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diff --git a/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html b/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html deleted file mode 100644 index 5fac644e62..0000000000 --- a/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2488 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" - "DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> -<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> -<head> -<meta name="GENERATOR" content="TtH 3.59" /> - <style type="text/css"> div.p { margin-top: 7pt;}</style> - <style type="text/css"><!-- - td div.comp { margin-top: -0.6ex; margin-bottom: -1ex;} - td div.comb { margin-top: -0.6ex; margin-bottom: -.6ex;} - td div.hrcomp { line-height: 0.9; margin-top: -0.8ex; margin-bottom: -1ex;} - td div.norm {line-height:normal;} - span.roman {font-family: serif; font-style: normal; font-weight: normal;} - span.overacc2 {position: relative; left: .8em; top: -1.2ex;} - span.overacc1 {position: relative; left: .6em; top: -1.2ex;} --></style> - - -<title> Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router </title> -</head> -<body> - -<h1 align="center">Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router </h1> -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<h3 align="center"> -Roger Dingledine, The Free Haven Project, <tt>arma@freehaven.net</tt><br> -Nick Mathewson, The Free Haven Project, <tt>nickm@freehaven.net</tt><br> -Paul Syverson, Naval Research Lab, <tt>syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil</tt> </h3> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<h2> Abstract</h2> -We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication -service. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations -in the original design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion -control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, -and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous -points. Tor works on the real-world -Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires -little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a -reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. -We briefly describe our experiences with an international network of -more than 30 nodes. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc1"> -<a name="sec:intro"> -1</a> Overview</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Onion Routing is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize -TCP-based applications like web browsing, secure shell, -and instant messaging. Clients choose a path through the network and -build a <em>circuit</em>, in which each node (or "onion router" or "OR") -in the path knows its predecessor and successor, but no other nodes in -the circuit. Traffic flows down the circuit in fixed-size -<em>cells</em>, which are unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node -(like the layers of an onion) and relayed downstream. The -Onion Routing project published several design and analysis -papers [<a href="#or-ih96" name="CITEor-ih96">27</a>,<a href="#or-jsac98" name="CITEor-jsac98">41</a>,<a href="#or-discex00" name="CITEor-discex00">48</a>,<a href="#or-pet00" name="CITEor-pet00">49</a>]. While a wide area Onion -Routing network was deployed briefly, the only long-running -public implementation was a fragile -proof-of-concept that ran on a single machine. Even this simple deployment -processed connections from over sixty thousand distinct IP addresses from -all over the world at a rate of about fifty thousand per day. -But many critical design and deployment issues were never -resolved, and the design has not been updated in years. Here -we describe Tor, a protocol for asynchronous, loosely federated onion -routers that provides the following improvements over the old Onion -Routing design: - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Perfect forward secrecy:</b> In the original Onion Routing design, -a single hostile node could record traffic and -later compromise successive nodes in the circuit and force them -to decrypt it. Rather than using a single multiply encrypted data -structure (an <em>onion</em>) to lay each circuit, -Tor now uses an incremental or <em>telescoping</em> path-building design, -where the initiator negotiates session keys with each successive hop in -the circuit. Once these keys are deleted, subsequently compromised nodes -cannot decrypt old traffic. As a side benefit, onion replay detection -is no longer necessary, and the process of building circuits is more -reliable, since the initiator knows when a hop fails and can then try -extending to a new node. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Separation of "protocol cleaning" from anonymity:</b> -Onion Routing originally required a separate "application -proxy" for each supported application protocol — most of which were -never written, so many applications were never supported. Tor uses the -standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS [<a href="#socks4" name="CITEsocks4">32</a>] proxy interface, allowing -us to support most TCP-based programs without modification. Tor now -relies on the filtering features of privacy-enhancing -application-level proxies such as Privoxy [<a href="#privoxy" name="CITEprivoxy">39</a>], without trying -to duplicate those features itself. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping (yet):</b> Onion -Routing originally called for batching and reordering cells as they arrived, -assumed padding between ORs, and in -later designs added padding between onion proxies (users) and -ORs [<a href="#or-ih96" name="CITEor-ih96">27</a>,<a href="#or-jsac98" name="CITEor-jsac98">41</a>]. Tradeoffs between padding protection -and cost were discussed, and <em>traffic shaping</em> algorithms were -theorized [<a href="#or-pet00" name="CITEor-pet00">49</a>] to provide good security without expensive -padding, but no concrete padding scheme was suggested. -Recent research [<a href="#econymics" name="CITEeconymics">1</a>] -and deployment experience [<a href="#freedom21-security" name="CITEfreedom21-security">4</a>] suggest that this -level of resource use is not practical or economical; and even full -link padding is still vulnerable [<a href="#defensive-dropping" name="CITEdefensive-dropping">33</a>]. Thus, -until we have a proven and convenient design for traffic shaping or -low-latency mixing that improves anonymity against a realistic -adversary, we leave these strategies out. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Many TCP streams can share one circuit:</b> Onion Routing originally -built a separate circuit for each -application-level request, but this required -multiple public key operations for every request, and also presented -a threat to anonymity from building so many circuits; see -Section <a href="#sec:maintaining-anonymity">9</a>. Tor multiplexes multiple TCP -streams along each circuit to improve efficiency and anonymity. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Leaky-pipe circuit topology:</b> Through in-band signaling -within the circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway -down the circuit. This novel approach -allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle — possibly -frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end -of the circuit. (It also allows for long-range padding if -future research shows this to be worthwhile.) - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Congestion control:</b> Earlier anonymity designs do not -address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches to -load balancing and flow control in overlay networks involve inter-node -control communication and global views of traffic. Tor's decentralized -congestion control uses end-to-end acks to maintain anonymity -while allowing nodes at the edges of the network to detect congestion -or flooding and send less data until the congestion subsides. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Directory servers:</b> The earlier Onion Routing design -planned to flood state information through the network — an approach -that can be unreliable and complex. Tor takes a simplified view toward distributing this -information. Certain more trusted nodes act as <em>directory -servers</em>: they provide signed directories describing known -routers and their current state. Users periodically download them -via HTTP. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Variable exit policies:</b> Tor provides a consistent mechanism -for each node to advertise a policy describing the hosts -and ports to which it will connect. These exit policies are critical -in a volunteer-based distributed infrastructure, because each operator -is comfortable with allowing different types of traffic to exit -from his node. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>End-to-end integrity checking:</b> The original Onion Routing -design did no integrity checking on data. Any node on the -circuit could change the contents of data cells as they passed by — for -example, to alter a connection request so it would connect -to a different webserver, or to `tag' encrypted traffic and look for -corresponding corrupted traffic at the network edges [<a href="#minion-design" name="CITEminion-design">15</a>]. -Tor hampers these attacks by verifying data integrity before it leaves -the network. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Rendezvous points and hidden services:</b> -Tor provides an integrated mechanism for responder anonymity via -location-protected servers. Previous Onion Routing designs included -long-lived "reply onions" that could be used to build circuits -to a hidden server, but these reply onions did not provide forward -security, and became useless if any node in the path went down -or rotated its keys. In Tor, clients negotiate <i>rendezvous points</i> -to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Unlike Freedom [<a href="#freedom2-arch" name="CITEfreedom2-arch">8</a>], Tor does not require OS kernel -patches or network stack support. This prevents us from anonymizing -non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our portability and -deployability. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -We have implemented all of the above features, including rendezvous -points. Our source code is -available under a free license, and Tor -is not covered by the patent that affected distribution and use of -earlier versions of Onion Routing. -We have deployed a wide-area alpha network -to test the design, to get more experience with usability -and users, and to provide a research platform for experimentation. -As of this writing, the network stands at 32 nodes spread over two continents. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -We review previous work in Section <a href="#sec:related-work">2</a>, describe -our goals and assumptions in Section <a href="#sec:assumptions">3</a>, -and then address the above list of improvements in -Sections <a href="#sec:design">4</a>, <a href="#sec:rendezvous">5</a>, and <a href="#sec:other-design">6</a>. -We summarize -in Section <a href="#sec:attacks">7</a> how our design stands up to -known attacks, and talk about our early deployment experiences in -Section <a href="#sec:in-the-wild">8</a>. We conclude with a list of open problems in -Section <a href="#sec:maintaining-anonymity">9</a> and future work for the Onion -Routing project in Section <a href="#sec:conclusion">10</a>. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc2"> -<a name="sec:related-work"> -2</a> Related work</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's <b>Mix-Net</b> -design [<a href="#chaum-mix" name="CITEchaum-mix">10</a>]. Chaum -proposed hiding the correspondence between sender and recipient by -wrapping messages in layers of public-key cryptography, and relaying them -through a path composed of "mixes." Each mix in turn -decrypts, delays, and re-orders messages before relaying them -onward. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Subsequent relay-based anonymity designs have diverged in two -main directions. Systems like <b>Babel</b> [<a href="#babel" name="CITEbabel">28</a>], -<b>Mixmaster</b> [<a href="#mixmaster-spec" name="CITEmixmaster-spec">36</a>], -and <b>Mixminion</b> [<a href="#minion-design" name="CITEminion-design">15</a>] have tried -to maximize anonymity at the cost of introducing comparatively large and -variable latencies. Because of this decision, these <em>high-latency</em> -networks resist strong global adversaries, -but introduce too much lag for interactive tasks like web browsing, -Internet chat, or SSH connections. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Tor belongs to the second category: <em>low-latency</em> designs that -try to anonymize interactive network traffic. These systems handle -a variety of bidirectional protocols. They also provide more convenient -mail delivery than the high-latency anonymous email -networks, because the remote mail server provides explicit and timely -delivery confirmation. But because these designs typically -involve many packets that must be delivered quickly, it is -difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the -communication from correlating the timing and volume -of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it [<a href="#SS03" name="CITESS03">45</a>]. -These -protocols are similarly vulnerable to an active adversary who introduces -timing patterns into traffic entering the network and looks -for correlated patterns among exiting traffic. -Although some work has been done to frustrate these attacks, most designs -protect primarily against traffic analysis rather than traffic -confirmation (see Section <a href="#subsec:threat-model">3.1</a>). - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -The simplest low-latency designs are single-hop proxies such as the -<b>Anonymizer</b> [<a href="#anonymizer" name="CITEanonymizer">3</a>]: a single trusted server strips the -data's origin before relaying it. These designs are easy to -analyze, but users must trust the anonymizing proxy. -Concentrating the traffic to this single point increases the anonymity set -(the people a given user is hiding among), but it is vulnerable if the -adversary can observe all traffic entering and leaving the proxy. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -More complex are distributed-trust, circuit-based anonymizing systems. -In these designs, a user establishes one or more medium-term bidirectional -end-to-end circuits, and tunnels data in fixed-size cells. -Establishing circuits is computationally expensive and typically -requires public-key -cryptography, whereas relaying cells is comparatively inexpensive and -typically requires only symmetric encryption. -Because a circuit crosses several servers, and each server only knows -the adjacent servers in the circuit, no single server can link a -user to her communication partners. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -The <b>Java Anon Proxy</b> (also known as JAP or Web MIXes) uses fixed shared -routes known as <em>cascades</em>. As with a single-hop proxy, this -approach aggregates users into larger anonymity sets, but again an -attacker only needs to observe both ends of the cascade to bridge all -the system's traffic. The Java Anon Proxy's design -calls for padding between end users and the head of the -cascade [<a href="#web-mix" name="CITEweb-mix">7</a>]. However, it is not demonstrated whether the current -implementation's padding policy improves anonymity. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>PipeNet</b> [<a href="#back01" name="CITEback01">5</a>,<a href="#pipenet" name="CITEpipenet">12</a>], another low-latency design proposed -around the same time as Onion Routing, gave -stronger anonymity but allowed a single user to shut -down the network by not sending. Systems like <b>ISDN -mixes</b> [<a href="#isdn-mixes" name="CITEisdn-mixes">38</a>] were designed for other environments with -different assumptions. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -In P2P designs like <b>Tarzan</b> [<a href="#tarzan:ccs02" name="CITEtarzan:ccs02">24</a>] and -<b>MorphMix</b> [<a href="#morphmix:fc04" name="CITEmorphmix:fc04">43</a>], all participants both generate -traffic and relay traffic for others. These systems aim to conceal -whether a given peer originated a request -or just relayed it from another peer. While Tarzan and MorphMix use -layered encryption as above, <b>Crowds</b> [<a href="#crowds-tissec" name="CITEcrowds-tissec">42</a>] simply assumes -an adversary who cannot observe the initiator: it uses no public-key -encryption, so any node on a circuit can read users' traffic. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Hordes</b> [<a href="#hordes-jcs" name="CITEhordes-jcs">34</a>] is based on Crowds but also uses multicast -responses to hide the initiator. <b>Herbivore</b> [<a href="#herbivore" name="CITEherbivore">25</a>] and -<b>P</b><sup><b>5</b></sup> [<a href="#p5" name="CITEp5">46</a>] go even further, requiring broadcast. -These systems are designed primarily for communication among peers, -although Herbivore users can make external connections by -requesting a peer to serve as a proxy. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Systems like <b>Freedom</b> and the original Onion Routing build circuits -all at once, using a layered "onion" of public-key encrypted messages, -each layer of which provides session keys and the address of the -next server in the circuit. Tor as described herein, Tarzan, MorphMix, -<b>Cebolla</b> [<a href="#cebolla" name="CITEcebolla">9</a>], and Rennhard's <b>Anonymity Network</b> [<a href="#anonnet" name="CITEanonnet">44</a>] -build circuits -in stages, extending them one hop at a time. -Section <a href="#subsubsec:constructing-a-circuit">4.2</a> describes how this -approach enables perfect forward secrecy. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Circuit-based designs must choose which protocol layer -to anonymize. They may intercept IP packets directly, and -relay them whole (stripping the source address) along the -circuit [<a href="#freedom2-arch" name="CITEfreedom2-arch">8</a>,<a href="#tarzan:ccs02" name="CITEtarzan:ccs02">24</a>]. Like -Tor, they may accept TCP streams and relay the data in those streams, -ignoring the breakdown of that data into TCP -segments [<a href="#morphmix:fc04" name="CITEmorphmix:fc04">43</a>,<a href="#anonnet" name="CITEanonnet">44</a>]. Finally, like Crowds, they may accept -application-level protocols such as HTTP and relay the application -requests themselves. -Making this protocol-layer decision requires a compromise between flexibility -and anonymity. For example, a system that understands HTTP -can strip -identifying information from requests, can take advantage of caching -to limit the number of requests that leave the network, and can batch -or encode requests to minimize the number of connections. -On the other hand, an IP-level anonymizer can handle nearly any protocol, -even ones unforeseen by its designers (though these systems require -kernel-level modifications to some operating systems, and so are more -complex and less portable). TCP-level anonymity networks like Tor present -a middle approach: they are application neutral (so long as the -application supports, or can be tunneled across, TCP), but by treating -application connections as data streams rather than raw TCP packets, -they avoid the inefficiencies of tunneling TCP over -TCP. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Distributed-trust anonymizing systems need to prevent attackers from -adding too many servers and thus compromising user paths. -Tor relies on a small set of well-known directory servers, run by -independent parties, to decide which nodes can -join. Tarzan and MorphMix allow unknown users to run servers, and use -a limited resource (like IP addresses) to prevent an attacker from -controlling too much of the network. Crowds suggests requiring -written, notarized requests from potential crowd members. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Anonymous communication is essential for censorship-resistant -systems like Eternity [<a href="#eternity" name="CITEeternity">2</a>], Free Haven [<a href="#freehaven-berk" name="CITEfreehaven-berk">19</a>], -Publius [<a href="#publius" name="CITEpublius">53</a>], and Tangler [<a href="#tangler" name="CITEtangler">52</a>]. Tor's rendezvous -points enable connections between mutually anonymous entities; they -are a building block for location-hidden servers, which are needed by -Eternity and Free Haven. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc3"> -<a name="sec:assumptions"> -3</a> Design goals and assumptions</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<font size="+1"><b>Goals</b></font><br /> -Like other low-latency anonymity designs, Tor seeks to frustrate -attackers from linking communication partners, or from linking -multiple communications to or from a single user. Within this -main goal, however, several considerations have directed -Tor's evolution. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Deployability:</b> The design must be deployed and used in the -real world. Thus it -must not be expensive to run (for example, by requiring more bandwidth -than volunteers are willing to provide); must not place a heavy -liability burden on operators (for example, by allowing attackers to -implicate onion routers in illegal activities); and must not be -difficult or expensive to implement (for example, by requiring kernel -patches, or separate proxies for every protocol). We also cannot -require non-anonymous parties (such as websites) -to run our software. (Our rendezvous point design does not meet -this goal for non-anonymous users talking to hidden servers, -however; see Section <a href="#sec:rendezvous">5</a>.) - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Usability:</b> A hard-to-use system has fewer users — and because -anonymity systems hide users among users, a system with fewer users -provides less anonymity. Usability is thus not only a convenience: -it is a security requirement [<a href="#econymics" name="CITEeconymics">1</a>,<a href="#back01" name="CITEback01">5</a>]. Tor should -therefore not -require modifying familiar applications; should not introduce prohibitive -delays; -and should require as few configuration decisions -as possible. Finally, Tor should be easily implementable on all common -platforms; we cannot require users to change their operating system -to be anonymous. (Tor currently runs on Win32, Linux, -Solaris, BSD-style Unix, MacOS X, and probably others.) - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Flexibility:</b> The protocol must be flexible and well-specified, -so Tor can serve as a test-bed for future research. -Many of the open problems in low-latency anonymity -networks, such as generating dummy traffic or preventing Sybil -attacks [<a href="#sybil" name="CITEsybil">22</a>], may be solvable independently from the issues -solved by -Tor. Hopefully future systems will not need to reinvent Tor's design. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Simple design:</b> The protocol's design and security -parameters must be well-understood. Additional features impose implementation -and complexity costs; adding unproven techniques to the design threatens -deployability, readability, and ease of security analysis. Tor aims to -deploy a simple and stable system that integrates the best accepted -approaches to protecting anonymity.<br /> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<font size="+1"><b>Non-goals</b></font><a name="subsec:non-goals"> -</a><br /> -In favoring simple, deployable designs, we have explicitly deferred -several possible goals, either because they are solved elsewhere, or because -they are not yet solved. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Not peer-to-peer:</b> Tarzan and MorphMix aim to scale to completely -decentralized peer-to-peer environments with thousands of short-lived -servers, many of which may be controlled by an adversary. This approach -is appealing, but still has many open -problems [<a href="#tarzan:ccs02" name="CITEtarzan:ccs02">24</a>,<a href="#morphmix:fc04" name="CITEmorphmix:fc04">43</a>]. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Not secure against end-to-end attacks:</b> Tor does not claim -to completely solve end-to-end timing or intersection -attacks. Some approaches, such as having users run their own onion routers, -may help; -see Section <a href="#sec:maintaining-anonymity">9</a> for more discussion. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>No protocol normalization:</b> Tor does not provide <em>protocol -normalization</em> like Privoxy or the Anonymizer. If senders want anonymity from -responders while using complex and variable -protocols like HTTP, Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such -as Privoxy to hide differences between clients, and expunge protocol -features that leak identity. -Note that by this separation Tor can also provide services that -are anonymous to the network yet authenticated to the responder, like -SSH. Similarly, Tor does not integrate -tunneling for non-stream-based protocols like UDP; this must be -provided by an external service if appropriate. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Not steganographic:</b> Tor does not try to conceal who is connected -to the network. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc3.1"> -<a name="subsec:threat-model"> -3.1</a> Threat Model</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when -analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical -low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong -adversary. Instead, we assume an adversary who can observe some fraction -of network traffic; who can generate, modify, delete, or delay -traffic; who can operate onion routers of his own; and who can -compromise some fraction of the onion routers. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -In low-latency anonymity systems that use layered encryption, the -adversary's typical goal is to observe both the initiator and the -responder. By observing both ends, passive attackers can confirm a -suspicion that Alice is -talking to Bob if the timing and volume patterns of the traffic on the -connection are distinct enough; active attackers can induce timing -signatures on the traffic to force distinct patterns. Rather -than focusing on these <em>traffic confirmation</em> attacks, -we aim to prevent <em>traffic -analysis</em> attacks, where the adversary uses traffic patterns to learn -which points in the network he should attack. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Our adversary might try to link an initiator Alice with her -communication partners, or try to build a profile of Alice's -behavior. He might mount passive attacks by observing the network edges -and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network — by -relationships in packet timing, volume, or externally visible -user-selected -options. The adversary can also mount active attacks by compromising -routers or keys; by replaying traffic; by selectively denying service -to trustworthy routers to move users to -compromised routers, or denying service to users to see if traffic -elsewhere in the -network stops; or by introducing patterns into traffic that can later be -detected. The adversary might subvert the directory servers to give users -differing views of network state. Additionally, he can try to decrease -the network's reliability by attacking nodes or by performing antisocial -activities from reliable nodes and trying to get them taken down — making -the network unreliable flushes users to other less anonymous -systems, where they may be easier to attack. We summarize -in Section <a href="#sec:attacks">7</a> how well the Tor design defends against -each of these attacks. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc4"> -<a name="sec:design"> -4</a> The Tor Design</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -The Tor network is an overlay network; each onion router (OR) -runs as a normal -user-level process without any special privileges. -Each onion router maintains a TLS [<a href="#TLS" name="CITETLS">17</a>] -connection to every other onion router. -Each user -runs local software called an onion proxy (OP) to fetch directories, -establish circuits across the network, -and handle connections from user applications. These onion proxies accept -TCP streams and multiplex them across the circuits. The onion -router on the other side -of the circuit connects to the requested destinations -and relays data. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Each onion router maintains a long-term identity key and a short-term -onion key. The identity -key is used to sign TLS certificates, to sign the OR's <em>router -descriptor</em> (a summary of its keys, address, bandwidth, exit policy, -and so on), and (by directory servers) to sign directories. The onion key is used to decrypt requests -from users to set up a circuit and negotiate ephemeral keys. -The TLS protocol also establishes a short-term link key when communicating -between ORs. Short-term keys are rotated periodically and -independently, to limit the impact of key compromise. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Section <a href="#subsec:cells">4.1</a> presents the fixed-size -<em>cells</em> that are the unit of communication in Tor. We describe -in Section <a href="#subsec:circuits">4.2</a> how circuits are -built, extended, truncated, and destroyed. Section <a href="#subsec:tcp">4.3</a> -describes how TCP streams are routed through the network. We address -integrity checking in Section <a href="#subsec:integrity-checking">4.4</a>, -and resource limiting in Section <a href="#subsec:rate-limit">4.5</a>. -Finally, -Section <a href="#subsec:congestion">4.6</a> talks about congestion control and -fairness issues. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc4.1"> -<a name="subsec:cells"> -4.1</a> Cells</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Onion routers communicate with one another, and with users' OPs, via -TLS connections with ephemeral keys. Using TLS conceals the data on -the connection with perfect forward secrecy, and prevents an attacker -from modifying data on the wire or impersonating an OR. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Traffic passes along these connections in fixed-size cells. Each cell -is 512 bytes, and consists of a header and a payload. The header includes a circuit -identifier (circID) that specifies which circuit the cell refers to -(many circuits can be multiplexed over the single TLS connection), and -a command to describe what to do with the cell's payload. (Circuit -identifiers are connection-specific: each circuit has a different -circID on each OP/OR or OR/OR connection it traverses.) -Based on their command, cells are either <em>control</em> cells, which are -always interpreted by the node that receives them, or <em>relay</em> cells, -which carry end-to-end stream data. The control cell commands are: -<em>padding</em> (currently used for keepalive, but also usable for link -padding); <em>create</em> or <em>created</em> (used to set up a new circuit); -and <em>destroy</em> (to tear down a circuit). - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Relay cells have an additional header (the relay header) at the front -of the payload, containing a streamID (stream identifier: many streams can -be multiplexed over a circuit); an end-to-end checksum for integrity -checking; the length of the relay payload; and a relay command. -The entire contents of the relay header and the relay cell payload -are encrypted or decrypted together as the relay cell moves along the -circuit, using the 128-bit AES cipher in counter mode to generate a -cipher stream. The relay commands are: <em>relay -data</em> (for data flowing down the stream), <em>relay begin</em> (to open a -stream), <em>relay end</em> (to close a stream cleanly), <em>relay -teardown</em> (to close a broken stream), <em>relay connected</em> -(to notify the OP that a relay begin has succeeded), <em>relay -extend</em> and <em>relay extended</em> (to extend the circuit by a hop, -and to acknowledge), <em>relay truncate</em> and <em>relay truncated</em> -(to tear down only part of the circuit, and to acknowledge), <em>relay -sendme</em> (used for congestion control), and <em>relay drop</em> (used to -implement long-range dummies). -We give a visual overview of cell structure plus the details of relay -cell structure, and then describe each of these cell types and commands -in more detail below. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="tth_fIg1"> -</a> <center><img src="cell-struct.png" alt="cell-struct.png" /> -</center> -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc4.2"> -<a name="subsec:circuits"> -4.2</a> Circuits and streams</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Onion Routing originally built one circuit for each -TCP stream. Because building a circuit can take several tenths of a -second (due to public-key cryptography and network latency), -this design imposed high costs on applications like web browsing that -open many TCP streams. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -In Tor, each circuit can be shared by many TCP streams. To avoid -delays, users construct circuits preemptively. To limit linkability -among their streams, users' OPs build a new circuit -periodically if the previous ones have been used, -and expire old used circuits that no longer have any open streams. -OPs consider rotating to a new circuit once a minute: thus -even heavy users spend negligible time -building circuits, but a limited number of requests can be linked -to each other through a given exit node. Also, because circuits are built -in the background, OPs can recover from failed circuit creation -without harming user experience.<br /> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="tth_fIg1"> -</a> <center><img src="interaction.png" alt="interaction.png" /> - -<center>Figure 1: Alice builds a two-hop circuit and begins fetching a web page.</center> -<a name="fig:interaction"> -</a> -</center> -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="subsubsec:constructing-a-circuit"></a> -<font size="+1"><b>Constructing a circuit</b></font> -<br /> -A user's OP constructs circuits incrementally, negotiating a -symmetric key with each OR on the circuit, one hop at a time. To begin -creating a new circuit, the OP (call her Alice) sends a -<em>create</em> cell to the first node in her chosen path (call him Bob). -(She chooses a new -circID C<sub>AB</sub> not currently used on the connection from her to Bob.) -The <em>create</em> cell's -payload contains the first half of the Diffie-Hellman handshake -(g<sup>x</sup>), encrypted to the onion key of Bob. Bob -responds with a <em>created</em> cell containing g<sup>y</sup> -along with a hash of the negotiated key K=g<sup>xy</sup>. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Once the circuit has been established, Alice and Bob can send one -another relay cells encrypted with the negotiated -key.<a href="#tthFtNtAAB" name="tthFrefAAB"><sup>1</sup></a> More detail is given in -the next section. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To extend the circuit further, Alice sends a <em>relay extend</em> cell -to Bob, specifying the address of the next OR (call her Carol), and -an encrypted g<sup>x<sub>2</sub></sup> for her. Bob copies the half-handshake into a -<em>create</em> cell, and passes it to Carol to extend the circuit. -(Bob chooses a new circID C<sub>BC</sub> not currently used on the connection -between him and Carol. Alice never needs to know this circID; only Bob -associates C<sub>AB</sub> on his connection with Alice to C<sub>BC</sub> on -his connection with Carol.) -When Carol responds with a <em>created</em> cell, Bob wraps the payload -into a <em>relay extended</em> cell and passes it back to Alice. Now -the circuit is extended to Carol, and Alice and Carol share a common key -K<sub>2</sub> = g<sup>x<sub>2</sub> y<sub>2</sub></sup>. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To extend the circuit to a third node or beyond, Alice -proceeds as above, always telling the last node in the circuit to -extend one hop further. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -This circuit-level handshake protocol achieves unilateral entity -authentication (Alice knows she's handshaking with the OR, but -the OR doesn't care who is opening the circuit — Alice uses no public key -and remains anonymous) and unilateral key authentication -(Alice and the OR agree on a key, and Alice knows only the OR learns -it). It also achieves forward -secrecy and key freshness. More formally, the protocol is as follows -(where E<sub>PK<sub>Bob</sub></sub>(·) is encryption with Bob's public key, -H is a secure hash function, and <font face="symbol">|</font -> is concatenation): - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="tth_tAb1"> -</a> -<table> -<tr><td align="right">Alice </td><td align="center">-> </td><td align="center">Bob </td><td>: E<sub>PK<sub>Bob</sub></sub>(g<sup>x</sup>) </td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">Bob </td><td align="center">-> </td><td align="center">Alice </td><td>: g<sup>y</sup>, H(K <font face="symbol">|</font -> "<span class="roman">handshake</span>") -</td></tr></table> - - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - In the second step, Bob proves that it was he who received g<sup>x</sup>, -and who chose y. We use PK encryption in the first step -(rather than, say, using the first two steps of STS, which has a -signature in the second step) because a single cell is too small to -hold both a public key and a signature. Preliminary analysis with the -NRL protocol analyzer [<a href="#meadows96" name="CITEmeadows96">35</a>] shows this protocol to be -secure (including perfect forward secrecy) under the -traditional Dolev-Yao model.<br /> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<font size="+1"><b>Relay cells</b></font><br /> -Once Alice has established the circuit (so she shares keys with each -OR on the circuit), she can send relay cells. -Upon receiving a relay -cell, an OR looks up the corresponding circuit, and decrypts the relay -header and payload with the session key for that circuit. -If the cell is headed away from Alice the OR then checks whether the -decrypted cell has a valid digest (as an optimization, the first -two bytes of the integrity check are zero, so in most cases we can avoid -computing the hash). -If valid, it accepts the relay cell and processes it as described -below. Otherwise, -the OR looks up the circID and OR for the -next step in the circuit, replaces the circID as appropriate, and -sends the decrypted relay cell to the next OR. (If the OR at the end -of the circuit receives an unrecognized relay cell, an error has -occurred, and the circuit is torn down.) - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -OPs treat incoming relay cells similarly: they iteratively unwrap the -relay header and payload with the session keys shared with each -OR on the circuit, from the closest to farthest. -If at any stage the digest is valid, the cell must have -originated at the OR whose encryption has just been removed. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To construct a relay cell addressed to a given OR, Alice assigns the -digest, and then iteratively -encrypts the cell payload (that is, the relay header and payload) with -the symmetric key of each hop up to that OR. Because the digest is -encrypted to a different value at each step, only at the targeted OR -will it have a meaningful value.<a href="#tthFtNtAAC" name="tthFrefAAC"><sup>2</sup></a> -This <em>leaky pipe</em> circuit topology -allows Alice's streams to exit at different ORs on a single circuit. -Alice may choose different exit points because of their exit policies, -or to keep the ORs from knowing that two streams -originate from the same person. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -When an OR later replies to Alice with a relay cell, it -encrypts the cell's relay header and payload with the single key it -shares with Alice, and sends the cell back toward Alice along the -circuit. Subsequent ORs add further layers of encryption as they -relay the cell back to Alice. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To tear down a circuit, Alice sends a <em>destroy</em> control -cell. Each OR in the circuit receives the <em>destroy</em> cell, closes -all streams on that circuit, and passes a new <em>destroy</em> cell -forward. But just as circuits are built incrementally, they can also -be torn down incrementally: Alice can send a <em>relay -truncate</em> cell to a single OR on a circuit. That OR then sends a -<em>destroy</em> cell forward, and acknowledges with a -<em>relay truncated</em> cell. Alice can then extend the circuit to -different nodes, without signaling to the intermediate nodes (or -a limited observer) that she has changed her circuit. -Similarly, if a node on the circuit goes down, the adjacent -node can send a <em>relay truncated</em> cell back to Alice. Thus the -"break a node and see which circuits go down" -attack [<a href="#freedom21-security" name="CITEfreedom21-security">4</a>] is weakened. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc4.3"> -<a name="subsec:tcp"> -4.3</a> Opening and closing streams</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -When Alice's application wants a TCP connection to a given -address and port, it asks the OP (via SOCKS) to make the -connection. The OP chooses the newest open circuit (or creates one if -needed), and chooses a suitable OR on that circuit to be the -exit node (usually the last node, but maybe others due to exit policy -conflicts; see Section <a href="#subsec:exitpolicies">6.2</a>.) The OP then opens -the stream by sending a <em>relay begin</em> cell to the exit node, -using a new random streamID. Once the -exit node connects to the remote host, it responds -with a <em>relay connected</em> cell. Upon receipt, the OP sends a -SOCKS reply to notify the application of its success. The OP -now accepts data from the application's TCP stream, packaging it into -<em>relay data</em> cells and sending those cells along the circuit to -the chosen OR. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -There's a catch to using SOCKS, however — some applications pass the -alphanumeric hostname to the Tor client, while others resolve it into -an IP address first and then pass the IP address to the Tor client. If -the application does DNS resolution first, Alice thereby reveals her -destination to the remote DNS server, rather than sending the hostname -through the Tor network to be resolved at the far end. Common applications -like Mozilla and SSH have this flaw. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -With Mozilla, the flaw is easy to address: the filtering HTTP -proxy called Privoxy gives a hostname to the Tor client, so Alice's -computer never does DNS resolution. -But a portable general solution, such as is needed for -SSH, is -an open problem. Modifying or replacing the local nameserver -can be invasive, brittle, and unportable. Forcing the resolver -library to prefer TCP rather than UDP is hard, and also has -portability problems. Dynamically intercepting system calls to the -resolver library seems a promising direction. We could also provide -a tool similar to <em>dig</em> to perform a private lookup through the -Tor network. Currently, we encourage the use of privacy-aware proxies -like Privoxy wherever possible. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Closing a Tor stream is analogous to closing a TCP stream: it uses a -two-step handshake for normal operation, or a one-step handshake for -errors. If the stream closes abnormally, the adjacent node simply sends a -<em>relay teardown</em> cell. If the stream closes normally, the node sends -a <em>relay end</em> cell down the circuit, and the other side responds with -its own <em>relay end</em> cell. Because -all relay cells use layered encryption, only the destination OR knows -that a given relay cell is a request to close a stream. This two-step -handshake allows Tor to support TCP-based applications that use half-closed -connections. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc4.4"> -<a name="subsec:integrity-checking"> -4.4</a> Integrity checking on streams</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Because the old Onion Routing design used a stream cipher without integrity -checking, traffic was -vulnerable to a malleability attack: though the attacker could not -decrypt cells, any changes to encrypted data -would create corresponding changes to the data leaving the network. -This weakness allowed an adversary who could guess the encrypted content -to change a padding cell to a destroy -cell; change the destination address in a <em>relay begin</em> cell to the -adversary's webserver; or change an FTP command from -<tt>dir</tt> to <tt>rm *</tt>. (Even an external -adversary could do this, because the link encryption similarly used a -stream cipher.) - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Because Tor uses TLS on its links, external adversaries cannot modify -data. Addressing the insider malleability attack, however, is -more complex. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -We could do integrity checking of the relay cells at each hop, either -by including hashes or by using an authenticating cipher mode like -EAX [<a href="#eax" name="CITEeax">6</a>], but there are some problems. First, these approaches -impose a message-expansion overhead at each hop, and so we would have to -either leak the path length or waste bytes by padding to a maximum -path length. Second, these solutions can only verify traffic coming -from Alice: ORs would not be able to produce suitable hashes for -the intermediate hops, since the ORs on a circuit do not know the -other ORs' session keys. Third, we have already accepted that our design -is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks; so tagging attacks performed -within the circuit provide no additional information to the attacker. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Thus, we check integrity only at the edges of each stream. (Remember that -in our leaky-pipe circuit topology, a stream's edge could be any hop -in the circuit.) When Alice -negotiates a key with a new hop, they each initialize a SHA-1 -digest with a derivative of that key, -thus beginning with randomness that only the two of them know. -Then they each incrementally add to the SHA-1 digest the contents of -all relay cells they create, and include with each relay cell the -first four bytes of the current digest. Each also keeps a SHA-1 -digest of data received, to verify that the received hashes are correct. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To be sure of removing or modifying a cell, the attacker must be able -to deduce the current digest state (which depends on all -traffic between Alice and Bob, starting with their negotiated key). -Attacks on SHA-1 where the adversary can incrementally add to a hash -to produce a new valid hash don't work, because all hashes are -end-to-end encrypted across the circuit. The computational overhead -of computing the digests is minimal compared to doing the AES -encryption performed at each hop of the circuit. We use only four -bytes per cell to minimize overhead; the chance that an adversary will -correctly guess a valid hash -is -acceptably low, given that the OP or OR tear down the circuit if they -receive a bad hash. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc4.5"> -<a name="subsec:rate-limit"> -4.5</a> Rate limiting and fairness</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Volunteers are more willing to run services that can limit -their bandwidth usage. To accommodate them, Tor servers use a -token bucket approach [<a href="#tannenbaum96" name="CITEtannenbaum96">50</a>] to -enforce a long-term average rate of incoming bytes, while still -permitting short-term bursts above the allowed bandwidth. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Because the Tor protocol outputs about the same number of bytes as it -takes in, it is sufficient in practice to limit only incoming bytes. -With TCP streams, however, the correspondence is not one-to-one: -relaying a single incoming byte can require an entire 512-byte cell. -(We can't just wait for more bytes, because the local application may -be awaiting a reply.) Therefore, we treat this case as if the entire -cell size had been read, regardless of the cell's fullness. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Further, inspired by Rennhard et al's design in [<a href="#anonnet" name="CITEanonnet">44</a>], a -circuit's edges can heuristically distinguish interactive streams from bulk -streams by comparing the frequency with which they supply cells. We can -provide good latency for interactive streams by giving them preferential -service, while still giving good overall throughput to the bulk -streams. Such preferential treatment presents a possible end-to-end -attack, but an adversary observing both -ends of the stream can already learn this information through timing -attacks. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc4.6"> -<a name="subsec:congestion"> -4.6</a> Congestion control</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Even with bandwidth rate limiting, we still need to worry about -congestion, either accidental or intentional. If enough users choose the -same OR-to-OR connection for their circuits, that connection can become -saturated. For example, an attacker could send a large file -through the Tor network to a webserver he runs, and then -refuse to read any of the bytes at the webserver end of the -circuit. Without some congestion control mechanism, these bottlenecks -can propagate back through the entire network. We don't need to -reimplement full TCP windows (with sequence numbers, -the ability to drop cells when we're full and retransmit later, and so -on), -because TCP already guarantees in-order delivery of each -cell. -We describe our response below. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Circuit-level throttling:</b> -To control a circuit's bandwidth usage, each OR keeps track of two -windows. The <em>packaging window</em> tracks how many relay data cells the OR is -allowed to package (from incoming TCP streams) for transmission back to the OP, -and the <em>delivery window</em> tracks how many relay data cells it is willing -to deliver to TCP streams outside the network. Each window is initialized -(say, to 1000 data cells). When a data cell is packaged or delivered, -the appropriate window is decremented. When an OR has received enough -data cells (currently 100), it sends a <em>relay sendme</em> cell towards the OP, -with streamID zero. When an OR receives a <em>relay sendme</em> cell with -streamID zero, it increments its packaging window. Either of these cells -increments the corresponding window by 100. If the packaging window -reaches 0, the OR stops reading from TCP connections for all streams -on the corresponding circuit, and sends no more relay data cells until -receiving a <em>relay sendme</em> cell. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -The OP behaves identically, except that it must track a packaging window -and a delivery window for every OR in the circuit. If a packaging window -reaches 0, it stops reading from streams destined for that OR. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<b>Stream-level throttling</b>: -The stream-level congestion control mechanism is similar to the -circuit-level mechanism. ORs and OPs use <em>relay sendme</em> cells -to implement end-to-end flow control for individual streams across -circuits. Each stream begins with a packaging window (currently 500 cells), -and increments the window by a fixed value (50) upon receiving a <em>relay -sendme</em> cell. Rather than always returning a <em>relay sendme</em> cell as soon -as enough cells have arrived, the stream-level congestion control also -has to check whether data has been successfully flushed onto the TCP -stream; it sends the <em>relay sendme</em> cell only when the number of bytes pending -to be flushed is under some threshold (currently 10 cells' worth). - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -These arbitrarily chosen parameters seem to give tolerable throughput -and delay; see Section <a href="#sec:in-the-wild">8</a>. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc5"> -<a name="sec:rendezvous"> -5</a> Rendezvous Points and hidden services</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Rendezvous points are a building block for <em>location-hidden -services</em> (also known as <em>responder anonymity</em>) in the Tor -network. Location-hidden services allow Bob to offer a TCP -service, such as a webserver, without revealing his IP address. -This type of anonymity protects against distributed DoS attacks: -attackers are forced to attack the onion routing network -because they do not know Bob's IP address. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Our design for location-hidden servers has the following goals. -<b>Access-control:</b> Bob needs a way to filter incoming requests, -so an attacker cannot flood Bob simply by making many connections to him. -<b>Robustness:</b> Bob should be able to maintain a long-term pseudonymous -identity even in the presence of router failure. Bob's service must -not be tied to a single OR, and Bob must be able to migrate his service -across ORs. <b>Smear-resistance:</b> -A social attacker -should not be able to "frame" a rendezvous router by -offering an illegal or disreputable location-hidden service and -making observers believe the router created that service. -<b>Application-transparency:</b> Although we require users -to run special software to access location-hidden servers, we must not -require them to modify their applications. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -We provide location-hiding for Bob by allowing him to advertise -several onion routers (his <em>introduction points</em>) as contact -points. He may do this on any robust efficient -key-value lookup system with authenticated updates, such as a -distributed hash table (DHT) like CFS [<a href="#cfs:sosp01" name="CITEcfs:sosp01">11</a>].<a href="#tthFtNtAAD" name="tthFrefAAD"><sup>3</sup></a> Alice, the client, chooses an OR as her -<em>rendezvous point</em>. She connects to one of Bob's introduction -points, informs him of her rendezvous point, and then waits for him -to connect to the rendezvous point. This extra level of indirection -helps Bob's introduction points avoid problems associated with serving -unpopular files directly (for example, if Bob serves -material that the introduction point's community finds objectionable, -or if Bob's service tends to get attacked by network vandals). -The extra level of indirection also allows Bob to respond to some requests -and ignore others. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc5.1"> -5.1</a> Rendezvous points in Tor</h3> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -The following steps are -performed on behalf of Alice and Bob by their local OPs; -application integration is described more fully below. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<dl compact="compact"> - - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>Bob generates a long-term public key pair to identify his service.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>Bob chooses some introduction points, and advertises them on - the lookup service, signing the advertisement with his public key. He - can add more later.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>Bob builds a circuit to each of his introduction points, and tells - them to wait for requests.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>Alice learns about Bob's service out of band (perhaps Bob told her, - or she found it on a website). She retrieves the details of Bob's - service from the lookup service. If Alice wants to access Bob's - service anonymously, she must connect to the lookup service via Tor.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>Alice chooses an OR as the rendezvous point (RP) for her connection to - Bob's service. She builds a circuit to the RP, and gives it a - randomly chosen "rendezvous cookie" to recognize Bob.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>Alice opens an anonymous stream to one of Bob's introduction - points, and gives it a message (encrypted with Bob's public key) - telling it about herself, - her RP and rendezvous cookie, and the - start of a DH - handshake. The introduction point sends the message to Bob.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>If Bob wants to talk to Alice, he builds a circuit to Alice's - RP and sends the rendezvous cookie, the second half of the DH - handshake, and a hash of the session - key they now share. By the same argument as in - Section <a href="#subsubsec:constructing-a-circuit">4.2</a>, Alice knows she - shares the key only with Bob.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>The RP connects Alice's circuit to Bob's. Note that RP can't - recognize Alice, Bob, or the data they transmit.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>Alice sends a <em>relay begin</em> cell along the circuit. It - arrives at Bob's OP, which connects to Bob's - webserver.</dd> - <dt><b></b></dt> - <dd><li>An anonymous stream has been established, and Alice and Bob - communicate as normal. -</dd> -</dl> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -When establishing an introduction point, Bob provides the onion router -with the public key identifying his service. Bob signs his -messages, so others cannot usurp his introduction point -in the future. He uses the same public key to establish the other -introduction points for his service, and periodically refreshes his -entry in the lookup service. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -The message that Alice gives -the introduction point includes a hash of Bob's public key and an optional initial authorization token (the -introduction point can do prescreening, for example to block replays). Her -message to Bob may include an end-to-end authorization token so Bob -can choose whether to respond. -The authorization tokens can be used to provide selective access: -important users can get uninterrupted access. -During normal situations, Bob's service might simply be offered -directly from mirrors, while Bob gives out tokens to high-priority users. If -the mirrors are knocked down, -those users can switch to accessing Bob's service via -the Tor rendezvous system. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Bob's introduction points are themselves subject to DoS — he must -open many introduction points or risk such an attack. -He can provide selected users with a current list or future schedule of -unadvertised introduction points; -this is most practical -if there is a stable and large group of introduction points -available. Bob could also give secret public keys -for consulting the lookup service. All of these approaches -limit exposure even when -some selected users collude in the DoS. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc5.2"> -5.2</a> Integration with user applications</h3> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Bob configures his onion proxy to know the local IP address and port of his -service, a strategy for authorizing clients, and his public key. The onion -proxy anonymously publishes a signed statement of Bob's -public key, an expiration time, and -the current introduction points for his service onto the lookup service, -indexed -by the hash of his public key. Bob's webserver is unmodified, -and doesn't even know that it's hidden behind the Tor network. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Alice's applications also work unchanged — her client interface -remains a SOCKS proxy. We encode all of the necessary information -into the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) Alice uses when establishing her -connection. Location-hidden services use a virtual top level domain -called <tt>.onion</tt>: thus hostnames take the form <tt>x.y.onion</tt> where -<tt>x</tt> is the authorization cookie and <tt>y</tt> encodes the hash of -the public key. Alice's onion proxy -examines addresses; if they're destined for a hidden server, it decodes -the key and starts the rendezvous as described above. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc5.3"> -5.3</a> Previous rendezvous work</h3> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Rendezvous points in low-latency anonymity systems were first -described for use in ISDN telephony [<a href="#jerichow-jsac98" name="CITEjerichow-jsac98">30</a>,<a href="#isdn-mixes" name="CITEisdn-mixes">38</a>]. -Later low-latency designs used rendezvous points for hiding location -of mobile phones and low-power location -trackers [<a href="#federrath-ih96" name="CITEfederrath-ih96">23</a>,<a href="#reed-protocols97" name="CITEreed-protocols97">40</a>]. Rendezvous for -anonymizing low-latency -Internet connections was suggested in early Onion Routing -work [<a href="#or-ih96" name="CITEor-ih96">27</a>], but the first published design was by Ian -Goldberg [<a href="#ian-thesis" name="CITEian-thesis">26</a>]. His design differs from -ours in three ways. First, Goldberg suggests that Alice should manually -hunt down a current location of the service via Gnutella; our approach -makes lookup transparent to the user, as well as faster and more robust. -Second, in Tor the client and server negotiate session keys -with Diffie-Hellman, so plaintext is not exposed even at the rendezvous -point. Third, -our design minimizes the exposure from running the -service, to encourage volunteers to offer introduction and rendezvous -services. Tor's introduction points do not output any bytes to the -clients; the rendezvous points don't know the client or the server, -and can't read the data being transmitted. The indirection scheme is -also designed to include authentication/authorization — if Alice doesn't -include the right cookie with her request for service, Bob need not even -acknowledge his existence. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc6"> -<a name="sec:other-design"> -6</a> Other design decisions</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc6.1"> -<a name="subsec:dos"> -6.1</a> Denial of service</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Providing Tor as a public service creates many opportunities for -denial-of-service attacks against the network. While -flow control and rate limiting (discussed in -Section <a href="#subsec:congestion">4.6</a>) prevent users from consuming more -bandwidth than routers are willing to provide, opportunities remain for -users to -consume more network resources than their fair share, or to render the -network unusable for others. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -First of all, there are several CPU-consuming denial-of-service -attacks wherein an attacker can force an OR to perform expensive -cryptographic operations. For example, an attacker can -fake the start of a TLS handshake, forcing the OR to carry out its -(comparatively expensive) half of the handshake at no real computational -cost to the attacker. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -We have not yet implemented any defenses for these attacks, but several -approaches are possible. First, ORs can -require clients to solve a puzzle [<a href="#puzzles-tls" name="CITEpuzzles-tls">16</a>] while beginning new -TLS handshakes or accepting <em>create</em> cells. So long as these -tokens are easy to verify and computationally expensive to produce, this -approach limits the attack multiplier. Additionally, ORs can limit -the rate at which they accept <em>create</em> cells and TLS connections, -so that -the computational work of processing them does not drown out the -symmetric cryptography operations that keep cells -flowing. This rate limiting could, however, allow an attacker -to slow down other users when they build new circuits. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Adversaries can also attack the Tor network's hosts and network -links. Disrupting a single circuit or link breaks all streams passing -along that part of the circuit. Users similarly lose service -when a router crashes or its operator restarts it. The current -Tor design treats such attacks as intermittent network failures, and -depends on users and applications to respond or recover as appropriate. A -future design could use an end-to-end TCP-like acknowledgment protocol, -so no streams are lost unless the entry or exit point is -disrupted. This solution would require more buffering at the network -edges, however, and the performance and anonymity implications from this -extra complexity still require investigation. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc6.2"> -<a name="subsec:exitpolicies"> -6.2</a> Exit policies and abuse</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Anonymity -presents would-be vandals and abusers with an opportunity to hide -the origins of their activities. Attackers can harm the Tor network by -implicating exit servers for their abuse. Also, applications that commonly -use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or webservers) -can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate -at the exit OR. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -We stress that Tor does not enable any new class of abuse. Spammers -and other attackers already have access to thousands of misconfigured -systems worldwide, and the Tor network is far from the easiest way -to launch attacks. -But because the -onion routers can be mistaken for the originators of the abuse, -and the volunteers who run them may not want to deal with the hassle of -explaining anonymity networks to irate administrators, we must block or limit -abuse through the Tor network. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To mitigate abuse issues, each onion router's <em>exit policy</em> -describes to which external addresses and ports the router will -connect. On one end of the spectrum are <em>open exit</em> -nodes that will connect anywhere. On the other end are <em>middleman</em> -nodes that only relay traffic to other Tor nodes, and <em>private exit</em> -nodes that only connect to a local host or network. A private -exit can allow a client to connect to a given host or -network more securely — an external adversary cannot eavesdrop traffic -between the private exit and the final destination, and so is less sure of -Alice's destination and activities. Most onion routers in the current -network function as -<em>restricted exits</em> that permit connections to the world at large, -but prevent access to certain abuse-prone addresses and services such -as SMTP. -The OR might also be able to authenticate clients to -prevent exit abuse without harming anonymity [<a href="#or-discex00" name="CITEor-discex00">48</a>]. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Many administrators use port restrictions to support only a -limited set of services, such as HTTP, SSH, or AIM. -This is not a complete solution, of course, since abuse opportunities for these -protocols are still well known. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -We have not yet encountered any abuse in the deployed network, but if -we do we should consider using proxies to clean traffic for certain -protocols as it leaves the network. For example, much abusive HTTP -behavior (such as exploiting buffer overflows or well-known script -vulnerabilities) can be detected in a straightforward manner. -Similarly, one could run automatic spam filtering software (such as -SpamAssassin) on email exiting the OR network. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -ORs may also rewrite exiting traffic to append -headers or other information indicating that the traffic has passed -through an anonymity service. This approach is commonly used -by email-only anonymity systems. ORs can also -run on servers with hostnames like <tt>anonymous</tt> to further -alert abuse targets to the nature of the anonymous traffic. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -A mixture of open and restricted exit nodes allows the most -flexibility for volunteers running servers. But while having many -middleman nodes provides a large and robust network, -having only a few exit nodes reduces the number of points -an adversary needs to monitor for traffic analysis, and places a -greater burden on the exit nodes. This tension can be seen in the -Java Anon Proxy -cascade model, wherein only one node in each cascade needs to handle -abuse complaints — but an adversary only needs to observe the entry -and exit of a cascade to perform traffic analysis on all that -cascade's users. The hydra model (many entries, few exits) presents a -different compromise: only a few exit nodes are needed, but an -adversary needs to work harder to watch all the clients; see -Section <a href="#sec:conclusion">10</a>. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Finally, we note that exit abuse must not be dismissed as a peripheral -issue: when a system's public image suffers, it can reduce the number -and diversity of that system's users, and thereby reduce the anonymity -of the system itself. Like usability, public perception is a -security parameter. Sadly, preventing abuse of open exit nodes is an -unsolved problem, and will probably remain an arms race for the -foreseeable future. The abuse problems faced by Princeton's CoDeeN -project [<a href="#darkside" name="CITEdarkside">37</a>] give us a glimpse of likely issues. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h3><a name="tth_sEc6.3"> -<a name="subsec:dirservers"> -6.3</a> Directory Servers</h3> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -First-generation Onion Routing designs [<a href="#freedom2-arch" name="CITEfreedom2-arch">8</a>,<a href="#or-jsac98" name="CITEor-jsac98">41</a>] used -in-band network status updates: each router flooded a signed statement -to its neighbors, which propagated it onward. But anonymizing networks -have different security goals than typical link-state routing protocols. -For example, delays (accidental or intentional) -that can cause different parts of the network to have different views -of link-state and topology are not only inconvenient: they give -attackers an opportunity to exploit differences in client knowledge. -We also worry about attacks to deceive a -client about the router membership list, topology, or current network -state. Such <em>partitioning attacks</em> on client knowledge help an -adversary to efficiently deploy resources -against a target [<a href="#minion-design" name="CITEminion-design">15</a>]. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Tor uses a small group of redundant, well-known onion routers to -track changes in network topology and node state, including keys and -exit policies. Each such <em>directory server</em> acts as an HTTP -server, so clients can fetch current network state -and router lists, and so other ORs can upload -state information. Onion routers periodically publish signed -statements of their state to each directory server. The directory servers -combine this information with their own views of network liveness, -and generate a signed description (a <em>directory</em>) of the entire -network state. Client software is -pre-loaded with a list of the directory servers and their keys, -to bootstrap each client's view of the network. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -When a directory server receives a signed statement for an OR, it -checks whether the OR's identity key is recognized. Directory -servers do not advertise unrecognized ORs — if they did, -an adversary could take over the network by creating many -servers [<a href="#sybil" name="CITEsybil">22</a>]. Instead, new nodes must be approved by the -directory -server administrator before they are included. Mechanisms for automated -node approval are an area of active research, and are discussed more -in Section <a href="#sec:maintaining-anonymity">9</a>. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Of course, a variety of attacks remain. An adversary who controls -a directory server can track clients by providing them different -information — perhaps by listing only nodes under its control, or by -informing only certain clients about a given node. Even an external -adversary can exploit differences in client knowledge: clients who use -a node listed on one directory server but not the others are vulnerable. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Thus these directory servers must be synchronized and redundant, so -that they can agree on a common directory. Clients should only trust -this directory if it is signed by a threshold of the directory -servers. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -The directory servers in Tor are modeled after those in -Mixminion [<a href="#minion-design" name="CITEminion-design">15</a>], but our situation is easier. First, -we make the -simplifying assumption that all participants agree on the set of -directory servers. Second, while Mixminion needs to predict node -behavior, Tor only needs a threshold consensus of the current -state of the network. Third, we assume that we can fall back to the -human administrators to discover and resolve problems when a consensus -directory cannot be reached. Since there are relatively few directory -servers (currently 3, but we expect as many as 9 as the network scales), -we can afford operations like broadcast to simplify the consensus-building -protocol. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To avoid attacks where a router connects to all the directory servers -but refuses to relay traffic from other routers, the directory servers -must also build circuits and use them to anonymously test router -reliability [<a href="#mix-acc" name="CITEmix-acc">18</a>]. Unfortunately, this defense is not yet -designed or -implemented. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Using directory servers is simpler and more flexible than flooding. -Flooding is expensive, and complicates the analysis when we -start experimenting with non-clique network topologies. Signed -directories can be cached by other -onion routers, -so directory servers are not a performance -bottleneck when we have many users, and do not aid traffic analysis by -forcing clients to announce their existence to any -central point. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc7"> -<a name="sec:attacks"> -7</a> Attacks and Defenses</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our -design withstands them.<br /> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<font size="+1"><b>Passive attacks</b></font><br /> -<em>Observing user traffic patterns.</em> Observing a user's connection -will not reveal her destination or data, but it will -reveal traffic patterns (both sent and received). Profiling via user -connection patterns requires further processing, because multiple -application streams may be operating simultaneously or in series over -a single circuit. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Observing user content.</em> While content at the user end is encrypted, -connections to responders may not be (indeed, the responding website -itself may be hostile). While filtering content is not a primary goal -of Onion Routing, Tor can directly use Privoxy and related -filtering services to anonymize application data streams. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Option distinguishability.</em> We allow clients to choose -configuration options. For example, clients concerned about request -linkability should rotate circuits more often than those concerned -about traceability. Allowing choice may attract users with different -needs; but clients who are -in the minority may lose more anonymity by appearing distinct than they -gain by optimizing their behavior [<a href="#econymics" name="CITEeconymics">1</a>]. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>End-to-end timing correlation.</em> Tor only minimally hides -such correlations. An attacker watching patterns of -traffic at the initiator and the responder will be -able to confirm the correspondence with high probability. The -greatest protection currently available against such confirmation is to hide -the connection between the onion proxy and the first Tor node, -by running the OP on the Tor node or behind a firewall. This approach -requires an observer to separate traffic originating at the onion -router from traffic passing through it: a global observer can do this, -but it might be beyond a limited observer's capabilities. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>End-to-end size correlation.</em> Simple packet counting -will also be effective in confirming -endpoints of a stream. However, even without padding, we may have some -limited protection: the leaky pipe topology means different numbers -of packets may enter one end of a circuit than exit at the other. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Website fingerprinting.</em> All the effective passive -attacks above are traffic confirmation attacks, -which puts them outside our design goals. There is also -a passive traffic analysis attack that is potentially effective. -Rather than searching exit connections for timing and volume -correlations, the adversary may build up a database of -"fingerprints" containing file sizes and access patterns for -targeted websites. He can later confirm a user's connection to a given -site simply by consulting the database. This attack has -been shown to be effective against SafeWeb [<a href="#hintz-pet02" name="CITEhintz-pet02">29</a>]. -It may be less effective against Tor, since -streams are multiplexed within the same circuit, and -fingerprinting will be limited to -the granularity of cells (currently 512 bytes). Additional -defenses could include -larger cell sizes, padding schemes to group websites -into large sets, and link -padding or long-range dummies.<a href="#tthFtNtAAE" name="tthFrefAAE"><sup>4</sup></a><br /> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<font size="+1"><b>Active attacks</b></font><br /> -<em>Compromise keys.</em> An attacker who learns the TLS session key can -see control cells and encrypted relay cells on every circuit on that -connection; learning a circuit -session key lets him unwrap one layer of the encryption. An attacker -who learns an OR's TLS private key can impersonate that OR for the TLS -key's lifetime, but he must -also learn the onion key to decrypt <em>create</em> cells (and because of -perfect forward secrecy, he cannot hijack already established circuits -without also compromising their session keys). Periodic key rotation -limits the window of opportunity for these attacks. On the other hand, -an attacker who learns a node's identity key can replace that node -indefinitely by sending new forged descriptors to the directory servers. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Iterated compromise.</em> A roving adversary who can -compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coercion, or extralegal -coercion) could march down the circuit compromising the -nodes until he reaches the end. Unless the adversary can complete -this attack within the lifetime of the circuit, however, the ORs -will have discarded the necessary information before the attack can -be completed. (Thanks to the perfect forward secrecy of session -keys, the attacker cannot force nodes to decrypt recorded -traffic once the circuits have been closed.) Additionally, building -circuits that cross jurisdictions can make legal coercion -harder — this phenomenon is commonly called "jurisdictional -arbitrage." The Java Anon Proxy project recently experienced the -need for this approach, when -a German court forced them to add a backdoor to -their nodes [<a href="#jap-backdoor" name="CITEjap-backdoor">51</a>]. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Run a recipient.</em> An adversary running a webserver -trivially learns the timing patterns of users connecting to it, and -can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses. -End-to-end attacks become easier: if the adversary can induce -users to connect to his webserver (perhaps by advertising -content targeted to those users), he now holds one end of their -connection. There is also a danger that application -protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal information -about the initiator. Tor depends on Privoxy and similar protocol cleaners -to solve this latter problem. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Run an onion proxy.</em> It is expected that end users will -nearly always run their own local onion proxy. However, in some -settings, it may be necessary for the proxy to run -remotely — typically, in institutions that want -to monitor the activity of those connecting to the proxy. -Compromising an onion proxy compromises all future connections -through it. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>DoS non-observed nodes.</em> An observer who can only watch some -of the Tor network can increase the value of this traffic -by attacking non-observed nodes to shut them down, reduce -their reliability, or persuade users that they are not trustworthy. -The best defense here is robustness. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Run a hostile OR.</em> In addition to being a local observer, -an isolated hostile node can create circuits through itself, or alter -traffic patterns to affect traffic at other nodes. Nonetheless, a hostile -node must be immediately adjacent to both endpoints to compromise the -anonymity of a circuit. If an adversary can -run multiple ORs, and can persuade the directory servers -that those ORs are trustworthy and independent, then occasionally -some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another -as the end of a circuit. If an adversary -controls m > 1 of N nodes, he can correlate at most -([m/N])<sup>2</sup> of the traffic — although an -adversary -could still attract a disproportionately large amount of traffic -by running an OR with a permissive exit policy, or by -degrading the reliability of other routers. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Introduce timing into messages.</em> This is simply a stronger -version of passive timing attacks already discussed earlier. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Tagging attacks.</em> A hostile node could "tag" a -cell by altering it. If the -stream were, for example, an unencrypted request to a Web site, -the garbled content coming out at the appropriate time would confirm -the association. However, integrity checks on cells prevent -this attack. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Replace contents of unauthenticated protocols.</em> When -relaying an unauthenticated protocol like HTTP, a hostile exit node -can impersonate the target server. Clients -should prefer protocols with end-to-end authentication. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Replay attacks.</em> Some anonymity protocols are vulnerable -to replay attacks. Tor is not; replaying one side of a handshake -will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest -of the recorded session can't be used. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Smear attacks.</em> An attacker could use the Tor network for -socially disapproved acts, to bring the -network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down. -Exit policies reduce the possibilities for abuse, but -ultimately the network requires volunteers who can tolerate -some political heat. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Distribute hostile code.</em> An attacker could trick users -into running subverted Tor software that did not, in fact, anonymize -their connections — or worse, could trick ORs into running weakened -software that provided users with less anonymity. We address this -problem (but do not solve it completely) by signing all Tor releases -with an official public key, and including an entry in the directory -that lists which versions are currently believed to be secure. To -prevent an attacker from subverting the official release itself -(through threats, bribery, or insider attacks), we provide all -releases in source code form, encourage source audits, and -frequently warn our users never to trust any software (even from -us) that comes without source.<br /> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<font size="+1"><b>Directory attacks</b></font><br /> -<em>Destroy directory servers.</em> If a few directory -servers disappear, the others still decide on a valid -directory. So long as any directory servers remain in operation, -they will still broadcast their views of the network and generate a -consensus directory. (If more than half are destroyed, this -directory will not, however, have enough signatures for clients to -use it automatically; human intervention will be necessary for -clients to decide whether to trust the resulting directory.) - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Subvert a directory server.</em> By taking over a directory server, -an attacker can partially influence the final directory. Since ORs -are included or excluded by majority vote, the corrupt directory can -at worst cast a tie-breaking vote to decide whether to include -marginal ORs. It remains to be seen how often such marginal cases -occur in practice. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Subvert a majority of directory servers.</em> An adversary who controls -more than half the directory servers can include as many compromised -ORs in the final directory as he wishes. We must ensure that directory -server operators are independent and attack-resistant. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Encourage directory server dissent.</em> The directory -agreement protocol assumes that directory server operators agree on -the set of directory servers. An adversary who can persuade some -of the directory server operators to distrust one another could -split the quorum into mutually hostile camps, thus partitioning -users based on which directory they use. Tor does not address -this attack. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Trick the directory servers into listing a hostile OR.</em> -Our threat model explicitly assumes directory server operators will -be able to filter out most hostile ORs. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Convince the directories that a malfunctioning OR is -working.</em> In the current Tor implementation, directory servers -assume that an OR is running correctly if they can start a TLS -connection to it. A hostile OR could easily subvert this test by -accepting TLS connections from ORs but ignoring all cells. Directory -servers must actively test ORs by building circuits and streams as -appropriate. The tradeoffs of a similar approach are discussed -in [<a href="#mix-acc" name="CITEmix-acc">18</a>].<br /> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<font size="+1"><b>Attacks against rendezvous points</b></font><br /> -<em>Make many introduction requests.</em> An attacker could -try to deny Bob service by flooding his introduction points with -requests. Because the introduction points can block requests that -lack authorization tokens, however, Bob can restrict the volume of -requests he receives, or require a certain amount of computation for -every request he receives. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Attack an introduction point.</em> An attacker could -disrupt a location-hidden service by disabling its introduction -points. But because a service's identity is attached to its public -key, the service can simply re-advertise -itself at a different introduction point. Advertisements can also be -done secretly so that only high-priority clients know the address of -Bob's introduction points or so that different clients know of different -introduction points. This forces the attacker to disable all possible -introduction points. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Compromise an introduction point.</em> An attacker who controls -Bob's introduction point can flood Bob with -introduction requests, or prevent valid introduction requests from -reaching him. Bob can notice a flood, and close the circuit. To notice -blocking of valid requests, however, he should periodically test the -introduction point by sending rendezvous requests and making -sure he receives them. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Compromise a rendezvous point.</em> A rendezvous -point is no more sensitive than any other OR on -a circuit, since all data passing through the rendezvous is encrypted -with a session key shared by Alice and Bob. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc8"> -<a name="sec:in-the-wild"> -8</a> Early experiences: Tor in the Wild</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -As of mid-May 2004, the Tor network consists of 32 nodes -(24 in the US, 8 in Europe), and more are joining each week as the code -matures. (For comparison, the current remailer network -has about 40 nodes.) Each node has at least a 768Kb/768Kb connection, and -many have 10Mb. The number of users varies (and of course, it's hard to -tell for sure), but we sometimes have several hundred users — administrators at -several companies have begun sending their entire departments' web -traffic through Tor, to block other divisions of -their company from reading their traffic. Tor users have reported using -the network for web browsing, FTP, IRC, AIM, Kazaa, SSH, and -recipient-anonymous email via rendezvous points. One user has anonymously -set up a Wiki as a hidden service, where other users anonymously publish -the addresses of their hidden services. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Each Tor node currently processes roughly 800,000 relay -cells (a bit under half a gigabyte) per week. On average, about 80% -of each 498-byte payload is full for cells going back to the client, -whereas about 40% is full for cells coming from the client. (The difference -arises because most of the network's traffic is web browsing.) Interactive -traffic like SSH brings down the average a lot — once we have more -experience, and assuming we can resolve the anonymity issues, we may -partition traffic into two relay cell sizes: one to handle -bulk traffic and one for interactive traffic. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Based in part on our restrictive default exit policy (we -reject SMTP requests) and our low profile, we have had no abuse -issues since the network was deployed in October -2003. Our slow growth rate gives us time to add features, -resolve bugs, and get a feel for what users actually want from an -anonymity system. Even though having more users would bolster our -anonymity sets, we are not eager to attract the Kazaa or warez -communities — we feel that we must build a reputation for privacy, human -rights, research, and other socially laudable activities. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -As for performance, profiling shows that Tor spends almost -all its CPU time in AES, which is fast. Current latency is attributable -to two factors. First, network latency is critical: we are -intentionally bouncing traffic around the world several times. Second, -our end-to-end congestion control algorithm focuses on protecting -volunteer servers from accidental DoS rather than on optimizing -performance. To quantify these effects, we did some informal tests using a network of 4 -nodes on the same machine (a heavily loaded 1GHz Athlon). We downloaded a 60 -megabyte file from <tt>debian.org</tt> every 30 minutes for 54 hours (108 sample -points). It arrived in about 300 seconds on average, compared to 210s for a -direct download. We ran a similar test on the production Tor network, -fetching the front page of <tt>cnn.com</tt> (55 kilobytes): -while a direct -download consistently took about 0.3s, the performance through Tor varied. -Some downloads were as fast as 0.4s, with a median at 2.8s, and -90% finishing within 5.3s. It seems that as the network expands, the chance -of building a slow circuit (one that includes a slow or heavily loaded node -or link) is increasing. On the other hand, as our users remain satisfied -with this increased latency, we can address our performance incrementally as we -proceed with development. -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Although Tor's clique topology and full-visibility directories present -scaling problems, we still expect the network to support a few hundred -nodes and maybe 10,000 users before we're forced to become -more distributed. With luck, the experience we gain running the current -topology will help us choose among alternatives when the time comes. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc9"> -<a name="sec:maintaining-anonymity"> -9</a> Open Questions in Low-latency Anonymity</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -In addition to the non-goals in -Section <a href="#subsec:non-goals">3</a>, many questions must be solved -before we can be confident of Tor's security. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Many of these open issues are questions of balance. For example, -how often should users rotate to fresh circuits? Frequent rotation -is inefficient, expensive, and may lead to intersection attacks and -predecessor attacks [<a href="#wright03" name="CITEwright03">54</a>], but infrequent rotation makes the -user's traffic linkable. Besides opening fresh circuits, clients can -also exit from the middle of the circuit, -or truncate and re-extend the circuit. More analysis is -needed to determine the proper tradeoff. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -How should we choose path lengths? If Alice always uses two hops, -then both ORs can be certain that by colluding they will learn about -Alice and Bob. In our current approach, Alice always chooses at least -three nodes unrelated to herself and her destination. -Should Alice choose a random path length (e.g. from a geometric -distribution) to foil an attacker who -uses timing to learn that he is the fifth hop and thus concludes that -both Alice and the responder are running ORs? - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Throughout this paper, we have assumed that end-to-end traffic -confirmation will immediately and automatically defeat a low-latency -anonymity system. Even high-latency anonymity systems can be -vulnerable to end-to-end traffic confirmation, if the traffic volumes -are high enough, and if users' habits are sufficiently -distinct [<a href="#statistical-disclosure" name="CITEstatistical-disclosure">14</a>,<a href="#limits-open" name="CITElimits-open">31</a>]. Can anything be -done to -make low-latency systems resist these attacks as well as high-latency -systems? Tor already makes some effort to conceal the starts and ends of -streams by wrapping long-range control commands in identical-looking -relay cells. Link padding could frustrate passive observers who count -packets; long-range padding could work against observers who own the -first hop in a circuit. But more research remains to find an efficient -and practical approach. Volunteers prefer not to run constant-bandwidth -padding; but no convincing traffic shaping approach has been -specified. Recent work on long-range padding [<a href="#defensive-dropping" name="CITEdefensive-dropping">33</a>] -shows promise. One could also try to reduce correlation in packet timing -by batching and re-ordering packets, but it is unclear whether this could -improve anonymity without introducing so much latency as to render the -network unusable. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -A cascade topology may better defend against traffic confirmation by -aggregating users, and making padding and -mixing more affordable. Does the hydra topology (many input nodes, -few output nodes) work better against some adversaries? Are we going -to get a hydra anyway because most nodes will be middleman nodes? - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Common wisdom suggests that Alice should run her own OR for best -anonymity, because traffic coming from her node could plausibly have -come from elsewhere. How much mixing does this approach need? Is it -immediately beneficial because of real-world adversaries that can't -observe Alice's router, but can run routers of their own? - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -To scale to many users, and to prevent an attacker from observing the -whole network, it may be necessary -to support far more servers than Tor currently anticipates. -This introduces several issues. First, if approval by a central set -of directory servers is no longer feasible, what mechanism should be used -to prevent adversaries from signing up many colluding servers? Second, -if clients can no longer have a complete picture of the network, -how can they perform discovery while preventing attackers from -manipulating or exploiting gaps in their knowledge? Third, if there -are too many servers for every server to constantly communicate with -every other, which non-clique topology should the network use? -(Restricted-route topologies promise comparable anonymity with better -scalability [<a href="#danezis-pets03" name="CITEdanezis-pets03">13</a>], but whatever topology we choose, we -need some way to keep attackers from manipulating their position within -it [<a href="#casc-rep" name="CITEcasc-rep">21</a>].) Fourth, if no central authority is tracking -server reliability, how do we stop unreliable servers from making -the network unusable? Fifth, do clients receive so much anonymity -from running their own ORs that we should expect them all to do -so [<a href="#econymics" name="CITEeconymics">1</a>], or do we need another incentive structure to -motivate them? Tarzan and MorphMix present possible solutions. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -When a Tor node goes down, all its circuits (and thus streams) must break. -Will users abandon the system because of this brittleness? How well -does the method in Section <a href="#subsec:dos">6.1</a> allow streams to survive -node failure? If affected users rebuild circuits immediately, how much -anonymity is lost? It seems the problem is even worse in a peer-to-peer -environment — such systems don't yet provide an incentive for peers to -stay connected when they're done retrieving content, so we would expect -a higher churn rate. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - <h2><a name="tth_sEc10"> -<a name="sec:conclusion"> -10</a> Future Directions</h2> -</a> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -Tor brings together many innovations into a unified deployable system. The -next immediate steps include: - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Scalability:</em> Tor's emphasis on deployability and design simplicity -has led us to adopt a clique topology, semi-centralized -directories, and a full-network-visibility model for client -knowledge. These properties will not scale past a few hundred servers. -Section <a href="#sec:maintaining-anonymity">9</a> describes some promising -approaches, but more deployment experience will be helpful in learning -the relative importance of these bottlenecks. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Bandwidth classes:</em> This paper assumes that all ORs have -good bandwidth and latency. We should instead adopt the MorphMix model, -where nodes advertise their bandwidth level (DSL, T1, T3), and -Alice avoids bottlenecks by choosing nodes that match or -exceed her bandwidth. In this way DSL users can usefully join the Tor -network. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Incentives:</em> Volunteers who run nodes are rewarded with publicity -and possibly better anonymity [<a href="#econymics" name="CITEeconymics">1</a>]. More nodes means increased -scalability, and more users can mean more anonymity. We need to continue -examining the incentive structures for participating in Tor. Further, -we need to explore more approaches to limiting abuse, and understand -why most people don't bother using privacy systems. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Cover traffic:</em> Currently Tor omits cover traffic — its costs -in performance and bandwidth are clear but its security benefits are -not well understood. We must pursue more research on link-level cover -traffic and long-range cover traffic to determine whether some simple padding -method offers provable protection against our chosen adversary. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Caching at exit nodes:</em> Perhaps each exit node should run a -caching web proxy [<a href="#shsm03" name="CITEshsm03">47</a>], to improve anonymity for cached pages -(Alice's request never -leaves the Tor network), to improve speed, and to reduce bandwidth cost. -On the other hand, forward security is weakened because caches -constitute a record of retrieved files. We must find the right -balance between usability and security. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Better directory distribution:</em> -Clients currently download a description of -the entire network every 15 minutes. As the state grows larger -and clients more numerous, we may need a solution in which -clients receive incremental updates to directory state. -More generally, we must find more -scalable yet practical ways to distribute up-to-date snapshots of -network status without introducing new attacks. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Further specification review:</em> Our public -byte-level specification [<a href="#tor-spec" name="CITEtor-spec">20</a>] needs -external review. We hope that as Tor -is deployed, more people will examine its -specification. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Multisystem interoperability:</em> We are currently working with the -designer of MorphMix to unify the specification and implementation of -the common elements of our two systems. So far, this seems -to be relatively straightforward. Interoperability will allow testing -and direct comparison of the two designs for trust and scalability. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<em>Wider-scale deployment:</em> The original goal of Tor was to -gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and -learn from having actual users. We are now at a point in design -and development where we can start deploying a wider network. Once -we have many actual users, we will doubtlessly be better -able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our -robustness/latency tradeoffs, our performance tradeoffs (including -cell size), our abuse-prevention mechanisms, and -our overall usability. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<h2>Acknowledgments</h2> - We thank Peter Palfrader, Geoff Goodell, Adam Shostack, Joseph Sokol-Margolis, - John Bashinski, and Zack Brown - for editing and comments; - Matej Pfajfar, Andrei Serjantov, Marc Rennhard for design discussions; - Bram Cohen for congestion control discussions; - Adam Back for suggesting telescoping circuits; and - Cathy Meadows for formal analysis of the <em>extend</em> protocol. - This work has been supported by ONR and DARPA. - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<h2>References</h2> - -<dl compact="compact"> -<font size="-1"></font> <dt><a href="#CITEeconymics" name="econymics">[1]</a></dt><dd> -A. 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IEEE - CS, May 2003.</dd> -</dl> - - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<hr /><h3>Footnotes:</h3> - -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="tthFtNtAAB"></a><a href="#tthFrefAAB"><sup>1</sup></a>Actually, the negotiated key is used to derive two - symmetric keys: one for each direction. -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="tthFtNtAAC"></a><a href="#tthFrefAAC"><sup>2</sup></a> - With 48 bits of digest per cell, the probability of an accidental -collision is far lower than the chance of hardware failure. -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="tthFtNtAAD"></a><a href="#tthFrefAAD"><sup>3</sup></a> -Rather than rely on an external infrastructure, the Onion Routing network -can run the lookup service itself. Our current implementation provides a -simple lookup system on the -directory servers. -<div class="p"><!----></div> -<a name="tthFtNtAAE"></a><a href="#tthFrefAAE"><sup>4</sup></a>Note that this fingerprinting -attack should not be confused with the much more complicated latency -attacks of [<a href="#back01" name="CITEback01">5</a>], which require a fingerprint of the latencies -of all circuits through the network, combined with those from the -network edges to the target user and the responder website. -<br /><br /><hr /><small>File translated from -T<sub><font size="-1">E</font></sub>X -by <a href="http://hutchinson.belmont.ma.us/tth/"> -T<sub><font size="-1">T</font></sub>H</a>, -version 3.59.<br />On 18 May 2004, 10:45.</small> -</body></html> - |