diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-spec.txt | 17 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-spec.txt b/doc/tor-spec.txt index 2a1ec39993..1179f131f6 100644 --- a/doc/tor-spec.txt +++ b/doc/tor-spec.txt @@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ when do we rotate which keys (tls, link, etc)? additional fields to existing structures; implementations are constrained to ignore fields they do not expect. - Parties negotiate OR connection versions as described below in section - + Parties negotiate OR connection versions as described below in sections + 4.1 and 4.2. 2. Connections @@ -305,13 +305,22 @@ when do we rotate which keys (tls, link, etc)? 0 when the other side is recognized as a router running version 0.1.2.??-alpha or earlier. - If a server finds that it wants to send a cell (for example because a + [If a server finds that it wants to send a cell (for example because a circuit wants to extend to that client, and the TLS connection is already established) yet no cell has arrived yet, we can't distinguish between a version 0 client and a slow network. We can't assume that the other side approves of version 0, so we can't just start using version 0. Perhaps the right answer is to then launch a - new TLS connection because you don't have a usable one after all? + new TLS connection because you don't have a usable one after all? -RD] + + [That would seem to be thrashy. Let's see if we can do better. Remember, + normal v0 clients always send something after connecting, so if we have + had a connection for a while and gotten nothing over it, we could get away + with assuming it's bad. Alternatively, we could identify V0 clients by + the OU=Tor field in the certificates: we don't check for it, and we never + documented it. We might break other people's clients by sending them + hello cells, but only if those clients are nonconformant. Am I right? + In any case, this seems way more reliable. -NM] 5. Circuit management |