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diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/170-user-path-config.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/170-user-path-config.txt deleted file mode 100644 index fa74c76f73..0000000000 --- a/doc/spec/proposals/170-user-path-config.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,95 +0,0 @@ -Title: Configuration options regarding circuit building -Filename: 170-user-path-config.txt -Author: Sebastian Hahn -Created: 01-March-2010 -Status: Draft - -Overview: - - This document outlines how Tor handles the user configuration - options to influence the circuit building process. - -Motivation: - - Tor's treatment of the configuration *Nodes options was surprising - to many users, and quite a few conspiracy theories have crept up. We - should update our specification and code to better describe and - communicate what is going during circuit building, and how we're - honoring configuration. So far, we've been tracking a bugreport - about this behaviour ( - https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&id=1090 ) - and Nick replied in a thread on or-talk ( - http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Feb-2010/msg00117.html ). - - This proposal tries to document our intention for those configuration - options. - -Design: - - Five configuration options are available to users to influence Tor's - circuit building. EntryNodes and ExitNodes define a list of nodes - that are for the Entry/Exit position in all circuits. ExcludeNodes - is a list of nodes that are used for no circuit, and - ExcludeExitNodes is a list of nodes that aren't used as the last - hop. StrictNodes defines Tor's behaviour in case of a conflict, for - example when a node that is excluded is the only available - introduction point. Setting StrictNodes to 1 breaks Tor's - functionality in that case, and it will refuse to build such a - circuit. - - Neither Nick's email nor bug 1090 have clear suggestions how we - should behave in each case, so I tried to come up with something - that made sense to me. - -Security implications: - - Deviating from normal circuit building can break one's anonymity, so - the documentation of the above option should contain a warning to - make users aware of the pitfalls. - -Specification: - - It is proposed that the "User configuration" part of path-spec - (section 2.2.2) be replaced with this: - - Users can alter the default behavior for path selection with - configuration options. In case of conflicts (excluding and requiring - the same node) the "StrictNodes" option is used to determine - behaviour. If a nodes is both excluded and required via a - configuration option, the exclusion takes preference. - - - If "ExitNodes" is provided, then every request requires an exit - node on the ExitNodes list. If a request is supported by no nodes - on that list, and "StrictNodes" is false, then Tor treats that - request as if ExitNodes were not provided. - - - "EntryNodes" behaves analogously. - - - If "ExcludeNodes" is provided, then no circuit uses any of the - nodes listed. If a circuit requires an excluded node to be used, - and "StrictNodes" is false, then Tor uses the node in that - position while not using any other of the excluded nodes. - - - If "ExcludeExitNodes" is provided, then Tor will not use the nodes - listed for the exit position in a circuit. If a circuit requires - an excluded node to be used in the exit position and "StrictNodes" - is false, then Tor builds that circuit as if ExcludeExitNodes were - not provided. - - - If a user tries to connect to or resolve a hostname of the form - <target>.<servername>.exit and the "AllowDotExit" configuration - option is set to 1, the request is rewritten to a request for - <target>, and the request is only supported by the exit whose - nickname or fingerprint is <servername>. If "AllowDotExit" is set - to 0 (default), any request for <anything>.exit is denied. - - - When any of the *Nodes settings are changed, all circuits are - expired immediately, to prevent a situation where a previously - built circuit is used even though some of its nodes are now - excluded. - - -Compatibility: - - The old Strict*Nodes options are deprecated, and the StrictNodes - option is new. Tor users may need to update their configuration file. |