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-rw-r--r--doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md7
-rw-r--r--doc/HACKING/HelpfulTools.md13
-rw-r--r--doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md77
-rw-r--r--doc/HACKING/Tracing.md91
-rw-r--r--doc/tor.1.txt333
-rw-r--r--doc/torify.1.txt20
-rw-r--r--doc/torrc_format.txt4
7 files changed, 292 insertions, 253 deletions
diff --git a/doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md b/doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md
index 01212a9919..c7787a72cc 100644
--- a/doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md
+++ b/doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ Coding conventions for Tor
tl;dr:
- Run configure with `--enable-fatal-warnings`
- - Run `make check-spaces` to catch whitespace errors
- Document your functions
- Write unit tests
+ - Run `make test-full` to test against all unit and integration tests.
+ - Run `make distcheck` to ensure the distribution works
- Add a file in `changes` for your branch.
Patch checklist
@@ -22,10 +23,12 @@ preference)
Did you remember...
- To build your code while configured with `--enable-fatal-warnings`?
- - To run `make check-spaces` on your code?
- To run `make check-docs` to see whether all new options are on
the manpage?
- To write unit tests, as possible?
+ - To run `make test-full` to test against all unit and integration tests (or
+ `make test-full-online` if you have a working connection to the internet)?
+ - To test that the distribution will actually work via `make distcheck`?
- To base your code on the appropriate branch?
- To include a file in the `changes` directory as appropriate?
diff --git a/doc/HACKING/HelpfulTools.md b/doc/HACKING/HelpfulTools.md
index 67481ace43..b8ba2aa408 100644
--- a/doc/HACKING/HelpfulTools.md
+++ b/doc/HACKING/HelpfulTools.md
@@ -226,17 +226,10 @@ performance! See the gperftools manual for more info, but basically:
Generating and analyzing a callgraph
------------------------------------
-1. Run `./scripts/maint/generate_callgraph.sh`. This will generate a
- bunch of files in a new ./callgraph directory.
+0. Build Tor on linux or mac, ideally with -O0 or -fno-inline.
-2. Run `./scripts/maint/analyze_callgraph.py callgraph/src/*/*`. This
- will do a lot of graph operations and then dump out a new
- `callgraph.pkl` file, containing data in Python's 'pickle' format.
-
-3. Run `./scripts/maint/display_callgraph.py`. It will display:
- - the number of functions reachable from each function.
- - all strongly-connnected components in the Tor callgraph
- - the largest bottlenecks in the largest SCC in the Tor callgraph.
+1. Clone 'https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/nickm/calltool.git/' .
+ Follow the README in that repository.
Note that currently the callgraph generator can't detect calls that pass
through function pointers.
diff --git a/doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md b/doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md
index 4761ca9a37..4ece4d7a1d 100644
--- a/doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md
+++ b/doc/HACKING/ReleasingTor.md
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ new Tor release:
What about Coverity Scan?
- Is make check-spaces happy?
-
Does 'make distcheck' complain?
How about 'make test-stem' and 'make test-network'?
@@ -44,21 +42,16 @@ new Tor release:
of them and reordering to focus on what users and funders would find
interesting and understandable.
- 1. Make sure that everything that wants a bug number has one.
- Make sure that everything which is a bugfix says what version
- it was a bugfix on.
-
- 2. Concatenate them.
-
- 3. Sort them by section. Within each section, sort by "version it's
- a bugfix on", else by numerical ticket order.
-
- 4. Clean them up:
+ To do this, first run `./scripts/maint/lintChanges.py changes/*` and
+ fix as many warnings as you can. Then run `./scripts/maint/sortChanges.py
+ changes/* > changelog.in` to combine headings and sort the entries.
+ After that, it's time to hand-edit and fix the issues that lintChanges
+ can't find:
- Standard idioms:
- `Fixes bug 9999; bugfix on 0.3.3.3-alpha.`
+ 1. Within each section, sort by "version it's a bugfix on", else by
+ numerical ticket order.
- One space after a period.
+ 2. Clean them up:
Make stuff very terse
@@ -86,19 +79,23 @@ new Tor release:
maint-0.2.1), be sure to make the stanzas identical (so people can
distinguish if these are the same change).
- 5. Merge them in.
+ 3. Clean everything one last time.
- 6. Clean everything one last time.
+ 4. Run `./scripts/maint/format_changelog.py --inplace` to make it prettier
- 7. Run `./scripts/maint/format_changelog.py` to make it prettier.
2. Compose a short release blurb to highlight the user-facing
changes. Insert said release blurb into the ChangeLog stanza. If it's
a stable release, add it to the ReleaseNotes file too. If we're adding
- to a release-0.2.x branch, manually commit the changelogs to the later
+ to a release-* branch, manually commit the changelogs to the later
git branches too.
-3. If you're doing the first stable release in a series, you need to
+3. If there are changes that require or suggest operator intervention
+ before or during the update, mail operators (either dirauth or relays
+ list) with a headline that indicates that an action is required or
+ appreciated.
+
+4. If you're doing the first stable release in a series, you need to
create a ReleaseNotes for the series as a whole. To get started
there, copy all of the Changelog entries from the series into a new
file, and run `./scripts/maint/sortChanges.py` on it. That will
@@ -111,38 +108,40 @@ new Tor release:
=== III. Making the source release.
-1. In `maint-0.2.x`, bump the version number in `configure.ac` and run
+1. In `maint-0.?.x`, bump the version number in `configure.ac` and run
`scripts/maint/updateVersions.pl` to update version numbers in other
- places, and commit. Then merge `maint-0.2.x` into `release-0.2.x`.
+ places, and commit. Then merge `maint-0.?.x` into `release-0.?.x`.
(NOTE: To bump the version number, edit `configure.ac`, and then run
either `make`, or `perl scripts/maint/updateVersions.pl`, depending on
your version.)
-2. Make distcheck, put the tarball up somewhere, and tell `#tor` about
- it. Wait a while to see if anybody has problems building it. Try to
- get Sebastian or somebody to try building it on Windows.
+2. Make distcheck, put the tarball up in somewhere (how about your
+ homedir on your homedir on people.torproject.org?) , and tell `#tor`
+ about it. Wait a while to see if anybody has problems building it.
+ (Though jenkins is usually pretty good about catching these things.)
=== IV. Commit, upload, announce
1. Sign the tarball, then sign and push the git tag:
gpg -ba <the_tarball>
- git tag -u <keyid> tor-0.2.x.y-status
- git push origin tag tor-0.2.x.y-status
+ git tag -u <keyid> tor-0.3.x.y-status
+ git push origin tag tor-0.3.x.y-status
2. scp the tarball and its sig to the dist website, i.e.
`/srv/dist-master.torproject.org/htdocs/` on dist-master. When you want
it to go live, you run "static-update-component dist.torproject.org"
on dist-master.
- Edit `include/versions.wmi` and `Makefile` to note the new version.
+ In the webwml.git repository, `include/versions.wmi` and `Makefile`
+ to note the new version.
(NOTE: Due to #17805, there can only be one stable version listed at
once. Nonetheless, do not call your version "alpha" if it is stable,
or people will get confused.)
-3. Email the packagers (cc'ing tor-assistants) that a new tarball is up.
+3. Email the packagers (cc'ing tor-team) that a new tarball is up.
The current list of packagers is:
- {weasel,gk,mikeperry} at torproject dot org
@@ -151,11 +150,7 @@ new Tor release:
- {lfleischer} at archlinux dot org
- {Nathan} at freitas dot net
- {mike} at tig dot as
- - {tails-rm} at boum dot org (for pre-release announcments)
-
-
- - {tails-dev} at boum dot org (for at-release announcements)
-
+ - {tails-rm} at boum dot org
4. Add the version number to Trac. To do this, go to Trac, log in,
select "Admin" near the top of the screen, then select "Versions" from
@@ -171,17 +166,17 @@ new Tor release:
blog-formatted version of the changelog with the -B option to
format-changelog.
- When you post, include an estimate of when the next TorBrowser releases
- will come out that include this Tor release.
+ When you post, include an estimate of when the next TorBrowser
+ releases will come out that include this Tor release. This will
+ usually track https://wiki.mozilla.org/RapidRelease/Calendar , but it
+ can vary.
=== V. Aftermath and cleanup
-1. If it's a stable release, bump the version number in the `maint-x.y.z`
- branch to "newversion-dev", and do a `merge -s ours` merge to avoid
- taking that change into master. Do a similar `merge -s theirs`
- merge to get the change (and only that change) into release. (Some
- of the build scripts require that maint merge cleanly into release.)
+1. If it's a stable release, bump the version number in the
+ `maint-x.y.z` branch to "newversion-dev", and do a `merge -s ours`
+ merge to avoid taking that change into master.
2. Forward-port the ChangeLog (and ReleaseNotes if appropriate).
diff --git a/doc/HACKING/Tracing.md b/doc/HACKING/Tracing.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5fb5165e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/HACKING/Tracing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# Tracing #
+
+This document describes how the event tracing subsystem works in tor so
+developers can add events to the code base but also hook them to an event
+tracing framework.
+
+## Basics ###
+
+Event tracing is seperated in two concepts, trace events and a tracer. The
+tracing subsystem can be found in `src/trace`. The `events.h` header file is
+the main file that maps the different tracers to trace events.
+
+### Events ###
+
+A trace event is basically a function from which we can pass any data that
+we want to collect. In addition, we specify a context for the event such as
+a subsystem and an event name.
+
+A trace event in tor has the following standard format:
+
+ tor_trace(subsystem, event\_name, args...)
+
+The `subsystem` parameter is the name of the subsytem the trace event is in.
+For example that could be "scheduler" or "vote" or "hs". The idea is to add
+some context to the event so when we collect them we know where it's coming
+from. The `event_name` is the name of the event which helps a lot with
+adding some semantic to the event. Finally, `args` is any number of
+arguments we want to collect.
+
+Here is an example of a possible tracepoint in main():
+
+ tor_trace(main, init_phase, argc)
+
+The above is a tracepoint in the `main` subsystem with `init_phase` as the
+event name and the `int argc` is passed to the event as well.
+
+How `argc` is collected or used has nothing to do with the instrumentation
+(adding trace events to the code). It is the work of the tracer so this is why
+the trace events and collection framework (tracer) are decoupled. You _can_
+have trace events without a tracer.
+
+### Tracer ###
+
+In `src/trace/events.h`, we map the `tor_trace()` function to the right
+tracer. A tracer support is only enabled at compile time. For instance, the
+file `src/trace/debug.h` contains the mapping of the generic tracing function
+`tor_trace()` to the `log_debug()` function. More specialized function can be
+mapped depending on the tracepoint.
+
+## Build System ##
+
+This section describes how it is integrated into the build system of tor.
+
+By default, every tracing events are disabled in tor that is `tor_trace()`
+is a NOP.
+
+To enable a tracer, there is a configure option on the form of:
+
+ --enable-tracing-<tracer>
+
+We have an option that will send every trace events to a `log_debug()` (as
+mentionned above) which will print you the subsystem and name of the event but
+not the arguments for technical reasons. This is useful if you want to quickly
+see if your trace event is being hit or well written. To do so, use this
+configure option:
+
+ --enable-tracing-debug
+
+## Instrument Tor ##
+
+This is pretty easy. Let's say you want to add a trace event in
+`src/or/rendcache.c`, you only have to add this include statement:
+
+ #include "trace/events.h"
+
+Once done, you can add as many as you want `tor_trace()` that you need.
+Please use the right subsystem (here it would be `hs`) and a unique name that
+tells what the event is for. For example:
+
+ tor_trace(hs, store_desc_as_client, desc, desc_id);
+
+If you look in `src/trace/events.h`, you'll see that if tracing is enabled it
+will be mapped to a function called:
+
+ tor_trace_hs_store_desc_as_client(desc, desc_id)
+
+And the point of all this is for that function to be defined in a new file
+that you might want to add named `src/trace/hs.{c|h}` which would defined how
+to collect the data for the `tor_trace_hs_store_desc_as_client()` function
+like for instance sending it to a `log_debug()` or do more complex operations
+or use a userspace tracer like LTTng (https://lttng.org).
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt
index 1665cfe947..e17c111919 100644
--- a/doc/tor.1.txt
+++ b/doc/tor.1.txt
@@ -153,6 +153,13 @@ values. To split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single
backslash character (\) before the end of the line. Comments can be used in
such multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a line.
+Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
+option with the value being a path. If the path is a file, the options from the
+file will be parsed as if they were written where the %include option is. If
+the path is a folder, all files on that folder will be parsed following lexical
+order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files on subfolders are ignored.
+The %include option can be used recursively.
+
By default, an option on the command line overrides an option found in the
configuration file, and an option in a configuration file overrides one in
the defaults file.
@@ -185,6 +192,9 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
course, more is better; we recommend at least 250 KBytes (2 mbits) if
possible. (Default: 1 GByte) +
+
+ Note that this option, and other bandwidth-limiting options, apply to TCP
+ data only: They do not count TCP headers or DNS traffic. +
+ +
With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes,
KBytes, and so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" can
also be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can be written as
@@ -338,14 +348,6 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
Unix domain sockets only: Do not insist that the directory
that holds the socket be read-restricted.
-[[ControlListenAddress]] **ControlListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
- Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind
- to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly
- recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're doing,
- since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
- dangerous. This directive can be specified multiple
- times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
-
[[ControlSocket]] **ControlSocket** __Path__::
Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
socket. '0' disables ControlSocket (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
@@ -391,7 +393,9 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
[[DataDirectory]] **DataDirectory** __DIR__::
Store working data in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is running.
- (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
+ (Default: ~/.tor if your home directory is not /; otherwise,
+ @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor. On Windows, the default is
+ your ApplicationData folder.)
[[DataDirectoryGroupReadable]] **DataDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
@@ -641,18 +645,19 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
(127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
[[OutboundBindAddressOR]] **OutboundBindAddressOR** __IP__::
- Make all outbound non-exit (=relay and other) connections originate from the IP
- address specified. This option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the same
- IP version. This option may be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once
- with an IPv6 address. This setting will be ignored for connections to the
- loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
+ Make all outbound non-exit (relay and other) connections
+ originate from the IP address specified. This option overrides
+ **OutboundBindAddress** for the same IP version. This option may
+ be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6
+ address. This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback
+ addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
[[OutboundBindAddressExit]] **OutboundBindAddressExit** __IP__::
- Make all outbound exit connections originate from the IP address specified. This
- option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the same IP version. This option
- may be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6 address. This
- setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8
- and ::1).
+ Make all outbound exit connections originate from the IP address
+ specified. This option overrides **OutboundBindAddress** for the
+ same IP version. This option may be used twice, once with an IPv4
+ address and once with an IPv6 address. This setting will be ignored
+ for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
[[PidFile]] **PidFile** __FILE__::
On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
@@ -663,12 +668,6 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
\'info'. (Default: 0)
-[[PredictedPortsRelevanceTime]] **PredictedPortsRelevanceTime** __NUM__::
- Set how long, after the client has made an anonymized connection to a
- given port, we will try to make sure that we build circuits to
- exits that support that port. The maximum value for this option is 1
- hour. (Default: 1 hour)
-
[[RunAsDaemon]] **RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
@@ -767,22 +766,6 @@ CLIENT OPTIONS
The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
**SocksPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or **NATDPort** is non-zero):
-[[AllowInvalidNodes]] **AllowInvalidNodes** **entry**|**exit**|**middle**|**introduction**|**rendezvous**|**...**::
- If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
- authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
- recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
- can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
- "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
-
-[[ExcludeSingleHopRelays]] **ExcludeSingleHopRelays** **0**|**1**::
- This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with
- the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set
- to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at
- higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally
- included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option,
- so using these relays might make your client stand out.
- (Default: 1)
-
[[Bridge]] **Bridge** [__transport__] __IP__:__ORPort__ [__fingerprint__]::
When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
"IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
@@ -796,7 +779,12 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
rather than connecting to the bridge directly. Some transports use a
transport-specific method to work out the remote address to connect to.
These transports typically ignore the "IP:ORPort" specified in the bridge
- line.
+ line. +
+ +
+ Tor passes any "key=val" settings to the pluggable transport proxy as
+ per-connection arguments when connecting to the bridge. Consult
+ the documentation of the pluggable transport for details of what
+ arguments it supports.
[[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
@@ -809,13 +797,15 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
(Default: 60 seconds)
-[[CircuitIdleTimeout]] **CircuitIdleTimeout** __NUM__::
- If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then
- close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all
- of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up
- making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we're
- receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1
- hour)
+[[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__::
+ Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for
+ this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept
+ open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each
+ of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely
+ idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
+ connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized
+ from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes;
+ Max: 24 hours)
[[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
@@ -832,6 +822,22 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a client
unless ORPort, ExtORPort, or DirPort are configured.) (Default: 0)
+[[ConnectionPadding]] **ConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
+ This option governs Tor's use of padding to defend against some forms of
+ traffic analysis. If it is set to 'auto', Tor will send padding only
+ if both the client and the relay support it. If it is set to 0, Tor will
+ not send any padding cells. If it is set to 1, Tor will still send padding
+ for client connections regardless of relay support. Only clients may set
+ this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
+ for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
+ (Default: auto)
+
+[[ReducedConnectionPadding]] **ReducedConnectionPadding** **0**|**1**::
+ If set to 1, Tor will not not hold OR connections open for very long,
+ and will send less padding on these connections. Only clients may set
+ this option. This option should be offered via the UI to mobile users
+ for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0)
+
[[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
@@ -974,24 +980,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
services can be configured to require authorization using the
**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
-[[CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout]] **CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**::
- If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden service client circuits
- which have not moved closer to connecting to their destination
- hidden service when their internal state has not changed for the
- duration of the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such
- circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish
- connecting to their destination hidden services. In either case,
- another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same
- destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0)
-
-[[CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout]] **CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout** **0**|**1**::
- If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden-service-side rendezvous
- circuits after the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such
- circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish
- connecting to their destinations. In either case, another
- rendezvous circuit for the same destination client will be
- launched. (Default: 0)
-
[[LongLivedPorts]] **LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
(e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
@@ -1050,7 +1038,8 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. For hidden
services, this applies to the __last__ time a circuit was used, not the
first. Circuits with streams constructed with SOCKS authentication via
- SocksPorts that have **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth** ignore this value.
+ SocksPorts that have **KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth** also remain alive
+ for MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds after carrying the last such stream.
(Default: 10 minutes)
[[MaxClientCircuitsPending]] **MaxClientCircuitsPending** __NUM__::
@@ -1112,8 +1101,9 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
Don't share circuits with streams targeting a different
destination address.
**KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
- If **IsolateSOCKSAuth** is enabled, keep alive circuits that have
- streams with SOCKS authentication set indefinitely.
+ If **IsolateSOCKSAuth** is enabled, keep alive circuits while they have
+ at least one stream with SOCKS authentication active. After such a circuit
+ is idle for more than MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds, it can be closed.
**SessionGroup=**__INT__;;
If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams
on this port to share circuits with streams from every other
@@ -1190,16 +1180,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for
conflicting flags.
-[[SocksListenAddress]] **SocksListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
- Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
- applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.
- 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
- to multiple addresses/ports. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can
- now use multiple SocksPort entries, and provide addresses for SocksPort
- entries, so SocksListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward
- compatibility, SocksListenAddress is only allowed when SocksPort is just
- a port number.)
-
[[SocksPolicy]] **SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
@@ -1267,16 +1247,16 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
[[NumEntryGuards]] **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
- as long-term entries for our circuits. If NUM is 0, we try to learn
- the number from the NumEntryGuards consensus parameter, and default
- to 3 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
+ as long-term entries for our circuits. If NUM is 0, we try to learn the
+ number from the guard-n-primary-guards-to-use consensus parameter, and
+ default to 1 if the consensus parameter isn't set. (Default: 0)
[[NumDirectoryGuards]] **NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__::
- If UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards is enabled, we try to make sure we
- have at least NUM routers to use as directory guards. If this option
- is set to 0, use the value from the NumDirectoryGuards consensus
- parameter, falling back to the value from NumEntryGuards if the
- consensus parameter is 0 or isn't set. (Default: 0)
+ If UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards is enabled, we try to make sure we have
+ at least NUM routers to use as directory guards. If this option is set to
+ 0, use the value from the guard-n-primary-dir-guards-to-use consensus
+ parameter, and default to 3 if the consensus parameter isn't set.
+ (Default: 0)
[[GuardLifetime]] **GuardLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before
@@ -1298,12 +1278,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
DNS requests. (Default: 0)
-[[WarnUnsafeSocks]] **WarnUnsafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
- When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a request is
- received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname. Allowing
- applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and
- can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1)
-
[[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __Address__/__bits__ +
[[VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6]] **VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__Address__]/__bits__::
@@ -1335,18 +1309,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit
relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0)
-[[FastFirstHopPK]] **FastFirstHopPK** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
- When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
- hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
- already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
- keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building a little
- slower. Setting this option to "auto" takes advice from the authorities
- in the latest consensus about whether to use this feature. +
- +
- Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's
- operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it
- doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: auto)
-
[[TransPort]] **TransPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to
0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port
@@ -1357,17 +1319,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
- default setting. You'll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for
- the network you'd like to proxy. (Default: 0)
-
-[[TransListenAddress]] **TransListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
- Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:
- 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an
- entire network. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can
- now use multiple TransPort entries, and provide addresses for TransPort
- entries, so TransListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward
- compatibility, TransListenAddress is only allowed when TransPort is just
- a port number.)
+ default setting. (Default: 0)
[[TransProxyType]] **TransProxyType** **default**|**TPROXY**|**ipfw**|**pf-divert**::
TransProxyType may only be enabled when there is transparent proxy listener
@@ -1375,9 +1327,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
+
Set this to "TPROXY" if you wish to be able to use the TPROXY Linux module
to transparently proxy connections that are configured using the TransPort
- option. This setting lets the listener on the TransPort accept connections
- for all addresses, even when the TransListenAddress is configured for an
- internal address. Detailed information on how to configure the TPROXY
+ option. Detailed information on how to configure the TPROXY
feature can be found in the Linux kernel source tree in the file
Documentation/networking/tproxy.txt. +
+
@@ -1405,13 +1355,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
+
This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)
-[[NATDListenAddress]] **NATDListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
- Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (DEPRECATED: As of
- 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple NATDPort entries, and provide
- addresses for NATDPort entries, so NATDListenAddress no longer has a
- purpose. For backward compatibility, NATDListenAddress is only allowed
- when NATDPort is just a port number.)
-
[[AutomapHostsOnResolve]] **AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
@@ -1432,13 +1375,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
addresses/ports. See SocksPort for an explanation of isolation
flags. (Default: 0)
-[[DNSListenAddress]] **DNSListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
- Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (DEPRECATED: As of
- 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple DNSPort entries, and provide
- addresses for DNSPort entries, so DNSListenAddress no longer has a
- purpose. For backward compatibility, DNSListenAddress is only allowed
- when DNSPort is just a port number.)
-
[[ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses]] **ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
@@ -1468,11 +1404,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None)
-[[AllowSingleHopCircuits]] **AllowSingleHopCircuits** **0**|**1**::
- When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays
- that have the **AllowSingleHopExits** option turned on to build
- one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)
-
[[OptimisticData]] **OptimisticData** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that supports
the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit node
@@ -1665,13 +1596,6 @@ is non-zero):
Tor client binds to. To bind to a different address, use the
*ListenAddress and OutboundBindAddress options.
-[[AllowSingleHopExits]] **AllowSingleHopExits** **0**|**1**::
- This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop
- proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is
- the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use
- servers that set this option, since most clients have
- ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
-
[[AssumeReachable]] **AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
@@ -1806,14 +1730,18 @@ is non-zero):
If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in
this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec)
-[[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
- Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or
- organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by
- their identity fingerprints. When two servers both declare
- that they are in the same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the
- same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its
- family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.) Do not list
- any bridge relay as it would compromise its concealment. +
+[[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...::
+ Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or
+ organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by
+ their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints.
+ This option can be repeated many times, for
+ convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily
+ lines are merged into one list.
+ When two relays both declare that they are in the
+ same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each
+ relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to
+ list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would
+ compromise its concealment. +
+
When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by
nickname: fingerprints are more reliable.
@@ -1855,15 +1783,6 @@ is non-zero):
For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
-[[ORListenAddress]] **ORListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
- Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
- servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
- specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified
- multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. +
- +
- This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with ORPort now
- that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
-
[[PortForwarding]] **PortForwarding** **0**|**1**::
Attempt to automatically forward the DirPort and ORPort on a NAT router
connecting this Tor server to the Internet. If set, Tor will try both
@@ -2015,12 +1934,6 @@ is non-zero):
[[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__::
A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
-[[TLSECGroup]] **TLSECGroup** **P224**|**P256**::
- What EC group should we try to use for incoming TLS connections?
- P224 is faster, but makes us stand out more. Has no effect if
- we're a client, or if our OpenSSL version lacks support for ECDHE.
- (Default: P256)
-
[[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
Relays only.
When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics about cell
@@ -2031,6 +1944,14 @@ is non-zero):
If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
extra-info document. (Default: 0)
+[[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
+ Relays only.
+ When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
+ sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
+ These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
+ information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
+ (Default: 1)
+
[[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
Relays and bridges only.
When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the
@@ -2139,15 +2060,6 @@ details.)
+
The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
-[[DirListenAddress]] **DirListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
- Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to
- this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
- This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
- addresses/ports. +
- +
- This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with DirPort now
- that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
-
[[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above,
@@ -2160,6 +2072,16 @@ details.)
because clients connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort
or BridgeRelay and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1)
+[[MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs]] **MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
+ When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate
+ consensus diffs for any consensus older than this amount of time.
+ If this option is set to zero, Tor will pick a reasonable default from
+ the current networkstatus document. You should not set this
+ option unless your cache is severely low on disk space or CPU.
+ If you need to set it, keeping it above 3 or 4 hours will help clients
+ much more than setting it to zero.
+ (Default: 0)
+
DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
----------------------------------
@@ -2775,7 +2697,8 @@ FILES
__DataDirectory__**/cached-status/**::
The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.
Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal
- identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. Mostly obsolete.
+ identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. Obsolete;
+ no longer in use.
__DataDirectory__**/cached-certs**::
This file holds downloaded directory key certificates that are used to
@@ -2791,6 +2714,13 @@ __DataDirectory__**/cached-descriptors** and **cached-descriptors.new**::
a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
+__DataDirectory__**/cached-extrainfo** and **cached-extrainfo.new**::
+ As "cached-descriptors", but holds optionally-downloaded "extra-info"
+ documents. Relays use these documents to send inessential information
+ about statistics, bandwidth history, and network health to the
+ authorities. They aren't fetched by default; see the DownloadExtraInfo
+ option for more info.
+
__DataDirectory__**/cached-microdescs** and **cached-microdescs.new**::
These files hold downloaded microdescriptors. Lines beginning with
@-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given
@@ -2805,18 +2735,27 @@ __DataDirectory__**/state**::
A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
the file. These include:
- The current entry guards and their status.
- - The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see
- below).
+ - The current bandwidth accounting values.
- When the file was last written
- What version of Tor generated the state file
- A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the server
descriptors.
+__DataDirectory__**/sr-state**::
+ Authority only. State file used to record information about the current
+ status of the shared-random-value voting state.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/diff-cache**::
+ Directory cache only. Holds older consensuses, and diffs from older
+ consensuses to the most recent consensus of each type, compressed
+ in various ways. Each file contains a set of key-value arguments
+ decribing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
+ main file contents.
+
__DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
- is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file as well. Only
- used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
+ is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file instead.
__DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**::
Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
@@ -2829,6 +2768,13 @@ __DataDirectory__**/lock**::
directory. If access to this file is locked, data directory is already
in use by Tor.
+__DataDirectory__**/key-pinning-journal**::
+ Used by authorities. A line-based file that records mappings between
+ RSA1024 identity keys and Ed25519 identity keys. Authorities enforce
+ these mappings, so that once a relay has picked an Ed25519 key, stealing
+ or factoring the RSA1024 key will no longer let an attacker impersonate
+ the relay.
+
__DataDirectory__**/keys/***::
Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
@@ -2879,13 +2825,17 @@ __DataDirectory__**/keys/ed25519_signing_cert**::
The certificate which authenticates "ed25519_signing_secret_key" as
having been signed by the Ed25519 master key.
-__DataDirectory__**/keys/secret_onion_key**::
+__DataDirectory__**/keys/secret_onion_key** and **secret_onion_key.old**::
A relay's RSA1024 short-term onion key. Used to decrypt old-style ("TAP")
- circuit extension requests.
+ circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
+ generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
+ made by clients that didn't have the new one.
-__DataDirectory__**/keys/secret_onion_key_ntor**::
+__DataDirectory__**/keys/secret_onion_key_ntor** and **secret_onion_key_ntor.old**::
A relay's Curve25519 short-term onion key. Used to handle modern ("ntor")
- circuit extension requests.
+ circuit extension requests. The ".old" file holds the previously
+ generated key, which the relay uses to handle any requests that were
+ made by clients that didn't have the new one.
__DataDirectory__**/fingerprint**::
Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
@@ -2940,11 +2890,20 @@ __DataDirectory__**/stats/conn-stats**::
Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate connection
history (number of active connections over time).
+__DataDirectory__**/stats/hidserv-stats**::
+ Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate counts
+ of what fraction of the traffic is hidden service rendezvous traffic, and
+ approximately how many hidden services the relay has seen.
+
__DataDirectory__**/networkstatus-bridges**::
Only used by authoritative bridge directories. Contains information
about bridges that have self-reported themselves to the bridge
authority.
+__DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
+ Authorities only. This file is used to configure which relays are
+ known to be valid, invalid, and so forth.
+
__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**::
The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
diff --git a/doc/torify.1.txt b/doc/torify.1.txt
index 8dca901317..7e49081cfc 100644
--- a/doc/torify.1.txt
+++ b/doc/torify.1.txt
@@ -17,25 +17,23 @@ SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTION
-----------
-**torify** is a simple wrapper that attempts to find the best underlying Tor
-wrapper available on a system. It calls torsocks with a tor specific
-configuration file. +
+**torify** is a simple wrapper that calls torsocks with a tor-specific
+configuration file.
-torsocks is an improved wrapper that explicitly rejects UDP, safely resolves DNS
-lookups and properly socksifies your TCP connections. +
-
-Please note that since both method use LD_PRELOAD, torify cannot be applied to
-suid binaries.
+It is provided for backward compatibility; instead you should use torsocks.
WARNING
-------
-When used with torsocks, torify should not leak DNS requests or UDP data. +
+When used with torsocks, torify should not leak DNS requests or UDP data.
+
+torify can leak ICMP data.
-Both will leak ICMP data.
+torify will not ensure that different requests are processed on
+different circuits.
SEE ALSO
--------
-**tor**(1), **tor-resolve**(1), **torsocks**(1)
+**tor**(1), **torsocks**(1)
AUTHORS
-------
diff --git a/doc/torrc_format.txt b/doc/torrc_format.txt
index 7a809901d9..b175b9fb15 100644
--- a/doc/torrc_format.txt
+++ b/doc/torrc_format.txt
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ and\
friends
# Backslashes in the middle of a line are included as-is. The key of
-# this one is "Too" and the value is "Many\\Backsl\ashes here" (with
+# this one is "Too" and the value is "Many\\Backsl\ashes \here" (with
# backslashes in that last string as-is)
Too \
Many\\\
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ here
# And here's the really yucky part. If a comment appears in a multi-line
# entry, the entry is still able to continue on the next line, as in the
# following, where the key is "This" and the value is
-# "entry and some are silly"
+# "entry and some are silly"
This entry \
# has comments \
and some \