diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/or/circuitbuild.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 502 |
1 files changed, 177 insertions, 325 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index ec61b4a455..78501c0aa2 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ /** * \file circuitbuild.c * - * \brief Implements the details of building circuits (by chosing paths, + * \brief Implements the details of building circuits (by choosing paths, * constructing/sending create/extend cells, and so on). * * On the client side, this module handles launching circuits. Circuit @@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ #include "core/or/command.h" #include "core/or/connection_edge.h" #include "core/or/connection_or.h" +#include "core/or/extendinfo.h" #include "core/or/onion.h" #include "core/or/ocirc_event.h" #include "core/or/policies.h" #include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "core/or/trace_probes_circuit.h" #include "core/or/crypt_path.h" #include "feature/client/bridges.h" #include "feature/client/circpathbias.h" @@ -70,6 +72,7 @@ #include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h" #include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" +#include "lib/trace/events.h" #include "core/or/cell_st.h" #include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" @@ -78,9 +81,6 @@ #include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h" #include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" -#include "feature/nodelist/microdesc_st.h" -#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" -#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h" static int circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ); @@ -96,13 +96,17 @@ static const node_t *choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, * callbacks. */ MOCK_IMPL(channel_t *, -channel_connect_for_circuit,(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *id_digest, - const struct ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)) +channel_connect_for_circuit,(const extend_info_t *ei)) { channel_t *chan; - chan = channel_connect(addr, port, id_digest, ed_id); + const tor_addr_port_t *orport = extend_info_pick_orport(ei); + if (!orport) + return NULL; + const char *id_digest = ei->identity_digest; + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id = &ei->ed_identity; + + chan = channel_connect(&orport->addr, orport->port, id_digest, ed_id); if (chan) command_setup_channel(chan); return chan; @@ -439,7 +443,8 @@ onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) /** Create and return a new origin circuit. Initialize its purpose and * build-state based on our arguments. The <b>flags</b> argument is a - * bitfield of CIRCLAUNCH_* flags. */ + * bitfield of CIRCLAUNCH_* flags, see circuit_launch_by_extend_info() for + * more details. */ origin_circuit_t * origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int flags) { @@ -455,13 +460,16 @@ origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int flags) ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) ? 1 : 0); circ->build_state->is_internal = ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) ? 1 : 0); + circ->build_state->is_ipv6_selftest = + ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_IPV6_SELFTEST) ? 1 : 0); circ->base_.purpose = purpose; return circ; } -/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit</b> - * is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable - * exit node. +/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit</b> is defined, then use + * that as your exit router, else choose a suitable exit node. The <b>flags</b> + * argument is a bitfield of CIRCLAUNCH_* flags, see + * circuit_launch_by_extend_info() for more details. * * Also launch a connection to the first OR in the chosen path, if * it's not open already. @@ -491,6 +499,8 @@ circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int flags) circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason); return NULL; } + + tor_trace(TR_SUBSYS(circuit), TR_EV(establish), circ); return circ; } @@ -546,7 +556,7 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) * - the address is internal, and * - we're not connecting to a configured bridge, and * - we're not configured to allow extends to private addresses. */ - if (tor_addr_is_internal(&firsthop->extend_info->addr, 0) && + if (extend_info_any_orport_addr_is_internal(firsthop->extend_info) && !extend_info_is_a_configured_bridge(firsthop->extend_info) && !options->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, @@ -555,19 +565,16 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */ - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Looking for firsthop '%s'", - fmt_addrport(&firsthop->extend_info->addr, - firsthop->extend_info->port)); - - /* We'll cleanup this code in #33220, when we add an IPv6 address to - * extend_info_t. */ - const bool addr_is_ipv4 = - (tor_addr_family(&firsthop->extend_info->addr) == AF_INET); + const tor_addr_port_t *orport4 = + extend_info_get_orport(firsthop->extend_info, AF_INET); + const tor_addr_port_t *orport6 = + extend_info_get_orport(firsthop->extend_info, AF_INET6); n_chan = channel_get_for_extend( firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest, &firsthop->extend_info->ed_identity, - addr_is_ipv4 ? &firsthop->extend_info->addr : NULL, - addr_is_ipv4 ? NULL : &firsthop->extend_info->addr, + orport4 ? &orport4->addr : NULL, + orport6 ? &orport6->addr : NULL, + true, &msg, &should_launch); @@ -579,15 +586,16 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) circ->base_.n_hop = extend_info_dup(firsthop->extend_info); if (should_launch) { - n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit( - &firsthop->extend_info->addr, - firsthop->extend_info->port, - firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest, - &firsthop->extend_info->ed_identity); + n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(firsthop->extend_info); if (!n_chan) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */ log_info(LD_CIRC,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED; } + /* We didn't find a channel, but we're launching one for an origin + * circuit. (If we decided not to launch a channel, then we found at + * least one once good in-progress channel use for this circuit, and + * marked it in channel_get_for_extend().) */ + channel_mark_as_used_for_origin_circuit(n_chan); circuit_chan_publish(circ, n_chan); } @@ -600,8 +608,11 @@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ) } else { /* it's already open. use it. */ tor_assert(!circ->base_.n_hop); circ->base_.n_chan = n_chan; + /* We found a channel, and we're using it for an origin circuit. */ + channel_mark_as_used_for_origin_circuit(n_chan); circuit_chan_publish(circ, n_chan); - log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin."); + log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Conn open for %s. Delivering first onion skin.", + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(firsthop->extend_info))); if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)) < 0) { log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed."); circ->base_.n_chan = NULL; @@ -629,7 +640,7 @@ circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status, int close_origin_circuits) tor_assert(chan); log_debug(LD_CIRC,"chan to %s, status=%d", - channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(chan), status); + channel_describe_peer(chan), status); pending_circs = smartlist_new(); circuit_get_all_pending_on_channel(pending_circs, chan); @@ -783,27 +794,15 @@ circuit_deliver_create_cell,(circuit_t *circ, return -1; } -/** Return true iff we should send a create_fast cell to start building a given - * circuit */ -static inline int +/** Return true iff we should send a create_fast cell to start building a + * given circuit */ +static inline bool should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) { - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); tor_assert(circ->cpath); tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info); - if (!circuit_has_usable_onion_key(circ)) { - /* We don't have ntor, and we don't have or can't use TAP, - * so our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */ - return 1; - } - if (public_server_mode(options)) { - /* We're a server, and we have a usable onion key. We can choose. - * Prefer to blend our circuit into the other circuits we are - * creating on behalf of others. */ - return 0; - } - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "usecreatefast", 0, 0, 1); + return ! circuit_has_usable_onion_key(circ); } /** @@ -882,14 +881,22 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, } /** - * Return true iff <b>purpose</b> is a purpose for a circuit which is - * allowed to have no guard configured, even if the circuit is multihop + * Return true iff <b>circ</b> is allowed + * to have no guard configured, even if the circuit is multihop * and guards are enabled. */ static int -circuit_purpose_may_omit_guard(int purpose) +circuit_may_omit_guard(const origin_circuit_t *circ) { - switch (purpose) { + if (BUG(!circ)) + return 0; + + if (circ->first_hop_from_controller) { + /* The controller picked the first hop: that bypasses the guard system. */ + return 1; + } + + switch (circ->base_.purpose) { case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT: /* Testing circuits may omit guards because they're measuring @@ -998,6 +1005,7 @@ circuit_send_first_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), &cc, 0) < 0) return - END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT; + tor_trace(TR_SUBSYS(circuit), TR_EV(first_onion_skin), circ, circ->cpath); circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING); @@ -1019,7 +1027,7 @@ circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ) guard_usable_t r; if (! circ->guard_state) { if (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ) != 1 && - ! circuit_purpose_may_omit_guard(circ->base_.purpose) && + ! circuit_may_omit_guard(circ) && get_options()->UseEntryGuards) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "%d-hop circuit %p with purpose %d has no " "guard state", @@ -1068,8 +1076,8 @@ circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ) control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE, 0); control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED"); clear_broken_connection_map(1); - if (server_mode(options) && !check_whether_orport_reachable(options)) { - inform_testing_reachability(); + if (server_mode(options) && + !router_all_orports_seem_reachable(options)) { router_do_reachability_checks(1, 1); } } @@ -1093,23 +1101,40 @@ circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ, { int len; extend_cell_t ec; + /* Relays and bridges can send IPv6 extends. But for clients, it's an + * obvious version distinguisher. */ + const bool include_ipv6 = server_mode(get_options()); memset(&ec, 0, sizeof(ec)); + tor_addr_make_unspec(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr); + tor_addr_make_unspec(&ec.orport_ipv6.addr); log_debug(LD_CIRC,"starting to send subsequent skin."); - if (tor_addr_family(&hop->extend_info->addr) != AF_INET) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Trying to extend to a non-IPv4 address."); - return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; - } - circuit_pick_extend_handshake(&ec.cell_type, &ec.create_cell.cell_type, &ec.create_cell.handshake_type, hop->extend_info); - tor_addr_copy(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, &hop->extend_info->addr); - ec.orport_ipv4.port = hop->extend_info->port; - tor_addr_make_unspec(&ec.orport_ipv6.addr); + const tor_addr_port_t *orport4 = + extend_info_get_orport(hop->extend_info, AF_INET); + const tor_addr_port_t *orport6 = + extend_info_get_orport(hop->extend_info, AF_INET6); + int n_addrs_set = 0; + if (orport4) { + tor_addr_copy(&ec.orport_ipv4.addr, &orport4->addr); + ec.orport_ipv4.port = orport4->port; + ++n_addrs_set; + } + if (orport6 && include_ipv6) { + tor_addr_copy(&ec.orport_ipv6.addr, &orport6->addr); + ec.orport_ipv6.port = orport6->port; + ++n_addrs_set; + } + + if (n_addrs_set == 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "No supported address family found in extend_info."); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; + } memcpy(ec.node_id, hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); /* Set the ED25519 identity too -- it will only get included * in the extend2 cell if we're configured to use it, though. */ @@ -1144,6 +1169,7 @@ circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ, return 0; /* circuit is closed */ } hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; + tor_trace(TR_SUBSYS(circuit), TR_EV(intermediate_onion_skin), circ, hop); return 0; } @@ -1557,7 +1583,23 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(router_crn_flags_t flags) const node_t *selected_node=NULL; const int need_uptime = (flags & CRN_NEED_UPTIME) != 0; const int need_capacity = (flags & CRN_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0; - const int direct_conn = (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0; + + /* We should not require guard flags on exits. */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(flags & CRN_NEED_GUARD) + return NULL; + + /* We reject single-hop exits for all node positions. */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) + return NULL; + + /* This isn't the function for picking rendezvous nodes. */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(flags & CRN_RENDEZVOUS_V3) + return NULL; + + /* We only want exits to extend if we cannibalize the circuit. + * But we don't require IPv6 extends yet. */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(flags & CRN_INITIATE_IPV6_EXTEND) + return NULL; connections = get_connection_array(); @@ -1590,19 +1632,14 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(router_crn_flags_t flags) */ continue; } - if (!node_has_preferred_descriptor(node, direct_conn)) { + if (!router_can_choose_node(node, flags)) { n_supported[i] = -1; continue; } - if (!node->is_running || node->is_bad_exit) { + if (node->is_bad_exit) { n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */ } - if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) { - /* never pick a non-general node as a random exit. */ - n_supported[i] = -1; - continue; - } if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, node)) { n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* user asked us not to use it, no matter what */ @@ -1612,27 +1649,6 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(router_crn_flags_t flags) n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */ } - - if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) { - n_supported[i] = -1; - continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable. Don't worry if - * this makes us reject all the possible routers: if so, - * we'll retry later in this function with need_update and - * need_capacity set to 0. */ - } - if (!(node->is_valid)) { - /* if it's invalid and we don't want it */ - n_supported[i] = -1; -// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- invalid router.", -// router->nickname, i); - continue; /* skip invalid routers */ - } - /* We do not allow relays that allow single hop exits by default. Option - * was deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha and removed in 0.3.1.0-alpha. */ - if (node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) { - n_supported[i] = -1; - continue; - } if (node_exit_policy_rejects_all(node)) { n_supported[i] = -1; // log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it rejects all.", @@ -1783,35 +1799,29 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, { const node_t *middle_node = NULL; - smartlist_t *whitelisted_live_middles = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_t *allowlisted_live_middles = smartlist_new(); smartlist_t *all_live_nodes = smartlist_new(); tor_assert(pick_from); /* Add all running nodes to all_live_nodes */ - router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes, - (flags & CRN_NEED_UPTIME) != 0, - (flags & CRN_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0, - (flags & CRN_NEED_GUARD) != 0, - (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0, - (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0, - (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0); - - /* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* whitelisted middles - * to the list whitelisted_live_middles. */ + router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes, flags); + + /* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* allowlisted middles + * to the list allowlisted_live_middles. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_live_nodes, node_t *, live_node) { if (routerset_contains_node(pick_from, live_node)) { - smartlist_add(whitelisted_live_middles, live_node); + smartlist_add(allowlisted_live_middles, live_node); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(live_node); /* Honor ExcludeNodes */ if (exclude_set) { - routerset_subtract_nodes(whitelisted_live_middles, exclude_set); + routerset_subtract_nodes(allowlisted_live_middles, exclude_set); } if (exclude_list) { - smartlist_subtract(whitelisted_live_middles, exclude_list); + smartlist_subtract(allowlisted_live_middles, exclude_list); } /** @@ -1827,9 +1837,9 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, * If there are a lot of nodes in here, assume they did not load balance * and do it for them, but also warn them that they may be Doing It Wrong. */ - if (smartlist_len(whitelisted_live_middles) <= + if (smartlist_len(allowlisted_live_middles) <= MAX_SANE_RESTRICTED_NODES) { - middle_node = smartlist_choose(whitelisted_live_middles); + middle_node = smartlist_choose(allowlisted_live_middles); } else { static ratelim_t pinned_notice_limit = RATELIM_INIT(24*3600); log_fn_ratelim(&pinned_notice_limit, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC, @@ -1837,17 +1847,17 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, "in %d total nodes. This is a lot of nodes. " "You may want to consider using a Tor controller " "to select and update a smaller set of nodes instead.", - position_hint, smartlist_len(whitelisted_live_middles)); + position_hint, smartlist_len(allowlisted_live_middles)); /* NO_WEIGHTING here just means don't take node flags into account * (ie: use consensus measurement only). This is done so that * we don't further surprise the user by not using Exits that they * specified at all */ - middle_node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(whitelisted_live_middles, + middle_node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(allowlisted_live_middles, NO_WEIGHTING); } - smartlist_free(whitelisted_live_middles); + smartlist_free(allowlisted_live_middles); smartlist_free(all_live_nodes); return middle_node; @@ -1975,6 +1985,43 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, return; } +/* Return a set of generic CRN_* flags based on <b>state</b>. + * + * Called for every position in the circuit. */ +STATIC int +cpath_build_state_to_crn_flags(const cpath_build_state_t *state) +{ + router_crn_flags_t flags = 0; + /* These flags apply to entry, middle, and exit nodes. + * If a flag only applies to a specific position, it should be checked in + * that function. */ + if (state->need_uptime) + flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME; + if (state->need_capacity) + flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY; + return flags; +} + +/* Return the CRN_INITIATE_IPV6_EXTEND flag, based on <b>state</b> and + * <b>cur_len</b>. + * + * Only called for middle nodes (for now). Must not be called on single-hop + * circuits. */ +STATIC int +cpath_build_state_to_crn_ipv6_extend_flag(const cpath_build_state_t *state, + int cur_len) +{ + IF_BUG_ONCE(state->desired_path_len < 2) + return 0; + + /* The last node is the relay doing the self-test. So we want to extend over + * IPv6 from the second-last node. */ + if (state->is_ipv6_selftest && cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 2) + return CRN_INITIATE_IPV6_EXTEND; + else + return 0; +} + /** Decide a suitable length for circ's cpath, and pick an exit * router (or use <b>exit</b> if provided). Store these in the * cpath. @@ -2008,14 +2055,13 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, exit_ei = extend_info_dup(exit_ei); } else { /* we have to decide one */ router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC; - if (state->need_uptime) - flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME; - if (state->need_capacity) - flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY; - if (is_hs_v3_rp_circuit) - flags |= CRN_RENDEZVOUS_V3; + flags |= cpath_build_state_to_crn_flags(state); + /* Some internal exits are one hop, for example directory connections. + * (Guards are always direct, middles are never direct.) */ if (state->onehop_tunnel) flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN; + if (is_hs_v3_rp_circuit) + flags |= CRN_RENDEZVOUS_V3; const node_t *node = choose_good_exit_server(circ, flags, state->is_internal); if (!node) { @@ -2077,32 +2123,27 @@ circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei) return 0; } -/** Return the number of routers in <b>routers</b> that are currently up - * and available for building circuits through. +/** Return the number of routers in <b>nodes</b> that are currently up and + * available for building circuits through. * - * (Note that this function may overcount or undercount, if we have - * descriptors that are not the type we would prefer to use for some - * particular router. See bug #25885.) + * If <b>direct</b> is true, only count nodes that are suitable for direct + * connections. Counts nodes regardless of whether their addresses are + * preferred. */ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC int, count_acceptable_nodes, (const smartlist_t *nodes, int direct)) { int num=0; + int flags = CRN_NEED_DESC; + + if (direct) + flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) { // log_debug(LD_CIRC, -// "Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option.", -// i, r->nickname); - if (! node->is_running) -// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i); - continue; - if (! node->is_valid) -// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i); - continue; - if (! node_has_preferred_descriptor(node, direct)) - continue; - /* The node has a descriptor, so we can just check the ntor key directly */ - if (!node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) + // "Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option.", + // i, r->nickname); + if (!router_can_choose_node(node, flags)) continue; ++num; } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); @@ -2127,7 +2168,7 @@ count_acceptable_nodes, (const smartlist_t *nodes, int direct)) * The alternative is building the circuit in reverse. Reverse calls to * onion_extend_cpath() (ie: select outer hops first) would then have the * property that you don't gain information about inner hops by observing - * outer ones. See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24487 + * outer ones. See https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/24487 * for this. * * (Note further that we still exclude the exit to prevent A - B - A @@ -2296,10 +2337,8 @@ choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose, excluded = build_middle_exclude_list(purpose, state, head, cur_len); - if (state->need_uptime) - flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME; - if (state->need_capacity) - flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY; + flags |= cpath_build_state_to_crn_flags(state); + flags |= cpath_build_state_to_crn_ipv6_extend_flag(state, cur_len); /** If a hidden service circuit wants a specific middle node, pin it. */ if (middle_node_must_be_vanguard(options, purpose, cur_len)) { @@ -2375,10 +2414,7 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state, } if (state) { - if (state->need_uptime) - flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME; - if (state->need_capacity) - flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY; + flags |= cpath_build_state_to_crn_flags(state); } choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); @@ -2428,7 +2464,6 @@ onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, circ->cpath, cur_len); if (r) { info = extend_info_from_node(r, 0); - tor_assert_nonfatal(info); } } @@ -2447,143 +2482,6 @@ onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) return 0; } -/** Allocate a new extend_info object based on the various arguments. */ -extend_info_t * -extend_info_new(const char *nickname, - const char *rsa_id_digest, - const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id, - crypto_pk_t *onion_key, - const curve25519_public_key_t *ntor_key, - const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) -{ - extend_info_t *info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t)); - memcpy(info->identity_digest, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN); - if (ed_id && !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)) - memcpy(&info->ed_identity, ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); - if (nickname) - strlcpy(info->nickname, nickname, sizeof(info->nickname)); - if (onion_key) - info->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(onion_key); - if (ntor_key) - memcpy(&info->curve25519_onion_key, ntor_key, - sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); - tor_addr_copy(&info->addr, addr); - info->port = port; - return info; -} - -/** Allocate and return a new extend_info that can be used to build a - * circuit to or through the node <b>node</b>. Use the primary address - * of the node (i.e. its IPv4 address) unless - * <b>for_direct_connect</b> is true, in which case the preferred - * address is used instead. May return NULL if there is not enough - * info about <b>node</b> to extend to it--for example, if the preferred - * routerinfo_t or microdesc_t is missing, or if for_direct_connect is - * true and none of the node's addresses is allowed by tor's firewall - * and IP version config. - **/ -extend_info_t * -extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect) -{ - crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL; - extend_info_t *info = NULL; - tor_addr_port_t ap; - int valid_addr = 0; - - if (!node_has_preferred_descriptor(node, for_direct_connect)) { - return NULL; - } - - /* Choose a preferred address first, but fall back to an allowed address. */ - if (for_direct_connect) - fascist_firewall_choose_address_node(node, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, &ap); - else { - node_get_prim_orport(node, &ap); - } - valid_addr = tor_addr_port_is_valid_ap(&ap, 0); - - if (valid_addr) - log_debug(LD_CIRC, "using %s for %s", - fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port), - node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname); - else - log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Could not choose valid address for %s", - node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname); - - /* Every node we connect or extend to must support ntor */ - if (!node_has_curve25519_onion_key(node)) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CIRC, - "Attempted to create extend_info for a node that does not support " - "ntor: %s", node_describe(node)); - return NULL; - } - - const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_pubkey = NULL; - - /* Don't send the ed25519 pubkey unless the target node actually supports - * authenticating with it. */ - if (node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 0)) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, "Including Ed25519 ID for %s", node_describe(node)); - ed_pubkey = node_get_ed25519_id(node); - } else if (node_get_ed25519_id(node)) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, "Not including the ed25519 ID for %s, since it won't " - "be able to authenticate it.", - node_describe(node)); - } - - /* Retrieve the curve25519 pubkey. */ - const curve25519_public_key_t *curve_pubkey = - node_get_curve25519_onion_key(node); - rsa_pubkey = node_get_rsa_onion_key(node); - - if (valid_addr && node->ri) { - info = extend_info_new(node->ri->nickname, - node->identity, - ed_pubkey, - rsa_pubkey, - curve_pubkey, - &ap.addr, - ap.port); - } else if (valid_addr && node->rs && node->md) { - info = extend_info_new(node->rs->nickname, - node->identity, - ed_pubkey, - rsa_pubkey, - curve_pubkey, - &ap.addr, - ap.port); - } - - crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey); - return info; -} - -/** Release storage held by an extend_info_t struct. */ -void -extend_info_free_(extend_info_t *info) -{ - if (!info) - return; - crypto_pk_free(info->onion_key); - tor_free(info); -} - -/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t with the same contents as - * <b>info</b>. */ -extend_info_t * -extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info) -{ - extend_info_t *newinfo; - tor_assert(info); - newinfo = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t)); - memcpy(newinfo, info, sizeof(extend_info_t)); - if (info->onion_key) - newinfo->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(info->onion_key); - else - newinfo->onion_key = NULL; - return newinfo; -} - /** Return the node_t for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>. * If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the node_t for * the chosen exit, return NULL. @@ -2619,43 +2517,6 @@ build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state) return state->chosen_exit->nickname; } -/** Return true iff the given address can be used to extend to. */ -int -extend_info_addr_is_allowed(const tor_addr_t *addr) -{ - tor_assert(addr); - - /* Check if we have a private address and if we can extend to it. */ - if ((tor_addr_is_internal(addr, 0) || tor_addr_is_multicast(addr)) && - !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) { - goto disallow; - } - /* Allowed! */ - return 1; - disallow: - return 0; -} - -/* Does ei have a valid TAP key? */ -int -extend_info_supports_tap(const extend_info_t* ei) -{ - tor_assert(ei); - /* Valid TAP keys are not NULL */ - return ei->onion_key != NULL; -} - -/* Does ei have a valid ntor key? */ -int -extend_info_supports_ntor(const extend_info_t* ei) -{ - tor_assert(ei); - /* Valid ntor keys have at least one non-zero byte */ - return !fast_mem_is_zero( - (const char*)ei->curve25519_onion_key.public_key, - CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); -} - /* Is circuit purpose allowed to use the deprecated TAP encryption protocol? * The hidden service protocol still uses TAP for some connections, because * ntor onion keys aren't included in HS descriptors or INTRODUCE cells. */ @@ -2690,15 +2551,6 @@ circuit_has_usable_onion_key(const origin_circuit_t *circ) circuit_can_use_tap(circ)); } -/* Does ei have an onion key which it would prefer to use? - * Currently, we prefer ntor keys*/ -int -extend_info_has_preferred_onion_key(const extend_info_t* ei) -{ - tor_assert(ei); - return extend_info_supports_ntor(ei); -} - /** Find the circuits that are waiting to find out whether their guards are * usable, and if any are ready to become usable, mark them open and try * attaching streams as appropriate. */ |