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Diffstat (limited to 'doc/design-paper')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/design-paper/challenges.tex | 25 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex index 897e5cf090..621e1e3f44 100644 --- a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex +++ b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex @@ -423,8 +423,7 @@ financial health as well as network security. % this para should probably move to the scalability / directory system. -RD % Nope. Cut for space, except for small comment added above -PFS -\section{Crossroads: Policy issues} -\label{sec:crossroads-policy} +\section{Policy issues} Many of the issues the Tor project needs to address extend beyond system design and technology development. In particular, the @@ -802,8 +801,7 @@ time. %[XXX Mention correct DNS-RBL implementation. -NM] -\section{Crossroads: Design choices} -\label{sec:crossroads-design} +\section{Design choices} In addition to social issues, Tor also faces some design challenges that must be addressed as the network develops. @@ -969,15 +967,15 @@ reveal the path taken by large traffic flows under low-usage circumstances. \label{subsec:helper-nodes} It has been thought for some time that the best anonymity protection -comes from running your own node~\cite{or-pet00,tor-design}. -(In fact, in Onion Routing's first design, this was the only option -possible~\cite{or-ih96}.) While the first implementation +comes from running your own node~\cite{tor-design,or-pet00}. +(In fact, this was the only option in the earliest Onion Routing +design~\cite{or-ih96}.) While the first implementation had a fixed path length of five nodes, first generation -Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen +Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen to simultaneously maximize efficiency and unpredictability in routes. If one followed Tor's three node default path length, an enclave-to-enclave communication (in which the entry and -exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves) +exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves) would be completely compromised by the middle node. Thus for enclave-to-enclave communication, four is the fewest number of nodes that preserves the $\frac{c^2}{n^2}$ degree of protection @@ -1188,8 +1186,7 @@ trust decisions than the Tor developers. %RIAA; less so if threat is to application data or individuals or... \section{Scaling} -%\label{sec:crossroads-scaling} -%P2P + anonymity issues: +\label{sec:scaling} Tor is running today with hundreds of nodes and tens of thousands of users, but it will certainly not scale to millions. @@ -1486,16 +1483,16 @@ this stage if the developers stopped actively working on it. We may get an unexpected boon from the fact that we're a general-purpose overlay network: as Tor grows more popular, other groups who need an overlay network on the Internet are starting to adapt Tor to their needs. - +% Second, Tor is only one of many components that preserve privacy online. To keep identifying information out of application traffic, we must build more and better protocol-aware proxies that are usable by ordinary people. - +% Third, we need to gain a reputation for social good, and learn how to coexist with the variety of Internet services and their established authentication mechanisms. We can't just keep escalating the blacklist standoff forever. - +% Fourth, as described in Section~\ref{sec:scaling}, the current Tor architecture does not scale even to handle current user demand. We must find designs and incentives to let clients relay traffic too, without |