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Diffstat (limited to 'doc/design-paper/challenges.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/design-paper/challenges.tex | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex index c21bc5db4c..ceb77530c8 100644 --- a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex +++ b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ the literature. In particular, because we support interactive communications without impractically expensive padding, we fall prey to a variety of intra-network~\cite{back01,attack-tor-oak05,flow-correlation04} and -end-to-end~\cite{danezis-pet2004,SS03} anonymity-breaking attacks. +end-to-end~\cite{danezis:pet2004,SS03} anonymity-breaking attacks. Tor does not attempt to defend against a global observer. In general, an attacker who can measure both ends of a connection through the Tor network @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ Mixminion, where the threat model is based on mixing messages with each other, there's an arms race between end-to-end statistical attacks and counter-strategies~\cite{statistical-disclosure,minion-design,e2e-traffic,trickle02}. But for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end \emph{traffic -correlation} attacks~\cite{danezis-pet2004,defensive-dropping,SS03} +correlation} attacks~\cite{danezis:pet2004,defensive-dropping,SS03} allow an attacker who can observe both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume, quickly linking the initiator to her destination. @@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ routing problems. %overhead associated with directories, discovery, and so on. We can address these points by reducing the network's connectivity. -Danezis~\cite{danezis-pets03} considers +Danezis~\cite{danezis:pet2003} considers the anonymity implications of restricting routes on mix networks and recommends an approach based on expander graphs (where any subgraph is likely to have many neighbors). It is not immediately clear that this approach will |