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-rw-r--r--src/core/or/connection_edge.h14
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.h b/src/core/or/connection_edge.h
index c9433adade..802ca071cd 100644
--- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.h
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.h
@@ -188,11 +188,9 @@ void connection_ap_warn_and_unmark_if_pending_circ(
entry_connection_t *entry_conn,
const char *where);
-/** Lowest value for DNS ttl that a server should give or a client should
- * believe. */
+/** Lowest value for DNS ttl clipping excluding the random addition. */
#define MIN_DNS_TTL (5*60)
-/** Highest value for DNS ttl that a server should give or a client should
- * believe. */
+/** Highest value for DNS ttl clipping excluding the random addition. */
#define MAX_DNS_TTL (60*60)
/** How long do we keep DNS cache entries before purging them (regardless of
* their TTL)? */
@@ -200,8 +198,16 @@ void connection_ap_warn_and_unmark_if_pending_circ(
/** How long do we cache/tell clients to cache DNS records when no TTL is
* known? */
#define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60)
+/** How much should we +- each TTL to make it fuzzy with uniform sampling at
+ * exits? The value 4 minutes was chosen so that the lowest possible clip is
+ * 60s. Such low clips were used in the past for all TTLs due to a bug in Tor,
+ * see "The effect of DNS on Tor's Anonymity" by Greschbach et al. In other
+ * words, sampling such low clips is unlikely to cause any breakage at exits.
+ */
+#define FUZZY_DNS_TTL (4*60)
uint32_t clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl);
+uint32_t clip_dns_fuzzy_ttl(uint32_t ttl);
int connection_half_edge_is_valid_data(const smartlist_t *half_conns,
streamid_t stream_id);