diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/or/channel.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/core/or/channel.c | 78 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.c b/src/core/or/channel.c index 3886906875..9649bdf278 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channel.c +++ b/src/core/or/channel.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ #include "core/or/relay.h" #include "core/or/scheduler.h" #include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" @@ -663,7 +664,7 @@ channel_find_by_global_id(uint64_t global_identifier) /** Return true iff <b>chan</b> matches <b>rsa_id_digest</b> and <b>ed_id</b>. * as its identity keys. If either is NULL, do not check for a match. */ -static int +int channel_remote_identity_matches(const channel_t *chan, const char *rsa_id_digest, const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) @@ -749,6 +750,7 @@ channel_check_for_duplicates(void) { channel_idmap_entry_t **iter; channel_t *chan; + int total_dirauth_connections = 0, total_dirauths = 0; int total_relay_connections = 0, total_relays = 0, total_canonical = 0; int total_half_canonical = 0; int total_gt_one_connection = 0, total_gt_two_connections = 0; @@ -756,13 +758,18 @@ channel_check_for_duplicates(void) HT_FOREACH(iter, channel_idmap, &channel_identity_map) { int connections_to_relay = 0; + const char *id_digest = (char *) (*iter)->digest; /* Only consider relay connections */ - if (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay((char*)(*iter)->digest)) + if (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(id_digest)) continue; total_relays++; + const bool is_dirauth = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(id_digest); + if (is_dirauth) + total_dirauths++; + for (chan = TOR_LIST_FIRST(&(*iter)->channel_list); chan; chan = channel_next_with_rsa_identity(chan)) { @@ -771,11 +778,12 @@ channel_check_for_duplicates(void) connections_to_relay++; total_relay_connections++; + if (is_dirauth) + total_dirauth_connections++; - if (chan->is_canonical(chan, 0)) total_canonical++; + if (chan->is_canonical(chan)) total_canonical++; - if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan, 0) - && chan->is_canonical(chan, 1)) { + if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan)) { total_half_canonical++; } } @@ -785,11 +793,28 @@ channel_check_for_duplicates(void) if (connections_to_relay > 4) total_gt_four_connections++; } -#define MIN_RELAY_CONNECTIONS_TO_WARN 5 + /* Don't bother warning about excessive connections unless we have + * at least this many connections, total. + */ +#define MIN_RELAY_CONNECTIONS_TO_WARN 25 + /* If the average number of connections for a regular relay is more than + * this, that's too high. + */ +#define MAX_AVG_RELAY_CONNECTIONS 1.5 + /* If the average number of connections for a dirauth is more than + * this, that's too high. + */ +#define MAX_AVG_DIRAUTH_CONNECTIONS 4 + + /* How many connections total would be okay, given the number of + * relays and dirauths that we have connections to? */ + const int max_tolerable_connections = (int)( + (total_relays-total_dirauths) * MAX_AVG_RELAY_CONNECTIONS + + total_dirauths * MAX_AVG_DIRAUTH_CONNECTIONS); /* If we average 1.5 or more connections per relay, something is wrong */ if (total_relays > MIN_RELAY_CONNECTIONS_TO_WARN && - total_relay_connections >= 1.5*total_relays) { + total_relay_connections > max_tolerable_connections) { log_notice(LD_OR, "Your relay has a very large number of connections to other relays. " "Is your outbound address the same as your relay address? " @@ -2431,21 +2456,9 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, continue; } - /* Never return a non-canonical connection using a recent link protocol - * if the address is not what we wanted. - * - * The channel_is_canonical_is_reliable() function asks the lower layer - * if we should trust channel_is_canonical(). The below is from the - * comments of the old circuit_or_get_for_extend() and applies when - * the lower-layer transport is channel_tls_t. - * - * (For old link protocols, we can't rely on is_canonical getting - * set properly if we're talking to the right address, since we might - * have an out-of-date descriptor, and we will get no NETINFO cell to - * tell us about the right address.) - */ + /* Only return canonical connections or connections where the address + * is the address we wanted. */ if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) && - channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(chan) && !channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, target_addr)) { ++n_noncanonical; continue; @@ -2587,16 +2600,12 @@ channel_dump_statistics, (channel_t *chan, int severity)) /* Handle marks */ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - " * Channel %"PRIu64 " has these marks: %s %s %s " - "%s %s %s", + " * Channel %"PRIu64 " has these marks: %s %s %s %s %s", (chan->global_identifier), channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(chan) ? "bad_for_new_circs" : "!bad_for_new_circs", channel_is_canonical(chan) ? "canonical" : "!canonical", - channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(chan) ? - "is_canonical_is_reliable" : - "!is_canonical_is_reliable", channel_is_client(chan) ? "client" : "!client", channel_is_local(chan) ? @@ -2955,22 +2964,7 @@ channel_is_canonical(channel_t *chan) tor_assert(chan); tor_assert(chan->is_canonical); - return chan->is_canonical(chan, 0); -} - -/** - * Test if the canonical flag is reliable. - * - * This function asks if the lower layer thinks it's safe to trust the - * result of channel_is_canonical(). - */ -int -channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(channel_t *chan) -{ - tor_assert(chan); - tor_assert(chan->is_canonical); - - return chan->is_canonical(chan, 1); + return chan->is_canonical(chan); } /** |