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-rw-r--r--src/core/or/connection_edge.c20
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
index d9067d5c29..504980c9fd 100644
--- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@
#include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "lib/buf/buffers.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
#include "core/or/cell_st.h"
@@ -498,6 +499,21 @@ clip_dns_ttl(uint32_t ttl)
return MAX_DNS_TTL;
}
+/** Given a TTL (in seconds), determine what TTL an exit relay should use by
+ * first clipping as usual and then adding some randomness which is sampled
+ * uniformly at random from [-FUZZY_DNS_TTL, FUZZY_DNS_TTL]. This facilitates
+ * fuzzy TTLs, which makes it harder to infer when a website was visited via
+ * side-channels like DNS (see "Website Fingerprinting with Website Oracles").
+ *
+ * Note that this can't underflow because FUZZY_DNS_TTL < MIN_DNS_TTL.
+ */
+uint32_t
+clip_dns_fuzzy_ttl(uint32_t ttl)
+{
+ return clip_dns_ttl(ttl) +
+ crypto_rand_uint(1 + 2*FUZZY_DNS_TTL) - FUZZY_DNS_TTL;
+}
+
/** Send a relay end cell from stream <b>conn</b> down conn's circuit, and
* remember that we've done so. If this is not a client connection, set the
* relay end cell's reason for closing as <b>reason</b>.
@@ -546,7 +562,7 @@ connection_edge_end(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason)
memcpy(payload+1, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&conn->base_.addr), 16);
addrlen = 16;
}
- set_uint32(payload+1+addrlen, htonl(clip_dns_ttl(conn->address_ttl)));
+ set_uint32(payload+1+addrlen, htonl(conn->address_ttl));
payload_len += 4+addrlen;
}
@@ -911,7 +927,7 @@ connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out,
return -1;
}
- set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(clip_dns_ttl(ttl)));
+ set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(ttl));
connected_payload_len += 4;
tor_assert(connected_payload_len <= MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);