diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/common/tortls.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/common/tortls.c | 249 |
1 files changed, 190 insertions, 59 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 1fbe3c663e..5f1930d884 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include "orconfig.h" #define TORTLS_PRIVATE +#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE #include <assert.h> #ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/ @@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) * SSL3 safely at the same time. */ #define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE -#endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */ /* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am @@ -88,6 +89,9 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) #define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010 #endif +/** Set to true iff openssl bug 7712 has been detected. */ +static int openssl_bug_7712_is_present = 0; + /** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers. * * @{ @@ -136,6 +140,7 @@ static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx); static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, + time_t now, int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance); /** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs @@ -388,7 +393,7 @@ tor_tls_init(void) "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster."); } /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -#endif +#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && ... */ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(); @@ -442,8 +447,9 @@ tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname) goto error; /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */ return name; - error: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/ + error: X509_NAME_free(name); return NULL; /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ @@ -458,11 +464,11 @@ tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname) * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure. */ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC X509 *, - tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, - crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, - const char *cname, - const char *cname_sign, - unsigned int cert_lifetime)) +tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa, + crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign, + const char *cname, + const char *cname_sign, + unsigned int cert_lifetime)) { /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial * numbers, so let's do that too. */ @@ -482,8 +488,25 @@ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC X509 *, * then we might pick a time where we're about to expire. Lastly, be * sure to start on a day boundary. */ time_t now = time(NULL); - start_time = crypto_rand_time_range(now - cert_lifetime, now) + 2*24*3600; - start_time -= start_time % (24*3600); + /* Our certificate lifetime will be cert_lifetime no matter what, but if we + * start cert_lifetime in the past, we'll have 0 real lifetime. instead we + * start up to (cert_lifetime - min_real_lifetime - start_granularity) in + * the past. */ + const time_t min_real_lifetime = 24*3600; + const time_t start_granularity = 24*3600; + time_t earliest_start_time; + /* Don't actually start in the future! */ + if (cert_lifetime <= min_real_lifetime + start_granularity) { + earliest_start_time = now - 1; + } else { + earliest_start_time = now + min_real_lifetime + start_granularity + - cert_lifetime; + } + start_time = crypto_rand_time_range(earliest_start_time, now); + /* Round the start time back to the start of a day. */ + start_time -= start_time % start_granularity; + + end_time = start_time + cert_lifetime; tor_assert(rsa); tor_assert(cname); @@ -517,12 +540,12 @@ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC X509 *, if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time)) goto error; - end_time = start_time + cert_lifetime; if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time)) goto error; if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey)) goto error; - if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha1())) + + if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256())) goto error; goto done; @@ -605,6 +628,12 @@ static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = #ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":" #endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":" +#endif #ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":" #endif @@ -614,8 +643,14 @@ static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] = /* Required */ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" /* Required */ - TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA - ; + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":" +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 + TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 +#endif + ; /* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to @@ -637,7 +672,7 @@ static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] = /** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */ void -tor_x509_cert_free(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) +tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) { if (! cert) return; @@ -656,7 +691,7 @@ tor_x509_cert_free(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) * Steals a reference to x509_cert. */ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *, - tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert)) +tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert)) { tor_x509_cert_t *cert; EVP_PKEY *pkey; @@ -670,12 +705,7 @@ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *, length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf); cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t)); if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */ - tor_free(cert); - log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't get length of encoded x509 certificate"); - X509_free(x509_cert); - return NULL; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ + goto err; } cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length; cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length); @@ -690,13 +720,25 @@ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *, if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) && (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) { crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); - crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests); + if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) { + crypto_pk_free(pk); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + goto err; + } + cert->pkey_digests_set = 1; crypto_pk_free(pk); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } return cert; + err: + /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */ + tor_free(cert); + log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate."); + X509_free(x509_cert); + return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ } /** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b>. */ @@ -800,8 +842,8 @@ tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx) /** Set *<b>link_cert_out</b> and *<b>id_cert_out</b> to the link certificate * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol * handshake's certificate chain. If <b>server</b> is true, provide the certs - * that we use in server mode; otherwise, provide the certs that we use in - * client mode. */ + * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we + * use in client mode. (link, ID) */ int tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server, const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out, @@ -831,7 +873,7 @@ tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void) /** * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate - * certifies. Return NULL if the cert's key is not RSA. + * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA. */ crypto_pk_t * tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert) @@ -888,6 +930,7 @@ int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert, const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert, + time_t now, int check_rsa_1024) { check_no_tls_errors(); @@ -907,7 +950,7 @@ tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity, /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the * lifetime. */ - if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, + if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now, 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0) goto bad; @@ -1052,6 +1095,8 @@ tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext, /** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */ #define NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1 +#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048 + /** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes. * <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the * certificate. @@ -1077,7 +1122,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */ if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new())) goto error; - if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa)<0) + if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0) goto error; if (!is_client) { /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3") @@ -1120,7 +1165,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, * with existing Tors. */ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method()))) goto error; -#endif +#endif /* 0 */ /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */ #ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD @@ -1129,7 +1174,8 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, #else if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()))) goto error; -#endif +#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */ + #ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_SECURITY_LEVEL /* Level 1 re-enables RSA1024 and DH1024 for compatibility with old tors */ SSL_CTX_set_security_level(result->ctx, 1); @@ -1172,17 +1218,20 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION); } + + /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS + * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over + * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */ #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data - * we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */ if (result->ctx->comp_methods) result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL; #endif -#endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ + #ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); #endif @@ -1359,7 +1408,7 @@ find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher) tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher); return c != NULL; } -#else +#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */ # if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) { @@ -1373,7 +1422,7 @@ find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher) tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher); return c != NULL; } -# endif +#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */ # ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) { /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have @@ -1389,12 +1438,12 @@ find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher) } return 0; } -# endif +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ (void) ssl; (void) m; (void) cipher; return 1; /* No way to search */ -#endif +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */ } /** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that @@ -1522,7 +1571,7 @@ tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl) return CIPHERS_ERR; } ciphers = session->ciphers; -#endif +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */ return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2; } @@ -1653,6 +1702,13 @@ tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer) SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname); tor_free(fake_hostname); } +#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */ + +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION + if (openssl_bug_7712_is_present) { + /* We can't actually use TLS 1.3 until this bug is fixed. */ + SSL_set_max_proto_version(result->ssl, TLS1_2_VERSION); + } #endif if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl, @@ -1780,7 +1836,7 @@ tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls) tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)); #else (void) tls; -#endif +#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */ } /** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or @@ -1796,7 +1852,7 @@ tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls) * underlying file descriptor. */ void -tor_tls_free(tor_tls_t *tls) +tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls) { if (!tls) return; @@ -1943,7 +1999,7 @@ tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls) return r; } -/** Perform the final part of the intial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This +/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1 * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation * handshake as appropriate. @@ -2097,13 +2153,13 @@ tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls)) /** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */ static void -log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem) +log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem, + time_t now) { BIO *bio = NULL; BUF_MEM *buf; char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL; char mytime[33]; - time_t now = time(NULL); struct tm tm; size_t n; @@ -2251,6 +2307,7 @@ tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key) */ int tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + time_t now, int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) { X509 *cert; @@ -2259,7 +2316,7 @@ tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl))) goto done; - if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, + if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now, past_tolerance, future_tolerance) < 0) goto done; @@ -2275,30 +2332,48 @@ tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, /** Helper: check whether <b>cert</b> is expired give or take * <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take - * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. If it is live, return 0. If it is not - * live, log a message and return -1. */ + * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. (Relative to the current time + * <b>now</b>.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message + * and return -1. */ static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, + time_t now, int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance) { - time_t now, t; - - now = time(NULL); + time_t t; t = now + future_tolerance; if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) { - log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid"); + log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now); return -1; } t = now - past_tolerance; if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) { - log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired"); + log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now); return -1; } return 0; } +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as <b>inp</b>, + but with the expiration time <b>new_expiration_time</b>, signed with + <b>signing_key</b>. */ +STATIC tor_x509_cert_t * +tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp, + time_t new_expiration_time, + crypto_pk_t *signing_key) +{ + X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert); + X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time); + EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1); + tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256())); + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + return tor_x509_cert_new(newc); +} +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ + /** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>. */ int @@ -2341,10 +2416,10 @@ tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written) if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL) wbio = tmpbio; -#else +#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */ if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL) wbio = tmpbio; -#endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */ w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio); /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here: @@ -2423,7 +2498,7 @@ SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len); return len; } -#endif +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */ #ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM static size_t @@ -2436,7 +2511,7 @@ SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len); return len; } -#endif +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */ #ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY STATIC size_t @@ -2450,7 +2525,7 @@ SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len) memcpy(out, s->master_key, len); return len; } -#endif +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */ /** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the @@ -2517,6 +2592,62 @@ tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)) return 0; } +/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the + * provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and + * <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in + * <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can + * compute. Return 0 on success; -1 on failure; and -2 on failure + * caused by OpenSSL bug 7712. + */ +MOCK_IMPL(int, +tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out, + const uint8_t *context, + size_t context_len, + const char *label)) +{ + tor_assert(tls); + tor_assert(tls->ssl); + + int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl, + secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN, + label, strlen(label), + context, context_len, 1); + + if (r != 1) { + int severity = openssl_bug_7712_is_present ? LOG_WARN : LOG_DEBUG; + tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_NET, "exporting keying material"); + } + +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + if (r != 1 && + strlen(label) > 12 && + SSL_version(tls->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { + + if (! openssl_bug_7712_is_present) { + /* We might have run into OpenSSL issue 7712, which caused OpenSSL + * 1.1.1a to not handle long labels. Let's test to see if we have. + */ + r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl, secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN, + "short", 5, context, context_len, 1); + if (r == 1) { + /* A short label succeeds, but a long label fails. This was openssl + * issue 7712. */ + openssl_bug_7712_is_present = 1; + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Detected OpenSSL bug 7712: disabling TLS 1.3 on " + "future connections. A fix is expected to appear in OpenSSL " + "1.1.1b."); + } + } + if (openssl_bug_7712_is_present) + return -2; + else + return -1; + } +#endif + + return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1; +} + /** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>. * Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read * buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used. @@ -2537,7 +2668,7 @@ tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls, (void)wbuf_bytes; return -1; -#else +#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */ if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf) *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len; else @@ -2549,7 +2680,7 @@ tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls, *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left; *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left; return 0; -#endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */ } /** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL |