal strategy for OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP state: Don't + * remove any tokens. + * + * We rely on the state length sampling and not token removal, to avoid + * the mallocs required to copy the histograms for token removal, + * and to avoid monotime calls needed to determine histogram + * bins for token removal. */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + token_removal = CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE; + + /* Figure out the length of the OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP state so that it's + * randomized. The relay side will send between INTRO_MACHINE_MINIMUM_PADDING + * and INTRO_MACHINE_MAXIMUM_PADDING padding cells towards the client. */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.type = CIRCPAD_DIST_UNIFORM; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.param1 = INTRO_MACHINE_MINIMUM_PADDING; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.param2 = INTRO_MACHINE_MAXIMUM_PADDING; + + /* Configure histogram */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_len = 2; + + /* For the relay-side machine we want to batch padding instantly to pretend + * its an incoming directory download. So set the histogram edges tight: + * (1, 10ms, infinity). */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_edges[0] = 1000; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_edges[1] = 10000; + + /* We put all our tokens in bin 0, which means we want 100% probability + * for choosing a inter-packet delay of between 1000 and 10000 microseconds + * (1 to 10ms). Since we only have 1 bin, it doesn't matter how many tokens + * there are, 1000 out of 1000 is 100% */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram[0] = 1000; + + /* just one bin, so setup the total tokens */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_total_tokens = + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP].histogram[0]; + + /* Register the machine */ + relay_machine->machine_num = smartlist_len(machines_sl); + circpad_register_padding_machine(relay_machine, machines_sl); + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Registered relay intro circuit hiding padding machine (%u)", + relay_machine->machine_num); +} + +/************************** Rendezvous-circuit machine ***********************/ + +/** Create a client-side padding machine that aims to hide rendezvous + * circuits.*/ +void +circpad_machine_client_hide_rend_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl) +{ + circpad_machine_spec_t *client_machine + = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_machine_spec_t)); + + client_machine->name = "client_rp_circ"; + + /* Only pad after the circuit has been built and pad to the middle */ + client_machine->conditions.state_mask = CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED; + client_machine->target_hopnum = 2; + + /* This is a client machine */ + client_machine->is_origin_side = 1; + + /* We only want to pad rendezvous circuits, and we want to start padding only + * after the rendezvous circuit has been established. + * + * Following a similar argument as for intro circuits, we are aiming for + * padded rendezvous circuits to blend in with the initial cell sequence of + * general circuits which usually look like this: + * + * [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [BEGIN] -> CONNECTED + * -> [DATA] -> [DATA] -> DATA -> DATA...(incoming cells continue) + * + * Whereas normal rendezvous circuits usually look like: + * + * [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EST_REND] -> REND_EST + * -> REND2 -> [BEGIN] + * + * This means that up to the sixth cell (in the first line), both general and + * rend circuits have identical cell sequences. + * + * After that we want to mimic a [DATA] -> [DATA] -> DATA -> DATA sequence. + * + * With padding negotiation right after the REND_ESTABLISHED, the sequence + * becomes: + * + * [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EXTEND2] -> EXTENDED2 -> [EST_REND] -> REND_EST + * -> [PADDING_NEGOTIATE] -> [DROP] -> PADDING_NEGOTIATED -> DROP... + * + * After which normal application DATA cells continue on the circuit. + * + * Hence this way we make rendezvous circuits look like general circuits up + * till the end of the circuit setup. */ + client_machine->conditions.purpose_mask = + circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)| + circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY)| + circpad_circ_purpose_to_mask(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED); + + /* Set padding machine limits to help guard against excessive padding */ + client_machine->allowed_padding_count = 1; + client_machine->max_padding_percent = 1; + + /* Two states: START, OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP (and END) */ + circpad_machine_states_init(client_machine, 2); + + /* START -> OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP transition upon sending the first + * non-padding cell (which is PADDING_NEGOTIATE) */ + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_START]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = + CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP; + + /* OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP -> END transition when we send our first + * padding packet and/or hit the state length (the state length is 1). */ + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_RECV] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_LENGTH_COUNT] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + + /* Don't use a token removal strategy since we don't want to use monotime + * functions and we want to avoid mallocing histogram copies. We want + * this machine to be light. */ + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + token_removal = CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE; + + /* Instead, to control the volume of padding (we just want to send a single + * padding cell) we will use a static state length. We just want one token, + * since we want to make the following pattern: + * [PADDING_NEGOTIATE] -> [DROP] -> PADDING_NEGOTIATED -> DROP */ + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.type = CIRCPAD_DIST_UNIFORM; + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.param1 = 1; + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.param2 = 2; // rand(1,2) is always 1 + + /* Histogram is: (0 msecs, 1 msec, infinity). We want this to be fast so + * that we send our outgoing [DROP] before the PADDING_NEGOTIATED comes + * back from the relay side. */ + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_len = 2; + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_edges[0] = 0; + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_edges[1] = 1000; + + /* We want a 100% probability of choosing an inter-packet delay of + * between 0 and 1ms. Since we don't use token removal, + * the number of tokens does not matter. (And also, state_length + * governs how many packets we send). */ + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram[0] = 1; + client_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_total_tokens = 1; + + /* Register the machine */ + client_machine->machine_num = smartlist_len(machines_sl); + circpad_register_padding_machine(client_machine, machines_sl); + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Registered client rendezvous circuit hiding padding machine (%u)", + client_machine->machine_num); +} + +/** Create a relay-side padding machine that aims to hide IP circuits. + * + * This is meant to follow the client-side machine. + */ +void +circpad_machine_relay_hide_rend_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl) +{ + circpad_machine_spec_t *relay_machine + = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circpad_machine_spec_t)); + + relay_machine->name = "relay_rp_circ"; + + /* Only pad after the circuit has been built and pad to the middle */ + relay_machine->conditions.min_hops = 2; + relay_machine->conditions.state_mask = CIRCPAD_CIRC_OPENED; + + /* This is a relay-side machine */ + relay_machine->is_origin_side = 0; + + /* Set padding machine limits to help guard against excessive padding */ + relay_machine->allowed_padding_count = 1; + relay_machine->max_padding_percent = 1; + + /* Two states: START, OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP (and END) */ + circpad_machine_states_init(relay_machine, 2); + + /* START -> OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP transition upon sending the first + * non-padding cell (which is PADDING_NEGOTIATED) */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_START]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_NONPADDING_SENT] = + CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP; + + /* OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP -> END transition when we send our first + * padding packet and/or hit the state length (the state length is 1). */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_PADDING_SENT] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + next_state[CIRCPAD_EVENT_LENGTH_COUNT] = CIRCPAD_STATE_END; + + /* Don't use a token removal strategy since we don't want to use monotime + * functions and we want to avoid mallocing histogram copies. We want + * this machine to be light. */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + token_removal = CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE; + + /* Instead, to control the volume of padding (we just want to send a single + * padding cell) we will use a static state length. We just want one token, + * since we want to make the following pattern: + * [PADDING_NEGOTIATE] -> [DROP] -> PADDING_NEGOTIATED -> DROP */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.type = CIRCPAD_DIST_UNIFORM; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.param1 = 1; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + length_dist.param2 = 2; // rand(1,2) is always 1 + + /* Histogram is: (0 msecs, 1 msec, infinity). We want this to be fast so + * that the outgoing DROP cell is sent immediately after the + * PADDING_NEGOTIATED. */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_len = 2; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_edges[0] = 0; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_edges[1] = 1000; + + /* We want a 100% probability of choosing an inter-packet delay of + * between 0 and 1ms. Since we don't use token removal, + * the number of tokens does not matter. (And also, state_length + * governs how many packets we send). */ + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram[0] = 1; + relay_machine->states[CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP]. + histogram_total_tokens = 1; + + /* Register the machine */ + relay_machine->machine_num = smartlist_len(machines_sl); + circpad_register_padding_machine(relay_machine, machines_sl); + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Registered relay rendezvous circuit hiding padding machine (%u)", + relay_machine->machine_num); +} diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.h b/src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c9798d42d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2018 The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file circuitpadding_machines.h + * \brief Header file for circuitpadding_machines.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CIRCUITPADDING_MACHINES_H +#define TOR_CIRCUITPADDING_MACHINES_H + +void circpad_machine_relay_hide_intro_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl); +void circpad_machine_client_hide_intro_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl); +void circpad_machine_relay_hide_rend_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl); +void circpad_machine_client_hide_rend_circuits(smartlist_t *machines_sl); + +#ifdef CIRCUITPADDING_MACHINES_PRIVATE + +/** State of the padding machines that actually sends padding */ +#define CIRCPAD_STATE_OBFUSCATE_CIRC_SETUP CIRCPAD_STATE_BURST + +/** Constants defining the amount of padding that a machine will send to hide + * HS circuits. The actual value is sampled uniformly random between the + * min/max values. + */ + +/** Minimum number of relay-side padding cells to be sent by this machine */ +#define INTRO_MACHINE_MINIMUM_PADDING 7 +/** Maximum number of relay-side padding cells to be sent by this machine. + * The actual value will be sampled between the min and max.*/ +#define INTRO_MACHINE_MAXIMUM_PADDING 10 + +#endif /* defined(CIRCUITPADDING_MACHINES_PRIVATE) */ + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CIRCUITPADDING_MACHINES_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c index 2cde21fa1f..5875627b93 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/circuitstats.h" #include "app/config/config.h" -#include "app/config/confparse.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "lib/confmgt/confmgt.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include "lib/time/tvdiff.h" #include "lib/encoding/confline.h" #include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" +#include "feature/relay/relay_periodic.h" #include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h" #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" @@ -639,9 +640,9 @@ circuit_build_times_rewind_history(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, int n) void circuit_build_times_mark_circ_as_measurement_only(origin_circuit_t *circ) { - control_event_circuit_status(circ, - CIRC_EVENT_FAILED, - END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT); + circuit_event_status(circ, + CIRC_EVENT_FAILED, + END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT); circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT); /* Record this event to check for too many timeouts @@ -971,7 +972,7 @@ circuit_build_times_update_state(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, /** * Shuffle the build times array. * - * Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher-Yates_shuffle + * Adapted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher-Yates_shuffle */ static void circuit_build_times_shuffle_and_store_array(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, @@ -1182,7 +1183,7 @@ circuit_build_times_parse_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, /** * Estimates the Xm and Alpha parameters using - * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation * * The notable difference is that we use mode instead of min to estimate Xm. * This is because our distribution is frechet-like. We claim this is @@ -1197,7 +1198,7 @@ circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) int n=0,i=0,abandoned_count=0; build_time_t max_time=0; - /* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation */ + /* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation */ /* We sort of cheat here and make our samples slightly more pareto-like * and less frechet-like. */ cbt->Xm = circuit_build_times_get_xm(cbt); @@ -1269,9 +1270,9 @@ circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) * We use it to calculate the timeout and also to generate synthetic * values of time for circuits that timeout before completion. * - * See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantile_function, - * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverse_transform_sampling and - * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Generating_a_ + * See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantile_function, + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverse_transform_sampling and + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Generating_a_ * random_sample_from_Pareto_distribution * That's right. I'll cite wikipedia all day long. * @@ -1420,6 +1421,7 @@ void circuit_build_times_network_is_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { time_t now = approx_time(); + // XXXX this should use pubsub if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts > 0) { time_t time_since_live = now - cbt->liveness.network_last_live; log_notice(LD_CIRC, diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitstats.h b/src/core/or/circuitstats.h index 845d7b6722..52c9100f53 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitstats.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitstats.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ typedef struct { } network_liveness_t; /** Structure for circuit build times history */ -struct circuit_build_times_s { +struct circuit_build_times_t { /** The circular array of recorded build times in milliseconds */ build_time_t circuit_build_times[CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE]; /** Current index in the circuit_build_times circular array */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.c b/src/core/or/circuituse.c index efd69fb4a3..a88ccf9dd1 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -35,13 +35,15 @@ #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuitstats.h" #include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding.h" #include "core/or/connection_edge.h" #include "core/or/policies.h" #include "feature/client/addressmap.h" #include "feature/client/bridges.h" #include "feature/client/circpathbias.h" #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/client/proxymode.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_client.h" @@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" -static void circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void); +STATIC void circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void); static void circuit_increment_failure_count(void); /** Check whether the hidden service destination of the stream at @@ -177,7 +179,6 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST || purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET) { tor_addr_t addr; - const int family = tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address); if (!exitnode && !build_state->onehop_tunnel) { log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Not considering circuit with unknown router."); return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet, @@ -198,6 +199,8 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; /* this is a circuit to somewhere else */ if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest)) { /* we don't know the digest; have to compare addr:port */ + const int family = tor_addr_parse(&addr, + conn->socks_request->address); if (family < 0 || !tor_addr_eq(&build_state->chosen_exit->addr, &addr) || build_state->chosen_exit->port != conn->socks_request->port) @@ -210,12 +213,14 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ, return 0; } } - if (origin_circ->prepend_policy && family != -1) { - int r = compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&addr, - conn->socks_request->port, - origin_circ->prepend_policy); - if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED) - return 0; + if (origin_circ->prepend_policy) { + if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address) != -1) { + int r = compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&addr, + conn->socks_request->port, + origin_circ->prepend_policy); + if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED) + return 0; + } } if (exitnode && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode)) { /* can't exit from this router */ @@ -543,9 +548,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000, options->SocksTimeout * 1000)); + bool fixed_time = circuit_build_times_disabled(get_options()); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *,victim) { struct timeval cutoff; - bool fixed_time = circuit_build_times_disabled(get_options()); if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(victim) || /* didn't originate here */ victim->marked_for_close) /* don't mess with marked circs */ @@ -727,7 +733,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(get_circuit_build_times())) { log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Deciding to count the timeout for circuit %"PRIu32"\n", + "Deciding to count the timeout for circuit %"PRIu32, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier); /* Circuits are allowed to last longer for measurement. @@ -770,16 +776,11 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) { switch (victim->purpose) { case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY: - /* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in - * an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. A circ's - * pending_final_cpath field is non-NULL iff it is a rend circ - * and we have tried to send an INTRODUCE1 cell specifying it. - * Thus, if the pending_final_cpath field *is* NULL, then we - * want to not spare it. */ - if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state && - TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->pending_final_cpath == - NULL) + /* We only want to spare a rend circ iff it has been specified in an + * INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. */ + if (!hs_circ_is_rend_sent_in_intro1(CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim))) { break; + } FALLTHROUGH; case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED: @@ -1425,6 +1426,11 @@ circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn) if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) { hs_dec_rdv_stream_counter(origin_circ); } + + /* If there are no more streams on this circ, tell circpad */ + if (!origin_circ->p_streams) + circpad_machine_event_circ_has_no_streams(origin_circ); + return; } } else { @@ -1465,7 +1471,7 @@ circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn) /** Find each circuit that has been unused for too long, or dirty * for too long and has no streams on it: mark it for close. */ -static void +STATIC void circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) { struct timeval cutoff, now; @@ -1505,6 +1511,7 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT || circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO || circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || + circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_CIRCUIT_PADDING || (circ->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && circ->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) || circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) { @@ -1674,7 +1681,7 @@ circuit_testing_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ, int at_last_hop) void circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) { - control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0); + circuit_event_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0); /* Remember that this circuit has finished building. Now if we start * it building again later (e.g. by extending it), we will know not @@ -1954,23 +1961,61 @@ have_enough_path_info(int need_exit) int circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(uint8_t purpose) { - if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS) { - return 1; - } - - /* Client-side purpose */ - if (purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MIN_ && - purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MAX_) { - return 1; - } - - /* Service-side purpose */ - if (purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ && - purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; + /* HS Vanguard purpose. */ + if (circuit_purpose_is_hs_vanguards(purpose)) { + return 1; + } + + /* Client-side purpose */ + if (circuit_purpose_is_hs_client(purpose)) { + return 1; + } + + /* Service-side purpose */ + if (circuit_purpose_is_hs_service(purpose)) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Retrun true iff the given circuit is an HS client circuit. */ +bool +circuit_purpose_is_hs_client(const uint8_t purpose) +{ + return (purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MIN_ && + purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MAX_); +} + +/** Retrun true iff the given circuit is an HS service circuit. */ +bool +circuit_purpose_is_hs_service(const uint8_t purpose) +{ + return (purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ && + purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_); +} + +/** Retrun true iff the given circuit is an HS Vanguards circuit. */ +bool +circuit_purpose_is_hs_vanguards(const uint8_t purpose) +{ + return (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS); +} + +/** Retrun true iff the given circuit is an HS v2 circuit. */ +bool +circuit_is_hs_v2(const circuit_t *circ) +{ + return (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && + (CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_data != NULL)); +} + +/** Retrun true iff the given circuit is an HS v3 circuit. */ +bool +circuit_is_hs_v3(const circuit_t *circ) +{ + return (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && + (CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->hs_ident != NULL)); } /** @@ -2523,8 +2568,7 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(edge_conn->rend_data); } else if (edge_conn->hs_ident) { circ->hs_ident = - hs_ident_circuit_new(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk, - HS_IDENT_CIRCUIT_INTRO); + hs_ident_circuit_new(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk); } if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND && circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) @@ -2596,6 +2640,12 @@ link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ, /* add it into the linked list of streams on this circuit */ log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "attaching new conn to circ. n_circ_id %u.", (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id); + + /* If this is the first stream on this circuit, tell circpad + * that streams are attached */ + if (!circ->p_streams) + circpad_machine_event_circ_has_streams(circ); + /* reset it, so we can measure circ timeouts */ ENTRY_TO_CONN(apconn)->timestamp_last_read_allowed = time(NULL); ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->next_stream = circ->p_streams; @@ -3070,7 +3120,7 @@ circuit_change_purpose(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t new_purpose) /* Take specific actions if we are repurposing a hidden service circuit. */ if (circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(circ->purpose) && !circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(new_purpose)) { - hs_circ_cleanup(circ); + hs_circ_cleanup_on_repurpose(circ); } } @@ -3080,6 +3130,8 @@ circuit_change_purpose(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t new_purpose) if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { control_event_circuit_purpose_changed(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), old_purpose); + + circpad_machine_event_circ_purpose_changed(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)); } } @@ -3113,7 +3165,9 @@ circuit_sent_valid_data(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t relay_body_len) { if (!circ) return; - tor_assert_nonfatal(relay_body_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + tor_assertf_nonfatal(relay_body_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, + "Wrong relay_body_len: %d (should be at most %d)", + relay_body_len, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); circ->n_delivered_written_circ_bw = tor_add_u32_nowrap(circ->n_delivered_written_circ_bw, relay_body_len); diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.h b/src/core/or/circuituse.h index 25588dbb11..95d36d6474 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuituse.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -64,6 +64,15 @@ int hostname_in_track_host_exits(const or_options_t *options, void mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns(origin_circuit_t *circ); int circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(uint8_t); + +/* Series of helper functions for hidden services. */ +bool circuit_purpose_is_hs_client(const uint8_t purpose); +bool circuit_purpose_is_hs_service(const uint8_t purpose); +bool circuit_purpose_is_hs_vanguards(const uint8_t purpose); + +bool circuit_is_hs_v2(const circuit_t *circ); +bool circuit_is_hs_v3(const circuit_t *circ); + int circuit_should_use_vanguards(uint8_t); void circuit_sent_valid_data(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t relay_body_len); void circuit_read_valid_data(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t relay_body_len); diff --git a/src/core/or/command.c b/src/core/or/command.c index 5fb6640c22..8a1d2066cc 100644 --- a/src/core/or/command.c +++ b/src/core/or/command.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -49,11 +49,12 @@ #include "core/or/dos.h" #include "core/or/onion.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" #include "feature/nodelist/describe.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" +#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h" #include "feature/relay/routermode.h" #include "feature/stats/rephist.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" @@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ command_process_cell(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell) command_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \ command_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \ } STMT_END -#else /* !(defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS)) */ +#else /* !defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ #define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) command_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn) #endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ @@ -217,23 +218,6 @@ command_process_cell(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell) } } -/** Process an incoming var_cell from a channel; in the current protocol all - * the var_cells are handshake-related and handled below the channel layer, - * so this just logs a warning and drops the cell. - */ - -void -command_process_var_cell(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell) -{ - tor_assert(chan); - tor_assert(var_cell); - - log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Received unexpected var_cell above the channel layer of type %d" - "; dropping it.", - var_cell->command); -} - /** Process a 'create' <b>cell</b> that just arrived from <b>chan</b>. Make a * new circuit with the p_circ_id specified in cell. Put the circuit in state * onionskin_pending, and pass the onionskin to the cpuworker. Circ will get @@ -685,8 +669,7 @@ command_setup_channel(channel_t *chan) tor_assert(chan); channel_set_cell_handlers(chan, - command_process_cell, - command_process_var_cell); + command_process_cell); } /** Given a listener, install the right handler to process incoming diff --git a/src/core/or/command.h b/src/core/or/command.h index 8c90e1de6f..14ebb4a339 100644 --- a/src/core/or/command.h +++ b/src/core/or/command.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #include "core/or/channel.h" void command_process_cell(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell); -void command_process_var_cell(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *cell); void command_setup_channel(channel_t *chan); void command_setup_listener(channel_listener_t *chan_l); diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c index 84b80313ce..1394a41c73 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -62,21 +62,24 @@ #include "app/config/config.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" +#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding.h" #include "core/or/connection_edge.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" #include "core/or/policies.h" #include "core/or/reasons.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "core/or/sendme.h" #include "core/proto/proto_http.h" #include "core/proto/proto_socks.h" #include "feature/client/addressmap.h" #include "feature/client/circpathbias.h" #include "feature/client/dnsserv.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" @@ -97,7 +100,7 @@ #include "feature/rend/rendservice.h" #include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h" #include "feature/stats/rephist.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "core/or/cell_st.h" @@ -300,6 +303,11 @@ connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial) } return 0; case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN: + if (! conn->base_.linked) { + note_user_activity(approx_time()); + } + + FALLTHROUGH; case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN: if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, package_partial, NULL) < 0) { /* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */ @@ -424,6 +432,21 @@ warn_if_hs_unreachable(const edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason) } } +/** Given a TTL (in seconds) from a DNS response or from a relay, determine + * what TTL clients and relays should actually use for caching it. */ +uint32_t +clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl) +{ + /* This logic is a defense against "DefectTor" DNS-based traffic + * confirmation attacks, as in https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf . + * We only give two values: a "low" value and a "high" value. + */ + if (ttl < MIN_DNS_TTL) + return MIN_DNS_TTL; + else + return MAX_DNS_TTL; +} + /** Send a relay end cell from stream <b>conn</b> down conn's circuit, and * remember that we've done so. If this is not a client connection, set the * relay end cell's reason for closing as <b>reason</b>. @@ -472,7 +495,7 @@ connection_edge_end(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason) memcpy(payload+1, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&conn->base_.addr), 16); addrlen = 16; } - set_uint32(payload+1+addrlen, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(conn->address_ttl))); + set_uint32(payload+1+addrlen, htonl(clip_dns_ttl(conn->address_ttl))); payload_len += 4+addrlen; } @@ -754,8 +777,13 @@ connection_edge_flushed_some(edge_connection_t *conn) { switch (conn->base_.state) { case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN: + if (! conn->base_.linked) { + note_user_activity(approx_time()); + } + + FALLTHROUGH; case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN: - connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn); + sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending(conn); break; } return 0; @@ -779,7 +807,7 @@ connection_edge_finished_flushing(edge_connection_t *conn) switch (conn->base_.state) { case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN: case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN: - connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn); + sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending(conn); return 0; case AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT: case AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT: @@ -832,7 +860,7 @@ connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out, return -1; } - set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(ttl))); + set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(clip_dns_ttl(ttl))); connected_payload_len += 4; tor_assert(connected_payload_len <= MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN); @@ -1211,7 +1239,7 @@ connection_ap_rescan_and_attach_pending(void) entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_line = 0; \ entry_conn->marked_pending_circ_file = 0; \ } while (0) -#else /* !(defined(DEBUGGING_17659)) */ +#else /* !defined(DEBUGGING_17659) */ #define UNMARK() do { } while (0) #endif /* defined(DEBUGGING_17659) */ @@ -1540,6 +1568,107 @@ consider_plaintext_ports(entry_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port) return 0; } +/** Parse the given hostname in address. Returns true if the parsing was + * successful and type_out contains the type of the hostname. Else, false is + * returned which means it was not recognized and type_out is set to + * BAD_HOSTNAME. + * + * The possible recognized forms are (where true is returned): + * + * If address is of the form "y.onion" with a well-formed handle y: + * Put a NUL after y, lower-case it, and return ONION_V2_HOSTNAME or + * ONION_V3_HOSTNAME depending on the HS version. + * + * If address is of the form "x.y.onion" with a well-formed handle x: + * Drop "x.", put a NUL after y, lower-case it, and return + * ONION_V2_HOSTNAME or ONION_V3_HOSTNAME depending on the HS version. + * + * If address is of the form "y.onion" with a badly-formed handle y: + * Return BAD_HOSTNAME and log a message. + * + * If address is of the form "y.exit": + * Put a NUL after y and return EXIT_HOSTNAME. + * + * Otherwise: + * Return NORMAL_HOSTNAME and change nothing. + */ +STATIC bool +parse_extended_hostname(char *address, hostname_type_t *type_out) +{ + char *s; + char *q; + char query[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1]; + + s = strrchr(address,'.'); + if (!s) { + *type_out = NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* no dot, thus normal */ + goto success; + } + if (!strcmp(s+1,"exit")) { + *s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */ + *type_out = EXIT_HOSTNAME; /* .exit */ + goto success; + } + if (strcmp(s+1,"onion")) { + *type_out = NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* neither .exit nor .onion, thus normal */ + goto success; + } + + /* so it is .onion */ + *s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */ + /* locate a 'sub-domain' component, in order to remove it */ + q = strrchr(address, '.'); + if (q == address) { + *type_out = BAD_HOSTNAME; + goto failed; /* reject sub-domain, as DNS does */ + } + q = (NULL == q) ? address : q + 1; + if (strlcpy(query, q, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1) >= + HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1) { + *type_out = BAD_HOSTNAME; + goto failed; + } + if (q != address) { + memmove(address, q, strlen(q) + 1 /* also get \0 */); + } + /* v2 onion address check. */ + if (strlen(query) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32) { + *type_out = ONION_V2_HOSTNAME; + if (rend_valid_v2_service_id(query)) { + goto success; + } + goto failed; + } + + /* v3 onion address check. */ + if (strlen(query) == HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32) { + *type_out = ONION_V3_HOSTNAME; + if (hs_address_is_valid(query)) { + goto success; + } + goto failed; + } + + /* Reaching this point, nothing was recognized. */ + *type_out = BAD_HOSTNAME; + goto failed; + + success: + return true; + failed: + /* otherwise, return to previous state and return 0 */ + *s = '.'; + const bool is_onion = (*type_out == ONION_V2_HOSTNAME) || + (*type_out == ONION_V3_HOSTNAME); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Invalid %shostname %s; rejecting", + is_onion ? "onion " : "", + safe_str_client(address)); + if (*type_out == ONION_V3_HOSTNAME) { + *type_out = BAD_HOSTNAME; + } + return false; +} + /** How many times do we try connecting with an exit configured via * TrackHostExits before concluding that it won't work any more and trying a * different one? */ @@ -2007,16 +2136,15 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, const int automap = rr.automap; const addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source = rr.exit_source; - /* Now, we parse the address to see if it's an .onion or .exit or - * other special address. - */ - const hostname_type_t addresstype = parse_extended_hostname(socks->address); - /* Now see whether the hostname is bogus. This could happen because of an * onion hostname whose format we don't recognize. */ - if (addresstype == BAD_HOSTNAME) { + hostname_type_t addresstype; + if (!parse_extended_hostname(socks->address, &addresstype)) { control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s", escaped(socks->address)); + if (addresstype == BAD_HOSTNAME) { + conn->socks_request->socks_extended_error_code = SOCKS5_HS_BAD_ADDRESS; + } connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1; } @@ -2803,6 +2931,31 @@ connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn) return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL); } +static const char HTTP_CONNECT_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = + "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n" + "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" + "<html>\n" + "<head>\n" + "<title>This is an HTTP CONNECT tunnel, not a full HTTP Proxy</title>\n" + "</head>\n" + "<body>\n" + "<h1>This is an HTTP CONNECT tunnel, not an HTTP proxy.</h1>\n" + "<p>\n" + "It appears you have configured your web browser to use this Tor port as\n" + "an HTTP proxy.\n" + "</p><p>\n" + "This is not correct: This port is configured as a CONNECT tunnel, not\n" + "an HTTP proxy. Please configure your client accordingly. You can also\n" + "use HTTPS; then the client should automatically use HTTP CONNECT." + "</p>\n" + "<p>\n" + "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">" + "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more " + "information.\n" + "</p>\n" + "</body>\n" + "</html>\n"; + /** Called on an HTTP CONNECT entry connection when some bytes have arrived, * but we have not yet received a full HTTP CONNECT request. Try to parse an * HTTP CONNECT request from the connection's inbuf. On success, set up the @@ -2843,7 +2996,7 @@ connection_ap_process_http_connect(entry_connection_t *conn) tor_assert(command); tor_assert(addrport); if (strcasecmp(command, "connect")) { - errmsg = "HTTP/1.0 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n\r\n"; + errmsg = HTTP_CONNECT_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG; goto err; } @@ -3309,8 +3462,9 @@ tell_controller_about_resolved_result(entry_connection_t *conn, expires = time(NULL) + ttl; if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len >= 4) { char *cp = tor_dup_ip(ntohl(get_uint32(answer))); - control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address, - cp, expires, NULL, 0); + if (cp) + control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address, + cp, expires, NULL, 0); tor_free(cp); } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) { char *cp = tor_strndup(answer, answer_len); @@ -3383,7 +3537,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved,(entry_connection_t *conn, } } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && answer_len == 16) { tor_addr_t a; - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&a, (char*)answer); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&a, answer); if (! tor_addr_is_null(&a)) { client_dns_set_addressmap(conn, conn->socks_request->address, &a, @@ -3484,11 +3638,17 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply, size_t replylen, int endreason) { char buf[256]; - socks5_reply_status_t status = - stream_end_reason_to_socks5_response(endreason); + socks5_reply_status_t status; tor_assert(conn->socks_request); /* make sure it's an AP stream */ + if (conn->socks_request->socks_use_extended_errors && + conn->socks_request->socks_extended_error_code != 0) { + status = conn->socks_request->socks_extended_error_code; + } else { + status = stream_end_reason_to_socks5_response(endreason); + } + if (!SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) { control_event_stream_status(conn, status==SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED ? STREAM_EVENT_SUCCEEDED : STREAM_EVENT_FAILED, @@ -3706,6 +3866,10 @@ handle_hs_exit_conn(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn) /* Link the circuit and the connection crypt path. */ conn->cpath_layer = origin_circ->cpath->prev; + /* If this is the first stream on this circuit, tell circpad */ + if (!origin_circ->p_streams) + circpad_machine_event_circ_has_streams(origin_circ); + /* Add it into the linked list of p_streams on this circuit */ conn->next_stream = origin_circ->p_streams; origin_circ->p_streams = conn; @@ -3796,6 +3960,7 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) if (! bcell.is_begindir) { /* Steal reference */ + tor_assert(bcell.address); address = bcell.address; port = bcell.port; @@ -4300,68 +4465,6 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, return 1; } -/** If address is of the form "y.onion" with a well-formed handle y: - * Put a NUL after y, lower-case it, and return ONION_V2_HOSTNAME or - * ONION_V3_HOSTNAME depending on the HS version. - * - * If address is of the form "x.y.onion" with a well-formed handle x: - * Drop "x.", put a NUL after y, lower-case it, and return - * ONION_V2_HOSTNAME or ONION_V3_HOSTNAME depending on the HS version. - * - * If address is of the form "y.onion" with a badly-formed handle y: - * Return BAD_HOSTNAME and log a message. - * - * If address is of the form "y.exit": - * Put a NUL after y and return EXIT_HOSTNAME. - * - * Otherwise: - * Return NORMAL_HOSTNAME and change nothing. - */ -hostname_type_t -parse_extended_hostname(char *address) -{ - char *s; - char *q; - char query[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1]; - - s = strrchr(address,'.'); - if (!s) - return NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* no dot, thus normal */ - if (!strcmp(s+1,"exit")) { - *s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */ - return EXIT_HOSTNAME; /* .exit */ - } - if (strcmp(s+1,"onion")) - return NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* neither .exit nor .onion, thus normal */ - - /* so it is .onion */ - *s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */ - /* locate a 'sub-domain' component, in order to remove it */ - q = strrchr(address, '.'); - if (q == address) { - goto failed; /* reject sub-domain, as DNS does */ - } - q = (NULL == q) ? address : q + 1; - if (strlcpy(query, q, HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1) >= - HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32+1) - goto failed; - if (q != address) { - memmove(address, q, strlen(q) + 1 /* also get \0 */); - } - if (rend_valid_v2_service_id(query)) { - return ONION_V2_HOSTNAME; /* success */ - } - if (hs_address_is_valid(query)) { - return ONION_V3_HOSTNAME; - } - failed: - /* otherwise, return to previous state and return 0 */ - *s = '.'; - log_warn(LD_APP, "Invalid onion hostname %s; rejecting", - safe_str_client(address)); - return BAD_HOSTNAME; -} - /** Return true iff the (possibly NULL) <b>alen</b>-byte chunk of memory at * <b>a</b> is equal to the (possibly NULL) <b>blen</b>-byte chunk of memory * at <b>b</b>. */ @@ -4565,6 +4668,25 @@ circuit_clear_isolation(origin_circuit_t *circ) circ->socks_username_len = circ->socks_password_len = 0; } +/** Send an END and mark for close the given edge connection conn using the + * given reason that has to be a stream reason. + * + * Note: We don't unattached the AP connection (if applicable) because we + * don't want to flush the remaining data. This function aims at ending + * everything quickly regardless of the connection state. + * + * This function can't fail and does nothing if conn is NULL. */ +void +connection_edge_end_close(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason) +{ + if (!conn) { + return; + } + + connection_edge_end(conn, reason); + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); +} + /** Free all storage held in module-scoped variables for connection_edge.c */ void connection_edge_free_all(void) diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.h b/src/core/or/connection_edge.h index 68d8b19a11..8c06af5664 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -71,6 +71,15 @@ entry_connection_t *EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(edge_connection_t *); #define connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, endreason) \ connection_mark_unattached_ap_((conn), (endreason), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__) +/** Possible return values for parse_extended_hostname. */ +typedef enum hostname_type_t { + BAD_HOSTNAME, + EXIT_HOSTNAME, + NORMAL_HOSTNAME, + ONION_V2_HOSTNAME, + ONION_V3_HOSTNAME, +} hostname_type_t; + MOCK_DECL(void,connection_mark_unattached_ap_, (entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason, int line, const char *file)); @@ -80,6 +89,7 @@ int connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int connection_edge_destroy(circid_t circ_id, edge_connection_t *conn); int connection_edge_end(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason); int connection_edge_end_errno(edge_connection_t *conn); +void connection_edge_end_close(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason); int connection_edge_flushed_some(edge_connection_t *conn); int connection_edge_finished_flushing(edge_connection_t *conn); int connection_edge_finished_connecting(edge_connection_t *conn); @@ -154,13 +164,6 @@ int connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *cpath); -/** Possible return values for parse_extended_hostname. */ -typedef enum hostname_type_t { - NORMAL_HOSTNAME, ONION_V2_HOSTNAME, ONION_V3_HOSTNAME, - EXIT_HOSTNAME, BAD_HOSTNAME -} hostname_type_t; -hostname_type_t parse_extended_hostname(char *address); - #if defined(HAVE_NET_IF_H) && defined(HAVE_NET_PFVAR_H) int get_pf_socket(void); #endif @@ -179,6 +182,21 @@ void connection_ap_warn_and_unmark_if_pending_circ( entry_connection_t *entry_conn, const char *where); +/** Lowest value for DNS ttl that a server should give or a client should + * believe. */ +#define MIN_DNS_TTL (5*60) +/** Highest value for DNS ttl that a server should give or a client should + * believe. */ +#define MAX_DNS_TTL (60*60) +/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of + * their TTL)? */ +#define MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE (3*60*60) +/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is + * known? */ +#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60) + +uint32_t clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl); + int connection_half_edge_is_valid_data(const smartlist_t *half_conns, streamid_t stream_id); int connection_half_edge_is_valid_sendme(const smartlist_t *half_conns, @@ -218,6 +236,8 @@ void half_edge_free_(struct half_edge_t *he); #ifdef CONNECTION_EDGE_PRIVATE +STATIC bool parse_extended_hostname(char *address, hostname_type_t *type_out); + /** A parsed BEGIN or BEGIN_DIR cell */ typedef struct begin_cell_t { /** The address the client has asked us to connect to, or NULL if this is diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.c b/src/core/or/connection_or.c index 67157d8d0b..b88d1b6afb 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -18,17 +18,19 @@ * tortls.c) which it uses as its TLS stream. It is responsible for * sending and receiving cells over that TLS. * - * This module also implements the client side of the v3 Tor link handshake, + * This module also implements the client side of the v3 (and greater) Tor + * link handshake. **/ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "feature/client/bridges.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" /* * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t). */ -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE #define CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE +#define ORCONN_EVENT_PRIVATE #include "core/or/channel.h" #include "core/or/channeltls.h" #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" @@ -38,14 +40,14 @@ #include "app/config/config.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" -#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "feature/relay/relay_handshake.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "feature/dirauth/reachability.h" #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" #include "lib/geoip/geoip.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" -#include "trunnel/link_handshake.h" +#include "trunnel/netinfo.h" #include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" @@ -76,7 +78,8 @@ #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" -#include "lib/tls/x509.h" + +#include "core/or/orconn_event.h" static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn); static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn); @@ -91,13 +94,6 @@ static unsigned int connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn); static void connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn); -/* - * Call this when changing connection state, so notifications to the owning - * channel can be handled. - */ - -static void connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state); - static void connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here); @@ -112,10 +108,6 @@ TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *c) return DOWNCAST(or_connection_t, c); } -/** Global map between Extended ORPort identifiers and OR - * connections. */ -static digestmap_t *orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL; - /** Clear clear conn->identity_digest and update other data * structures as appropriate.*/ void @@ -201,71 +193,6 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, channel_set_identity_digest(chan, rsa_digest, ed_id); } -/** Remove the Extended ORPort identifier of <b>conn</b> from the - * global identifier list. Also, clear the identifier from the - * connection itself. */ -void -connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn) -{ - or_connection_t *tmp; - if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map) - return; - if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id) - return; - - tmp = digestmap_remove(orconn_ext_or_id_map, conn->ext_or_conn_id); - if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id)) - tor_assert(tmp == conn); - - memset(conn->ext_or_conn_id, 0, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); -} - -/** Return the connection whose ext_or_id is <b>id</b>. Return NULL if no such - * connection is found. */ -or_connection_t * -connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id) -{ - if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map) - return NULL; - return digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, id); -} - -/** Deallocate the global Extended ORPort identifier list */ -void -connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void) -{ - digestmap_free(orconn_ext_or_id_map, NULL); - orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL; -} - -/** Creates an Extended ORPort identifier for <b>conn</b> and deposits - * it into the global list of identifiers. */ -void -connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn) -{ - char random_id[EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN]; - or_connection_t *tmp; - - if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map) - orconn_ext_or_id_map = digestmap_new(); - - /* Remove any previous identifiers: */ - if (conn->ext_or_conn_id && !tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id)) - connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(conn); - - do { - crypto_rand(random_id, sizeof(random_id)); - } while (digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id)); - - if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id) - conn->ext_or_conn_id = tor_malloc_zero(EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); - - memcpy(conn->ext_or_conn_id, random_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); - - tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id, conn); - tor_assert(!tmp); -} - /**************************************************************/ /** Map from a string describing what a non-open OR connection was doing when @@ -400,23 +327,69 @@ connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain) smartlist_free(items); } +/** + * Helper function to publish an OR connection status event + * + * Publishes a messages to subscribers of ORCONN messages, and sends + * the control event. + **/ +void +connection_or_event_status(or_connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t tp, + int reason) +{ + orconn_status_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg)); + + msg->gid = conn->base_.global_identifier; + msg->status = tp; + msg->reason = reason; + orconn_status_publish(msg); + control_event_or_conn_status(conn, tp, reason); +} + +/** + * Helper function to publish a state change message + * + * connection_or_change_state() calls this to notify subscribers about + * a change of an OR connection state. + **/ +static void +connection_or_state_publish(const or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state) +{ + orconn_state_msg_t *msg = tor_malloc(sizeof(*msg)); + + msg->gid = conn->base_.global_identifier; + if (conn->is_pt) { + /* Do extra decoding because conn->proxy_type indicates the proxy + * protocol that tor uses to talk with the transport plugin, + * instead of PROXY_PLUGGABLE. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->proxy_type != PROXY_NONE); + msg->proxy_type = PROXY_PLUGGABLE; + } else { + msg->proxy_type = conn->proxy_type; + } + msg->state = state; + if (conn->chan) { + msg->chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->global_identifier; + } else { + msg->chan = 0; + } + orconn_state_publish(msg); +} + /** Call this to change or_connection_t states, so the owning channel_tls_t can * be notified. */ -static void -connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state) +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void, +connection_or_change_state,(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)) { - uint8_t old_state; - tor_assert(conn); - old_state = conn->base_.state; conn->base_.state = state; + connection_or_state_publish(conn, state); if (conn->chan) - channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(conn->chan, conn, - old_state, state); + channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(conn->chan, conn, state); } /** Return the number of circuits using an or_connection_t; this used to @@ -676,6 +649,19 @@ connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn) switch (conn->base_.state) { case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING: + /* PROXY_HAPROXY gets connected by receiving an ack. */ + if (conn->proxy_type == PROXY_HAPROXY) { + tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_HAPROXY_WAIT_FOR_FLUSH); + TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state = PROXY_CONNECTED; + + if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) { + /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */ + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return -1; + } + break; + } + break; case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: @@ -707,8 +693,6 @@ connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn) log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.", conn->address,conn->port); - control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE, 0); - control_event_boot_first_orconn(); if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) { /* start proxy handshake */ @@ -717,8 +701,9 @@ connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn) return -1; } - connection_start_reading(conn); connection_or_change_state(or_conn, OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING); + connection_start_reading(conn); + return 0; } @@ -758,21 +743,27 @@ connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn) entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)); if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) { int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error); - control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, - reason); - if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) - control_event_bootstrap_prob_or( - orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason), - reason, or_conn); + connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, + reason); + if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) { + const char *warning = NULL; + if (reason == END_OR_CONN_REASON_TLS_ERROR && or_conn->tls) { + warning = tor_tls_get_last_error_msg(or_conn->tls); + } + if (warning == NULL) { + warning = orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason); + } + control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(warning, reason, or_conn); + } } } } else if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) { /* We only set hold_open_until_flushed when we're intentionally * closing a connection. */ - control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED, + connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED, tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error)); } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(or_conn->identity_digest)) { - control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED, + connection_or_event_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED, tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error)); } } @@ -918,12 +909,21 @@ connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here) } if (r) { - tor_addr_port_t node_ap; - node_get_pref_orport(r, &node_ap); - /* XXXX proposal 186 is making this more complex. For now, a conn - is canonical when it uses the _preferred_ address. */ - if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr)) + tor_addr_port_t node_ipv4_ap; + tor_addr_port_t node_ipv6_ap; + node_get_prim_orport(r, &node_ipv4_ap); + node_get_pref_ipv6_orport(r, &node_ipv6_ap); + if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv4_ap.addr) || + tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ipv6_ap.addr)) { connection_or_set_canonical(conn, 1); + } + /* Choose the correct canonical address and port. */ + tor_addr_port_t *node_ap; + if (tor_addr_family(&conn->base_.addr) == AF_INET) { + node_ap = &node_ipv4_ap; + } else { + node_ap = &node_ipv6_ap; + } if (!started_here) { /* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense. * This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by @@ -935,13 +935,14 @@ connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here) * right IP address and port 56244, that wouldn't be as helpful. now we * log the "right" port too, so we know if it's moria1 or moria2. */ - tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr); - conn->base_.port = node_ap.port; + /* See #33898 for a ticket that resolves this technical debt. */ + tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap->addr); + conn->base_.port = node_ap->port; } tor_free(conn->nickname); conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r)); tor_free(conn->base_.address); - conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap.addr); + conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap->addr); } else { tor_free(conn->nickname); conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2); @@ -1229,11 +1230,11 @@ or_connect_failure_ht_hash(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *entry) } HT_PROTOTYPE(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node, - or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq) + or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq); HT_GENERATE2(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node, or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq, - 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_) + 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_); /* Initialize a given connect failure entry with the given identity_digest, * addr and port. All field are optional except ocf. */ @@ -1364,7 +1365,7 @@ void connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn, int reason, const char *msg) { - control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, reason); + connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, reason); if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(get_options())) control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(msg, reason, conn); note_or_connect_failed(conn); @@ -1430,7 +1431,7 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, int r; tor_addr_t proxy_addr; uint16_t proxy_port; - int proxy_type; + int proxy_type, is_pt = 0; tor_assert(_addr); tor_assert(id_digest); @@ -1471,21 +1472,27 @@ connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, return NULL; } - connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING); - control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0); - conn->is_outgoing = 1; /* If we are using a proxy server, find it and use it. */ - r = get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, TO_CONN(conn)); + r = get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, &is_pt, + TO_CONN(conn)); if (r == 0) { conn->proxy_type = proxy_type; if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) { tor_addr_copy(&addr, &proxy_addr); port = proxy_port; conn->base_.proxy_state = PROXY_INFANT; + conn->is_pt = is_pt; } + connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING); + connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0); } else { + /* This duplication of state change calls is necessary in case we + * run into an error condition below */ + connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING); + connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0); + /* get_proxy_addrport() might fail if we have a Bridge line that references a transport, but no ClientTransportPlugin lines defining its transport proxy. If this is the case, let's try to @@ -1691,7 +1698,8 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) switch (result) { CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY: - log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.", + conn->tls_error = result; + log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.", tor_tls_err_to_string(result)); return -1; case TOR_TLS_DONE: @@ -1723,6 +1731,7 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted read"); return 0; case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: + conn->tls_error = result; log_info(LD_OR,"tls closed. breaking connection."); return -1; } @@ -1981,8 +1990,8 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn, /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */ entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); - control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, - END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY); + connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, + END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY); if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) control_event_bootstrap_prob_or( "Unexpected identity in router certificate", @@ -2222,7 +2231,7 @@ int connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn) { connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN); - control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0); + connection_or_event_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0); /* Link protocol 3 appeared in Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha, so any connection * that uses an earlier link protocol should not be treated as a relay. */ @@ -2252,6 +2261,8 @@ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) cell_pack(&networkcell, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids); + /* We need to count padding cells from this non-packed code path + * since they are sent via chan->write_cell() (which is not packed) */ rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL); if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING) rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_CELL); @@ -2262,7 +2273,7 @@ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) if (conn->chan) { channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); - if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->currently_padding) { + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->padding_enabled) { rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL); if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING) rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL); @@ -2292,6 +2303,7 @@ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell, if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0); + rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL); /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */ if (conn->chan) channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); @@ -2428,6 +2440,31 @@ connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus) return 0; } +static netinfo_addr_t * +netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(const tor_addr_t *tor_addr) +{ + sa_family_t addr_family = tor_addr_family(tor_addr); + + if (BUG(addr_family != AF_INET && addr_family != AF_INET6)) + return NULL; + + netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr = netinfo_addr_new(); + + if (addr_family == AF_INET) { + netinfo_addr_set_addr_type(netinfo_addr, NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4); + netinfo_addr_set_len(netinfo_addr, 4); + netinfo_addr_set_addr_ipv4(netinfo_addr, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(tor_addr)); + } else if (addr_family == AF_INET6) { + netinfo_addr_set_addr_type(netinfo_addr, NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6); + netinfo_addr_set_len(netinfo_addr, 16); + uint8_t *ipv6_buf = netinfo_addr_getarray_addr_ipv6(netinfo_addr); + const uint8_t *in6_addr = tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(tor_addr); + memcpy(ipv6_buf, in6_addr, 16); + } + + return netinfo_addr; +} + /** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know * about their address, our address, and the current time. */ MOCK_IMPL(int, @@ -2436,8 +2473,7 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn)) cell_t cell; time_t now = time(NULL); const routerinfo_t *me; - int len; - uint8_t *out; + int r = -1; tor_assert(conn->handshake_state); @@ -2450,20 +2486,21 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn)) memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); cell.command = CELL_NETINFO; + netinfo_cell_t *netinfo_cell = netinfo_cell_new(); + /* Timestamp, if we're a relay. */ if (public_server_mode(get_options()) || ! conn->is_outgoing) - set_uint32(cell.payload, htonl((uint32_t)now)); + netinfo_cell_set_timestamp(netinfo_cell, (uint32_t)now); /* Their address. */ - out = cell.payload + 4; + const tor_addr_t *remote_tor_addr = + !tor_addr_is_null(&conn->real_addr) ? &conn->real_addr : &conn->base_.addr; /* We use &conn->real_addr below, unless it hasn't yet been set. If it * hasn't yet been set, we know that base_.addr hasn't been tampered with * yet either. */ - len = append_address_to_payload(out, !tor_addr_is_null(&conn->real_addr) - ? &conn->real_addr : &conn->base_.addr); - if (len<0) - return -1; - out += len; + netinfo_addr_t *their_addr = netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(remote_tor_addr); + + netinfo_cell_set_other_addr(netinfo_cell, their_addr); /* My address -- only include it if I'm a public relay, or if I'm a * bridge and this is an incoming connection. If I'm a bridge and this @@ -2471,556 +2508,40 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn)) if ((public_server_mode(get_options()) || !conn->is_outgoing) && (me = router_get_my_routerinfo())) { tor_addr_t my_addr; - *out++ = 1 + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr); - tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&my_addr, me->addr); - len = append_address_to_payload(out, &my_addr); - if (len < 0) - return -1; - out += len; - - if (!tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr)) { - len = append_address_to_payload(out, &me->ipv6_addr); - if (len < 0) - return -1; - } - } else { - *out = 0; - } - - conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0; - conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1; - connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn); - - return 0; -} - -/** Helper used to add an encoded certs to a cert cell */ -static void -add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell_t *certs_cell, - uint8_t cert_type, - const uint8_t *cert_encoded, - size_t cert_len) -{ - tor_assert(cert_len <= UINT16_MAX); - certs_cell_cert_t *ccc = certs_cell_cert_new(); - ccc->cert_type = cert_type; - ccc->cert_len = cert_len; - certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(ccc, cert_len); - memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(ccc), cert_encoded, cert_len); - - certs_cell_add_certs(certs_cell, ccc); -} - -/** Add an encoded X509 cert (stored as <b>cert_len</b> bytes at - * <b>cert_encoded</b>) to the trunnel certs_cell_t object that we are - * building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to <b>cert_type</b>. - * (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */ -static void -add_x509_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell, - uint8_t cert_type, - const tor_x509_cert_t *cert) -{ - if (NULL == cert) - return; - const uint8_t *cert_encoded = NULL; - size_t cert_len; - tor_x509_cert_get_der(cert, &cert_encoded, &cert_len); + uint8_t n_my_addrs = 1 + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr); + netinfo_cell_set_n_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, n_my_addrs); - add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type, cert_encoded, cert_len); -} + netinfo_cell_add_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, + netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(&my_addr)); -/** Add an Ed25519 cert from <b>cert</b> to the trunnel certs_cell_t object - * that we are building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to - * <b>cert_type</b>. (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */ -static void -add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell, - uint8_t cert_type, - const tor_cert_t *cert) -{ - if (NULL == cert) - return; - - add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type, - cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len); -} - -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing = 0; -#else -#define certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing 0 -#endif - -/** Send a CERTS cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 - * on failure. */ -int -connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn) -{ - const tor_x509_cert_t *global_link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; - tor_x509_cert_t *own_link_cert = NULL; - var_cell_t *cell; - - certs_cell_t *certs_cell = NULL; - - tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3); - - if (! conn->handshake_state) - return -1; - - const int conn_in_server_mode = ! conn->handshake_state->started_here; - - /* Get the encoded values of the X509 certificates */ - if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(conn_in_server_mode, - &global_link_cert, &id_cert) < 0) - return -1; - - if (conn_in_server_mode) { - own_link_cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls); - } - tor_assert(id_cert); - - certs_cell = certs_cell_new(); - - /* Start adding certs. First the link cert or auth1024 cert. */ - if (conn_in_server_mode) { - tor_assert_nonfatal(own_link_cert); - add_x509_cert(certs_cell, - OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK, own_link_cert); - } else { - tor_assert(global_link_cert); - add_x509_cert(certs_cell, - OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024, global_link_cert); - } - - /* Next the RSA->RSA ID cert */ - add_x509_cert(certs_cell, - OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024, id_cert); - - /* Next the Ed25519 certs */ - add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell, - CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN, - get_master_signing_key_cert()); - if (conn_in_server_mode) { - tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert || - certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing); - add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell, - CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK, - conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert); - } else { - add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell, - CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH, - get_current_auth_key_cert()); - } - - /* And finally the crosscert. */ - { - const uint8_t *crosscert=NULL; - size_t crosscert_len; - get_master_rsa_crosscert(&crosscert, &crosscert_len); - if (crosscert) { - add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, - CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID, - crosscert, crosscert_len); + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr)) { + netinfo_cell_add_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, + netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(&me->ipv6_addr)); } } - /* We've added all the certs; make the cell. */ - certs_cell->n_certs = certs_cell_getlen_certs(certs_cell); - - ssize_t alloc_len = certs_cell_encoded_len(certs_cell); - tor_assert(alloc_len >= 0 && alloc_len <= UINT16_MAX); - cell = var_cell_new(alloc_len); - cell->command = CELL_CERTS; - ssize_t enc_len = certs_cell_encode(cell->payload, alloc_len, certs_cell); - tor_assert(enc_len > 0 && enc_len <= alloc_len); - cell->payload_len = enc_len; - - connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn); - var_cell_free(cell); - certs_cell_free(certs_cell); - tor_x509_cert_free(own_link_cert); - - return 0; -} - -#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -int testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported = 0; -#else -#define testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported 0 -#endif - -/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type</b> is an AUTHCHALLENGE type that - * we can send and receive. */ -int -authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type) -{ - switch (challenge_type) { - case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET: -#ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS - return 1; -#else - return testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported; -#endif - case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705: - return 1; - case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705: - default: - return 0; + const char *errmsg = NULL; + if ((errmsg = netinfo_cell_check(netinfo_cell))) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Failed to validate NETINFO cell with error: %s", + errmsg); + goto cleanup; } -} - -/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type_a</b> is one that we would rather - * use than <b>challenge_type_b</b>. */ -int -authchallenge_type_is_better(uint16_t challenge_type_a, - uint16_t challenge_type_b) -{ - /* Any supported type is better than an unsupported one; - * all unsupported types are equally bad. */ - if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_a)) - return 0; - if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_b)) - return 1; - /* It happens that types are superior in numerically ascending order. - * If that ever changes, this must change too. */ - return (challenge_type_a > challenge_type_b); -} - -/** Send an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 - * on success, -1 on failure. */ -int -connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn) -{ - var_cell_t *cell = NULL; - int r = -1; - tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3); - - if (! conn->handshake_state) - return -1; - - auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new(); - tor_assert(sizeof(ac->challenge) == 32); - crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge)); - - if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)) - auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET); - /* Disabled, because everything that supports this method also supports - * the much-superior ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 */ - /* auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705); */ - if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705)) - auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705); - auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac, - auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(ac)); - - cell = var_cell_new(auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(ac)); - ssize_t len = auth_challenge_cell_encode(cell->payload, cell->payload_len, - ac); - if (len != cell->payload_len) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Encoded auth challenge cell length not as expected"); - goto done; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ + if (netinfo_cell_encode(cell.payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE, + netinfo_cell) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Failed generating NETINFO cell"); + goto cleanup; } - cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE; - connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn); - r = 0; + conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0; + conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1; + connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn); - done: - var_cell_free(cell); - auth_challenge_cell_free(ac); + r = 0; + cleanup: + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); return r; } - -/** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use - * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>. Return it - * in a var_cell_t. - * - * If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first - * V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's - * determined by the rest of the handshake, and which match the provided value - * exactly. - * - * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the - * first V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything - * that should be signed), but don't actually sign it. - * - * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is provided, calculate the - * entire authenticator, signed with <b>signing_key</b>. - * - * Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure. - */ -var_cell_t * -connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn, - const int authtype, - crypto_pk_t *signing_key, - const ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key, - int server) -{ - auth1_t *auth = NULL; - auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new(); - var_cell_t *result = NULL; - int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0; - const char *authtype_str = NULL; - - int is_ed = 0; - - /* assert state is reasonable XXXX */ - switch (authtype) { - case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET: - authtype_str = "AUTH0001"; - old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 1; - break; - case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705: - authtype_str = "AUTH0002"; - break; - case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705: - authtype_str = "AUTH0003"; - is_ed = 1; - break; - default: - tor_assert(0); - break; - } - - auth = auth1_new(); - ctx->is_ed = is_ed; - - /* Type: 8 bytes. */ - memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8); - - { - const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL; - const common_digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests; - const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id; - if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, NULL, &id_cert)) - goto err; - my_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert); - their_digests = - tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert); - tor_assert(my_digests); - tor_assert(their_digests); - my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256]; - their_id = (uint8_t*)their_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256]; - - client_id = server ? their_id : my_id; - server_id = server ? my_id : their_id; - - /* Client ID digest: 32 octets. */ - memcpy(auth->cid, client_id, 32); - - /* Server ID digest: 32 octets. */ - memcpy(auth->sid, server_id, 32); - } - - if (is_ed) { - const ed25519_public_key_t *my_ed_id, *their_ed_id; - if (!conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign) { - log_warn(LD_OR, "Ed authenticate without Ed ID cert from peer."); - goto err; - } - my_ed_id = get_master_identity_key(); - their_ed_id = &conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key; - - const uint8_t *cid_ed = (server ? their_ed_id : my_ed_id)->pubkey; - const uint8_t *sid_ed = (server ? my_ed_id : their_ed_id)->pubkey; - - memcpy(auth->u1_cid_ed, cid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); - memcpy(auth->u1_sid_ed, sid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); - } - - { - crypto_digest_t *server_d, *client_d; - if (server) { - server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent; - client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received; - } else { - client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent; - server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received; - } - - /* Server log digest : 32 octets */ - crypto_digest_get_digest(server_d, (char*)auth->slog, 32); - - /* Client log digest : 32 octets */ - crypto_digest_get_digest(client_d, (char*)auth->clog, 32); - } - - { - /* Digest of cert used on TLS link : 32 octets. */ - tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL; - if (server) { - cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls); - } else { - cert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls); - } - if (!cert) { - log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making %s data.", - authtype_str); - goto err; - } - - memcpy(auth->scert, - tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32); - - tor_x509_cert_free(cert); - } - - /* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */ - if (old_tlssecrets_algorithm) { - if (tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets) < 0) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Somebody asked us for an older TLS " - "authentication method (AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET) " - "which we don't support."); - } - } else { - char label[128]; - tor_snprintf(label, sizeof(label), - "EXPORTER FOR TOR TLS CLIENT BINDING %s", authtype_str); - int r = tor_tls_export_key_material(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets, - auth->cid, sizeof(auth->cid), - label); - if (r < 0) { - if (r != -2) - log_warn(LD_BUG, "TLS key export failed for unknown reason."); - // If r == -2, this was openssl bug 7712. - goto err; - } - } - - /* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out - * of the habit of sending time around willynilly. Fortunately, nothing - * checks it. That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */ - crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24); - - ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx); - if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) { - maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN; - } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) { - maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key); - } - - const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */ - result = var_cell_new(AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN + maxlen); - uint8_t *const out = result->payload + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN; - const size_t outlen = maxlen; - ssize_t len; - - result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE; - set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype)); - - if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data."); - goto err; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } - - if (server) { - auth1_t *tmp = NULL; - ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len, ctx); - if (!tmp) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data that " - "we just encoded"); - goto err; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } - result->payload_len = (tmp->end_of_signed - result->payload); - - auth1_free(tmp); - if (len2 != len) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data."); - goto err; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } - goto done; - } - - if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) { - ed25519_signature_t sig; - if (ed25519_sign(&sig, out, len, ed_signing_key) < 0) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to sign ed25519 authentication data"); - goto err; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } - auth1_setlen_sig(auth, ED25519_SIG_LEN); - memcpy(auth1_getarray_sig(auth), sig.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN); - - } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) { - auth1_setlen_sig(auth, crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key)); - - char d[32]; - crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, len, DIGEST_SHA256); - int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key, - (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth), - auth1_getlen_sig(auth), - d, 32); - if (siglen < 0) { - log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to sign AUTH1 data."); - goto err; - } - - auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen); - } - - len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx); - if (len < 0) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data."); - goto err; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } - tor_assert(len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN <= result->payload_len); - result->payload_len = len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN; - set_uint16(result->payload+2, htons(len)); - - goto done; - - err: - var_cell_free(result); - result = NULL; - done: - auth1_free(auth); - auth_ctx_free(ctx); - return result; -} - -/** Send an AUTHENTICATE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on - * success, -1 on failure */ -MOCK_IMPL(int, -connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype)) -{ - var_cell_t *cell; - crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(); - /* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */ - - if (!pk) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't compute authenticate cell: no client auth key"); - return -1; - } - if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to send authenticate cell with unknown " - "authentication type %d", authtype); - return -1; - } - - cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn, - authtype, - pk, - get_current_auth_keypair(), - 0 /* not server */); - if (! cell) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!"); - return -1; - } - connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn); - var_cell_free(cell); - - return 0; -} diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.h b/src/core/or/connection_or.h index 817bcdd317..e9ace56ab4 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_or.h +++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -17,40 +17,11 @@ struct ed25519_keypair_t; or_connection_t *TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *); -#define OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1 -/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for connect() to finish. */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 1 -/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for proxy handshake to complete */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING 2 -/** State for an OR connection client: SSL is handshaking, not done - * yet. */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING 3 -/** State for a connection to an OR: We're doing a second SSL handshake for - * renegotiation purposes. (V2 handshake only.) */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING 4 -/** State for a connection at an OR: We're waiting for the client to - * renegotiate (to indicate a v2 handshake) or send a versions cell (to - * indicate a v3 handshake) */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING 5 -/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, we've done - * renegotiation, but we haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions and - * sent a netinfo cell. */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 6 -/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, but we - * haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions, done a V3 handshake, and - * sent a netinfo cell. */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3 7 -/** State for an OR connection: Ready to send/receive cells. */ -#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 8 -#define OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 8 +#include "core/or/orconn_event.h" void connection_or_clear_identity(or_connection_t *conn); void connection_or_clear_identity_map(void); void clear_broken_connection_map(int disable); -or_connection_t *connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest, - const tor_addr_t *target_addr, - const char **msg_out, - int *launch_out); void connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn); int connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn); @@ -81,6 +52,9 @@ MOCK_DECL(void,connection_or_close_for_error, void connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain); +void connection_or_event_status(or_connection_t *conn, + or_conn_status_event_t tp, int reason); + MOCK_DECL(int,connection_tls_start_handshake,(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving)); int connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn); @@ -119,19 +93,6 @@ MOCK_DECL(void,connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)); int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus); MOCK_DECL(int,connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn)); -int connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn); -int connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn); -int authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type); -int authchallenge_type_is_better(uint16_t challenge_type_a, - uint16_t challenge_type_b); -var_cell_t *connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body( - or_connection_t *conn, - const int authtype, - crypto_pk_t *signing_key, - const struct ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key, - int server); -MOCK_DECL(int,connection_or_send_authenticate_cell, - (or_connection_t *conn, int type)); int is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t version); @@ -156,10 +117,16 @@ void connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force); #ifdef CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE STATIC int should_connect_to_relay(const or_connection_t *or_conn); STATIC void note_or_connect_failed(const or_connection_t *or_conn); -#endif + +/* + * Call this when changing connection state, so notifications to the owning + * channel can be handled. + */ +MOCK_DECL(STATIC void,connection_or_change_state, + (or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)); +#endif /* defined(CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE) */ #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS -extern int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing; extern int testing__connection_or_pretend_TLSSECRET_is_supported; #endif diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_st.h b/src/core/or/connection_st.h index c197a81340..685c9f89f4 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/connection_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file connection_st.h + * @brief Base connection structure. + **/ + #ifndef CONNECTION_ST_H #define CONNECTION_ST_H @@ -149,4 +154,4 @@ struct connection_t { * directory connection. */ #define DIR_CONN_IS_SERVER(conn) ((conn)->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER) -#endif +#endif /* !defined(CONNECTION_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/core_or.md b/src/core/or/core_or.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0b4d430a00 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/core_or.md @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +@dir core/or +@brief core/or: **Onion routing happens here!** + +This is the central part of Tor that handles the core tasks of onion routing: +building circuit, handling circuits, attaching circuit to streams, moving +data around, and so forth. + +Some aspects of this module should probably be refactored into others. + +Notable files here include: + +`channel.c` +: Generic channel implementation. Channels handle sending and receiving cells +among tor nodes. + +`channeltls.c` +: Channel implementation for TLS-based OR connections. Uses `connection_or.c`. + +`circuitbuild.c` +: Code for constructing circuits and choosing their paths. (*Note*: +this module could plausibly be split into handling the client side, +the server side, and the path generation aspects of circuit building.) + +`circuitlist.c` +: Code for maintaining and navigating the global list of circuits. + +`circuitmux.c` +: Generic circuitmux implementation. A circuitmux handles deciding, for a +particular channel, which circuit should write next. + +`circuitmux_ewma.c` +: A circuitmux implementation based on the EWMA (exponentially +weighted moving average) algorithm. + +`circuituse.c` +: Code to actually send and receive data on circuits. + +`command.c` +: Handles incoming cells on channels. + +`connection.c` +: Generic and common connection tools, and implementation for the simpler +connection types. + +`connection_edge.c` +: Implementation for entry and exit connections. + +`connection_or.c` +: Implementation for OR connections (the ones that send cells over TLS). + +`onion.c` +: Generic code for generating and responding to CREATE and CREATED +cells, and performing the appropriate onion handshakes. Also contains +code to manage the server-side onion queue. + +`relay.c` +: Handles particular types of relay cells, and provides code to receive, +encrypt, route, and interpret relay cells. + +`scheduler.c` +: Decides which channel/circuit pair is ready to receive the next cell. + diff --git a/src/core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h b/src/core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h index dbe596d851..ee9a0d972c 100644 --- a/src/core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file cpath_build_state_st.h + * @brief Circuit-build-stse structure + **/ + #ifndef CIRCUIT_BUILD_STATE_ST_ST_H #define CIRCUIT_BUILD_STATE_ST_ST_H @@ -34,5 +39,4 @@ struct cpath_build_state_t { time_t expiry_time; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(CIRCUIT_BUILD_STATE_ST_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/crypt_path.c b/src/core/or/crypt_path.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8f41540848 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/crypt_path.c @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file crypt_path.c + * + * \brief Functions dealing with layered circuit encryption. This file aims to + * provide an API around the crypt_path_t structure which holds crypto + * information about a specific hop of a circuit. + * + * TODO: We should eventually move all functions dealing and manipulating + * crypt_path_t to this file, so that eventually we encapsulate more and more + * of crypt_path_t. Here are some more functions that can be moved here with + * some more effort: + * + * - circuit_list_path_impl() + * - Functions dealing with cpaths in HSv2 create_rend_cpath() and + * create_rend_cpath_legacy() + * - The cpath related parts of rend_service_receive_introduction() and + * rend_client_send_introduction(). + **/ + +#define CRYPT_PATH_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/or/crypt_path.h" + +#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h" +#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h" +#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h" + +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" + +#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h" +#include "core/or/cell_st.h" + +/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>. + * This function is used to extend cpath by another hop. + */ +void +cpath_extend_linked_list(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop) +{ + if (*head_ptr) { + new_hop->next = (*head_ptr); + new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev; + (*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop; + (*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop; + } else { + *head_ptr = new_hop; + new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop; + } +} + +/** Create a new hop, annotate it with information about its + * corresponding router <b>choice</b>, and append it to the + * end of the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>. */ +int +cpath_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice) +{ + crypt_path_t *hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t)); + + /* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */ + cpath_extend_linked_list(head_ptr, hop); + + hop->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC; + hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED; + + hop->extend_info = extend_info_dup(choice); + + hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); + hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + + return 0; +} + +/** Verify that cpath <b>cp</b> has all of its invariants + * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid. + */ +void +cpath_assert_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp) +{ + const crypt_path_t *start = cp; + + do { + cpath_assert_layer_ok(cp); + /* layers must be in sequence of: "open* awaiting? closed*" */ + if (cp != start) { + if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) { + tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); + } else if (cp->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { + tor_assert(cp->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); + } + } + cp = cp->next; + tor_assert(cp); + } while (cp != start); +} + +/** Verify that cpath layer <b>cp</b> has all of its invariants + * correct. Trigger an assert if anything is invalid. + */ +void +cpath_assert_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp) +{ +// tor_assert(cp->addr); /* these are zero for rendezvous extra-hops */ +// tor_assert(cp->port); + tor_assert(cp); + tor_assert(cp->magic == CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC); + switch (cp->state) + { + case CPATH_STATE_OPEN: + relay_crypto_assert_ok(&cp->pvt_crypto); + FALLTHROUGH; + case CPATH_STATE_CLOSED: + /*XXXX Assert that there's no handshake_state either. */ + tor_assert(!cp->rend_dh_handshake_state); + break; + case CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS: + /* tor_assert(cp->dh_handshake_state); */ + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_ERR, LD_BUG, "Unexpected state %d", cp->state); + tor_assert(0); + } + tor_assert(cp->package_window >= 0); + tor_assert(cp->deliver_window >= 0); +} + +/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in key_data. + * + * If <b>is_hs_v3</b> is set, this cpath will be used for next gen hidden + * service circuits and <b>key_data</b> must be at least + * HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN bytes in length. + * + * If <b>is_hs_v3</b> is not set, key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN + * bytes, which are used as follows: + * - 20 to initialize f_digest + * - 20 to initialize b_digest + * - 16 to key f_crypto + * - 16 to key b_crypto + * + * (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.) + * + * Return 0 if init was successful, else -1 if it failed. + */ +int +cpath_init_circuit_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, + const char *key_data, size_t key_data_len, + int reverse, int is_hs_v3) +{ + + tor_assert(cpath); + return relay_crypto_init(&cpath->pvt_crypto, key_data, key_data_len, + reverse, is_hs_v3); +} + +/** Deallocate space associated with the cpath node <b>victim</b>. */ +void +cpath_free(crypt_path_t *victim) +{ + if (!victim) + return; + + relay_crypto_clear(&victim->pvt_crypto); + onion_handshake_state_release(&victim->handshake_state); + crypto_dh_free(victim->rend_dh_handshake_state); + extend_info_free(victim->extend_info); + + memwipe(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */ + tor_free(victim); +} + +/********************** cpath crypto API *******************************/ + +/** Encrypt or decrypt <b>payload</b> using the crypto of <b>cpath</b>. Actual + * operation decided by <b>is_decrypt</b>. */ +void +cpath_crypt_cell(const crypt_path_t *cpath, uint8_t *payload, bool is_decrypt) +{ + if (is_decrypt) { + relay_crypt_one_payload(cpath->pvt_crypto.b_crypto, payload); + } else { + relay_crypt_one_payload(cpath->pvt_crypto.f_crypto, payload); + } +} + +/** Getter for the incoming digest of <b>cpath</b>. */ +struct crypto_digest_t * +cpath_get_incoming_digest(const crypt_path_t *cpath) +{ + return cpath->pvt_crypto.b_digest; +} + +/** Set the right integrity digest on the outgoing <b>cell</b> based on the + * cell payload and update the forward digest of <b>cpath</b>. */ +void +cpath_set_cell_forward_digest(crypt_path_t *cpath, cell_t *cell) +{ + relay_set_digest(cpath->pvt_crypto.f_digest, cell); +} + +/************ cpath sendme API ***************************/ + +/** Return the sendme_digest of this <b>cpath</b>. */ +uint8_t * +cpath_get_sendme_digest(crypt_path_t *cpath) +{ + return relay_crypto_get_sendme_digest(&cpath->pvt_crypto); +} + +/** Record the cell digest, indicated by is_foward_digest or not, as the + * SENDME cell digest. */ +void +cpath_sendme_record_cell_digest(crypt_path_t *cpath, bool is_foward_digest) +{ + tor_assert(cpath); + relay_crypto_record_sendme_digest(&cpath->pvt_crypto, is_foward_digest); +} + +/************ other cpath functions ***************************/ + +/** Return the first non-open hop in cpath, or return NULL if all + * hops are open. */ +crypt_path_t * +cpath_get_next_non_open_hop(crypt_path_t *cpath) +{ + crypt_path_t *hop = cpath; + do { + if (hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) + return hop; + hop = hop->next; + } while (hop != cpath); + return NULL; +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS + +/** Unittest helper function: Count number of hops in cpath linked list. */ +unsigned int +cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr) +{ + unsigned int n_hops = 0; + crypt_path_t *tmp; + + if (!*head_ptr) { + return 0; + } + + tmp = *head_ptr; + do { + n_hops++; + tmp = tmp->next; + } while (tmp != *head_ptr); + + return n_hops; +} + +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + diff --git a/src/core/or/crypt_path.h b/src/core/or/crypt_path.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7a95fec2b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/crypt_path.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/** + * \file crypt_path.h + * \brief Header file for crypt_path.c. + **/ + +#ifndef CRYPT_PATH_H +#define CRYPT_PATH_H + +void cpath_assert_layer_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp); + +void cpath_assert_ok(const crypt_path_t *cp); + +int cpath_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); + +int cpath_init_circuit_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, + const char *key_data, size_t key_data_len, + int reverse, int is_hs_v3); + +void +cpath_free(crypt_path_t *victim); + +void cpath_extend_linked_list(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop); + +void +cpath_crypt_cell(const crypt_path_t *cpath, uint8_t *payload, bool is_decrypt); + +struct crypto_digest_t * +cpath_get_incoming_digest(const crypt_path_t *cpath); + +void cpath_sendme_record_cell_digest(crypt_path_t *cpath, + bool is_foward_digest); + +void +cpath_set_cell_forward_digest(crypt_path_t *cpath, cell_t *cell); + +crypt_path_t *cpath_get_next_non_open_hop(crypt_path_t *cpath); + +void cpath_sendme_circuit_record_inbound_cell(crypt_path_t *cpath); + +uint8_t *cpath_get_sendme_digest(crypt_path_t *cpath); + +#if defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) +unsigned int cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr); +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +#endif /* !defined(CRYPT_PATH_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/crypt_path_reference_st.h b/src/core/or/crypt_path_reference_st.h index 3d79f26c1c..71f9cb8c36 100644 --- a/src/core/or/crypt_path_reference_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/crypt_path_reference_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file crypt_path_reference_st.h + * @brief reference-counting structure for crypt_path_t + **/ + #ifndef CRYPT_PATH_REFERENCE_ST_H #define CRYPT_PATH_REFERENCE_ST_H @@ -19,5 +24,4 @@ struct crypt_path_reference_t { crypt_path_t *cpath; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(CRYPT_PATH_REFERENCE_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/crypt_path_st.h b/src/core/or/crypt_path_st.h index 429480f8ab..2b69728a6d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/crypt_path_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/crypt_path_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file crypt_path_st.h + * @brief Path structures for origin circuits. + **/ + #ifndef CRYPT_PATH_ST_H #define CRYPT_PATH_ST_H @@ -24,15 +29,24 @@ struct onion_handshake_state_t { } u; }; +/** Macro to encapsulate private members of a struct. + * + * Renames 'x' to 'x_crypt_path_private_field'. + */ +#define CRYPT_PATH_PRIV_FIELD(x) x ## _crypt_path_private_field + +#ifdef CRYPT_PATH_PRIVATE + +/* Helper macro to access private members of a struct. */ +#define pvt_crypto CRYPT_PATH_PRIV_FIELD(crypto) + +#endif /* defined(CRYPT_PATH_PRIVATE) */ + /** Holds accounting information for a single step in the layered encryption * performed by a circuit. Used only at the client edge of a circuit. */ struct crypt_path_t { uint32_t magic; - /** Cryptographic state used for encrypting and authenticating relay - * cells to and from this hop. */ - relay_crypto_t crypto; - /** Current state of the handshake as performed with the OR at this * step. */ onion_handshake_state_t handshake_state; @@ -65,6 +79,12 @@ struct crypt_path_t { * at this step? */ int deliver_window; /**< How many cells are we willing to deliver originating * at this step? */ + + /*********************** Private members ****************************/ + + /** Private member: Cryptographic state used for encrypting and + * authenticating relay cells to and from this hop. */ + relay_crypto_t CRYPT_PATH_PRIV_FIELD(crypto); }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(CRYPT_PATH_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/dataflow.md b/src/core/or/dataflow.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1098701780 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/dataflow.md @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +@tableofcontents + +@page dataflow Data flow in the Tor process + +We read bytes from the network, we write bytes to the network. For the +most part, the bytes we write correspond roughly to bytes we have read, +with bits of cryptography added in. + +The rest is a matter of details. + +### Connections and buffers: reading, writing, and interpreting. + +At a low level, Tor's networking code is based on "connections". Each +connection represents an object that can send or receive network-like +events. For the most part, each connection has a single underlying TCP +stream (I'll discuss counterexamples below). + +A connection that behaves like a TCP stream has an input buffer and an +output buffer. Incoming data is +written into the input buffer ("inbuf"); data to be written to the +network is queued on an output buffer ("outbuf"). + +Buffers are implemented in buffers.c. Each of these buffers is +implemented as a linked queue of memory extents, in the style of classic +BSD mbufs, or Linux skbufs. + +A connection's reading and writing can be enabled or disabled. Under +the hood, this functionality is implemented using libevent events: one +for reading, one for writing. These events are turned on/off in +main.c, in the functions connection_{start,stop}_{reading,writing}. + +When a read or write event is turned on, the main libevent loop polls +the kernel, asking which sockets are ready to read or write. (This +polling happens in the event_base_loop() call in run_main_loop_once() +in main.c.) When libevent finds a socket that's ready to read or write, +it invokes conn_{read,write}_callback(), also in main.c + +These callback functions delegate to connection_handle_read() and +connection_handle_write() in connection.c, which read or write on the +network as appropriate, possibly delegating to openssl. + +After data is read or written, or other event occurs, these +connection_handle_read_write() functions call logic functions whose job is +to respond to the information. Some examples included: + + * connection_flushed_some() -- called after a connection writes any + amount of data from its outbuf. + * connection_finished_flushing() -- called when a connection has + emptied its outbuf. + * connection_finished_connecting() -- called when an in-process connection + finishes making a remote connection. + * connection_reached_eof() -- called after receiving a FIN from the + remote server. + * connection_process_inbuf() -- called when more data arrives on + the inbuf. + +These functions then call into specific implementations depending on +the type of the connection. For example, if the connection is an +edge_connection_t, connection_reached_eof() will call +connection_edge_reached_eof(). + +> **Note:** "Also there are bufferevents!" We have vestigial +> code for an alternative low-level networking +> implementation, based on Libevent's evbuffer and bufferevent +> code. These two object types take on (most of) the roles of +> buffers and connections respectively. It isn't working in today's +> Tor, due to code rot and possible lingering libevent bugs. More +> work is needed; it would be good to get this working efficiently +> again, to have IOCP support on Windows. + + +#### Controlling connections #### + +A connection can have reading or writing enabled or disabled for a +wide variety of reasons, including: + + * Writing is disabled when there is no more data to write + * For some connection types, reading is disabled when the inbuf is + too full. + * Reading/writing is temporarily disabled on connections that have + recently read/written enough data up to their bandwidth + * Reading is disabled on connections when reading more data from them + would require that data to be buffered somewhere else that is + already full. + +Currently, these conditions are checked in a diffuse set of +increasingly complex conditional expressions. In the future, it could +be helpful to transition to a unified model for handling temporary +read/write suspensions. + +#### Kinds of connections #### + +Today Tor has the following connection and pseudoconnection types. +For the most part, each type of channel has an associated C module +that implements its underlying logic. + +**Edge connections** receive data from and deliver data to points +outside the onion routing network. See `connection_edge.c`. They fall into two types: + +**Entry connections** are a type of edge connection. They receive data +from the user running a Tor client, and deliver data to that user. +They are used to implement SOCKSPort, TransPort, NATDPort, and so on. +Sometimes they are called "AP" connections for historical reasons (it +used to stand for "Application Proxy"). + +**Exit connections** are a type of edge connection. They exist at an +exit node, and transmit traffic to and from the network. + +(Entry connections and exit connections are also used as placeholders +when performing a remote DNS request; they are not decoupled from the +notion of "stream" in the Tor protocol. This is implemented partially +in `connection_edge.c`, and partially in `dnsserv.c` and `dns.c`.) + +**OR connections** send and receive Tor cells over TLS, using some +version of the Tor link protocol. Their implementation is spread +across `connection_or.c`, with a bit of logic in `command.c`, +`relay.c`, and `channeltls.c`. + +**Extended OR connections** are a type of OR connection for use on +bridges using pluggable transports, so that the PT can tell the bridge +some information about the incoming connection before passing on its +data. They are implemented in `ext_orport.c`. + +**Directory connections** are server-side or client-side connections +that implement Tor's HTTP-based directory protocol. These are +instantiated using a socket when Tor is making an unencrypted HTTP +connection. When Tor is tunneling a directory request over a Tor +circuit, directory connections are implemented using a linked +connection pair (see below). Directory connections are implemented in +`directory.c`; some of the server-side logic is implemented in +`dirserver.c`. + +**Controller connections** are local connections to a controller +process implementing the controller protocol from +control-spec.txt. These are in `control.c`. + +**Listener connections** are not stream oriented! Rather, they wrap a +listening socket in order to detect new incoming connections. They +bypass most of stream logic. They don't have associated buffers. +They are implemented in `connection.c`. + + + +>**Note**: "History Time!" You might occasionally find reference to a couple types of connections +> which no longer exist in modern Tor. A *CPUWorker connection* +>connected the main Tor process to a thread or process used for +>computation. (Nowadays we use in-process communication.) Even more +>anciently, a *DNSWorker connection* connected the main tor process to +>a separate thread or process used for running `gethostbyname()` or +>`getaddrinfo()`. (Nowadays we use Libevent's evdns facility to +>perform DNS requests asynchronously.) + +#### Linked connections #### + +Sometimes two channels are joined together, such that data which the +Tor process sends on one should immediately be received by the same +Tor process on the other. (For example, when Tor makes a tunneled +directory connection, this is implemented on the client side as a +directory connection whose output goes, not to the network, but to a +local entry connection. And when a directory receives a tunnelled +directory connection, this is implemented as an exit connection whose +output goes, not to the network, but to a local directory connection.) + +The earliest versions of Tor to support linked connections used +socketpairs for the purpose. But using socketpairs forced us to copy +data through kernelspace, and wasted limited file descriptors. So +instead, a pair of connections can be linked in-process. Each linked +connection has a pointer to the other, such that data written on one +is immediately readable on the other, and vice versa. + +### From connections to channels ### + +There's an abstraction layer above OR connections (the ones that +handle cells) and below cells called **Channels**. A channel's +purpose is to transmit authenticated cells from one Tor instance +(relay or client) to another. + +Currently, only one implementation exists: Channel_tls, which sends +and receiveds cells over a TLS-based OR connection. + +Cells are sent on a channel using +`channel_write_{,packed_,var_}cell()`. Incoming cells arrive on a +channel from its backend using `channel_queue*_cell()`, and are +immediately processed using `channel_process_cells()`. + +Some cell types are handled below the channel layer, such as those +that affect handshaking only. And some others are passed up to the +generic cross-channel code in `command.c`: cells like `DESTROY` and +`CREATED` are all trivial to handle. But relay cells +require special handling... + +### From channels through circuits ### + +When a relay cell arrives on an existing circuit, it is handled in +`circuit_receive_relay_cell()` -- one of the innermost functions in +Tor. This function encrypts or decrypts the relay cell as +appropriate, and decides whether the cell is intended for the current +hop of the circuit. + +If the cell *is* intended for the current hop, we pass it to +`connection_edge_process_relay_cell()` in `relay.c`, which acts on it +based on its relay command, and (possibly) queues its data on an +`edge_connection_t`. + +If the cell *is not* intended for the current hop, we queue it for the +next channel in sequence with `append cell_to_circuit_queue()`. This +places the cell on a per-circuit queue for cells headed out on that +particular channel. + +### Sending cells on circuits: the complicated bit. + +Relay cells are queued onto circuits from one of two (main) sources: +reading data from edge connections, and receiving a cell to be relayed +on a circuit. Both of these sources place their cells on cell queue: +each circuit has one cell queue for each direction that it travels. + +A naive implementation would skip using cell queues, and instead write +each outgoing relay cell. (Tor did this in its earlier versions.) +But such an approach tends to give poor performance, because it allows +high-volume circuits to clog channels, and it forces the Tor server to +send data queued on a circuit even after that circuit has been closed. + +So by using queues on each circuit, we can add cells to each channel +on a just-in-time basis, choosing the cell at each moment based on +a performance-aware algorithm. + +This logic is implemented in two main modules: `scheduler.c` and +`circuitmux*.c`. The scheduler code is responsible for determining +globally, across all channels that could write cells, which one should +next receive queued cells. The circuitmux code determines, for all +of the circuits with queued cells for a channel, which one should +queue the next cell. + +(This logic applies to outgoing relay cells only; incoming relay cells +are processed as they arrive.) + diff --git a/src/core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h b/src/core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h index 56630670ba..aa28289be5 100644 --- a/src/core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h @@ -1,12 +1,19 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file destroy_cell_queue_st.h + * @brief Destroy-cell queue structures + **/ + #ifndef DESTROY_CELL_QUEUE_ST_H #define DESTROY_CELL_QUEUE_ST_H +#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" + /** A single queued destroy cell. */ struct destroy_cell_t { TOR_SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(destroy_cell_t) next; @@ -19,9 +26,8 @@ struct destroy_cell_t { /** A queue of destroy cells on a channel. */ struct destroy_cell_queue_t { /** Linked list of packed_cell_t */ - TOR_SIMPLEQ_HEAD(dcell_simpleq, destroy_cell_t) head; + TOR_SIMPLEQ_HEAD(dcell_simpleq_t, destroy_cell_t) head; int n; /**< The number of cells in the queue. */ }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(DESTROY_CELL_QUEUE_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/dos.c b/src/core/or/dos.c index d06eaa6d05..5f99280030 100644 --- a/src/core/or/dos.c +++ b/src/core/or/dos.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2018-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /* @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "core/or/channel.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "feature/hs/hs_dos.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" #include "feature/relay/routermode.h" @@ -629,6 +630,7 @@ dos_log_heartbeat(void) char *cc_msg = NULL; char *single_hop_client_msg = NULL; char *circ_stats_msg = NULL; + char *hs_dos_intro2_msg = NULL; /* Stats number coming from relay.c append_cell_to_circuit_queue(). */ tor_asprintf(&circ_stats_msg, @@ -654,17 +656,24 @@ dos_log_heartbeat(void) num_single_hop_client_refused); } + /* HS DoS stats. */ + tor_asprintf(&hs_dos_intro2_msg, + " %" PRIu64 " INTRODUCE2 rejected.", + hs_dos_get_intro2_rejected_count()); + log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, - "DoS mitigation since startup:%s%s%s%s", + "DoS mitigation since startup:%s%s%s%s%s", circ_stats_msg, (cc_msg != NULL) ? cc_msg : " [cc not enabled]", (conn_msg != NULL) ? conn_msg : " [conn not enabled]", - (single_hop_client_msg != NULL) ? single_hop_client_msg : ""); + (single_hop_client_msg != NULL) ? single_hop_client_msg : "", + (hs_dos_intro2_msg != NULL) ? hs_dos_intro2_msg : ""); tor_free(conn_msg); tor_free(cc_msg); tor_free(single_hop_client_msg); tor_free(circ_stats_msg); + tor_free(hs_dos_intro2_msg); return; } diff --git a/src/core/or/dos.h b/src/core/or/dos.h index 058b7afce6..b3eca058b8 100644 --- a/src/core/or/dos.h +++ b/src/core/or/dos.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2018-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /* @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ MOCK_DECL(STATIC unsigned int, get_param_cc_enabled, MOCK_DECL(STATIC unsigned int, get_param_conn_enabled, (const networkstatus_t *ns)); -#endif /* TOR_DOS_PRIVATE */ +#endif /* defined(DOS_PRIVATE) */ -#endif /* TOR_DOS_H */ +#endif /* !defined(TOR_DOS_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/edge_connection_st.h b/src/core/or/edge_connection_st.h index 1665b8589f..9b2f031b9d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/edge_connection_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/edge_connection_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file edge_connection_st.h + * @brief Edge-connection structure. + **/ + #ifndef EDGE_CONNECTION_ST_H #define EDGE_CONNECTION_ST_H @@ -73,5 +78,4 @@ struct edge_connection_t { uint64_t dirreq_id; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(EDGE_CONNECTION_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/entry_connection_st.h b/src/core/or/entry_connection_st.h index 45621fadbf..495ffd85dd 100644 --- a/src/core/or/entry_connection_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/entry_connection_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file entry_connection_st.h + * @brief Entry connection structure. + **/ + #ifndef ENTRY_CONNECTION_ST_H #define ENTRY_CONNECTION_ST_H @@ -96,5 +101,4 @@ struct entry_connection_t { /** Cast a entry_connection_t subtype pointer to a edge_connection_t **/ #define ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(c) (&(((c))->edge_)) -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(ENTRY_CONNECTION_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h b/src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h index 87dfb331e5..ef1095086d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file entry_port_cfg_st.h + * @brief Configuration structure for client ports. + **/ + #ifndef ENTRY_PORT_CFG_ST_H #define ENTRY_PORT_CFG_ST_H @@ -48,7 +53,9 @@ struct entry_port_cfg_t { * do we prefer IPv6? */ unsigned int prefer_ipv6_virtaddr : 1; -}; + /** For socks listeners: can we send back the extended SOCKS5 error code? */ + unsigned int extended_socks5_codes : 1; -#endif +}; +#endif /* !defined(ENTRY_PORT_CFG_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/extend_info_st.h b/src/core/or/extend_info_st.h index bc7a77b1b2..a66ce24cfa 100644 --- a/src/core/or/extend_info_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/extend_info_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file extend_info_st.h + * @brief Extend-info structure. + **/ + #ifndef EXTEND_INFO_ST_H #define EXTEND_INFO_ST_H @@ -27,4 +32,4 @@ struct extend_info_t { curve25519_public_key_t curve25519_onion_key; }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(EXTEND_INFO_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/half_edge_st.h b/src/core/or/half_edge_st.h index d4617be108..c6b6e518fc 100644 --- a/src/core/or/half_edge_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/half_edge_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file half_edge_st.h + * @brief Half-open connection structure. + **/ + #ifndef HALF_EDGE_ST_H #define HALF_EDGE_ST_H @@ -30,5 +35,4 @@ typedef struct half_edge_t { int connected_pending : 1; } half_edge_t; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(HALF_EDGE_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/include.am b/src/core/or/include.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3626e76bed --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/include.am @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT SOURCES HERE. +LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \ + src/core/or/address_set.c \ + src/core/or/channel.c \ + src/core/or/channelpadding.c \ + src/core/or/channeltls.c \ + src/core/or/circuitbuild.c \ + src/core/or/circuitlist.c \ + src/core/or/circuitmux.c \ + src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.c \ + src/core/or/circuitpadding.c \ + src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.c \ + src/core/or/circuitstats.c \ + src/core/or/circuituse.c \ + src/core/or/crypt_path.c \ + src/core/or/command.c \ + src/core/or/connection_edge.c \ + src/core/or/connection_or.c \ + src/core/or/dos.c \ + src/core/or/onion.c \ + src/core/or/ocirc_event.c \ + src/core/or/or_periodic.c \ + src/core/or/or_sys.c \ + src/core/or/orconn_event.c \ + src/core/or/policies.c \ + src/core/or/protover.c \ + src/core/or/protover_rust.c \ + src/core/or/reasons.c \ + src/core/or/relay.c \ + src/core/or/scheduler.c \ + src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c \ + src/core/or/scheduler_vanilla.c \ + src/core/or/sendme.c \ + src/core/or/status.c \ + src/core/or/versions.c + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT HEADERS HERE. +noinst_HEADERS += \ + src/core/or/addr_policy_st.h \ + src/core/or/address_set.h \ + src/core/or/cell_queue_st.h \ + src/core/or/cell_st.h \ + src/core/or/channel.h \ + src/core/or/channelpadding.h \ + src/core/or/channeltls.h \ + src/core/or/circuit_st.h \ + src/core/or/circuitbuild.h \ + src/core/or/circuitlist.h \ + src/core/or/circuitmux.h \ + src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h \ + src/core/or/circuitstats.h \ + src/core/or/circuitpadding.h \ + src/core/or/circuitpadding_machines.h \ + src/core/or/circuituse.h \ + src/core/or/command.h \ + src/core/or/connection_edge.h \ + src/core/or/connection_or.h \ + src/core/or/connection_st.h \ + src/core/or/crypt_path.h \ + src/core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h \ + src/core/or/crypt_path_reference_st.h \ + src/core/or/crypt_path_st.h \ + src/core/or/destroy_cell_queue_st.h \ + src/core/or/dos.h \ + src/core/or/edge_connection_st.h \ + src/core/or/half_edge_st.h \ + src/core/or/entry_connection_st.h \ + src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h \ + src/core/or/extend_info_st.h \ + src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h \ + src/core/or/onion.h \ + src/core/or/or.h \ + src/core/or/or_periodic.h \ + src/core/or/or_sys.h \ + src/core/or/orconn_event.h \ + src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h \ + src/core/or/or_connection_st.h \ + src/core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h \ + src/core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h \ + src/core/or/ocirc_event.h \ + src/core/or/origin_circuit_st.h \ + src/core/or/policies.h \ + src/core/or/port_cfg_st.h \ + src/core/or/protover.h \ + src/core/or/reasons.h \ + src/core/or/relay.h \ + src/core/or/relay_crypto_st.h \ + src/core/or/scheduler.h \ + src/core/or/sendme.h \ + src/core/or/server_port_cfg_st.h \ + src/core/or/socks_request_st.h \ + src/core/or/status.h \ + src/core/or/tor_version_st.h \ + src/core/or/var_cell_st.h \ + src/core/or/versions.h diff --git a/src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h b/src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h index 8989a39dc8..78175ea061 100644 --- a/src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file listener_connection_st.h + * @brief Listener connection structure. + **/ + #ifndef LISTENER_CONNECTION_ST_H #define LISTENER_CONNECTION_ST_H @@ -21,5 +26,4 @@ struct listener_connection_t { }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(LISTENER_CONNECTION_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/ocirc_event.c b/src/core/or/ocirc_event.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa16459175 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/ocirc_event.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file ocirc_event.c + * \brief Publish state change messages for origin circuits + * + * Implements a basic publish-subscribe framework for messages about + * the state of origin circuits. The publisher calls the subscriber + * callback functions synchronously. + * + * Although the synchronous calls might not simplify the call graph, + * this approach improves data isolation because the publisher doesn't + * need knowledge about the internals of subscribing subsystems. It + * also avoids race conditions that might occur in asynchronous + * frameworks. + **/ + +#include "core/or/or.h" + +#define OCIRC_EVENT_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" +#include "core/or/ocirc_event.h" +#include "core/or/or_sys.h" +#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" +#include "lib/subsys/subsys.h" + +DECLARE_PUBLISH(ocirc_state); +DECLARE_PUBLISH(ocirc_chan); +DECLARE_PUBLISH(ocirc_cevent); + +static void +ocirc_event_free(msg_aux_data_t u) +{ + tor_free_(u.ptr); +} + +static char * +ocirc_state_fmt(msg_aux_data_t u) +{ + ocirc_state_msg_t *msg = (ocirc_state_msg_t *)u.ptr; + char *s = NULL; + + tor_asprintf(&s, "<gid=%"PRIu32" state=%d onehop=%d>", + msg->gid, msg->state, msg->onehop); + return s; +} + +static char * +ocirc_chan_fmt(msg_aux_data_t u) +{ + ocirc_chan_msg_t *msg = (ocirc_chan_msg_t *)u.ptr; + char *s = NULL; + + tor_asprintf(&s, "<gid=%"PRIu32" chan=%"PRIu64" onehop=%d>", + msg->gid, msg->chan, msg->onehop); + return s; +} + +static char * +ocirc_cevent_fmt(msg_aux_data_t u) +{ + ocirc_cevent_msg_t *msg = (ocirc_cevent_msg_t *)u.ptr; + char *s = NULL; + + tor_asprintf(&s, "<gid=%"PRIu32" evtype=%d reason=%d onehop=%d>", + msg->gid, msg->evtype, msg->reason, msg->onehop); + return s; +} + +static dispatch_typefns_t ocirc_state_fns = { + .free_fn = ocirc_event_free, + .fmt_fn = ocirc_state_fmt, +}; + +static dispatch_typefns_t ocirc_chan_fns = { + .free_fn = ocirc_event_free, + .fmt_fn = ocirc_chan_fmt, +}; + +static dispatch_typefns_t ocirc_cevent_fns = { + .free_fn = ocirc_event_free, + .fmt_fn = ocirc_cevent_fmt, +}; + +int +ocirc_add_pubsub(struct pubsub_connector_t *connector) +{ + if (DISPATCH_REGISTER_TYPE(connector, ocirc_state, ô_state_fns)) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_REGISTER_TYPE(connector, ocirc_chan, ô_chan_fns)) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_REGISTER_TYPE(connector, ocirc_cevent, ô_cevent_fns)) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_ADD_PUB(connector, ocirc, ocirc_state)) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_ADD_PUB(connector, ocirc, ocirc_chan)) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_ADD_PUB(connector, ocirc, ocirc_cevent)) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +void +ocirc_state_publish(ocirc_state_msg_t *msg) +{ + PUBLISH(ocirc_state, msg); +} + +void +ocirc_chan_publish(ocirc_chan_msg_t *msg) +{ + PUBLISH(ocirc_chan, msg); +} + +void +ocirc_cevent_publish(ocirc_cevent_msg_t *msg) +{ + PUBLISH(ocirc_cevent, msg); +} diff --git a/src/core/or/ocirc_event.h b/src/core/or/ocirc_event.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..10307a3664 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/ocirc_event.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file ocirc_event.h + * \brief Header file for ocirc_event.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_OCIRC_EVENT_H +#define TOR_OCIRC_EVENT_H + +#include <stdbool.h> + +#include "lib/cc/torint.h" +#include "lib/pubsub/pubsub.h" + +/** Used to indicate the type of a circuit event passed to the controller. + * The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */ +typedef enum circuit_status_event_t { + CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED = 0, + CIRC_EVENT_BUILT = 1, + CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED = 2, + CIRC_EVENT_FAILED = 3, + CIRC_EVENT_CLOSED = 4, +} circuit_status_event_t; + +/** Message for origin circuit state update */ +typedef struct ocirc_state_msg_t { + uint32_t gid; /**< global ID (only origin circuits have them) */ + int state; /**< new circuit state */ + bool onehop; /**< one-hop circuit? */ +} ocirc_state_msg_t; + +DECLARE_MESSAGE(ocirc_state, ocirc_state, ocirc_state_msg_t *); + +/** + * Message when a channel gets associated to a circuit. + * + * This doesn't always correspond to something in circuitbuild.c + * setting the n_chan field in the circuit. For some reason, if + * circuit_handle_first_hop() launches a new circuit, it doesn't set + * the n_chan field. + */ +typedef struct ocirc_chan_msg_t { + uint32_t gid; /**< global ID */ + uint64_t chan; /**< channel ID */ + bool onehop; /**< one-hop circuit? */ +} ocirc_chan_msg_t; + +DECLARE_MESSAGE(ocirc_chan, ocirc_chan, ocirc_chan_msg_t *); + +/** + * Message for origin circuit status event + * + * This contains information that ends up in CIRC control protocol events. + */ +typedef struct ocirc_cevent_msg_t { + uint32_t gid; /**< global ID */ + int evtype; /**< event type */ + int reason; /**< reason */ + bool onehop; /**< one-hop circuit? */ +} ocirc_cevent_msg_t; + +DECLARE_MESSAGE(ocirc_cevent, ocirc_cevent, ocirc_cevent_msg_t *); + +#ifdef OCIRC_EVENT_PRIVATE +void ocirc_state_publish(ocirc_state_msg_t *msg); +void ocirc_chan_publish(ocirc_chan_msg_t *msg); +void ocirc_cevent_publish(ocirc_cevent_msg_t *msg); +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_OCIRC_EVENT_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/onion.c b/src/core/or/onion.c index aeddedd807..a3b5c6922d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/onion.c +++ b/src/core/or/onion.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -240,11 +240,21 @@ created_cell_parse(created_cell_t *cell_out, const cell_t *cell_in) static int check_extend_cell(const extend_cell_t *cell) { + const bool is_extend2 = (cell->cell_type == RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2); + if (tor_digest_is_zero((const char*)cell->node_id)) return -1; - /* We don't currently allow EXTEND2 cells without an IPv4 address */ - if (tor_addr_family(&cell->orport_ipv4.addr) == AF_UNSPEC) - return -1; + if (!tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(&cell->orport_ipv4, 0)) { + /* EXTEND cells must have an IPv4 address. */ + if (!is_extend2) { + return -1; + } + /* EXTEND2 cells must have at least one IP address. + * It can be IPv4 or IPv6. */ + if (!tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(&cell->orport_ipv6, 0)) { + return -1; + } + } if (cell->create_cell.cell_type == CELL_CREATE) { if (cell->cell_type != RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND) return -1; @@ -343,7 +353,7 @@ extend_cell_from_extend2_cell_body(extend_cell_t *cell_out, continue; found_ipv6 = 1; tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&cell_out->orport_ipv6.addr, - (const char *)ls->un_ipv6_addr); + ls->un_ipv6_addr); cell_out->orport_ipv6.port = ls->un_ipv6_port; break; case LS_LEGACY_ID: @@ -364,7 +374,12 @@ extend_cell_from_extend2_cell_body(extend_cell_t *cell_out, } } - if (!found_rsa_id || !found_ipv4) /* These are mandatory */ + /* EXTEND2 cells must have an RSA ID */ + if (!found_rsa_id) + return -1; + + /* EXTEND2 cells must have at least one IP address */ + if (!found_ipv4 && !found_ipv6) return -1; return create_cell_from_create2_cell_body(&cell_out->create_cell, @@ -374,9 +389,11 @@ extend_cell_from_extend2_cell_body(extend_cell_t *cell_out, /** Parse an EXTEND or EXTEND2 cell (according to <b>command</b>) from the * <b>payload_length</b> bytes of <b>payload</b> into <b>cell_out</b>. Return * 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ -int -extend_cell_parse(extend_cell_t *cell_out, const uint8_t command, - const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_length) +MOCK_IMPL(int, +extend_cell_parse,(extend_cell_t *cell_out, + const uint8_t command, + const uint8_t *payload, + size_t payload_length)) { tor_assert(cell_out); @@ -618,12 +635,13 @@ extend_cell_format(uint8_t *command_out, uint16_t *len_out, break; case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2: { - uint8_t n_specifiers = 2; + uint8_t n_specifiers = 1; *command_out = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; extend2_cell_body_t *cell = extend2_cell_body_new(); link_specifier_t *ls; - { - /* IPv4 specifier first. */ + if (tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(&cell_in->orport_ipv4, 0)) { + /* Maybe IPv4 specifier first. */ + ++n_specifiers; ls = link_specifier_new(); extend2_cell_body_add_ls(cell, ls); ls->ls_type = LS_IPV4; @@ -649,6 +667,17 @@ extend_cell_format(uint8_t *command_out, uint16_t *len_out, ls->ls_len = 32; memcpy(ls->un_ed25519_id, cell_in->ed_pubkey.pubkey, 32); } + if (tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(&cell_in->orport_ipv6, 0)) { + /* Then maybe IPv6 specifier. */ + ++n_specifiers; + ls = link_specifier_new(); + extend2_cell_body_add_ls(cell, ls); + ls->ls_type = LS_IPV6; + ls->ls_len = 18; + tor_addr_copy_ipv6_bytes(ls->un_ipv6_addr, + &cell_in->orport_ipv6.addr); + ls->un_ipv6_port = cell_in->orport_ipv6.port; + } cell->n_spec = n_specifiers; /* Now, the handshake */ diff --git a/src/core/or/onion.h b/src/core/or/onion.h index bb0b5b8dfd..256f0a3f31 100644 --- a/src/core/or/onion.h +++ b/src/core/or/onion.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ typedef struct extend_cell_t { /** Ed25519 public identity key. Zero if not set. */ struct ed25519_public_key_t ed_pubkey; /** The "create cell" embedded in this extend cell. Note that unlike the - * create cells we generate ourself, this once can have a handshake type we - * don't recognize. */ + * create cells we generate ourselves, this create cell can have a handshake + * type we don't recognize. */ create_cell_t create_cell; } extend_cell_t; @@ -74,8 +74,10 @@ void create_cell_init(create_cell_t *cell_out, uint8_t cell_type, const uint8_t *onionskin); int create_cell_parse(create_cell_t *cell_out, const cell_t *cell_in); int created_cell_parse(created_cell_t *cell_out, const cell_t *cell_in); -int extend_cell_parse(extend_cell_t *cell_out, const uint8_t command, - const uint8_t *payload_in, size_t payload_len); +MOCK_DECL(int,extend_cell_parse,(extend_cell_t *cell_out, + const uint8_t command, + const uint8_t *payload_in, + size_t payload_len)); int extended_cell_parse(extended_cell_t *cell_out, const uint8_t command, const uint8_t *payload_in, size_t payload_len); diff --git a/src/core/or/or.h b/src/core/or/or.h index 7c601e49b3..8758a2ec6f 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or.h +++ b/src/core/or/or.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -24,9 +24,8 @@ #include "lib/arch/bytes.h" #include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h" -#include "lib/cc/torint.h" #include "lib/container/map.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "lib/container/smartlist.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rsa.h" @@ -97,6 +96,8 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t; #define SIGNEWNYM 129 #define SIGCLEARDNSCACHE 130 #define SIGHEARTBEAT 131 +#define SIGACTIVE 132 +#define SIGDORMANT 133 #if (SIZEOF_CELL_T != 0) /* On Irix, stdlib.h defines a cell_t type, so we need to make sure @@ -166,12 +167,13 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t; #define PROXY_CONNECT 1 #define PROXY_SOCKS4 2 #define PROXY_SOCKS5 3 -/* !!!! If there is ever a PROXY_* type over 3, we must grow the proxy_type +#define PROXY_HAPROXY 4 +/* !!!! If there is ever a PROXY_* type over 7, we must grow the proxy_type * field in or_connection_t */ /* Pluggable transport proxy type. Don't use this in or_connection_t, * instead use the actual underlying proxy type (see above). */ -#define PROXY_PLUGGABLE 4 +#define PROXY_PLUGGABLE 5 /** How many circuits do we want simultaneously in-progress to handle * a given stream? */ @@ -205,6 +207,9 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t; #define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED 39 #define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK 40 +#define RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATE 41 +#define RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATED 42 + /* Reasons why an OR connection is closed. */ #define END_OR_CONN_REASON_DONE 1 #define END_OR_CONN_REASON_REFUSED 2 /* connection refused */ @@ -215,7 +220,8 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t; #define END_OR_CONN_REASON_IO_ERROR 7 /* read/write error */ #define END_OR_CONN_REASON_RESOURCE_LIMIT 8 /* sockets, buffers, etc */ #define END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING 9 /* PT failed or not available */ -#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC 10 +#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_TLS_ERROR 10 /* Problem in TLS protocol */ +#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC 11 /* Reasons why we (or a remote OR) might close a stream. See tor-spec.txt for * documentation of these. The values must match. */ @@ -604,21 +610,21 @@ typedef uint32_t circid_t; /** Identifies a stream on a circuit */ typedef uint16_t streamid_t; -/* channel_t typedef; struct channel_s is in channel.h */ +/* channel_t typedef; struct channel_t is in channel.h */ -typedef struct channel_s channel_t; +typedef struct channel_t channel_t; -/* channel_listener_t typedef; struct channel_listener_s is in channel.h */ +/* channel_listener_t typedef; struct channel_listener_t is in channel.h */ -typedef struct channel_listener_s channel_listener_t; +typedef struct channel_listener_t channel_listener_t; /* TLS channel stuff */ -typedef struct channel_tls_s channel_tls_t; +typedef struct channel_tls_t channel_tls_t; -/* circuitmux_t typedef; struct circuitmux_s is in circuitmux.h */ +/* circuitmux_t typedef; struct circuitmux_t is in circuitmux.h */ -typedef struct circuitmux_s circuitmux_t; +typedef struct circuitmux_t circuitmux_t; typedef struct cell_t cell_t; typedef struct var_cell_t var_cell_t; @@ -834,6 +840,14 @@ typedef struct protover_summary_flags_t { * service rendezvous point supporting version 3 as seen in proposal 224. * This requires HSRend=2. */ unsigned int supports_v3_rendezvous_point: 1; + + /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows clients to + * negotiate hs circuit setup padding. Requires Padding>=2. */ + unsigned int supports_hs_setup_padding : 1; + + /** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to support the + * ESTABLISH_INTRO DoS cell extension. Requires HSIntro>=5. */ + unsigned int supports_establish_intro_dos_extension : 1; } protover_summary_flags_t; typedef struct routerinfo_t routerinfo_t; @@ -982,8 +996,6 @@ typedef struct routerset_t routerset_t; typedef struct or_options_t or_options_t; -#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_protocol_warning_severity_level()) - typedef struct or_state_t or_state_t; #define MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN 256 @@ -1000,7 +1012,7 @@ typedef struct or_state_t or_state_t; #define BW_MIN_WEIGHT_SCALE 1 #define BW_MAX_WEIGHT_SCALE INT32_MAX -typedef struct circuit_build_times_s circuit_build_times_t; +typedef struct circuit_build_times_t circuit_build_times_t; /********************************* config.c ***************************/ diff --git a/src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h b/src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h index 6b6feb9d89..4e17b1c143 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #ifndef OR_CIRCUIT_ST_H @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #include "core/or/circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h" +#include "lib/evloop/token_bucket.h" + struct onion_queue_t; /** An or_circuit_t holds information needed to implement a circuit at an @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ struct or_circuit_t { /** Pointer to a workqueue entry, if this circuit has given an onionskin to * a cpuworker and is waiting for a response. Used to decide whether it is * safe to free a circuit or if it is still in use by a cpuworker. */ - struct workqueue_entry_s *workqueue_entry; + struct workqueue_entry_t *workqueue_entry; /** The circuit_id used in the previous (backward) hop of this circuit. */ circid_t p_circ_id; @@ -33,11 +35,6 @@ struct or_circuit_t { cell_queue_t p_chan_cells; /** The channel that is previous in this circuit. */ channel_t *p_chan; - /** - * Circuit mux associated with p_chan to which this circuit is attached; - * NULL if we have no p_chan. - */ - circuitmux_t *p_mux; /** Linked list of Exit streams associated with this circuit. */ edge_connection_t *n_streams; /** Linked list of Exit streams associated with this circuit that are @@ -74,7 +71,20 @@ struct or_circuit_t { * exit-ward queues of this circuit; reset every time when writing * buffer stats to disk. */ uint64_t total_cell_waiting_time; + + /** If set, the DoS defenses are enabled on this circuit meaning that the + * introduce2_bucket is initialized and used. */ + unsigned int introduce2_dos_defense_enabled : 1; + /** If set, the DoS defenses were explicitly enabled through the + * ESTABLISH_INTRO cell extension. If unset, the consensus is used to learn + * if the defenses can be enabled or not. */ + unsigned int introduce2_dos_defense_explicit : 1; + + /** INTRODUCE2 cell bucket controlling how much can go on this circuit. Only + * used if this is a service introduction circuit at the intro point + * (purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT). */ + token_bucket_ctr_t introduce2_bucket; }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(OR_CIRCUIT_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h index d5db5e8694..92956c2847 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file or_connection_st.h + * @brief OR connection structure. + **/ + #ifndef OR_CONNECTION_ST_H #define OR_CONNECTION_ST_H @@ -58,7 +63,7 @@ struct or_connection_t { /** True iff this is an outgoing connection. */ unsigned int is_outgoing:1; - unsigned int proxy_type:2; /**< One of PROXY_NONE...PROXY_SOCKS5 */ + unsigned int proxy_type:3; /**< One of PROXY_NONE...PROXY_HAPROXY */ unsigned int wide_circ_ids:1; /** True iff this connection has had its bootstrap failure logged with * control_event_bootstrap_problem. */ @@ -67,6 +72,8 @@ struct or_connection_t { * geoip cache and handled by the DoS mitigation subsystem. We use this to * insure we have a coherent count of concurrent connection. */ unsigned int tracked_for_dos_mitigation : 1; + /** True iff this connection is using a pluggable transport */ + unsigned int is_pt : 1; uint16_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for * "none negotiated yet." */ @@ -89,4 +96,4 @@ struct or_connection_t { uint64_t bytes_xmitted, bytes_xmitted_by_tls; }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(OR_CONNECTION_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h b/src/core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h index a93b7104aa..31755f04a1 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file or_handshake_certs_st.h + * @brief OR handshake certs structure + **/ + #ifndef OR_HANDSHAKE_CERTS_ST #define OR_HANDSHAKE_CERTS_ST @@ -37,4 +42,4 @@ struct or_handshake_certs_t { size_t ed_rsa_crosscert_len; }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(OR_HANDSHAKE_CERTS_ST) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h b/src/core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h index 09a8a34179..050404046d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file or_handshake_state_st.h + * @brief OR handshake state structure + **/ + #ifndef OR_HANDSHAKE_STATE_ST #define OR_HANDSHAKE_STATE_ST @@ -74,5 +79,4 @@ struct or_handshake_state_t { or_handshake_certs_t *certs; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(OR_HANDSHAKE_STATE_ST) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/or_periodic.c b/src/core/or/or_periodic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4dfdce14ca --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/or_periodic.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file or_periodic.c + * @brief Periodic callbacks for the onion routing subsystem + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include "core/or/or.h" + +#include "core/mainloop/periodic.h" + +#include "core/or/channel.h" +#include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/or/or_periodic.h" + +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h" + +#ifndef COCCI +#define DECLARE_EVENT(name, roles, flags) \ + static periodic_event_item_t name ## _event = \ + PERIODIC_EVENT(name, \ + PERIODIC_EVENT_ROLE_##roles, \ + flags) +#endif /* !defined(COCCI) */ + +#define FL(name) (PERIODIC_EVENT_FLAG_ ## name) + +#define CHANNEL_CHECK_INTERVAL (60*60) +static int +check_canonical_channels_callback(time_t now, const or_options_t *options) +{ + (void)now; + if (public_server_mode(options)) + channel_check_for_duplicates(); + + return CHANNEL_CHECK_INTERVAL; +} + +DECLARE_EVENT(check_canonical_channels, RELAY, FL(NEED_NET)); + +/** + * Periodic callback: as a server, see if we have any old unused circuits + * that should be expired */ +static int +expire_old_circuits_serverside_callback(time_t now, + const or_options_t *options) +{ + (void)options; + /* every 11 seconds, so not usually the same second as other such events */ + circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside(now); + return 11; +} + +DECLARE_EVENT(expire_old_circuits_serverside, ROUTER, FL(NEED_NET)); + +void +or_register_periodic_events(void) +{ + // These are router-only events, but they're owned by the OR subsystem. */ + periodic_events_register(&check_canonical_channels_event); + periodic_events_register(&expire_old_circuits_serverside_event); +} diff --git a/src/core/or/or_periodic.h b/src/core/or/or_periodic.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..080573a838 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/or_periodic.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file or_periodic.h + * @brief Header for core/or/or_periodic.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CORE_OR_OR_PERIODIC_H +#define TOR_CORE_OR_OR_PERIODIC_H + +void or_register_periodic_events(void); + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CORE_OR_OR_PERIODIC_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/or_sys.c b/src/core/or/or_sys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73c6087dce --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/or_sys.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file or_sys.c + * @brief Subsystem definitions for OR module. + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/or/or_periodic.h" +#include "core/or/or_sys.h" +#include "core/or/policies.h" +#include "core/or/protover.h" +#include "core/or/versions.h" + +#include "lib/subsys/subsys.h" + +static int +subsys_or_initialize(void) +{ + or_register_periodic_events(); + return 0; +} + +static void +subsys_or_shutdown(void) +{ + protover_free_all(); + protover_summary_cache_free_all(); + policies_free_all(); +} + +static int +subsys_or_add_pubsub(struct pubsub_connector_t *connector) +{ + int rv = 0; + if (orconn_add_pubsub(connector) < 0) + rv = -1; + if (ocirc_add_pubsub(connector) < 0) + rv = -1; + return rv; +} + +const struct subsys_fns_t sys_or = { + .name = "or", + SUBSYS_DECLARE_LOCATION(), + .supported = true, + .level = 20, + .initialize = subsys_or_initialize, + .shutdown = subsys_or_shutdown, + .add_pubsub = subsys_or_add_pubsub, +}; diff --git a/src/core/or/or_sys.h b/src/core/or/or_sys.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ee56c8682 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/or_sys.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * @file or_sys.h + * @brief Header for core/or/or_sys.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CORE_OR_OR_SYS_H +#define TOR_CORE_OR_OR_SYS_H + +extern const struct subsys_fns_t sys_or; + +struct pubsub_connector_t; +int ocirc_add_pubsub(struct pubsub_connector_t *connector); +int orconn_add_pubsub(struct pubsub_connector_t *connector); + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CORE_OR_OR_SYS_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/orconn_event.c b/src/core/or/orconn_event.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c30e2dd22f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/orconn_event.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file orconn_event.c + * \brief Publish state change messages for OR connections + * + * Implements a basic publish-subscribe framework for messages about + * the state of OR connections. The publisher calls the subscriber + * callback functions synchronously. + * + * Although the synchronous calls might not simplify the call graph, + * this approach improves data isolation because the publisher doesn't + * need knowledge about the internals of subscribing subsystems. It + * also avoids race conditions that might occur in asynchronous + * frameworks. + **/ + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "lib/pubsub/pubsub.h" +#include "lib/subsys/subsys.h" + +#define ORCONN_EVENT_PRIVATE +#include "core/or/orconn_event.h" +#include "core/or/or_sys.h" + +DECLARE_PUBLISH(orconn_state); +DECLARE_PUBLISH(orconn_status); + +static void +orconn_event_free(msg_aux_data_t u) +{ + tor_free_(u.ptr); +} + +static char * +orconn_state_fmt(msg_aux_data_t u) +{ + orconn_state_msg_t *msg = (orconn_state_msg_t *)u.ptr; + char *s = NULL; + + tor_asprintf(&s, "<gid=%"PRIu64" chan=%"PRIu64" proxy_type=%d state=%d>", + msg->gid, msg->chan, msg->proxy_type, msg->state); + return s; +} + +static char * +orconn_status_fmt(msg_aux_data_t u) +{ + orconn_status_msg_t *msg = (orconn_status_msg_t *)u.ptr; + char *s = NULL; + + tor_asprintf(&s, "<gid=%"PRIu64" status=%d reason=%d>", + msg->gid, msg->status, msg->reason); + return s; +} + +static dispatch_typefns_t orconn_state_fns = { + .free_fn = orconn_event_free, + .fmt_fn = orconn_state_fmt, +}; + +static dispatch_typefns_t orconn_status_fns = { + .free_fn = orconn_event_free, + .fmt_fn = orconn_status_fmt, +}; + +int +orconn_add_pubsub(struct pubsub_connector_t *connector) +{ + if (DISPATCH_REGISTER_TYPE(connector, orconn_state, &orconn_state_fns)) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_REGISTER_TYPE(connector, orconn_status, &orconn_status_fns)) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_ADD_PUB(connector, orconn, orconn_state) != 0) + return -1; + if (DISPATCH_ADD_PUB(connector, orconn, orconn_status) != 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +void +orconn_state_publish(orconn_state_msg_t *msg) +{ + PUBLISH(orconn_state, msg); +} + +void +orconn_status_publish(orconn_status_msg_t *msg) +{ + PUBLISH(orconn_status, msg); +} diff --git a/src/core/or/orconn_event.h b/src/core/or/orconn_event.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2653b20d6e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/orconn_event.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file orconn_event.h + * \brief Header file for orconn_event.c + * + * The OR_CONN_STATE_* symbols are here to make it easier for + * subscribers to make decisions based on the messages that they + * receive. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_ORCONN_EVENT_H +#define TOR_ORCONN_EVENT_H + +#include "lib/pubsub/pubsub.h" + +/** + * @name States of OR connections + * + * These must be in a partial ordering such that usually no OR + * connection will transition from a higher-numbered state to a + * lower-numbered one. Code such as bto_update_best() depends on this + * ordering to determine the best state it's seen so far. + * @{ */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1 +/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for connect() to finish. */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 1 +/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for proxy handshake to complete */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING 2 +/** State for an OR connection client: SSL is handshaking, not done + * yet. */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING 3 +/** State for a connection to an OR: We're doing a second SSL handshake for + * renegotiation purposes. (V2 handshake only.) */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING 4 +/** State for a connection at an OR: We're waiting for the client to + * renegotiate (to indicate a v2 handshake) or send a versions cell (to + * indicate a v3 handshake) */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING 5 +/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, we've done + * renegotiation, but we haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions and + * sent a netinfo cell. */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 6 +/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, but we + * haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions, done a V3 handshake, and + * sent a netinfo cell. */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3 7 +/** State for an OR connection: Ready to send/receive cells. */ +#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 8 +#define OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 8 +/** @} */ + +/** Used to indicate the type of an OR connection event passed to the + * controller. The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */ +typedef enum or_conn_status_event_t { + OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED = 0, + OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED = 1, + OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED = 2, + OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED = 3, + OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW = 4, +} or_conn_status_event_t; + +/** + * Message for orconn state update + * + * This contains information about internal state changes of + * or_connection_t objects. The chan and proxy_type fields are + * additional information that a subscriber may need to make + * decisions. + **/ +typedef struct orconn_state_msg_t { + uint64_t gid; /**< connection's global ID */ + uint64_t chan; /**< associated channel ID */ + int proxy_type; /**< connection's proxy type */ + uint8_t state; /**< new connection state */ +} orconn_state_msg_t; + +DECLARE_MESSAGE(orconn_state, orconn_state, orconn_state_msg_t *); + +/** + * Message for orconn status event + * + * This contains information that ends up in ORCONN control protocol + * events. + **/ +typedef struct orconn_status_msg_t { + uint64_t gid; /**< connection's global ID */ + int status; /**< or_conn_status_event_t */ + int reason; /**< reason */ +} orconn_status_msg_t; + +DECLARE_MESSAGE(orconn_status, orconn_status, orconn_status_msg_t *); + +#ifdef ORCONN_EVENT_PRIVATE +void orconn_state_publish(orconn_state_msg_t *); +void orconn_status_publish(orconn_status_msg_t *); +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_ORCONN_EVENT_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/origin_circuit_st.h b/src/core/or/origin_circuit_st.h index f55416db14..79e250cd59 100644 --- a/src/core/or/origin_circuit_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/origin_circuit_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file origin_circuit_st.h + * @brief Origin circuit structure. + **/ + #ifndef ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_ST_H #define ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_ST_H @@ -161,6 +166,10 @@ struct origin_circuit_t { * connections to this circuit. */ unsigned int unusable_for_new_conns : 1; + /* If this flag is set (due to padding negotiation failure), we should + * not try to negotiate further circuit padding. */ + unsigned padding_negotiation_failed : 1; + /** * Tristate variable to guard against pathbias miscounting * due to circuit purpose transitions changing the decision @@ -291,4 +300,4 @@ struct origin_circuit_t { }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/policies.c b/src/core/or/policies.c index 3ed282d785..2bf2dc7005 100644 --- a/src/core/or/policies.c +++ b/src/core/or/policies.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ #include "feature/relay/routermode.h" #include "lib/geoip/geoip.h" #include "ht.h" +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/encoding/confline.h" +#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h" #include "core/or/addr_policy_st.h" #include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h" @@ -165,7 +167,7 @@ policy_expand_unspec(smartlist_t **policy) } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&newpolicy_ipv4.addr, 0); tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&newpolicy_ipv6.addr, - "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"); + (const uint8_t *)"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"); smartlist_add(tmp, addr_policy_get_canonical_entry(&newpolicy_ipv4)); smartlist_add(tmp, addr_policy_get_canonical_entry(&newpolicy_ipv6)); addr_policy_free(p); @@ -918,49 +920,6 @@ fascist_firewall_choose_address_ipv4h(uint32_t ipv4h_addr, pref_ipv6, ap); } -/* Some microdescriptor consensus methods have no IPv6 addresses in rs: they - * are in the microdescriptors. For these consensus methods, we can't rely on - * the node's IPv6 address until its microdescriptor is available (when using - * microdescs). - * But for bridges, rewrite_node_address_for_bridge() updates node->ri with - * the configured address, so we can trust bridge addresses. - * (Bridges could gain an IPv6 address if their microdescriptor arrives, but - * this will never be their preferred address: that is in the config.) - * Returns true if the node needs a microdescriptor for its IPv6 address, and - * false if the addresses in the node are already up-to-date. - */ -static int -node_awaiting_ipv6(const or_options_t* options, const node_t *node) -{ - tor_assert(node); - - /* There's no point waiting for an IPv6 address if we'd never use it */ - if (!fascist_firewall_use_ipv6(options)) { - return 0; - } - - /* If the node has an IPv6 address, we're not waiting */ - if (node_has_ipv6_addr(node)) { - return 0; - } - - /* If the current consensus method and flavour has IPv6 addresses, we're not - * waiting */ - if (networkstatus_consensus_has_ipv6(options)) { - return 0; - } - - /* Bridge clients never use the address from a bridge's md, so there's no - * need to wait for it. */ - if (node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) { - return 0; - } - - /* We are waiting if we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits() and we have no - * md. */ - return (!node->md && we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits(options)); -} - /** Like fascist_firewall_choose_address_base(), but takes <b>rs</b>. * Consults the corresponding node, then falls back to rs if node is NULL. * This should only happen when there's no valid consensus, and rs doesn't @@ -983,7 +942,7 @@ fascist_firewall_choose_address_rs(const routerstatus_t *rs, const or_options_t *options = get_options(); const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(rs->identity_digest); - if (node && !node_awaiting_ipv6(options, node)) { + if (node) { fascist_firewall_choose_address_node(node, fw_connection, pref_only, ap); } else { /* There's no node-specific IPv6 preference, so use the generic IPv6 @@ -1001,6 +960,83 @@ fascist_firewall_choose_address_rs(const routerstatus_t *rs, } } +/** Like fascist_firewall_choose_address_base(), but takes in a smartlist + * <b>lspecs</b> consisting of one or more link specifiers. We assume + * fw_connection is FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION as link specifiers cannot + * contain DirPorts. + */ +void +fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls(const smartlist_t *lspecs, + int pref_only, tor_addr_port_t* ap) +{ + int have_v4 = 0, have_v6 = 0; + uint16_t port_v4 = 0, port_v6 = 0; + tor_addr_t addr_v4, addr_v6; + + tor_assert(ap); + + if (lspecs == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown or missing link specifiers"); + return; + } + if (smartlist_len(lspecs) == 0) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Link specifiers are empty"); + return; + } + + tor_addr_make_null(&ap->addr, AF_UNSPEC); + ap->port = 0; + + tor_addr_make_null(&addr_v4, AF_INET); + tor_addr_make_null(&addr_v6, AF_INET6); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(lspecs, const link_specifier_t *, ls) { + switch (link_specifier_get_ls_type(ls)) { + case LS_IPV4: + /* Skip if we already seen a v4. */ + if (have_v4) continue; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr_v4, + link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_addr(ls)); + port_v4 = link_specifier_get_un_ipv4_port(ls); + have_v4 = 1; + break; + case LS_IPV6: + /* Skip if we already seen a v6, or deliberately skip it if we're not a + * direct connection. */ + if (have_v6) continue; + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&addr_v6, + link_specifier_getconstarray_un_ipv6_addr(ls)); + port_v6 = link_specifier_get_un_ipv6_port(ls); + have_v6 = 1; + break; + default: + /* Ignore unknown. */ + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls); + + /* If we don't have IPv4 or IPv6 in link specifiers, log a bug and return. */ + if (!have_v4 && !have_v6) { + if (!have_v6) { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "None of our link specifiers have IPv4 or IPv6"); + } else { + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "None of our link specifiers have IPv4"); + } + return; + } + + /* Here, don't check for DirPorts as link specifiers are only used for + * ORPorts. */ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + int pref_ipv6 = fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(options); + /* Assume that the DirPorts are zero as link specifiers only use ORPorts. */ + fascist_firewall_choose_address_base(&addr_v4, port_v4, 0, + &addr_v6, port_v6, 0, + FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, + pref_only, pref_ipv6, + ap); +} + /** Like fascist_firewall_choose_address_base(), but takes <b>node</b>, and * looks up the node's IPv6 preference rather than taking an argument * for pref_ipv6. */ @@ -1019,17 +1055,6 @@ fascist_firewall_choose_address_node(const node_t *node, } node_assert_ok(node); - /* Calling fascist_firewall_choose_address_node() when the node is missing - * IPv6 information breaks IPv6-only clients. - * If the node is a hard-coded fallback directory or authority, call - * fascist_firewall_choose_address_rs() on the fake (hard-coded) routerstatus - * for the node. - * If it is not hard-coded, check that the node has a microdescriptor, full - * descriptor (routerinfo), or is one of our configured bridges before - * calling this function. */ - if (BUG(node_awaiting_ipv6(get_options(), node))) { - return; - } const int pref_ipv6_node = (fw_connection == FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION ? node_ipv6_or_preferred(node) @@ -1150,6 +1175,15 @@ authdir_policy_badexit_address(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port) #define REJECT(arg) \ STMT_BEGIN *msg = tor_strdup(arg); goto err; STMT_END +/** Check <b>or_options</b> to determine whether or not we are using the + * default options for exit policy. Return true if so, false otherwise. */ +static int +policy_using_default_exit_options(const or_options_t *or_options) +{ + return (or_options->ExitPolicy == NULL && or_options->ExitRelay == -1 && + or_options->ReducedExitPolicy == 0 && or_options->IPv6Exit == 0); +} + /** Config helper: If there's any problem with the policy configuration * options in <b>options</b>, return -1 and set <b>msg</b> to a newly * allocated description of the error. Else return 0. */ @@ -1168,9 +1202,8 @@ validate_addr_policies(const or_options_t *options, char **msg) static int warned_about_nonexit = 0; - if (public_server_mode(options) && - !warned_about_nonexit && options->ExitPolicy == NULL && - options->ExitRelay == -1 && options->ReducedExitPolicy == 0) { + if (public_server_mode(options) && !warned_about_nonexit && + policy_using_default_exit_options(options)) { warned_about_nonexit = 1; log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "By default, Tor does not run as an exit relay. " "If you want to be an exit relay, " @@ -1359,9 +1392,9 @@ policy_hash(const policy_map_ent_t *ent) } HT_PROTOTYPE(policy_map, policy_map_ent_t, node, policy_hash, - policy_eq) + policy_eq); HT_GENERATE2(policy_map, policy_map_ent_t, node, policy_hash, - policy_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_) + policy_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_); /** Given a pointer to an addr_policy_t, return a copy of the pointer to the * "canonical" copy of that addr_policy_t; the canonical copy is a single @@ -2127,9 +2160,9 @@ policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options(const or_options_t *or_options, int rv = 0; /* Short-circuit for non-exit relays, or for relays where we didn't specify - * ExitPolicy or ReducedExitPolicy and ExitRelay is auto. */ - if (or_options->ExitRelay == 0 || (or_options->ExitPolicy == NULL && - or_options->ExitRelay == -1 && or_options->ReducedExitPolicy == 0)) { + * ExitPolicy or ReducedExitPolicy or IPv6Exit and ExitRelay is auto. */ + if (or_options->ExitRelay == 0 || + policy_using_default_exit_options(or_options)) { append_exit_policy_string(result, "reject *4:*"); append_exit_policy_string(result, "reject *6:*"); return 0; @@ -2706,7 +2739,7 @@ parse_short_policy(const char *summary) int is_accept; int n_entries; short_policy_entry_t entries[MAX_EXITPOLICY_SUMMARY_LEN]; /* overkill */ - const char *next; + char *next; if (!strcmpstart(summary, "accept ")) { is_accept = 1; @@ -2721,57 +2754,56 @@ parse_short_policy(const char *summary) n_entries = 0; for ( ; *summary; summary = next) { - const char *comma = strchr(summary, ','); - unsigned low, high; - char dummy; - char ent_buf[32]; - size_t len; - - next = comma ? comma+1 : strchr(summary, '\0'); - len = comma ? (size_t)(comma - summary) : strlen(summary); - if (n_entries == MAX_EXITPOLICY_SUMMARY_LEN) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR, "Impossibly long policy summary %s", escaped(orig_summary)); return NULL; } - if (! TOR_ISDIGIT(*summary) || len > (sizeof(ent_buf)-1)) { - /* unrecognized entry format. skip it. */ - continue; - } - if (len < 1) { - /* empty; skip it. */ - /* XXX This happens to be unreachable, since if len==0, then *summary is - * ',' or '\0', and the TOR_ISDIGIT test above would have failed. */ - continue; + unsigned low, high; + int ok; + low = (unsigned) tor_parse_ulong(summary, 10, 1, 65535, &ok, &next); + if (!ok) { + if (! TOR_ISDIGIT(*summary) || *summary == ',') { + /* Unrecognized format: skip it. */ + goto skip_ent; + } else { + goto bad_ent; + } } - memcpy(ent_buf, summary, len); - ent_buf[len] = '\0'; + switch (*next) { + case ',': + ++next; + FALLTHROUGH; + case '\0': + high = low; + break; + case '-': + high = (unsigned) tor_parse_ulong(next+1, 10, low, 65535, &ok, &next); + if (!ok) + goto bad_ent; - if (tor_sscanf(ent_buf, "%u-%u%c", &low, &high, &dummy) == 2) { - if (low<1 || low>65535 || high<1 || high>65535 || low>high) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR, - "Found bad entry in policy summary %s", escaped(orig_summary)); - return NULL; - } - } else if (tor_sscanf(ent_buf, "%u%c", &low, &dummy) == 1) { - if (low<1 || low>65535) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR, - "Found bad entry in policy summary %s", escaped(orig_summary)); - return NULL; - } - high = low; - } else { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR,"Found bad entry in policy summary %s", - escaped(orig_summary)); - return NULL; + if (*next == ',') + ++next; + else if (*next != '\0') + goto bad_ent; + + break; + default: + goto bad_ent; } entries[n_entries].min_port = low; entries[n_entries].max_port = high; n_entries++; + + continue; + skip_ent: + next = strchr(next, ','); + if (!next) + break; + ++next; } if (n_entries == 0) { @@ -2792,6 +2824,11 @@ parse_short_policy(const char *summary) result->n_entries = n_entries; memcpy(result->entries, entries, sizeof(short_policy_entry_t)*n_entries); return result; + + bad_ent: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR,"Found bad entry in policy summary %s", + escaped(orig_summary)); + return NULL; } /** Write <b>policy</b> back out into a string. */ diff --git a/src/core/or/policies.h b/src/core/or/policies.h index 2c38de362f..72a37d62b0 100644 --- a/src/core/or/policies.h +++ b/src/core/or/policies.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ int fascist_firewall_allows_dir_server(const dir_server_t *ds, void fascist_firewall_choose_address_rs(const routerstatus_t *rs, firewall_connection_t fw_connection, int pref_only, tor_addr_port_t* ap); +void fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls(const smartlist_t *lspecs, + int pref_only, tor_addr_port_t* ap); void fascist_firewall_choose_address_node(const node_t *node, firewall_connection_t fw_connection, int pref_only, tor_addr_port_t* ap); diff --git a/src/core/or/port_cfg_st.h b/src/core/or/port_cfg_st.h index b67091ce32..064e679d78 100644 --- a/src/core/or/port_cfg_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/port_cfg_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file port_cfg_st.h + * @brief Listener port configuration structure. + **/ + #ifndef PORT_CFG_ST_H #define PORT_CFG_ST_H @@ -31,5 +36,4 @@ struct port_cfg_t { char unix_addr[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(PORT_CFG_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/protover.c b/src/core/or/protover.c index dfb0e9e303..0d03e9a06b 100644 --- a/src/core/or/protover.c +++ b/src/core/or/protover.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2016-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ static int protocol_list_contains(const smartlist_t *protos, static const struct { protocol_type_t protover_type; const char *name; +/* If you add a new protocol here, you probably also want to add + * parsing for it in summarize_protover_flags(), so that it has a + * summary flag in routerstatus_t */ } PROTOCOL_NAMES[] = { { PRT_LINK, "Link" }, { PRT_LINKAUTH, "LinkAuth" }, @@ -49,7 +52,9 @@ static const struct { { PRT_HSREND, "HSRend" }, { PRT_DESC, "Desc" }, { PRT_MICRODESC, "Microdesc"}, - { PRT_CONS, "Cons" } + { PRT_PADDING, "Padding"}, + { PRT_CONS, "Cons" }, + { PRT_FLOWCTRL, "FlowCtrl"}, }; #define N_PROTOCOL_NAMES ARRAY_LENGTH(PROTOCOL_NAMES) @@ -386,8 +391,9 @@ protover_get_supported_protocols(void) "Cons=1-2 " "Desc=1-2 " "DirCache=1-2 " + "FlowCtrl=1 " "HSDir=1-2 " - "HSIntro=3-4 " + "HSIntro=3-5 " "HSRend=1-2 " "Link=1-5 " #ifdef HAVE_WORKING_TOR_TLS_GET_TLSSECRETS @@ -396,6 +402,7 @@ protover_get_supported_protocols(void) "LinkAuth=3 " #endif "Microdesc=1-2 " + "Padding=2 " "Relay=1-2"; } @@ -815,6 +822,8 @@ protover_all_supported(const char *s, char **missing_out) * ones and, if so, add them to unsupported->ranges. */ if (versions->low != 0 && versions->high != 0) { smartlist_add(unsupported->ranges, versions); + } else { + tor_free(versions); } /* Finally, if we had something unsupported, add it to the list of * missing_some things and mark that there was something missing. */ @@ -823,7 +832,6 @@ protover_all_supported(const char *s, char **missing_out) all_supported = 0; } else { proto_entry_free(unsupported); - tor_free(versions); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(range); diff --git a/src/core/or/protover.h b/src/core/or/protover.h index 7e181ba97a..9509f3e8a3 100644 --- a/src/core/or/protover.h +++ b/src/core/or/protover.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2016-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -28,21 +28,25 @@ struct smartlist_t; #define PROTOVER_HS_INTRO_V3 4 /** The protover version number that signifies HSv3 rendezvous point support */ #define PROTOVER_HS_RENDEZVOUS_POINT_V3 2 +/** The protover that signals support for HS circuit setup padding machines */ +#define PROTOVER_HS_SETUP_PADDING 2 /** List of recognized subprotocols. */ /// C_RUST_COUPLED: src/rust/protover/ffi.rs `translate_to_rust` /// C_RUST_COUPLED: src/rust/protover/protover.rs `Proto` typedef enum protocol_type_t { - PRT_LINK, - PRT_LINKAUTH, - PRT_RELAY, - PRT_DIRCACHE, - PRT_HSDIR, - PRT_HSINTRO, - PRT_HSREND, - PRT_DESC, - PRT_MICRODESC, - PRT_CONS, + PRT_LINK = 0, + PRT_LINKAUTH = 1, + PRT_RELAY = 2, + PRT_DIRCACHE = 3, + PRT_HSDIR = 4, + PRT_HSINTRO = 5, + PRT_HSREND = 6, + PRT_DESC = 7, + PRT_MICRODESC = 8, + PRT_CONS = 9, + PRT_PADDING = 10, + PRT_FLOWCTRL = 11, } protocol_type_t; bool protover_contains_long_protocol_names(const char *s); diff --git a/src/core/or/protover_rust.c b/src/core/or/protover_rust.c index bc56ea11d0..f44746b6da 100644 --- a/src/core/or/protover_rust.c +++ b/src/core/or/protover_rust.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2016-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /* diff --git a/src/core/or/reasons.c b/src/core/or/reasons.c index e21bfa670a..708f43a689 100644 --- a/src/core/or/reasons.c +++ b/src/core/or/reasons.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(int r) return "IOERROR"; case END_OR_CONN_REASON_RESOURCE_LIMIT: return "RESOURCELIMIT"; + case END_OR_CONN_REASON_TLS_ERROR: + return "TLS_ERROR"; case END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC: return "MISC"; case END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING: @@ -276,6 +278,8 @@ tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(int e) case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: case TOR_TLS_DONE: return END_OR_CONN_REASON_DONE; + case TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC: + return END_OR_CONN_REASON_TLS_ERROR; default: return END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC; } diff --git a/src/core/or/reasons.h b/src/core/or/reasons.h index c45a8bc38d..2e534aab73 100644 --- a/src/core/or/reasons.h +++ b/src/core/or/reasons.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** diff --git a/src/core/or/relay.c b/src/core/or/relay.c index 00353f47a9..892dbe2d0a 100644 --- a/src/core/or/relay.c +++ b/src/core/or/relay.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -49,22 +49,24 @@ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "feature/client/addressmap.h" #include "lib/err/backtrace.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "core/or/channel.h" #include "feature/client/circpathbias.h" #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/or/circuitpadding.h" #include "lib/compress/compress.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/or/connection_edge.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/relay/dns.h" +#include "feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.h" #include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" @@ -80,7 +82,6 @@ #include "feature/nodelist/describe.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" #include "core/or/scheduler.h" -#include "feature/stats/rephist.h" #include "core/or/cell_st.h" #include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" @@ -93,15 +94,12 @@ #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" - -#include "lib/intmath/weakrng.h" +#include "core/or/sendme.h" static edge_connection_t *relay_lookup_conn(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction, crypt_path_t *layer_hint); -static void circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circuit_t *circ, - crypt_path_t *layer_hint); static void circuit_resume_edge_reading(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint); static int circuit_resume_edge_reading_helper(edge_connection_t *conn, @@ -134,9 +132,6 @@ uint64_t stats_n_relay_cells_delivered = 0; * reached (see append_cell_to_circuit_queue()) */ uint64_t stats_n_circ_max_cell_reached = 0; -/** Used to tell which stream to read from first on a circuit. */ -static tor_weak_rng_t stream_choice_rng = TOR_WEAK_RNG_INIT; - /** * Update channel usage state based on the type of relay cell and * circuit properties. @@ -253,6 +248,10 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (recognized) { edge_connection_t *conn = NULL; + /* Recognized cell, the cell digest has been updated, we'll record it for + * the SENDME if need be. */ + sendme_record_received_cell_digest(circ, layer_hint); + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING) { if (pathbias_check_probe_response(circ, cell) == -1) { pathbias_count_valid_cells(circ, cell); @@ -267,8 +266,8 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { ++stats_n_relay_cells_delivered; log_debug(LD_OR,"Sending away from origin."); - if ((reason=connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell, circ, conn, NULL)) - < 0) { + reason = connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell, circ, conn, NULL); + if (reason < 0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "connection_edge_process_relay_cell (away from origin) " "failed."); @@ -278,8 +277,9 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) { ++stats_n_relay_cells_delivered; log_debug(LD_OR,"Sending to origin."); - if ((reason = connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell, circ, conn, - layer_hint)) < 0) { + reason = connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell, circ, conn, + layer_hint); + if (reason < 0) { /* If a client is trying to connect to unknown hidden service port, * END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN is sent back so we can then close the circuit. * Do not log warn as this is an expected behavior for a service. */ @@ -293,7 +293,9 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, return 0; } - /* not recognized. pass it on. */ + /* not recognized. inform circpad and pass it on. */ + circpad_deliver_unrecognized_cell_events(circ, cell_direction); + if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { cell->circ_id = circ->n_circ_id; /* switch it */ chan = circ->n_chan; @@ -353,11 +355,11 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, * - Encrypt it to the right layer * - Append it to the appropriate cell_queue on <b>circ</b>. */ -static int -circuit_package_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, +MOCK_IMPL(int, +circuit_package_relay_cell, (cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, cell_direction_t cell_direction, crypt_path_t *layer_hint, streamid_t on_stream, - const char *filename, int lineno) + const char *filename, int lineno)) { channel_t *chan; /* where to send the cell */ @@ -524,6 +526,8 @@ relay_command_to_string(uint8_t command) case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK: return "INTRODUCE_ACK"; case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2: return "EXTEND2"; case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED2: return "EXTENDED2"; + case RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATE: return "PADDING_NEGOTIATE"; + case RELAY_COMMAND_PADDING_NEGOTIATED: return "PADDING_NEGOTIATED"; default: tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Unrecognized relay command %u", (unsigned)command); @@ -531,6 +535,64 @@ relay_command_to_string(uint8_t command) } } +/** When padding a cell with randomness, leave this many zeros after the + * payload. */ +#define CELL_PADDING_GAP 4 + +/** Return the offset where the padding should start. The <b>data_len</b> is + * the relay payload length expected to be put in the cell. It can not be + * bigger than RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE else this function assert(). + * + * Value will always be smaller than CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE because this offset is + * for the entire cell length not just the data payload length. Zero is + * returned if there is no room for padding. + * + * This function always skips the first 4 bytes after the payload because + * having some unused zero bytes has saved us a lot of times in the past. */ + +STATIC size_t +get_pad_cell_offset(size_t data_len) +{ + /* This is never supposed to happen but in case it does, stop right away + * because if tor is tricked somehow into not adding random bytes to the + * payload with this function returning 0 for a bad data_len, the entire + * authenticated SENDME design can be bypassed leading to bad denial of + * service attacks. */ + tor_assert(data_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + + /* If the offset is larger than the cell payload size, we return an offset + * of zero indicating that no padding needs to be added. */ + size_t offset = RELAY_HEADER_SIZE + data_len + CELL_PADDING_GAP; + if (offset >= CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE) { + return 0; + } + return offset; +} + +/* Add random bytes to the unused portion of the payload, to foil attacks + * where the other side can predict all of the bytes in the payload and thus + * compute the authenticated SENDME cells without seeing the traffic. See + * proposal 289. */ +static void +pad_cell_payload(uint8_t *cell_payload, size_t data_len) +{ + size_t pad_offset, pad_len; + + tor_assert(cell_payload); + + pad_offset = get_pad_cell_offset(data_len); + if (pad_offset == 0) { + /* We can't add padding so we are done. */ + return; + } + + /* Remember here that the cell_payload is the length of the header and + * payload size so we offset it using the full length of the cell. */ + pad_len = CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - pad_offset; + crypto_fast_rng_getbytes(get_thread_fast_rng(), + cell_payload + pad_offset, pad_len); +} + /** Make a relay cell out of <b>relay_command</b> and <b>payload</b>, and send * it onto the open circuit <b>circ</b>. <b>stream_id</b> is the ID on * <b>circ</b> for the stream that's sending the relay cell, or 0 if it's a @@ -574,11 +636,14 @@ relay_send_command_from_edge_,(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ, if (payload_len) memcpy(cell.payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, payload, payload_len); + /* Add random padding to the cell if we can. */ + pad_cell_payload(cell.payload, payload_len); + log_debug(LD_OR,"delivering %d cell %s.", relay_command, cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT ? "forward" : "backward"); - if (relay_command == RELAY_COMMAND_DROP) - rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_DROP); + /* Tell circpad we're sending a relay cell */ + circpad_deliver_sent_relay_cell_events(circ, relay_command); /* If we are sending an END cell and this circuit is used for a tunneled * directory request, advance its state. */ @@ -602,7 +667,9 @@ relay_send_command_from_edge_,(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ, * one of them. Don't worry about the conn protocol version: * append_cell_to_circuit_queue will fix it up. */ cell.command = CELL_RELAY_EARLY; - --origin_circ->remaining_relay_early_cells; + /* If we're out of relay early cells, tell circpad */ + if (--origin_circ->remaining_relay_early_cells == 0) + circpad_machine_event_circ_has_no_relay_early(origin_circ); log_debug(LD_OR, "Sending a RELAY_EARLY cell; %d remaining.", (int)origin_circ->remaining_relay_early_cells); /* Memorize the command that is sent as RELAY_EARLY cell; helps debug @@ -639,6 +706,14 @@ relay_send_command_from_edge_,(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ, circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL); return -1; } + + /* If applicable, note the cell digest for the SENDME version 1 purpose if + * we need to. This call needs to be after the circuit_package_relay_cell() + * because the cell digest is set within that function. */ + if (relay_command == RELAY_COMMAND_DATA) { + sendme_record_cell_digest_on_circ(circ, cpath_layer); + } + return 0; } @@ -792,7 +867,7 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open( ttl = (int)ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+5)); } else if (rh->length == 17 || rh->length == 21) { tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&addr, - (char*)(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1)); + (cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1)); if (rh->length == 21) ttl = (int)ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+17)); } @@ -1017,7 +1092,7 @@ connected_cell_parse(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell, return -1; if (get_uint8(payload + 4) != 6) return -1; - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, (char*)(payload + 5)); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, (payload + 5)); bytes = ntohl(get_uint32(payload + 21)); if (bytes <= INT32_MAX) *ttl_out = (int) bytes; @@ -1090,7 +1165,7 @@ resolved_cell_parse(const cell_t *cell, const relay_header_t *rh, if (answer_len != 16) goto err; addr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*addr)); - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&addr->addr, (const char*) cp); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&addr->addr, cp); cp += 16; addr->ttl = ntohl(get_uint32(cp)); cp += 4; @@ -1447,85 +1522,108 @@ relay_crypt_from_last_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) return true; } -/** An incoming relay cell has arrived on circuit <b>circ</b>. If - * <b>conn</b> is NULL this is a control cell, else <b>cell</b> is - * destined for <b>conn</b>. +/** Process a SENDME cell that arrived on <b>circ</b>. If it is a stream level + * cell, it is destined for the given <b>conn</b>. If it is a circuit level + * cell, it is destined for the <b>layer_hint</b>. The <b>domain</b> is the + * logging domain that should be used. * - * If <b>layer_hint</b> is defined, then we're the origin of the - * circuit, and it specifies the hop that packaged <b>cell</b>. - * - * Return -reason if you want to warn and tear down the circuit, else 0. - */ -STATIC int -connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, - edge_connection_t *conn, - crypt_path_t *layer_hint) + * Return 0 if everything went well or a negative value representing a circuit + * end reason on error for which the caller is responsible for closing it. */ +static int +process_sendme_cell(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell, + circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint, int domain) { - static int num_seen=0; - relay_header_t rh; - unsigned domain = layer_hint?LD_APP:LD_EXIT; - int reason; - int optimistic_data = 0; /* Set to 1 if we receive data on a stream - * that's in the EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING - * or EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING states. */ - - tor_assert(cell); - tor_assert(circ); + int ret; - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); -// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"command %d stream %d", rh.command, rh.stream_id); - num_seen++; - log_debug(domain, "Now seen %d relay cells here (command %d, stream %d).", - num_seen, rh.command, rh.stream_id); + tor_assert(rh); - if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Relay cell length field too long. Closing circuit."); - return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + if (!rh->stream_id) { + /* Circuit level SENDME cell. */ + ret = sendme_process_circuit_level(layer_hint, circ, + cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, + rh->length); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + /* Resume reading on any streams now that we've processed a valid + * SENDME cell that updated our package window. */ + circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint); + /* We are done, the rest of the code is for the stream level. */ + return 0; } - if (rh.stream_id == 0) { - switch (rh.command) { - case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN: - case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED: - case RELAY_COMMAND_END: - case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE: - case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED: - case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR: - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Relay command %d with zero " - "stream_id. Dropping.", (int)rh.command); - return 0; - default: - ; + /* No connection, might be half edge state. We are done if so. */ + if (!conn) { + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_sendme(ocirc->half_streams, + rh->stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh->length); + log_info(domain, "Sendme cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " + "stream id %d", + ocirc->global_identifier, rh->stream_id); + } } + + log_info(domain, "SENDME cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).", + rh->stream_id); + return 0; } - /* either conn is NULL, in which case we've got a control cell, or else - * conn points to the recognized stream. */ + /* Stream level SENDME cell. */ + ret = sendme_process_stream_level(conn, circ, rh->length); + if (ret < 0) { + /* Means we need to close the circuit with reason ret. */ + return ret; + } - if (conn && !connection_state_is_open(TO_CONN(conn))) { - if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT && - (conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING || - conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING) && - rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_DATA) { - /* Allow DATA cells to be delivered to an exit node in state - * EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING or EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING. - * This speeds up HTTP, for example. */ - optimistic_data = 1; - } else if (rh.stream_id == 0 && rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_DATA) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Somehow I had a connection that matched a " - "data cell with stream ID 0."); - } else { - return connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( - &rh, cell, circ, conn, layer_hint); - } + /* We've now processed properly a SENDME cell, all windows have been + * properly updated, we'll read on the edge connection to see if we can + * get data out towards the end point (Exit or client) since we are now + * allowed to deliver more cells. */ + + if (circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circ)) { + /* Still waiting for queue to flush; don't touch conn */ + return 0; + } + connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn)); + /* handle whatever might still be on the inbuf */ + if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, 1, NULL) < 0) { + /* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */ + connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); + return 0; } + return 0; +} - switch (rh.command) { - case RELAY_COMMAND_DROP: - rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_DROP); -// log_info(domain,"Got a relay-level padding cell. Dropping."); - return 0; +/** A helper for connection_edge_process_relay_cell(): Actually handles the + * cell that we received on the connection. + * + * The arguments are the same as in the parent function + * connection_edge_process_relay_cell(), plus the relay header <b>rh</b> as + * unpacked by the parent function, and <b>optimistic_data</b> as set by the + * parent function. + */ +STATIC int +handle_relay_cell_command(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, + edge_connection_t *conn, crypt_path_t *layer_hint, + relay_header_t *rh, int optimistic_data) +{ + unsigned domain = layer_hint?LD_APP:LD_EXIT; + int reason; + + tor_assert(rh); + + /* First pass the cell to the circuit padding subsystem, in case it's a + * padding cell or circuit that should be handled there. */ + if (circpad_check_received_cell(cell, circ, layer_hint, rh) == 0) { + log_debug(domain, "Cell handled as circuit padding"); + return 0; + } + + /* Now handle all the other commands */ + switch (rh->command) { case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN: case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR: if (layer_hint && @@ -1546,7 +1644,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, "Begin cell for known stream. Dropping."); return 0; } - if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR && + if (rh->command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR && circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) { /* Assign this circuit and its app-ward OR connection a unique ID, * so that we can measure download times. The local edge and dir @@ -1559,24 +1657,21 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, return connection_exit_begin_conn(cell, circ); case RELAY_COMMAND_DATA: ++stats_n_data_cells_received; - if (( layer_hint && --layer_hint->deliver_window < 0) || - (!layer_hint && --circ->deliver_window < 0)) { + + /* Update our circuit-level deliver window that we received a DATA cell. + * If the deliver window goes below 0, we end the circuit and stream due + * to a protocol failure. */ + if (sendme_circuit_data_received(circ, layer_hint) < 0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "(relay data) circ deliver_window below 0. Killing."); - if (conn) { - /* XXXX Do we actually need to do this? Will killing the circuit - * not send an END and mark the stream for close as appropriate? */ - connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); - } + connection_edge_end_close(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } - log_debug(domain,"circ deliver_window now %d.", layer_hint ? - layer_hint->deliver_window : circ->deliver_window); - circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circ, layer_hint); + /* Consider sending a circuit-level SENDME cell. */ + sendme_circuit_consider_sending(circ, layer_hint); - if (rh.stream_id == 0) { + if (rh->stream_id == 0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Relay data cell with zero " "stream_id. Dropping."); return 0; @@ -1584,32 +1679,37 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_data(ocirc->half_streams, - rh.stream_id)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + rh->stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh->length); log_info(domain, "data cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " - "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh->stream_id); } } log_info(domain,"data cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).", - rh.stream_id); + rh->stream_id); return 0; } - if (--conn->deliver_window < 0) { /* is it below 0 after decrement? */ + /* Update our stream-level deliver window that we just received a DATA + * cell. Going below 0 means we have a protocol level error so the + * stream and circuit are closed. */ + + if (sendme_stream_data_received(conn) < 0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "(relay data) conn deliver_window below 0. Killing."); + connection_edge_end_close(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; } /* Total all valid application bytes delivered */ - if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && rh.length > 0) { - circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh.length); + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && rh->length > 0) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh->length); } - stats_n_data_bytes_received += rh.length; + stats_n_data_bytes_received += rh->length; connection_buf_add((char*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE), - rh.length, TO_CONN(conn)); + rh->length, TO_CONN(conn)); #ifdef MEASUREMENTS_21206 /* Count number of RELAY_DATA cells received on a linked directory @@ -1625,26 +1725,26 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, /* Only send a SENDME if we're not getting optimistic data; otherwise * a SENDME could arrive before the CONNECTED. */ - connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn); + sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending(conn); } return 0; case RELAY_COMMAND_END: - reason = rh.length > 0 ? + reason = rh->length > 0 ? get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC; if (!conn) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (relay_crypt_from_last_hop(ocirc, layer_hint) && connection_half_edge_is_valid_end(ocirc->half_streams, - rh.stream_id)) { + rh->stream_id)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh->length); log_info(domain, "end cell (%s) on circ %u valid on half-closed " "stream id %d", stream_end_reason_to_string(reason), - ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + ocirc->global_identifier, rh->stream_id); return 0; } } @@ -1676,7 +1776,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, /* Total all valid application bytes delivered */ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh.length); + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh->length); } } return 0; @@ -1684,7 +1784,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2: { static uint64_t total_n_extend=0, total_nonearly=0; total_n_extend++; - if (rh.stream_id) { + if (rh->stream_id) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain, "'extend' cell received for non-zero stream. Dropping."); return 0; @@ -1725,9 +1825,9 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, log_debug(domain,"Got an extended cell! Yay."); { extended_cell_t extended_cell; - if (extended_cell_parse(&extended_cell, rh.command, + if (extended_cell_parse(&extended_cell, rh->command, (const uint8_t*)cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, - rh.length)<0) { + rh->length)<0) { log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Can't parse EXTENDED cell; killing circuit."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; @@ -1745,7 +1845,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, } /* Total all valid bytes delivered. */ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh.length); + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), rh->length); } return 0; case RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATE: @@ -1789,7 +1889,7 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, * circuit is being torn down anyway, though. */ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), - rh.length); + rh->length); } circuit_truncated(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), get_uint8(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE)); @@ -1804,11 +1904,11 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_connected(ocirc->half_streams, - rh.stream_id)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + rh->stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh->length); log_info(domain, "connected cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " - "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh->stream_id); return 0; } } @@ -1816,102 +1916,10 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, log_info(domain, "'connected' received on circid %u for streamid %d, " "no conn attached anymore. Ignoring.", - (unsigned)circ->n_circ_id, rh.stream_id); + (unsigned)circ->n_circ_id, rh->stream_id); return 0; case RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME: - if (!rh.stream_id) { - if (layer_hint) { - if (layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT > - CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { - static struct ratelim_t exit_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); - log_fn_ratelim(&exit_warn_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. " - "Closing circ."); - return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - } - layer_hint->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; - log_debug(LD_APP,"circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.", - layer_hint->package_window); - circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint); - - /* We count circuit-level sendme's as valid delivered data because - * they are rate limited. - */ - if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), - rh.length); - } - - } else { - if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT > - CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { - static struct ratelim_t client_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); - log_fn_ratelim(&client_warn_ratelim,LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Unexpected sendme cell from client. " - "Closing circ (window %d).", - circ->package_window); - return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - } - circ->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; - log_debug(LD_APP, - "circ-level sendme at non-origin, packagewindow %d.", - circ->package_window); - circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint); - } - return 0; - } - if (!conn) { - if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - if (connection_half_edge_is_valid_sendme(ocirc->half_streams, - rh.stream_id)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); - log_info(domain, - "sendme cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " - "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); - } - } - - log_info(domain,"sendme cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).", - rh.stream_id); - return 0; - } - - /* Don't allow the other endpoint to request more than our maximum - * (i.e. initial) stream SENDME window worth of data. Well-behaved - * stock clients will not request more than this max (as per the check - * in the while loop of connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme()). - */ - if (conn->package_window + STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT > - STREAMWINDOW_START_MAX) { - static struct ratelim_t stream_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); - log_fn_ratelim(&stream_warn_ratelim, LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, - "Unexpected stream sendme cell. Closing circ (window %d).", - conn->package_window); - return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - } - - /* At this point, the stream sendme is valid */ - if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), - rh.length); - } - - conn->package_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT; - log_debug(domain,"stream-level sendme, packagewindow now %d.", - conn->package_window); - if (circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circ)) { - /* Still waiting for queue to flush; don't touch conn */ - return 0; - } - connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn)); - /* handle whatever might still be on the inbuf */ - if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, 1, NULL) < 0) { - /* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */ - connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); - return 0; - } - return 0; + return process_sendme_cell(rh, cell, circ, conn, layer_hint, domain); case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE: if (layer_hint) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP, @@ -1940,11 +1948,11 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (relay_crypt_from_last_hop(ocirc, layer_hint) && connection_half_edge_is_valid_resolved(ocirc->half_streams, - rh.stream_id)) { - circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh.length); + rh->stream_id)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(ocirc, rh->length); log_info(domain, "resolved cell on circ %u valid on half-closed " - "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh.stream_id); + "stream id %d", ocirc->global_identifier, rh->stream_id); return 0; } } @@ -1962,17 +1970,96 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED: case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED: rend_process_relay_cell(circ, layer_hint, - rh.command, rh.length, + rh->command, rh->length, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE); return 0; } log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Received unknown relay command %d. Perhaps the other side is using " "a newer version of Tor? Dropping.", - rh.command); + rh->command); return 0; /* for forward compatibility, don't kill the circuit */ } +/** An incoming relay cell has arrived on circuit <b>circ</b>. If + * <b>conn</b> is NULL this is a control cell, else <b>cell</b> is + * destined for <b>conn</b>. + * + * If <b>layer_hint</b> is defined, then we're the origin of the + * circuit, and it specifies the hop that packaged <b>cell</b>. + * + * Return -reason if you want to warn and tear down the circuit, else 0. + */ +STATIC int +connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, + edge_connection_t *conn, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint) +{ + static int num_seen=0; + relay_header_t rh; + unsigned domain = layer_hint?LD_APP:LD_EXIT; + int optimistic_data = 0; /* Set to 1 if we receive data on a stream + * that's in the EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING + * or EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING states. */ + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(circ); + + relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); +// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"command %d stream %d", rh.command, rh.stream_id); + num_seen++; + log_debug(domain, "Now seen %d relay cells here (command %d, stream %d).", + num_seen, rh.command, rh.stream_id); + + if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Relay cell length field too long. Closing circuit."); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + + if (rh.stream_id == 0) { + switch (rh.command) { + case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN: + case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED: + case RELAY_COMMAND_END: + case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE: + case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED: + case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Relay command %d with zero " + "stream_id. Dropping.", (int)rh.command); + return 0; + default: + ; + } + } + + /* Tell circpad that we've received a recognized cell */ + circpad_deliver_recognized_relay_cell_events(circ, rh.command, layer_hint); + + /* either conn is NULL, in which case we've got a control cell, or else + * conn points to the recognized stream. */ + if (conn && !connection_state_is_open(TO_CONN(conn))) { + if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT && + (conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING || + conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING) && + rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_DATA) { + /* Allow DATA cells to be delivered to an exit node in state + * EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING or EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING. + * This speeds up HTTP, for example. */ + optimistic_data = 1; + } else if (rh.stream_id == 0 && rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_DATA) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Somehow I had a connection that matched a " + "data cell with stream ID 0."); + } else { + return connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( + &rh, cell, circ, conn, layer_hint); + } + } + + return handle_relay_cell_command(cell, circ, conn, layer_hint, + &rh, optimistic_data); +} + /** How many relay_data cells have we built, ever? */ uint64_t stats_n_data_cells_packaged = 0; /** How many bytes of data have we put in relay_data cells have we built, @@ -1986,6 +2073,84 @@ uint64_t stats_n_data_cells_received = 0; * ever received were completely full of data. */ uint64_t stats_n_data_bytes_received = 0; +/** + * Called when initializing a circuit, or when we have reached the end of the + * window in which we need to send some randomness so that incoming sendme + * cells will be unpredictable. Resets the flags and picks a new window. + */ +void +circuit_reset_sendme_randomness(circuit_t *circ) +{ + circ->have_sent_sufficiently_random_cell = 0; + circ->send_randomness_after_n_cells = CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT / 2 + + crypto_fast_rng_get_uint(get_thread_fast_rng(), CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT / 2); +} + +/** + * Any relay data payload containing fewer than this many real bytes is + * considered to have enough randomness to. + **/ +#define RELAY_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_FOR_RANDOM_SENDMES \ + (RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE - CELL_PADDING_GAP - 16) + +/** + * Helper. Return the number of bytes that should be put into a cell from a + * given edge connection on which <b>n_available</b> bytes are available. + */ +STATIC size_t +connection_edge_get_inbuf_bytes_to_package(size_t n_available, + int package_partial, + circuit_t *on_circuit) +{ + if (!n_available) + return 0; + + /* Do we need to force this payload to have space for randomness? */ + const bool force_random_bytes = + (on_circuit->send_randomness_after_n_cells == 0) && + (! on_circuit->have_sent_sufficiently_random_cell); + + /* At most how much would we like to send in this cell? */ + size_t target_length; + if (force_random_bytes) { + target_length = RELAY_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_FOR_RANDOM_SENDMES; + } else { + target_length = RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE; + } + + /* Decide how many bytes we will actually put into this cell. */ + size_t package_length; + if (n_available >= target_length) { /* A full payload is available. */ + package_length = target_length; + } else { /* not a full payload available */ + if (package_partial) + package_length = n_available; /* just take whatever's available now */ + else + return 0; /* nothing to do until we have a full payload */ + } + + /* If we reach this point, we will be definitely sending the cell. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(package_length > 0); + + if (package_length <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_FOR_RANDOM_SENDMES) { + /* This cell will have enough randomness in the padding to make a future + * sendme cell unpredictable. */ + on_circuit->have_sent_sufficiently_random_cell = 1; + } + + if (on_circuit->send_randomness_after_n_cells == 0) { + /* Either this cell, or some previous cell, had enough padding to + * ensure sendme unpredictability. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(on_circuit->have_sent_sufficiently_random_cell); + /* Pick a new interval in which we need to send randomness. */ + circuit_reset_sendme_randomness(on_circuit); + } + + --on_circuit->send_randomness_after_n_cells; + + return package_length; +} + /** If <b>conn</b> has an entire relay payload of bytes on its inbuf (or * <b>package_partial</b> is true), and the appropriate package windows aren't * empty, grab a cell and send it down the circuit. @@ -2058,17 +2223,14 @@ connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial, bytes_to_process = connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)); } - if (!bytes_to_process) + length = connection_edge_get_inbuf_bytes_to_package(bytes_to_process, + package_partial, circ); + if (!length) return 0; - if (!package_partial && bytes_to_process < RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) - return 0; + /* If we reach this point, we will definitely be packaging bytes into + * a cell. */ - if (bytes_to_process > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) { - length = RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE; - } else { - length = bytes_to_process; - } stats_n_data_bytes_packaged += length; stats_n_data_cells_packaged += 1; @@ -2103,15 +2265,17 @@ connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial, return 0; } - if (!cpath_layer) { /* non-rendezvous exit */ - tor_assert(circ->package_window > 0); - circ->package_window--; - } else { /* we're an AP, or an exit on a rendezvous circ */ - tor_assert(cpath_layer->package_window > 0); - cpath_layer->package_window--; + /* Handle the circuit-level SENDME package window. */ + if (sendme_note_circuit_data_packaged(circ, cpath_layer) < 0) { + /* Package window has gone under 0. Protocol issue. */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Circuit package window is below 0. Closing circuit."); + conn->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + return -1; } - if (--conn->package_window <= 0) { /* is it 0 after decrement? */ + /* Handle the stream-level SENDME package window. */ + if (sendme_note_stream_data_packaged(conn) < 0) { connection_stop_reading(TO_CONN(conn)); log_debug(domain,"conn->package_window reached 0."); circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading(circ, cpath_layer); @@ -2129,42 +2293,6 @@ connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial, goto repeat_connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf; } -/** Called when we've just received a relay data cell, when - * we've just finished flushing all bytes to stream <b>conn</b>, - * or when we've flushed *some* bytes to the stream <b>conn</b>. - * - * If conn->outbuf is not too full, and our deliver window is - * low, send back a suitable number of stream-level sendme cells. - */ -void -connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(edge_connection_t *conn) -{ - circuit_t *circ; - - if (connection_outbuf_too_full(TO_CONN(conn))) - return; - - circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn); - if (!circ) { - /* this can legitimately happen if the destroy has already - * arrived and torn down the circuit */ - log_info(LD_APP,"No circuit associated with conn. Skipping."); - return; - } - - while (conn->deliver_window <= STREAMWINDOW_START - STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT) { - log_debug(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP ?LD_APP:LD_EXIT, - "Outbuf %d, Queuing stream sendme.", - (int)conn->base_.outbuf_flushlen); - conn->deliver_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT; - if (connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME, - NULL, 0) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_APP,"connection_edge_send_command failed. Skipping."); - return; /* the circuit's closed, don't continue */ - } - } -} - /** The circuit <b>circ</b> has received a circuit-level sendme * (on hop <b>layer_hint</b>, if we're the OP). Go through all the * attached streams and let them resume reading and packaging, if @@ -2187,12 +2315,6 @@ circuit_resume_edge_reading(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) circ, layer_hint); } -void -stream_choice_seed_weak_rng(void) -{ - crypto_seed_weak_rng(&stream_choice_rng); -} - /** A helper function for circuit_resume_edge_reading() above. * The arguments are the same, except that <b>conn</b> is the head * of a linked list of edge streams that should each be considered. @@ -2244,7 +2366,8 @@ circuit_resume_edge_reading_helper(edge_connection_t *first_conn, int num_streams = 0; for (conn = first_conn; conn; conn = conn->next_stream) { num_streams++; - if (tor_weak_random_one_in_n(&stream_choice_rng, num_streams)) { + + if (crypto_fast_rng_one_in_n(get_thread_fast_rng(), num_streams)) { chosen_stream = conn; } /* Invariant: chosen_stream has been chosen uniformly at random from @@ -2386,33 +2509,6 @@ circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) return 0; } -/** Check if the deliver_window for circuit <b>circ</b> (at hop - * <b>layer_hint</b> if it's defined) is low enough that we should - * send a circuit-level sendme back down the circuit. If so, send - * enough sendmes that the window would be overfull if we sent any - * more. - */ -static void -circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) -{ -// log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Considering: layer_hint is %s", -// layer_hint ? "defined" : "null"); - while ((layer_hint ? layer_hint->deliver_window : circ->deliver_window) <= - CIRCWINDOW_START - CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT) { - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Queuing circuit sendme."); - if (layer_hint) - layer_hint->deliver_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; - else - circ->deliver_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; - if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME, - NULL, 0, layer_hint) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "relay_send_command_from_edge failed. Circuit's closed."); - return; /* the circuit's closed, don't continue */ - } - } -} - /** The total number of cells we have allocated. */ static size_t total_cells_allocated = 0; @@ -2787,7 +2883,7 @@ set_streams_blocked_on_circ(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan, } /** Extract the command from a packed cell. */ -static uint8_t +uint8_t packed_cell_get_command(const packed_cell_t *cell, int wide_circ_ids) { if (wide_circ_ids) { @@ -3142,7 +3238,7 @@ decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out, const uint8_t *payload, case RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6: if (payload[1] != 16) return NULL; - tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, (char*)(payload+2)); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, (payload+2)); break; default: tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out); diff --git a/src/core/or/relay.h b/src/core/or/relay.h index 7cc3c43e43..31bed0e01b 100644 --- a/src/core/or/relay.h +++ b/src/core/or/relay.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ int connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial, int *max_cells); void connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(edge_connection_t *conn); +void circuit_reset_sendme_randomness(circuit_t *circ); extern uint64_t stats_n_data_cells_packaged; extern uint64_t stats_n_data_bytes_packaged; @@ -78,6 +79,11 @@ void destroy_cell_queue_append(destroy_cell_queue_t *queue, void channel_unlink_all_circuits(channel_t *chan, smartlist_t *detached_out); MOCK_DECL(int, channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit, (channel_t *chan, int max)); +MOCK_DECL(int, circuit_package_relay_cell, (cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, + cell_direction_t cell_direction, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint, streamid_t on_stream, + const char *filename, int lineno)); + void update_circuit_on_cmux_(circuit_t *circ, cell_direction_t direction, const char *file, int lineno); #define update_circuit_on_cmux(circ, direction) \ @@ -89,15 +95,19 @@ const uint8_t *decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out, int payload_len); void circuit_clear_cell_queue(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan); -void stream_choice_seed_weak_rng(void); - circid_t packed_cell_get_circid(const packed_cell_t *cell, int wide_circ_ids); +uint8_t packed_cell_get_command(const packed_cell_t *cell, int wide_circ_ids); #ifdef RELAY_PRIVATE +STATIC int +handle_relay_cell_command(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, + edge_connection_t *conn, crypt_path_t *layer_hint, + relay_header_t *rh, int optimistic_data); + STATIC int connected_cell_parse(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell, tor_addr_t *addr_out, int *ttl_out); /** An address-and-ttl tuple as yielded by resolved_cell_parse */ -typedef struct address_ttl_s { +typedef struct address_ttl_t { tor_addr_t addr; char *hostname; int ttl; @@ -117,8 +127,11 @@ STATIC int cell_queues_check_size(void); STATIC int connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn, crypt_path_t *layer_hint); +STATIC size_t get_pad_cell_offset(size_t payload_len); +STATIC size_t connection_edge_get_inbuf_bytes_to_package(size_t n_available, + int package_partial, + circuit_t *on_circuit); #endif /* defined(RELAY_PRIVATE) */ #endif /* !defined(TOR_RELAY_H) */ - diff --git a/src/core/or/relay_crypto_st.h b/src/core/or/relay_crypto_st.h index dafce257c7..d92f486a90 100644 --- a/src/core/or/relay_crypto_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/relay_crypto_st.h @@ -1,13 +1,18 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file relay_crypto_st.h + * @brief Relay-cell encryption state structure. + **/ + #ifndef RELAY_CRYPTO_ST_H #define RELAY_CRYPTO_ST_H -#define crypto_cipher_t aes_cnt_cipher +#define crypto_cipher_t aes_cnt_cipher_t struct crypto_cipher_t; struct crypto_digest_t; @@ -25,7 +30,9 @@ struct relay_crypto_t { /** Digest state for cells heading away from the OR at this step. */ struct crypto_digest_t *b_digest; + /** Digest used for the next SENDME cell if any. */ + uint8_t sendme_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; }; #undef crypto_cipher_t -#endif +#endif /* !defined(RELAY_CRYPTO_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/scheduler.c b/src/core/or/scheduler.c index 9f1a27d501..072d78128b 100644 --- a/src/core/or/scheduler.c +++ b/src/core/or/scheduler.c @@ -1,18 +1,17 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2013-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2013-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" -#define SCHEDULER_PRIVATE_ +#define SCHEDULER_PRIVATE #define SCHEDULER_KIST_PRIVATE #include "core/or/scheduler.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE #include "core/or/channeltls.h" -#include "lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h" #include "core/or/or_connection_st.h" @@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ * circuit scheduler. It was supposed to prioritize circuits across many * channels, but wasn't effective. It is preserved in scheduler_vanilla.c. * - * [0]: http://www.robgjansen.com/publications/kist-sec2014.pdf + * [0]: https://www.robgjansen.com/publications/kist-sec2014.pdf * * Then we actually got around to implementing KIST for real. We decided to * modularize the scheduler so new ones can be implemented. You can find KIST @@ -267,7 +266,7 @@ select_scheduler(void) log_notice(LD_SCHED, "Scheduler type KIST has been disabled by " "the consensus or no kernel support."); } -#else /* !(defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT)) */ +#else /* !defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT) */ log_info(LD_SCHED, "Scheduler type KIST not built in"); #endif /* defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT) */ continue; @@ -503,7 +502,12 @@ scheduler_free_all(void) the_scheduler = NULL; } -/** Mark a channel as no longer ready to accept writes. */ +/** Mark a channel as no longer ready to accept writes. + * + * Possible state changes: + * - SCHED_CHAN_PENDING -> SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE + * - SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS -> SCHED_CHAN_IDLE + */ MOCK_IMPL(void, scheduler_channel_doesnt_want_writes,(channel_t *chan)) { @@ -514,31 +518,32 @@ scheduler_channel_doesnt_want_writes,(channel_t *chan)) return; } - /* If it's already in pending, we can put it in waiting_to_write */ if (chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_PENDING) { /* - * It's in channels_pending, so it shouldn't be in any of - * the other lists. It can't write any more, so it goes to - * channels_waiting_to_write. + * It has cells but no longer can write, so it becomes + * SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE. It's in channels_pending, so we + * should remove it from the list. */ smartlist_pqueue_remove(channels_pending, scheduler_compare_channels, offsetof(channel_t, sched_heap_idx), chan); scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE); - } else { + } else if (chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS) { /* - * It's not in pending, so it can't become waiting_to_write; it's - * either not in any of the lists (nothing to do) or it's already in - * waiting_for_cells (remove it, can't write any more). + * It does not have cells and no longer can write, so it becomes + * SCHED_CHAN_IDLE. */ - if (chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS) { - scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_IDLE); - } + scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_IDLE); } } -/** Mark a channel as having waiting cells. */ +/** Mark a channel as having waiting cells. + * + * Possible state changes: + * - SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS -> SCHED_CHAN_PENDING + * - SCHED_CHAN_IDLE -> SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE + */ MOCK_IMPL(void, scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells,(channel_t *chan)) { @@ -549,12 +554,11 @@ scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells,(channel_t *chan)) return; } - /* First, check if it's also writeable */ if (chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS) { /* - * It's in channels_waiting_for_cells, so it shouldn't be in any of - * the other lists. It has waiting cells now, so it goes to - * channels_pending. + * It is able to write and now has cells, so it becomes + * SCHED_CHAN_PENDING. It must be added to the channels_pending + * list. */ scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_PENDING); if (!SCHED_BUG(chan->sched_heap_idx != -1, chan)) { @@ -566,16 +570,12 @@ scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells,(channel_t *chan)) /* If we made a channel pending, we potentially have scheduling work to * do. */ the_scheduler->schedule(); - } else { + } else if (chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_IDLE) { /* - * It's not in waiting_for_cells, so it can't become pending; it's - * either not in any of the lists (we add it to waiting_to_write) - * or it's already in waiting_to_write or pending (we do nothing) + * It is not able to write but now has cells, so it becomes + * SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE. */ - if (!(chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE || - chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_PENDING)) { - scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE); - } + scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE); } } @@ -663,8 +663,12 @@ scheduler_release_channel,(channel_t *chan)) scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_IDLE); } -/** Mark a channel as ready to accept writes */ - +/** Mark a channel as ready to accept writes. + * Possible state changes: + * + * - SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE -> SCHED_CHAN_PENDING + * - SCHED_CHAN_IDLE -> SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS + */ void scheduler_channel_wants_writes(channel_t *chan) { @@ -675,10 +679,11 @@ scheduler_channel_wants_writes(channel_t *chan) return; } - /* If it's already in waiting_to_write, we can put it in pending */ if (chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE) { /* - * It can write now, so it goes to channels_pending. + * It has cells and can now write, so it becomes + * SCHED_CHAN_PENDING. It must be added to the channels_pending + * list. */ scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_PENDING); if (!SCHED_BUG(chan->sched_heap_idx != -1, chan)) { @@ -689,15 +694,12 @@ scheduler_channel_wants_writes(channel_t *chan) } /* We just made a channel pending, we have scheduling work to do. */ the_scheduler->schedule(); - } else { + } else if (chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_IDLE) { /* - * It's not in SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE, so it can't become pending; - * it's either idle and goes to WAITING_FOR_CELLS, or it's a no-op. + * It does not have cells but can now write, so it becomes + * SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS. */ - if (!(chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS || - chan->scheduler_state == SCHED_CHAN_PENDING)) { - scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS); - } + scheduler_set_channel_state(chan, SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS); } } diff --git a/src/core/or/scheduler.h b/src/core/or/scheduler.h index 843be2603c..82df2b0b0f 100644 --- a/src/core/or/scheduler.h +++ b/src/core/or/scheduler.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* * Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ typedef enum { * doesn't create any state for itself, thus it has nothing to free when Tor * is shutting down), then set that function pointer to NULL. */ -typedef struct scheduler_s { +typedef struct scheduler_t { /* Scheduler type. This is used for logging when the scheduler is switched * during runtime. */ scheduler_types_t type; @@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ MOCK_DECL(void, scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells, (channel_t *chan)); * These functions are only visible to the scheduling system, the current * scheduler implementation, and tests. *****************************************************************************/ -#ifdef SCHEDULER_PRIVATE_ +#ifdef SCHEDULER_PRIVATE + +#include "ext/ht.h" /********************************* * Defined in scheduler.c @@ -173,8 +175,8 @@ void scheduler_touch_channel(channel_t *chan); /* Socket table entry which holds information of a channel's socket and kernel * TCP information. Only used by KIST. */ -typedef struct socket_table_ent_s { - HT_ENTRY(socket_table_ent_s) node; +typedef struct socket_table_ent_t { + HT_ENTRY(socket_table_ent_t) node; const channel_t *chan; /* Amount written this scheduling run */ uint64_t written; @@ -187,7 +189,7 @@ typedef struct socket_table_ent_s { uint32_t notsent; } socket_table_ent_t; -typedef HT_HEAD(outbuf_table_s, outbuf_table_ent_s) outbuf_table_t; +typedef HT_HEAD(outbuf_table_s, outbuf_table_ent_t) outbuf_table_t; MOCK_DECL(int, channel_should_write_to_kernel, (outbuf_table_t *table, channel_t *chan)); @@ -212,7 +214,6 @@ extern int32_t sched_run_interval; scheduler_t *get_vanilla_scheduler(void); -#endif /* defined(SCHEDULER_PRIVATE_) */ +#endif /* defined(SCHEDULER_PRIVATE) */ #endif /* !defined(TOR_SCHEDULER_H) */ - diff --git a/src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c b/src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c index 79ecb0bc7e..c73d768f88 100644 --- a/src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c +++ b/src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c @@ -1,17 +1,22 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file scheduler_kist.c + * @brief Implements the KIST cell scheduler. + **/ + #define SCHEDULER_KIST_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE #include "core/or/channel.h" #include "core/or/channeltls.h" -#define SCHEDULER_PRIVATE_ +#define SCHEDULER_PRIVATE #include "core/or/scheduler.h" #include "lib/math/fp.h" @@ -46,22 +51,22 @@ socket_table_ent_eq(const socket_table_ent_t *a, const socket_table_ent_t *b) return a->chan == b->chan; } -typedef HT_HEAD(socket_table_s, socket_table_ent_s) socket_table_t; +typedef HT_HEAD(socket_table_s, socket_table_ent_t) socket_table_t; static socket_table_t socket_table = HT_INITIALIZER(); -HT_PROTOTYPE(socket_table_s, socket_table_ent_s, node, socket_table_ent_hash, - socket_table_ent_eq) -HT_GENERATE2(socket_table_s, socket_table_ent_s, node, socket_table_ent_hash, - socket_table_ent_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_) +HT_PROTOTYPE(socket_table_s, socket_table_ent_t, node, socket_table_ent_hash, + socket_table_ent_eq); +HT_GENERATE2(socket_table_s, socket_table_ent_t, node, socket_table_ent_hash, + socket_table_ent_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_); /* outbuf_table hash table stuff. The outbuf_table keeps track of which * channels have data sitting in their outbuf so the kist scheduler can force * a write from outbuf to kernel periodically during a run and at the end of a * run. */ -typedef struct outbuf_table_ent_s { - HT_ENTRY(outbuf_table_ent_s) node; +typedef struct outbuf_table_ent_t { + HT_ENTRY(outbuf_table_ent_t) node; channel_t *chan; } outbuf_table_ent_t; @@ -77,10 +82,10 @@ outbuf_table_ent_eq(const outbuf_table_ent_t *a, const outbuf_table_ent_t *b) return a->chan->global_identifier == b->chan->global_identifier; } -HT_PROTOTYPE(outbuf_table_s, outbuf_table_ent_s, node, outbuf_table_ent_hash, - outbuf_table_ent_eq) -HT_GENERATE2(outbuf_table_s, outbuf_table_ent_s, node, outbuf_table_ent_hash, - outbuf_table_ent_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_) +HT_PROTOTYPE(outbuf_table_s, outbuf_table_ent_t, node, outbuf_table_ent_hash, + outbuf_table_ent_eq); +HT_GENERATE2(outbuf_table_s, outbuf_table_ent_t, node, outbuf_table_ent_hash, + outbuf_table_ent_eq, 0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_); /***************************************************************************** * Other internal data @@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ static unsigned int kist_lite_mode = 0; * changed and it doesn't recognized the values passed to the syscalls needed * by KIST. In that case, fallback to the naive approach. */ static unsigned int kist_no_kernel_support = 0; -#else /* !(defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT)) */ +#else /* !defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT) */ static unsigned int kist_lite_mode = 1; #endif /* defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT) */ @@ -298,7 +303,7 @@ update_socket_info_impl, (socket_table_ent_t *ent)) } return; -#else /* !(defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT)) */ +#else /* !defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT) */ goto fallback; #endif /* defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT) */ @@ -458,6 +463,13 @@ MOCK_IMPL(void, channel_write_to_kernel, (channel_t *chan)) log_debug(LD_SCHED, "Writing %lu bytes to kernel for chan %" PRIu64, (unsigned long)channel_outbuf_length(chan), chan->global_identifier); + /* Note that 'connection_handle_write()' may change the scheduler state of + * the channel during the scheduling loop with + * 'connection_or_flushed_some()' -> 'scheduler_channel_wants_writes()'. + * This side-effect will only occur if the channel is currently in the + * 'SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE' or 'SCHED_CHAN_IDLE' states, which KIST + * rarely uses, so it should be fine unless KIST begins using these states + * in the future. */ connection_handle_write(TO_CONN(BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan)->conn), 0); } @@ -724,7 +736,7 @@ kist_scheduler_run(void) SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(to_readd, channel_t *, readd_chan) { scheduler_set_channel_state(readd_chan, SCHED_CHAN_PENDING); if (!smartlist_contains(cp, readd_chan)) { - if (!SCHED_BUG(chan->sched_heap_idx != -1, chan)) { + if (!SCHED_BUG(readd_chan->sched_heap_idx != -1, readd_chan)) { /* XXXX Note that the check above is in theory redundant with * the smartlist_contains check. But let's make sure we're * not messing anything up, and leave them both for now. */ @@ -833,7 +845,7 @@ scheduler_can_use_kist(void) return run_interval > 0; } -#else /* !(defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT)) */ +#else /* !defined(HAVE_KIST_SUPPORT) */ int scheduler_can_use_kist(void) diff --git a/src/core/or/scheduler_vanilla.c b/src/core/or/scheduler_vanilla.c index 33536ae04b..d862ff8710 100644 --- a/src/core/or/scheduler_vanilla.c +++ b/src/core/or/scheduler_vanilla.c @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file scheduler_vanilla.c + * @brief "Vanilla" (pre-KIST) cell scheduler code. + **/ + #include "core/or/or.h" #include "app/config/config.h" -#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE #include "core/or/channel.h" -#define SCHEDULER_PRIVATE_ +#define SCHEDULER_PRIVATE #include "core/or/scheduler.h" /***************************************************************************** @@ -172,4 +177,3 @@ get_vanilla_scheduler(void) { return &vanilla_scheduler; } - diff --git a/src/core/or/sendme.c b/src/core/or/sendme.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..788f56088c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/sendme.c @@ -0,0 +1,710 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2019-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file sendme.c + * \brief Code that is related to SENDME cells both in terms of + * creating/parsing cells and handling the content. + */ + +#define SENDME_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/or.h" + +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "core/crypto/relay_crypto.h" +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h" +#include "core/or/cell_st.h" +#include "core/or/crypt_path.h" +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h" +#include "core/or/circuituse.h" +#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h" +#include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "core/or/sendme.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" +#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h" +#include "trunnel/sendme_cell.h" + +/* Return the minimum version given by the consensus (if any) that should be + * used when emitting a SENDME cell. */ +STATIC int +get_emit_min_version(void) +{ + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "sendme_emit_min_version", + SENDME_EMIT_MIN_VERSION_DEFAULT, + SENDME_EMIT_MIN_VERSION_MIN, + SENDME_EMIT_MIN_VERSION_MAX); +} + +/* Return the minimum version given by the consensus (if any) that should be + * accepted when receiving a SENDME cell. */ +STATIC int +get_accept_min_version(void) +{ + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "sendme_accept_min_version", + SENDME_ACCEPT_MIN_VERSION_DEFAULT, + SENDME_ACCEPT_MIN_VERSION_MIN, + SENDME_ACCEPT_MIN_VERSION_MAX); +} + +/* Pop the first cell digset on the given circuit from the SENDME last digests + * list. NULL is returned if the list is uninitialized or empty. + * + * The caller gets ownership of the returned digest thus is responsible for + * freeing the memory. */ +static uint8_t * +pop_first_cell_digest(const circuit_t *circ) +{ + uint8_t *circ_digest; + + tor_assert(circ); + + if (circ->sendme_last_digests == NULL || + smartlist_len(circ->sendme_last_digests) == 0) { + return NULL; + } + + /* More cell digest than the SENDME window is never suppose to happen. The + * cell should have been rejected before reaching this point due to its + * package_window down to 0 leading to a circuit close. Scream loudly but + * still pop the element so we don't memory leak. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(smartlist_len(circ->sendme_last_digests) <= + CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX / CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT); + + circ_digest = smartlist_get(circ->sendme_last_digests, 0); + smartlist_del_keeporder(circ->sendme_last_digests, 0); + return circ_digest; +} + +/* Return true iff the given cell digest matches the first digest in the + * circuit sendme list. */ +static bool +v1_digest_matches(const uint8_t *circ_digest, const uint8_t *cell_digest) +{ + tor_assert(circ_digest); + tor_assert(cell_digest); + + /* Compare the digest with the one in the SENDME. This cell is invalid + * without a perfect match. */ + if (tor_memneq(circ_digest, cell_digest, TRUNNEL_SENDME_V1_DIGEST_LEN)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "SENDME v1 cell digest do not match."); + return false; + } + + /* Digests matches! */ + return true; +} + +/* Return true iff the given decoded SENDME version 1 cell is valid and + * matches the expected digest on the circuit. + * + * Validation is done by comparing the digest in the cell from the previous + * cell we saw which tells us that the other side has in fact seen that cell. + * See proposal 289 for more details. */ +static bool +cell_v1_is_valid(const sendme_cell_t *cell, const uint8_t *circ_digest) +{ + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(circ_digest); + + const uint8_t *cell_digest = sendme_cell_getconstarray_data_v1_digest(cell); + return v1_digest_matches(circ_digest, cell_digest); +} + +/* Return true iff the given cell version can be handled or if the minimum + * accepted version from the consensus is known to us. */ +STATIC bool +cell_version_can_be_handled(uint8_t cell_version) +{ + int accept_version = get_accept_min_version(); + + /* We will first check if the consensus minimum accepted version can be + * handled by us and if not, regardless of the cell version we got, we can't + * continue. */ + if (accept_version > SENDME_MAX_SUPPORTED_VERSION) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Unable to accept SENDME version %u (from consensus). " + "We only support <= %u. Probably your tor is too old?", + accept_version, SENDME_MAX_SUPPORTED_VERSION); + goto invalid; + } + + /* Then, is this version below the accepted version from the consensus? If + * yes, we must not handle it. */ + if (cell_version < accept_version) { + log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unacceptable SENDME version %u. Only " + "accepting %u (from consensus). Closing circuit.", + cell_version, accept_version); + goto invalid; + } + + /* Is this cell version supported by us? */ + if (cell_version > SENDME_MAX_SUPPORTED_VERSION) { + log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "SENDME cell version %u is not supported by us. " + "We only support <= %u", + cell_version, SENDME_MAX_SUPPORTED_VERSION); + goto invalid; + } + + return true; + invalid: + return false; +} + +/* Return true iff the encoded SENDME cell in cell_payload of length + * cell_payload_len is valid. For each version: + * + * 0: No validation + * 1: Authenticated with last cell digest. + * + * This is the main critical function to make sure we can continue to + * send/recv cells on a circuit. If the SENDME is invalid, the circuit should + * be marked for close by the caller. */ +STATIC bool +sendme_is_valid(const circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cell_payload, + size_t cell_payload_len) +{ + uint8_t cell_version; + uint8_t *circ_digest = NULL; + sendme_cell_t *cell = NULL; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(cell_payload); + + /* An empty payload means version 0 so skip trunnel parsing. We won't be + * able to parse a 0 length buffer into a valid SENDME cell. */ + if (cell_payload_len == 0) { + cell_version = 0; + } else { + /* First we'll decode the cell so we can get the version. */ + if (sendme_cell_parse(&cell, cell_payload, cell_payload_len) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Unparseable SENDME cell received. Closing circuit."); + goto invalid; + } + cell_version = sendme_cell_get_version(cell); + } + + /* Validate that we can handle this cell version. */ + if (!cell_version_can_be_handled(cell_version)) { + goto invalid; + } + + /* Pop the first element that was added (FIFO). We do that regardless of the + * version so we don't accumulate on the circuit if v0 is used by the other + * end point. */ + circ_digest = pop_first_cell_digest(circ); + if (circ_digest == NULL) { + /* We shouldn't have received a SENDME if we have no digests. Log at + * protocol warning because it can be tricked by sending many SENDMEs + * without prior data cell. */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "We received a SENDME but we have no cell digests to match. " + "Closing circuit."); + goto invalid; + } + + /* Validate depending on the version now. */ + switch (cell_version) { + case 0x01: + if (!cell_v1_is_valid(cell, circ_digest)) { + goto invalid; + } + break; + case 0x00: + /* Version 0, there is no work to be done on the payload so it is + * necessarily valid if we pass the version validation. */ + break; + default: + log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unknown SENDME cell version %d received.", + cell_version); + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached(); + break; + } + + /* Valid cell. */ + sendme_cell_free(cell); + tor_free(circ_digest); + return true; + invalid: + sendme_cell_free(cell); + tor_free(circ_digest); + return false; +} + +/* Build and encode a version 1 SENDME cell into payload, which must be at + * least of RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE bytes, using the digest for the cell data. + * + * Return the size in bytes of the encoded cell in payload. A negative value + * is returned on encoding failure. */ +STATIC ssize_t +build_cell_payload_v1(const uint8_t *cell_digest, uint8_t *payload) +{ + ssize_t len = -1; + sendme_cell_t *cell = NULL; + + tor_assert(cell_digest); + tor_assert(payload); + + cell = sendme_cell_new(); + + /* Building a payload for version 1. */ + sendme_cell_set_version(cell, 0x01); + /* Set the data length field for v1. */ + sendme_cell_set_data_len(cell, TRUNNEL_SENDME_V1_DIGEST_LEN); + + /* Copy the digest into the data payload. */ + memcpy(sendme_cell_getarray_data_v1_digest(cell), cell_digest, + sendme_cell_get_data_len(cell)); + + /* Finally, encode the cell into the payload. */ + len = sendme_cell_encode(payload, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, cell); + + sendme_cell_free(cell); + return len; +} + +/* Send a circuit-level SENDME on the given circuit using the layer_hint if + * not NULL. The digest is only used for version 1. + * + * Return 0 on success else a negative value and the circuit will be closed + * because we failed to send the cell on it. */ +static int +send_circuit_level_sendme(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint, + const uint8_t *cell_digest) +{ + uint8_t emit_version; + uint8_t payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; + ssize_t payload_len; + + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(cell_digest); + + emit_version = get_emit_min_version(); + switch (emit_version) { + case 0x01: + payload_len = build_cell_payload_v1(cell_digest, payload); + if (BUG(payload_len < 0)) { + /* Unable to encode the cell, abort. We can recover from this by closing + * the circuit but in theory it should never happen. */ + return -1; + } + log_debug(LD_PROTOCOL, "Emitting SENDME version 1 cell."); + break; + case 0x00: + FALLTHROUGH; + default: + /* Unknown version, fallback to version 0 meaning no payload. */ + payload_len = 0; + log_debug(LD_PROTOCOL, "Emitting SENDME version 0 cell. " + "Consensus emit version is %d", emit_version); + break; + } + + if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME, + (char *) payload, payload_len, + layer_hint) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "SENDME relay_send_command_from_edge failed. Circuit's closed."); + return -1; /* the circuit's closed, don't continue */ + } + return 0; +} + +/* Record the cell digest only if the next cell is expected to be a SENDME. */ +static void +record_cell_digest_on_circ(circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *sendme_digest) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(sendme_digest); + + /* Add the digest to the last seen list in the circuit. */ + if (circ->sendme_last_digests == NULL) { + circ->sendme_last_digests = smartlist_new(); + } + smartlist_add(circ->sendme_last_digests, + tor_memdup(sendme_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); +} + +/* + * Public API + */ + +/** Return true iff the next cell for the given cell window is expected to be + * a SENDME. + * + * We are able to know that because the package or deliver window value minus + * one cell (the possible SENDME cell) should be a multiple of the increment + * window value. */ +static bool +circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(int window) +{ + /* At the start of the window, no SENDME will be expected. */ + if (window == CIRCWINDOW_START) { + return false; + } + + /* Are we at the limit of the increment and if not, we don't expect next + * cell is a SENDME. + * + * We test against the window minus 1 because when we are looking if the + * next cell is a SENDME, the window (either package or deliver) hasn't been + * decremented just yet so when this is called, we are currently processing + * the "window - 1" cell. + * + * This function is used when recording a cell digest and this is done quite + * low in the stack when decrypting or encrypting a cell. The window is only + * updated once the cell is actually put in the outbuf. */ + if (((window - 1) % CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT) != 0) { + return false; + } + + /* Next cell is expected to be a SENDME. */ + return true; +} + +/** Called when we've just received a relay data cell, when we've just + * finished flushing all bytes to stream <b>conn</b>, or when we've flushed + * *some* bytes to the stream <b>conn</b>. + * + * If conn->outbuf is not too full, and our deliver window is low, send back a + * suitable number of stream-level sendme cells. + */ +void +sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending(edge_connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + + int log_domain = TO_CONN(conn)->type == CONN_TYPE_AP ? LD_APP : LD_EXIT; + + /* Don't send it if we still have data to deliver. */ + if (connection_outbuf_too_full(TO_CONN(conn))) { + goto end; + } + + if (circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn) == NULL) { + /* This can legitimately happen if the destroy has already arrived and + * torn down the circuit. */ + log_info(log_domain, "No circuit associated with edge connection. " + "Skipping sending SENDME."); + goto end; + } + + while (conn->deliver_window <= + (STREAMWINDOW_START - STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT)) { + log_debug(log_domain, "Outbuf %" TOR_PRIuSZ ", queuing stream SENDME.", + TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf_flushlen); + conn->deliver_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT; + if (connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME, + NULL, 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "connection_edge_send_command failed while sending " + "a SENDME. Circuit probably closed, skipping."); + goto end; /* The circuit's closed, don't continue */ + } + } + + end: + return; +} + +/** Check if the deliver_window for circuit <b>circ</b> (at hop + * <b>layer_hint</b> if it's defined) is low enough that we should + * send a circuit-level sendme back down the circuit. If so, send + * enough sendmes that the window would be overfull if we sent any + * more. + */ +void +sendme_circuit_consider_sending(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) +{ + bool sent_one_sendme = false; + const uint8_t *digest; + + while ((layer_hint ? layer_hint->deliver_window : circ->deliver_window) <= + CIRCWINDOW_START - CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT) { + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Queuing circuit sendme."); + if (layer_hint) { + layer_hint->deliver_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; + digest = cpath_get_sendme_digest(layer_hint); + } else { + circ->deliver_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; + digest = relay_crypto_get_sendme_digest(&TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->crypto); + } + if (send_circuit_level_sendme(circ, layer_hint, digest) < 0) { + return; /* The circuit's closed, don't continue */ + } + /* Current implementation is not suppose to send multiple SENDME at once + * because this means we would use the same relay crypto digest for each + * SENDME leading to a mismatch on the other side and the circuit to + * collapse. Scream loudly if it ever happens so we can address it. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(!sent_one_sendme); + sent_one_sendme = true; + } +} + +/* Process a circuit-level SENDME cell that we just received. The layer_hint, + * if not NULL, is the Exit hop of the connection which means that we are a + * client. In that case, circ must be an origin circuit. The cell_body_len is + * the length of the SENDME cell payload (excluding the header). The + * cell_payload is the payload. + * + * Return 0 on success (the SENDME is valid and the package window has + * been updated properly). + * + * On error, a negative value is returned, which indicates that the + * circuit must be closed using the value as the reason for it. */ +int +sendme_process_circuit_level(crypt_path_t *layer_hint, + circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cell_payload, + uint16_t cell_payload_len) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + tor_assert(cell_payload); + + /* Validate the SENDME cell. Depending on the version, different validation + * can be done. An invalid SENDME requires us to close the circuit. */ + if (!sendme_is_valid(circ, cell_payload, cell_payload_len)) { + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + + /* If we are the origin of the circuit, we are the Client so we use the + * layer hint (the Exit hop) for the package window tracking. */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + /* If we are the origin of the circuit, it is impossible to not have a + * cpath. Just in case, bug on it and close the circuit. */ + if (BUG(layer_hint == NULL)) { + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + if ((layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT) > + CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { + static struct ratelim_t exit_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&exit_warn_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. " + "Closing circ."); + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + layer_hint->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; + log_debug(LD_APP, "circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.", + layer_hint->package_window); + + /* We count circuit-level sendme's as valid delivered data because they + * are rate limited. */ + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), cell_payload_len); + } else { + /* We aren't the origin of this circuit so we are the Exit and thus we + * track the package window with the circuit object. */ + if ((circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT) > + CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { + static struct ratelim_t client_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&client_warn_ratelim, LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Unexpected sendme cell from client. " + "Closing circ (window %d).", circ->package_window); + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + circ->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT; + log_debug(LD_EXIT, "circ-level sendme at non-origin, packagewindow %d.", + circ->package_window); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Process a stream-level SENDME cell that we just received. The conn is the + * edge connection (stream) that the circuit circ is associated with. The + * cell_body_len is the length of the payload (excluding the header). + * + * Return 0 on success (the SENDME is valid and the package window has + * been updated properly). + * + * On error, a negative value is returned, which indicates that the + * circuit must be closed using the value as the reason for it. */ +int +sendme_process_stream_level(edge_connection_t *conn, circuit_t *circ, + uint16_t cell_body_len) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(circ); + + /* Don't allow the other endpoint to request more than our maximum (i.e. + * initial) stream SENDME window worth of data. Well-behaved stock clients + * will not request more than this max (as per the check in the while loop + * of sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending()). */ + if ((conn->package_window + STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT) > + STREAMWINDOW_START_MAX) { + static struct ratelim_t stream_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&stream_warn_ratelim, LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Unexpected stream sendme cell. Closing circ (window %d).", + conn->package_window); + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + /* At this point, the stream sendme is valid */ + conn->package_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT; + + /* We count circuit-level sendme's as valid delivered data because they are + * rate limited. */ + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + circuit_read_valid_data(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), cell_body_len); + } + + log_debug(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) ? LD_APP : LD_EXIT, + "stream-level sendme, package_window now %d.", + conn->package_window); + return 0; +} + +/* Called when a relay DATA cell is received on the given circuit. If + * layer_hint is NULL, this means we are the Exit end point else we are the + * Client. Update the deliver window and return its new value. */ +int +sendme_circuit_data_received(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) +{ + int deliver_window, domain; + + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + tor_assert(layer_hint); + --layer_hint->deliver_window; + deliver_window = layer_hint->deliver_window; + domain = LD_APP; + } else { + tor_assert(!layer_hint); + --circ->deliver_window; + deliver_window = circ->deliver_window; + domain = LD_EXIT; + } + + log_debug(domain, "Circuit deliver_window now %d.", deliver_window); + return deliver_window; +} + +/* Called when a relay DATA cell is received for the given edge connection + * conn. Update the deliver window and return its new value. */ +int +sendme_stream_data_received(edge_connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + return --conn->deliver_window; +} + +/* Called when a relay DATA cell is packaged on the given circuit. If + * layer_hint is NULL, this means we are the Exit end point else we are the + * Client. Update the package window and return its new value. */ +int +sendme_note_circuit_data_packaged(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint) +{ + int package_window, domain; + + tor_assert(circ); + + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + /* Client side. */ + tor_assert(layer_hint); + --layer_hint->package_window; + package_window = layer_hint->package_window; + domain = LD_APP; + } else { + /* Exit side. */ + tor_assert(!layer_hint); + --circ->package_window; + package_window = circ->package_window; + domain = LD_EXIT; + } + + log_debug(domain, "Circuit package_window now %d.", package_window); + return package_window; +} + +/* Called when a relay DATA cell is packaged for the given edge connection + * conn. Update the package window and return its new value. */ +int +sendme_note_stream_data_packaged(edge_connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn); + + --conn->package_window; + log_debug(LD_APP, "Stream package_window now %d.", conn->package_window); + return conn->package_window; +} + +/* Record the cell digest into the circuit sendme digest list depending on + * which edge we are. The digest is recorded only if we expect the next cell + * that we will receive is a SENDME so we can match the digest. */ +void +sendme_record_cell_digest_on_circ(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *cpath) +{ + int package_window; + uint8_t *sendme_digest; + + tor_assert(circ); + + package_window = circ->package_window; + if (cpath) { + package_window = cpath->package_window; + } + + /* Is this the last cell before a SENDME? The idea is that if the + * package_window reaches a multiple of the increment, after this cell, we + * should expect a SENDME. */ + if (!circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(package_window)) { + return; + } + + /* Getting the digest is expensive so we only do it once we are certain to + * record it on the circuit. */ + if (cpath) { + sendme_digest = cpath_get_sendme_digest(cpath); + } else { + sendme_digest = + relay_crypto_get_sendme_digest(&TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->crypto); + } + + record_cell_digest_on_circ(circ, sendme_digest); +} + +/* Called once we decrypted a cell and recognized it. Record the cell digest + * as the next sendme digest only if the next cell we'll send on the circuit + * is expected to be a SENDME. */ +void +sendme_record_received_cell_digest(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *cpath) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + + /* Only record if the next cell is expected to be a SENDME. */ + if (!circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(cpath ? cpath->deliver_window : + circ->deliver_window)) { + return; + } + + if (cpath) { + /* Record incoming digest. */ + cpath_sendme_record_cell_digest(cpath, false); + } else { + /* Record foward digest. */ + relay_crypto_record_sendme_digest(&TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->crypto, true); + } +} + +/* Called once we encrypted a cell. Record the cell digest as the next sendme + * digest only if the next cell we expect to receive is a SENDME so we can + * match the digests. */ +void +sendme_record_sending_cell_digest(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *cpath) +{ + tor_assert(circ); + + /* Only record if the next cell is expected to be a SENDME. */ + if (!circuit_sendme_cell_is_next(cpath ? cpath->package_window : + circ->package_window)) { + goto end; + } + + if (cpath) { + /* Record the forward digest. */ + cpath_sendme_record_cell_digest(cpath, true); + } else { + /* Record the incoming digest. */ + relay_crypto_record_sendme_digest(&TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->crypto, false); + } + + end: + return; +} diff --git a/src/core/or/sendme.h b/src/core/or/sendme.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..05d37ec3bb --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/or/sendme.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2019-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file sendme.h + * \brief Header file for sendme.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_SENDME_H +#define TOR_SENDME_H + +#include "core/or/edge_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h" +#include "core/or/circuit_st.h" + +/* Sending SENDME cell. */ +void sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending(edge_connection_t *edge_conn); +void sendme_circuit_consider_sending(circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint); + +/* Processing SENDME cell. */ +int sendme_process_circuit_level(crypt_path_t *layer_hint, + circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *cell_payload, + uint16_t cell_payload_len); +int sendme_process_stream_level(edge_connection_t *conn, circuit_t *circ, + uint16_t cell_body_len); + +/* Update deliver window functions. */ +int sendme_stream_data_received(edge_connection_t *conn); +int sendme_circuit_data_received(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer_hint); + +/* Update package window functions. */ +int sendme_note_circuit_data_packaged(circuit_t *circ, + crypt_path_t *layer_hint); +int sendme_note_stream_data_packaged(edge_connection_t *conn); + +/* Record cell digest on circuit. */ +void sendme_record_cell_digest_on_circ(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *cpath); +/* Record cell digest as the SENDME digest. */ +void sendme_record_received_cell_digest(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *cpath); +void sendme_record_sending_cell_digest(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *cpath); + +/* Private section starts. */ +#ifdef SENDME_PRIVATE + +/* The maximum supported version. Above that value, the cell can't be + * recognized as a valid SENDME. */ +#define SENDME_MAX_SUPPORTED_VERSION 1 + +/* The cell version constants for when emitting a cell. */ +#define SENDME_EMIT_MIN_VERSION_DEFAULT 1 +#define SENDME_EMIT_MIN_VERSION_MIN 0 +#define SENDME_EMIT_MIN_VERSION_MAX UINT8_MAX + +/* The cell version constants for when accepting a cell. */ +#define SENDME_ACCEPT_MIN_VERSION_DEFAULT 0 +#define SENDME_ACCEPT_MIN_VERSION_MIN 0 +#define SENDME_ACCEPT_MIN_VERSION_MAX UINT8_MAX + +/* + * Unit tests declaractions. + */ +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS + +STATIC int get_emit_min_version(void); +STATIC int get_accept_min_version(void); + +STATIC bool cell_version_can_be_handled(uint8_t cell_version); + +STATIC ssize_t build_cell_payload_v1(const uint8_t *cell_digest, + uint8_t *payload); +STATIC bool sendme_is_valid(const circuit_t *circ, + const uint8_t *cell_payload, + size_t cell_payload_len); + +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + +#endif /* defined(SENDME_PRIVATE) */ + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_SENDME_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/server_port_cfg_st.h b/src/core/or/server_port_cfg_st.h index bd026af7ee..9a005eccdf 100644 --- a/src/core/or/server_port_cfg_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/server_port_cfg_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file server_port_cfg_st.h + * @brief Cnfiguration structure for server ports. + **/ + #ifndef SERVER_PORT_CFG_ST_H #define SERVER_PORT_CFG_ST_H @@ -16,5 +21,4 @@ struct server_port_cfg_t { unsigned int bind_ipv6_only : 1; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(SERVER_PORT_CFG_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/socks_request_st.h b/src/core/or/socks_request_st.h index 5922870c61..4bcdb48b92 100644 --- a/src/core/or/socks_request_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/socks_request_st.h @@ -1,12 +1,19 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file socks_request_st.h + * @brief Client request structure. + **/ + #ifndef SOCKS_REQUEST_ST_H #define SOCKS_REQUEST_ST_H +#include "lib/net/socks5_status.h" + #define MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN 1024 #define SOCKS_NO_AUTH 0x00 @@ -58,6 +65,11 @@ struct socks_request_t { * "username/password" authentication if both are offered. Used as input to * parse_socks. */ unsigned int socks_prefer_no_auth : 1; + /** If set, we can send back the extended error code in the reply. */ + unsigned int socks_use_extended_errors : 1; + /** If non zero, this contains the extended error code that should be used + * if the port was configured to use them. */ + socks5_reply_status_t socks_extended_error_code; /** Number of bytes in username; 0 if username is NULL */ size_t usernamelen; @@ -74,4 +86,4 @@ struct socks_request_t { uint8_t socks5_atyp; /* SOCKS5 address type */ }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(SOCKS_REQUEST_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/status.c b/src/core/or/status.c index 46494ca76c..ed8448883c 100644 --- a/src/core/or/status.c +++ b/src/core/or/status.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2010-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2010-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include "core/or/or.h" #include "core/or/circuituse.h" #include "app/config/config.h" +#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h" #include "core/or/status.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" @@ -146,6 +147,8 @@ log_heartbeat(time_t now) uptime, count_circuits(), bw_sent, bw_rcvd, hibernating?" We are currently hibernating.":""); + dirclient_dump_total_dls(); + if (server_mode(options) && accounting_is_enabled(options) && !hibernating) { log_accounting(now, options); } diff --git a/src/core/or/status.h b/src/core/or/status.h index 3467501ebb..639f8cdf51 100644 --- a/src/core/or/status.h +++ b/src/core/or/status.h @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2010-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* Copyright (c) 2010-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file status.h + * @brief Header for status.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_STATUS_H #define TOR_STATUS_H @@ -15,4 +20,3 @@ STATIC char *bytes_to_usage(uint64_t bytes); #endif #endif /* !defined(TOR_STATUS_H) */ - diff --git a/src/core/or/tor_version_st.h b/src/core/or/tor_version_st.h index 716429bd32..46644c5eb8 100644 --- a/src/core/or/tor_version_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/tor_version_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file tor_version_st.h + * @brief Parsed Tor version structure. + **/ + #ifndef TOR_VERSION_ST_H #define TOR_VERSION_ST_H @@ -28,5 +33,4 @@ struct tor_version_t { char git_tag[DIGEST_LEN]; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(TOR_VERSION_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/var_cell_st.h b/src/core/or/var_cell_st.h index 4287c83f6d..caf64c63a5 100644 --- a/src/core/or/var_cell_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/var_cell_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file var_cell_st.h + * @brief Variable-length cell structure. + **/ + #ifndef VAR_CELL_ST_H #define VAR_CELL_ST_H @@ -19,5 +24,4 @@ struct var_cell_t { uint8_t payload[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; }; -#endif - +#endif /* !defined(VAR_CELL_ST_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/versions.c b/src/core/or/versions.c index 33273a5294..31f1f5b997 100644 --- a/src/core/or/versions.c +++ b/src/core/or/versions.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -16,6 +16,25 @@ #include "core/or/tor_version_st.h" +/** + * Return the approximate date when this release came out, or was + * scheduled to come out, according to the APPROX_RELEASE_DATE set in + * configure.ac + **/ +time_t +tor_get_approx_release_date(void) +{ + char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + tor_snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), + "%s 00:00:00", APPROX_RELEASE_DATE); + time_t result = 0; + int r = parse_iso_time(tbuf, &result); + if (BUG(r < 0)) { + result = 0; + } + return result; +} + /** Return VS_RECOMMENDED if <b>myversion</b> is contained in * <b>versionlist</b>. Else, return VS_EMPTY if versionlist has no * entries. Else, return VS_OLD if every member of @@ -277,7 +296,7 @@ tor_version_parse(const char *s, tor_version_t *out) return -1; hexlen = (int)(close_paren-cp); memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); - if ( hexlen == 0 || (hexlen % 2) == 1) + if (hexlen == 0 || (hexlen % 2) == 1) return -1; if (base16_decode(digest, hexlen/2, cp, hexlen) != hexlen/2) return -1; @@ -377,6 +396,69 @@ sort_version_list(smartlist_t *versions, int remove_duplicates) smartlist_uniq(versions, compare_tor_version_str_ptr_, tor_free_); } +/** If there are more than this many entries, we're probably under + * some kind of weird DoS. */ +static const int MAX_PROTOVER_SUMMARY_MAP_LEN = 1024; + +/** + * Map from protover string to protover_summary_flags_t. + */ +static strmap_t *protover_summary_map = NULL; + +/** + * Helper. Given a non-NULL protover string <b>protocols</b>, set <b>out</b> + * to its summary, and memoize the result in <b>protover_summary_map</b>. + */ +static void +memoize_protover_summary(protover_summary_flags_t *out, + const char *protocols) +{ + if (!protover_summary_map) + protover_summary_map = strmap_new(); + + if (strmap_size(protover_summary_map) >= MAX_PROTOVER_SUMMARY_MAP_LEN) { + protover_summary_cache_free_all(); + tor_assert(protover_summary_map == NULL); + protover_summary_map = strmap_new(); + } + + const protover_summary_flags_t *cached = + strmap_get(protover_summary_map, protocols); + + if (cached != NULL) { + /* We found a cached entry; no need to parse this one. */ + memcpy(out, cached, sizeof(protover_summary_flags_t)); + tor_assert(out->protocols_known); + return; + } + + memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out)); + out->protocols_known = 1; + out->supports_extend2_cells = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_RELAY, 2); + out->supports_ed25519_link_handshake_compat = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_LINKAUTH, 3); + out->supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any = + protocol_list_supports_protocol_or_later(protocols, PRT_LINKAUTH, 3); + out->supports_ed25519_hs_intro = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_HSINTRO, 4); + out->supports_v3_hsdir = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_HSDIR, + PROTOVER_HSDIR_V3); + out->supports_v3_rendezvous_point = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_HSREND, + PROTOVER_HS_RENDEZVOUS_POINT_V3); + out->supports_hs_setup_padding = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_PADDING, + PROTOVER_HS_SETUP_PADDING); + out->supports_establish_intro_dos_extension = + protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_HSINTRO, 5); + + protover_summary_flags_t *new_cached = tor_memdup(out, sizeof(*out)); + cached = strmap_set(protover_summary_map, protocols, new_cached); + tor_assert(!cached); +} + /** Summarize the protocols listed in <b>protocols</b> into <b>out</b>, * falling back or correcting them based on <b>version</b> as appropriate. */ @@ -388,21 +470,7 @@ summarize_protover_flags(protover_summary_flags_t *out, tor_assert(out); memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out)); if (protocols) { - out->protocols_known = 1; - out->supports_extend2_cells = - protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_RELAY, 2); - out->supports_ed25519_link_handshake_compat = - protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_LINKAUTH, 3); - out->supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any = - protocol_list_supports_protocol_or_later(protocols, PRT_LINKAUTH, 3); - out->supports_ed25519_hs_intro = - protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_HSINTRO, 4); - out->supports_v3_hsdir = - protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_HSDIR, - PROTOVER_HSDIR_V3); - out->supports_v3_rendezvous_point = - protocol_list_supports_protocol(protocols, PRT_HSREND, - PROTOVER_HS_RENDEZVOUS_POINT_V3); + memoize_protover_summary(out, protocols); } if (version && !strcmpstart(version, "Tor ")) { if (!out->protocols_known) { @@ -420,3 +488,13 @@ summarize_protover_flags(protover_summary_flags_t *out, } } } + +/** + * Free all space held in the protover_summary_map. + */ +void +protover_summary_cache_free_all(void) +{ + strmap_free(protover_summary_map, tor_free_); + protover_summary_map = NULL; +} diff --git a/src/core/or/versions.h b/src/core/or/versions.h index 22f3be176f..75dc17f9c7 100644 --- a/src/core/or/versions.h +++ b/src/core/or/versions.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ typedef enum version_status_t { VS_UNKNOWN, /**< We have no idea. */ } version_status_t; +time_t tor_get_approx_release_date(void); + version_status_t tor_version_is_obsolete(const char *myversion, const char *versionlist); int tor_version_parse_platform(const char *platform, @@ -41,4 +43,6 @@ void summarize_protover_flags(protover_summary_flags_t *out, const char *protocols, const char *version); +void protover_summary_cache_free_all(void); + #endif /* !defined(TOR_VERSIONS_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/proto/.may_include b/src/core/proto/.may_include new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a66c3f83a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/proto/.may_include @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +!advisory + +orconfig.h + +lib/crypt_ops/*.h +lib/buf/*.h +lib/malloc/*.h +lib/string/*.h + +lib/net/address.h + +trunnel/*.h + +core/proto/*.h diff --git a/src/core/proto/core_proto.md b/src/core/proto/core_proto.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad43bc5846 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/proto/core_proto.md @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +@dir /core/proto +@brief core/proto: Protocol encoding/decoding + +These functions should (but do not always) exist at a lower level than most +of the rest of core. + diff --git a/src/core/proto/include.am b/src/core/proto/include.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..726ef924cf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/proto/include.am @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT SOURCES HERE. +LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \ + src/core/proto/proto_cell.c \ + src/core/proto/proto_control0.c \ + src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.c \ + src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.c \ + src/core/proto/proto_http.c \ + src/core/proto/proto_socks.c + +# ADD_C_FILE: INSERT HEADERS HERE. +noinst_HEADERS += \ + src/core/proto/proto_cell.h \ + src/core/proto/proto_control0.h \ + src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.h \ + src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.h \ + src/core/proto/proto_http.h \ + src/core/proto/proto_socks.h diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_cell.c b/src/core/proto/proto_cell.c index 0442e2c6ee..5c1a2c24d7 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_cell.c +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_cell.c @@ -1,11 +1,18 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_cell.c + * @brief Decodes Tor cells from buffers. + **/ +/* Right now it only handles variable-length cells, but eventually + * we should refactor other cell-reading code into here. */ + #include "core/or/or.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "core/proto/proto_cell.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" @@ -83,4 +90,3 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto) *out = result; return 1; } - diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_cell.h b/src/core/proto/proto_cell.h index 4f3982ea43..0e9cfbfed3 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_cell.h +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_cell.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_cell.h + * @brief Header for proto_cell.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_PROTO_CELL_H #define TOR_PROTO_CELL_H @@ -14,4 +19,3 @@ int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(struct buf_t *buf, struct var_cell_t **out, int linkproto); #endif /* !defined(TOR_PROTO_CELL_H) */ - diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_control0.c b/src/core/proto/proto_control0.c index 21fa328f02..323b37c539 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_control0.c +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_control0.c @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_control0.c + * @brief Code to detect the obsolete v0 control protocol. + **/ + #include "core/or/or.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "core/proto/proto_control0.h" /** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller @@ -23,4 +28,3 @@ peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf) } return 0; } - diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_control0.h b/src/core/proto/proto_control0.h index 162e513a1b..561bf00d19 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_control0.h +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_control0.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_control0.h + * @brief Header for proto_control0.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H #define TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H @@ -11,4 +16,3 @@ struct buf_t; int peek_buf_has_control0_command(struct buf_t *buf); #endif /* !defined(TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H) */ - diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.c b/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.c index edbc51b10c..23fc2393b7 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.c +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.c @@ -1,11 +1,16 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_ext_or.c + * @brief Parsing/encoding for the extended OR protocol. + **/ + #include "core/or/or.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "feature/relay/ext_orport.h" #include "core/proto/proto_ext_or.h" @@ -37,4 +42,3 @@ fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) buf_get_bytes(buf, (*out)->body, len); return 1; } - diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.h b/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.h index b2bc64af85..3408599fb7 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.h +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_ext_or.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_ext_or.h + * @brief Header for proto_ext_or.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_PROTO_EXT_OR_H #define TOR_PROTO_EXT_OR_H @@ -19,4 +24,11 @@ struct ext_or_cmd_t { int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(struct buf_t *buf, struct ext_or_cmd_t **out); +ext_or_cmd_t *ext_or_cmd_new(uint16_t len); + +#define ext_or_cmd_free(cmd) \ + FREE_AND_NULL(ext_or_cmd_t, ext_or_cmd_free_, (cmd)) + +void ext_or_cmd_free_(ext_or_cmd_t *cmd); + #endif /* !defined(TOR_PROTO_EXT_OR_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.c b/src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9129fc55bf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2019-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define PROTO_HAPROXY_PRIVATE +#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h" +#include "lib/net/address.h" +#include "lib/string/printf.h" +#include "core/proto/proto_haproxy.h" + +/** Return a newly allocated PROXY header null-terminated string. Returns NULL + * if addr_port->addr is incompatible with the proxy protocol. + */ +char * +haproxy_format_proxy_header_line(const tor_addr_port_t *addr_port) +{ + tor_assert(addr_port); + + sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr_port->addr); + const char *family_string = NULL; + const char *src_addr_string = NULL; + + switch (family) { + case AF_INET: + family_string = "TCP4"; + src_addr_string = "0.0.0.0"; + break; + case AF_INET6: + family_string = "TCP6"; + src_addr_string = "::"; + break; + default: + /* Unknown family. */ + return NULL; + } + + char *buf; + char addrbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN]; + + tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf, &addr_port->addr, sizeof(addrbuf), 0); + + tor_asprintf(&buf, "PROXY %s %s %s 0 %d\r\n", family_string, src_addr_string, + addrbuf, addr_port->port); + + return buf; +} diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.h b/src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63c164e1a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_haproxy.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2019-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_PROTO_HAPROXY_H +#define TOR_PROTO_HAPROXY_H + +struct tor_addr_port_t; + +char *haproxy_format_proxy_header_line( + const struct tor_addr_port_t *addr_port); + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_PROTO_HAPROXY_H) */ diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_http.c b/src/core/proto/proto_http.c index 5c86fc4979..ef4b897fcc 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_http.c +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_http.c @@ -1,12 +1,17 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_http.c + * @brief Parse a subset of the HTTP protocol. + **/ + #define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "core/proto/proto_http.h" /** Return true if <b>cmd</b> looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */ @@ -168,4 +173,3 @@ buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, return ok ? 1 : -1; } - diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_http.h b/src/core/proto/proto_http.h index cd70050205..e0c5135346 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_http.h +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_http.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_http.h + * @brief Header for proto_http.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H #define TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H @@ -21,4 +26,3 @@ STATIC int buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen, #endif #endif /* !defined(TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H) */ - diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c b/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c index 5a7d7ac9be..bcb0c2b2f9 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c @@ -1,14 +1,19 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_socks.c + * @brief Implementations for SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols. + **/ + #include "core/or/or.h" #include "feature/client/addressmap.h" -#include "lib/container/buffers.h" +#include "lib/buf/buffers.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" -#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "feature/relay/ext_orport.h" @@ -105,7 +110,7 @@ socks_request_free_(socks_request_t *req) /** * Parse a single SOCKS4 request from buffer <b>raw_data</b> of length * <b>datalen</b> and update relevant fields of <b>req</b>. If SOCKS4a - * request is detected, set <b>*is_socks4a<b> to true. Set <b>*drain_out</b> + * request is detected, set <b>*is_socks4a</b> to true. Set <b>*drain_out</b> * to number of bytes we parsed so far. * * Return SOCKS_RESULT_DONE if parsing succeeded, SOCKS_RESULT_INVALID if @@ -584,9 +589,8 @@ parse_socks5_client_request(const uint8_t *raw_data, socks_request_t *req, strlcpy(req->address, hostname, sizeof(req->address)); } break; case 4: { - const char *ipv6 = - (const char *)socks5_client_request_getarray_dest_addr_ipv6( - trunnel_req); + const uint8_t *ipv6 = + socks5_client_request_getarray_dest_addr_ipv6(trunnel_req); tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, ipv6); tor_addr_to_str(req->address, &destaddr, sizeof(req->address), 1); @@ -618,6 +622,7 @@ process_socks5_client_request(socks_request_t *req, int safe_socks) { socks_result_t res = SOCKS_RESULT_DONE; + tor_addr_t tmpaddr; if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE && @@ -628,11 +633,10 @@ process_socks5_client_request(socks_request_t *req, } if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR && - !string_is_valid_ipv4_address(req->address) && - !string_is_valid_ipv6_address(req->address)) { + tor_addr_parse(&tmpaddr, req->address) < 0) { socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with " - "hostname type. Rejecting."); + "a malformed address. Rejecting."); res = SOCKS_RESULT_INVALID; goto end; diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_socks.h b/src/core/proto/proto_socks.h index 2a387bf848..f3af0d988e 100644 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_socks.h +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_socks.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file proto_socks.h + * @brief Header for proto_socks.c + **/ + #ifndef TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H #define TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H diff --git a/src/core/stA1RajU b/src/core/stA1RajU new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e69de29bb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/stA1RajU diff --git a/src/core/stiysZND b/src/core/stiysZND Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000000..faa365b769 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/stiysZND |