diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/or/circuitbuild.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 33 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index ea32a5bc57..2bcc642a97 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ #include "feature/relay/router.h" #include "feature/relay/routermode.h" #include "feature/relay/selftest.h" -#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h" #include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/trace/events.h" @@ -881,14 +880,22 @@ circuit_pick_extend_handshake(uint8_t *cell_type_out, } /** - * Return true iff <b>purpose</b> is a purpose for a circuit which is - * allowed to have no guard configured, even if the circuit is multihop + * Return true iff <b>circ</b> is allowed + * to have no guard configured, even if the circuit is multihop * and guards are enabled. */ static int -circuit_purpose_may_omit_guard(int purpose) +circuit_may_omit_guard(const origin_circuit_t *circ) { - switch (purpose) { + if (BUG(!circ)) + return 0; + + if (circ->first_hop_from_controller) { + /* The controller picked the first hop: that bypasses the guard system. */ + return 1; + } + + switch (circ->base_.purpose) { case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING: case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT: /* Testing circuits may omit guards because they're measuring @@ -1019,7 +1026,7 @@ circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ) guard_usable_t r; if (! circ->guard_state) { if (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ) != 1 && - ! circuit_purpose_may_omit_guard(circ->base_.purpose) && + ! circuit_may_omit_guard(circ) && get_options()->UseEntryGuards) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "%d-hop circuit %p with purpose %d has no " "guard state", @@ -1070,7 +1077,7 @@ circuit_build_no_more_hops(origin_circuit_t *circ) clear_broken_connection_map(1); if (server_mode(options) && !router_all_orports_seem_reachable(options)) { - router_do_reachability_checks(1, 1); + router_do_reachability_checks(); } } @@ -1331,16 +1338,13 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason) * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) * * - A hidden service connecting to a rendezvous point, which the - * client picked (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, via - * rend_service_receive_introduction() and - * rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous) + * client picked (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND. * * There are currently two situations where we picked the exit node * ourselves, making DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN a safe circuit length: * * - We are a hidden service connecting to an introduction point - * (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO, via - * rend_service_launch_establish_intro()) + * (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO). * * - We are a router testing its own reachabiity * (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, via router_do_reachability_checks()) @@ -2030,7 +2034,7 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, if (state->onehop_tunnel) { log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Launching a one-hop circuit for dir tunnel%s.", - (rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()) ? + (hs_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()) ? ", or intro or rendezvous connection" : "")); state->desired_path_len = 1; } else { @@ -2456,7 +2460,6 @@ onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, circ->cpath, cur_len); if (r) { info = extend_info_from_node(r, 0); - tor_assert_nonfatal(info); } } |