diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/or/or_connection_st.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/core/or/or_connection_st.h | 37 |
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h index d5db5e8694..d99aaaefad 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h +++ b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +/** + * @file or_connection_st.h + * @brief OR connection structure. + **/ + #ifndef OR_CONNECTION_ST_H #define OR_CONNECTION_ST_H @@ -26,7 +31,7 @@ struct or_connection_t { /** This is the ClientHash value we expect to receive from the * client during the Extended ORPort authentication protocol. We * compute it upon receiving the ClientNoce from the client, and we - * compare it with the acual ClientHash value sent by the + * compare it with the actual ClientHash value sent by the * client. */ char *ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash; /** String carrying the name of the pluggable transport @@ -44,10 +49,19 @@ struct or_connection_t { /* Channel using this connection */ channel_tls_t *chan; - tor_addr_t real_addr; /**< The actual address that this connection came from - * or went to. The <b>addr</b> field is prone to - * getting overridden by the address from the router - * descriptor matching <b>identity_digest</b>. */ + /** + * The "canonical" address and port for this relay's ORPort, if this is + * a known relay. + * + * An ORPort is "canonical" in this sense only if it is the same ORPort + * that is listed for this identity in the consensus we have. + * + * This field may be set on outbound connections for _any_ relay, and on + * inbound connections after authentication. If we don't know the relay's + * identity, or if we don't have the relay's identity in our consensus, we + * leave this address as UNSPEC. + **/ + tor_addr_port_t canonical_orport; /** Should this connection be used for extending circuits to the server * matching the <b>identity_digest</b> field? Set to true if we're pretty @@ -58,8 +72,13 @@ struct or_connection_t { /** True iff this is an outgoing connection. */ unsigned int is_outgoing:1; - unsigned int proxy_type:2; /**< One of PROXY_NONE...PROXY_SOCKS5 */ + unsigned int proxy_type:3; /**< One of PROXY_NONE...PROXY_HAPROXY */ unsigned int wide_circ_ids:1; + /** True iff a failure on this connection indicates a possible + * bootstrapping problem. We set this as true if we notice that this + * connection could handle a pending origin circuit, or if we launch it to + * handle an origin circuit. */ + unsigned int potentially_used_for_bootstrapping:1; /** True iff this connection has had its bootstrap failure logged with * control_event_bootstrap_problem. */ unsigned int have_noted_bootstrap_problem:1; @@ -67,6 +86,8 @@ struct or_connection_t { * geoip cache and handled by the DoS mitigation subsystem. We use this to * insure we have a coherent count of concurrent connection. */ unsigned int tracked_for_dos_mitigation : 1; + /** True iff this connection is using a pluggable transport */ + unsigned int is_pt : 1; uint16_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for * "none negotiated yet." */ @@ -89,4 +110,4 @@ struct or_connection_t { uint64_t bytes_xmitted, bytes_xmitted_by_tls; }; -#endif +#endif /* !defined(OR_CONNECTION_ST_H) */ |